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Abstract 
In the supranational system of the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
state's liability is defined in terms of positive obligations when human rights have to 
be actively protected. In addition to the traditional negative obligation of non-
interference, the state must also guarantee the enjoyment of human rights to all 
individuals within its jurisdiction. Individuals have to be actively protected against 
acts of interference from private parties and, where appropriate, to be assisted if 
they are not able to enjoy human rights due to their own circumstances of personal 
vulnerability. The liability of the states in terms of positive obligations induces a 
freestanding imperative of human rights that changes fundamentally the perception 
of the role of the state and the participatory ability of the individual, who can now 
assert her human rights in all circumstances in which they are relevant. In that 
regard, positive obligations herald the most advanced control of the state ever 
attempted in international law. 
Opening the scope of protection of human rights across the board 
necessitates corresponding adjustments in the functioning of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which can no longer rely on ad hoc balances of overall justice to 
sustain such an unprecedented extension of its business. 
The current study focuses on the technical expertise that is needed to 
establish the practical legitimacy of the apparently open-ended scope of positive 
obligations in view of the actual capabilities of the Convention's institution and those 
of the member states. Positive obligations are evaluated in relation to their potential 
to extend and further improve the protection of human rights in the wide range of 
circumstances in which the state authorities do not directly interfere. What is sought 
is a comprehensive methodological framework of critical stages and parameters 
through which the content of positive obligations can be determined. The emphasis 
is put on the quality of legal reasoning that guarantees certainty and predictability in 
the planning of the application and development of positive obligations. For this 
purpose, procedural safeguards are particularly stressed to ensure an objective 
application of law, as well as the necessary access for the participation of the 
individual in the implementation and enforcement of positive obligations at the 
domestic level. 
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1 
The Working Base 
A. What's Right and What's Wrong with Positive Obligations 
The discourse of the protection of human rights fifty-nine years after the signing of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter the Convention)^ is now 
placed within a normalised era of European history in which the state acts as their 
principal protector and guarantor. These are the times in which human rights are 
increasingly advertised in political manifestos and their established status is 
reflected in university study packages and job opportvmities both hnked to the 
growing supermarket of governmental, intergovernmental, international or non-
governmental human rights organisations.^ In this mainstream climate, the obvious 
and fundamental functions of the state, and by extension, of law, are re-discussed, 
rediscovered and restated in order to secure a normal starting point. As Phedon 
Vegleris recalled in the early 1970s, 
[i]t is also undeniable that the protection of the individual from attacks on his 
liberties by other private individuals constitutes one of the normal functions of 
the law, particularly civil and criminal law, and an essential task of the executive 
and judicial authorities. And it is a historical fact that this function of the law 
was in operation and had reached a certain degree of stability even before the 
rights of the individual vis-a-vis the State were proclaimed, or means of defence 
against agents acting on behalf of the State were instituted. 
' Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome, 4 November, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocol No. 11 and Protocol 
No. 14). 
^ Some tensions are currently observed with the franchising of non-governmental 
organisations. See, e.g., Moscou; branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Judgment of 5 October 
2006, no. 72881/01; Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Judgment 5 April 2007, no. 
18147/02. 'NGOs are no more elected than big corporations are, and substituting orthodox 
democratic politics with a world run by NGOs is therefore problematic.', foreword by Anthony 
Giddens, p.iii, in M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, H. Anheier (eds). Global Civil Society (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). For the business market of education including social sciences and human rights, 
see, generally, Global Education (Special Double Issue): 'The Race is On' Newsweek, 20-27 
August 2007. 
3 P. Vegleris, "Twenty Years" experience of the Convention and Future Prospects' in 
A H . Robertson (ed.), Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 1973): 341-412, 
382; From the same book, see also, J . De Meyer, 'The Rights to Respect for Private and Family 
Life, Home and Commimications in Relations Between Individuals, and the Resulting Obligations 
for States Parties to the Convention', pp. 255-275,273. 
Viewed from the neutral and normal point of a genuine democracy, human rights 
violations by the state are the exception rather than the rule, and therefore the time 
has come to reverse the perspective from which the human rights discourse is made, 
namely the cljissical liberal view of the state's non-interference (negative 
obligation).4 
In response to a new generation of hiunan rights claims pushed forward by a 
new generation of Europeans, who have been brought up free from the complexes of 
the past, the Convention has passed to its complete phase imder which entitlement 
to human rights means entitlement to enjoy himian rights, and not merely an 
entitlement to their non-violation by state agents. States are perceived as having 
'inherent' positive obligations to protect and guarantee human rights within their 
territory. The Convention imposes positive obligations on the state to actively 
protect the hirnian rights of individuals against acts of interference from other 
private parties. To the extent that it is the state, which has the sovereign power and 
ability to regulate all activities operating within its jurisdiction, its indirect 
responsibility can reasonably be raised when human rights are violated by private 
parties. 
Departing from the point that it is 'a historical fact' that the active protection of 
individuals from acts of interference of other individuals constitutes one of the 
normal and classic functions defining the state, s the subject matter of positive 
obUgations appears basic at a first glance. There are, however, important questions 
on important details. Moving from general to specific issues, it is asked whether 
protection exists in the particular context of private interactions or whether 
protection is effective through regulation and procedural safeguards. Of importance 
also, is the question of when human rights protection is provided and on whom the 
initiative of protection depends. If protection in a given context has been provided 
by the state, it pays to see the background/history of how protection of human rights 
was pressed by social forces and how long it took to acquire its the current legal 
status. 
4 G. Malinverni, 'Les Fonctions des Droits fondamentaxix dans la Jurisprudence de la 
Commission at la Cour Europeennes des Droits de 1' Homme' in W. Haller, A. Kolz, G. Miiller, D. 
Thiirer (eds), Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1989): 539-560 'In recent 
years, this concept appears to be insufficient, because of its purely negative character. Indeed, it 
does not allow fundamental rights to assume the function that is expected of them in a modem 
society. Therefore, to the traditional concept it is increasingly contrasted a constitutive concept of 
liberties.' (translation), p. 539. 
sVegleris, (note 3). 
By contrast, the uniqueness of positive obligations is that the active protection 
of human rights is demanded right now or should have already been provided for 
by the state's mechanism in circumstances in which there are known human rights 
issues. More importantly, the initiator of this demand is not the elected member of 
the Parhament, but the ordinary individual. In this account, positive obHgations 
impose real constitutional priorities on the state's business in the form of the active 
protection of human rights. Other means of asserting protection of human rights, 
such as street level pressure, collective actions, campaigns of civil society groups, 
lobbjdng work and modem institutionalised monitoring systems, remain usual and 
helpful avenues. But the emergence of the ordinary individual, the atomic imit, as 
the initiator of the constitutional claim (in legally binding terms) of the protection of 
human rights in contexts in which private individuals interact, has no precedent in 
the political history of humankind. 
To illustrate this point, we can look at those cases from the jurispmdence of 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the Court) in which states have been 
found in breach of their positive obligation to regulate and effectively implement 
health and safety standards for industrial activities, whose operation violated the 
human rights of some individuals.^ The message, therefore, is that an industrial 
activity (set up by private or public funds) must operate under health and safety 
standards. This issue, however, is basic, for the debate and campaign for sjifety 
standards in industrial sites is not new. Rather, the novelty of the message of 
positive obligations is the one single individual who is able to pursue her grievance 
within the system of the Convention and oblige a whole state, this most powerful 
and stmctured organisation, to prioritise its work and guarantee the protection of 
human rights in the various contexts in which private individuals interact. 
Positive obligations exist because the binding system of the Convention exists. 
Therefore, the participatory ability of the ordinary individual to initiate the 
constitutional claim exists only, because of the Convention. The current study covers 
the state of law on positive obligations, as has developed in the system of the 
European Convention of Human Rights until September 2009. Previous major 
studies on positive obUgations have covered the jurisprudence until the year of 
2002, but there have been many and important developments since that time. A 
number of these developments concern positive obligations in circumstances where 
* See, e.g., Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 19 February 1998, no. 14967/89; 
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, Judgment of 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99; Tatar v. Romania, 
Judgment of 27 January 2009, no. 67021/01 (available in French only). 
various individuals claim assistance from the state because they cannot enjoy human 
rights due to their own circumstances of personal vulnerability (physical and 
psychological condition). This is an important and considerable extension of the 
scope of positive obligations, and that of the Convention, which can only be 
explained by the fact that the ordinary individual has become increasingly aware of 
her participatory ability to initiate the constitutional claim of humein rights 
protection at the supranational level of the Convention. As generally speaking, the 
protection of himian rights is not only restricted to acts of interference, positive 
obligations are now debated and asserted across the board. 
However, the problem with positive obhgations is that their scope appears 
open-ended. As the study of the case-law will show, the Court does not set general 
conceptual Umitations for its intervention to review the manner by which human 
rights standards are safeguarded in private interactions, other than those linked to 
the conceptual scope of the Convention rights which are often described and 
interpreted in equally broad terms. In principle, positive obligations can be claimed 
everywhere, a fact that creates problems, as well as opportunities. Where positive 
obligations concern direct assistance to vulnerable individuals (i.e. an act of 
interference from a given source is absent), Umitations are considered in relation to 
the state's margin of appreciation, whose evaluation is not always clear. The list of 
problems with positive obligations is long, if one takes a close look at how they have 
developed in the jurisprudence. Often, problems do not exist separately, but come as 
result of a previous problem that arises in relation to a legal test or principle. In this 
regard, our study has to give due weight to the most important and preliminary 
questions. Problems may also arise from lack of focus on what is really at stake. 
The interests of this study lie in the wider eff^ ects of positive obligations, whose 
application in the system of the Convention produces two consecutive results. In 
particular, 
i ) Positive obligations secure the participatory position of the ordinary 
individual to initiate the constitutional question of the active protection of 
hvunan rights in all areas in which they are relevant (i.e. beyond direct 
interference by state actors), thereby changing fundamentally the structure 
of democratic governance. 
And as a consequence of the first result: 
2) They expand the intensity of review of the state's system at lengths not 
previotisly imagined or attempted by any national or international law 
institution, through the empowerment of their nationals who are now able, 
for the first time, to be personally engaged in a continuous vigilance and re-
discussion of the standards of human rights protection. 
It should be noted, however, that the open discussion on positive obligations is not 
made over the above-stated results. Europeeui judges are renowned for their low 
profile and cautiousness with states' sensitivities about the ever-decreasing national 
sovereignty that unavoidably restilts from the interaction of national legal systems 
with European human rights law. It is to their credit that they have always managed 
to sense carefully the international climate and the changing social dynamics in 
various comers of Europe before moving to modify steadily and progressively the 
intensity of their review on the states' legal system. There are nvimerous statements 
by the Coiut on the state's margin of appreciation and on the optional choice of the 
domestic incorporation of the Convention but, in reality, what is actually observed is 
a considerable expansion of positive obligations and numerous rulings against the 
states that we present and discuss in the following chapters. 
The whole debate on positive obligations over the last thirty years is being held 
in the neutral technical language of European htmian rights law. If the scope of 
positive obligations has to be curtailed or expanded, it has to be made in technical 
terms, because their wider effects are not openly stated so that there can be any 
meaningful elaboration or challenge. It is important, however, for the reader of this 
study to appreciate the significance of the issue with which we deal here from an 
early stage. 
The current study of positive obligations concentrates on the technical points of 
law, save for a brief discussion of the object and pvuTJOse of the Convention in a sub-
section of this introductory chapter. We have set two principal aims: first, to explain 
the content of positive obligations in accordance with their potential to extend and 
further improve the protection of human rights in a wide range of circumstances in 
which the state does not directly interfere; secondly, to transpose the content of 
positive obligations at the domestic level through procedural safeguards and 
institutional access for the pzuticipation of the ordinary individual so as to guarantee 
the implementation of protection and the continuous debate of human rights. 
The principal condition for achieving these aims regards thei practical 
realisation of positive obligations. The content of positive obligations tias to be 
sought over a scope of human rights protection that can realistically be handled at 
both national and supranational level so as to emerge as a pan-Europeam minimum 
standard. Accordingly, the challenge is that the open-ended scope of positive 
obligations, as has ambitiously been set by the Convention, has to be brought vmder 
a manageable level and be secured by a coherent methodological framework to 
provide certainty and predictability in the planning of the application and 
development of positive obligations. 
All aims and challenges discussed above are addressed in the rest of chapters, 
whose overview is detailed in the following section that sets out the route-map for 
the rest of study. 
B. Overview of Chapters 
The current study is interested in the real and practical results of positive obligations 
that can be achieved or reasonably expected by the articulation of a doctrine in 
technical terms. The system of the Convention produces such results and, therefore, 
our exclusive area of study is its jurispmdence that is related or connected to the 
development of positive obligations. 
Before moving to address the aims and challenges of this study in the following 
chapters, various essential starting points have to be secured as a working base in 
the introductory chapter. At first, it has to be noted that there has been a substantial 
body of jurispmdence on positive obligations in the last thirty years without a 
connection being made to any theoretical base. Of course, the Court responds to 
individual petitions and senses the changes in civil society dynamics across its 
jurisdiction so as to develop accordingly the state's positive obligations. 
There are, however, two reasons why we need some theoretical input: first, 
because in the volumes of European human rights law literature, positive obligations 
are usually ignored and scholarly commentary still debates the legitimacy of their 
subject matter or the conceptual hmits of the Covut's intervention in private 
relationships, we need to include discussion of the object and purpose of the 
Convention, the influential scholarly contributions preceding the first application of 
positive obligations in the late 1970s, an analysis of the early case-law on positive 
obligations, and the cvirrent national and intemational debate on the protection of 
human rights in private interactions. Secondly, a theoretical discussion provides 
useful backgroimd knowledge that can help explain the ever-increasing expansion of 
positive obligations in the Court's jurisprudence. 
However, in view of the fact that the jurisprudence on positive obligations has 
continuously progressed for the last thirty years through an internal development of 
various technical principles, rather than the subjectivity of theory, the theoretical 
discussion in this study cannot move beyond its introduction. It should also be noted 
that when there is a theoretical debate on the conceptual Umits of positive 
obligations, it is the practical issue of the reasonable management and control of 
positive obUgations (i.e. the technical legal issue) that prompts and ultimately 
justifies a given theoretical position. 
There are additional basic issues of context and subject matter that determine 
crucial perspectives and conceptual parameters about the scope and structure of the 
Convention rights, which have to be secured early in the study, as they affect 
considerably the technical discussion in the following chapters. 
This chapter provides also an analysis of the Court's internal debate on the 
manner and intensity of its review of the state's legal system, including the relevant 
key changes introduced by the new Protocol 14 that aim to improve the quality of the 
European judges' decisions and the management of the ever-growing caseload. From 
this ongoing debate, various trends and shifts in focus have emerged that reflect the 
current evaluation of the capabilities, objectives and function of the Court which 
guide the discussion of positive obhgations in subsequent chapters. 
Having covered the essential starting points for the study of positive 
obligations, we arrange the plan of chapters to cover the substantive content of 
positive obhgations in chapters 2 and 3, before moving, in chapter 4, to discuss the 
procedural framework that guarantees the implementation of positive obligations at 
the domestic level. 
Chapter 2 covers the application and development of positive obUgations in the 
system of the Convention. Positive obligations are determined through a coherent 
framework that accords due weight to contextual differences. With reference to the 
Court's internal debate, the chapter rehes on current case-law developments to 
assert the distinctiveness of positive obligations which estabUshes their potential 
and guides accordingly the determination of their content. The critical condition, 
against which the state's international Uability can be engaged when human rights 
are violated by non-state actors, is identified and placed at the centre of the 
proposed fi-amework. Since the question of international Uability arises first, the 
content of positive obligations, at whichever stage and level is examined, is 
determined in conformity with the conditions engaging the state's liability under the 
Convention. 
The more detailed discussion of positive obligations is sub-divided according to 
the nature and structure of the Convention rights and the practical limitations of the 
cost of human rights protection. Critical conditions and parameters that affect the 
judicial examination are addressed in order of their respective importance. The 
length of this chapter exceeds that of any other chapter due to the large number of 
critical details that all have to be identified and be known before determining 
positive obligations in the wide range of circumstances in which human rights can be 
threatened in private interactions. 
Chapter 3 continues the discussion on the substantive content of positive 
obligations that extends to the protection of vulnerable individuals who cannot enjoy 
human rights due to their own personal (psychological and physical) condition. 
Before a content of positive obligations can be described, Umits of legitimacy and 
practicahty of protection are identified. The chapter recognises (the possibility of) 
positive obligations through well-defined limits, given that protection of human 
rights is claimed in the very wide range of circumstances in which the causal element 
of a prior interference from a private or public actor is absent. Limits that relate to 
the scope of the Convention rights have already been introduced and discussed in 
the preceding chapters, as they concern basic and preliminary questions of the 
content of positive obhgations whose application transcends context. Their 
discussion in this chapter is particularly valuable for the whole thesis of this study 
that aims to establish a meinageable scope of positive obligations through a 
methodological framework of critical principles and parameters and procedural 
guarantees. In that regeird, the content of positive obhgations is not only examined 
as a personal form of protection but as the very framework though which any given 
content of protection can be asserted and finally emerge. 
Chapter 4 completes the study by addressing the question of the domestic 
implementation of the substantive content of positive obligations that is covered in 
the previous chapters. It discusses procedural rights and legal principles by which 
the Court reviews procedural safeguards and structures that are crucial for the 
enforcement of positive obUgations in the state's legal order. The analysis of the 
procedural framework extends to the procedural aspects of the substantive content 
of positive obligations (as is discussed in previous chapters) that targets both the 
duties of private parties who directly cause the human rights violation and those of 
pubhc officials in discharging the state's positive obligations in relation to the acts of 
the former. Procedtiral Scifeguards are marked as access points for the participation 
of the ordinary individual in the implementation and enforcement of the substantive 
content of positive obligations at the domestic level. The underlying aim is to 
manage positive obligations at the European level through an intensified review of 
the domestic procedural infrastructure in the critical stages (and sub-stages) of the 
decision-making process of the pubUc administration. 
C. Basic Issues of Context and Subject Matter 
I. The Distinctiveness of IHuman Rights 
Stating the most basic point, the protective role of the state is examined over 'human 
rights'. The frademark term 'human rights' that is recognisable universally has been 
launched with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in 1948.7 Closely connected to human rights are the so-called 
fundamental freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression), which have both an individual 
and collective/political dimension. Being mutually inclusive, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms form one interconnected whole, with the term human rights 
encompassing fundamental freedoms. Also, under the strict liberal imderstanding, 
the rights of individuals are freedoms from acts of interference and, therefore, 
human rights can be seen as synonymous to fundamental freedoms. However, the 
use of the term rights instead of freedoms has a great significance, in that the rights 
term connotes a natural law imperative that induces an open-ended negotiation of 
the relationship between the state and the individual citizen, as well as the full and 
continuous arrangement of constitutional balances of rights and freedoms between 
the citizens themselves. This position is further influenced by the concurring 
existence of international law that aims at the rights of everyone in order to 
prescribe imiversal values, rather than to simply preserve the state of citizens and 
their individual interests, for which purpose human rights had originally developed 
and accordingly declared. In this connection, human rights gradually emerge, in 
addition or otherwise, as a special and distinguishable category of rights that revolve 
7 For a detailed analysis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see P. Drost, Human 
Rights as Legal Rights: The Realization of Individual Human Rights in Positive International 
Law, (2°^ ed. A.W. Sijthoff, 1965). The membership of the United Nations has expanded since its 
foimdation in 1945, with Switzerland becoming the igo"" member and, thus, a member of the 
General Assembly in 2002. NB: Switzerland is the country in which most of the United Nations 
institutions have been based up to now. 
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around intrinsic elements of one's personhood to define indispensable 
anthropocentric values of universal standing. 
Other altemative or concurring terminology exists, such as 'fundamental rights' 
which is more expansive and does not automatically reveal the exact nature of the 
rights referred to. 8 Examples from the wording used in national constitutions 
include: Droits de rHomme et du Citoyen (the Rights of Man and of the Citizen); 
Grundrechte /Grondrechten (Basic Rights); Human Rights Act; ATOHIKCI Kai 
KoivcoviKa AiKaiciiiaxa (Individual and Social Rights); Diritti e Doveri dei Cittadini 
(Rights and Duties of Citizens); Drepturile, libertafile §i indatoririle fundamentale 
(Fundamental rights. Liberties, and Duties); Temel Haklar ve Odevler /Direitos e 
Deveres Fundamentales /De los Derechos y Derebes Fundamentales (Fundamental 
Rights and Duties); OCHOBHU JJpaea u 3a&bJi3KeHWi na rpaxdaHume 
(Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens). 
However, it is not the label, which is given to a category or set of rights that is 
important, but rather their nature and exact content. For the purposes of the current 
study, which is exclusively made on the European Convention, human rights include 
fundamental ft-eedoms which apply to every individual (citizens and non-citizens, 
including those fi-om non-member states) within its territorial jurisdiction.? The 
content of human rights and fundamental freedoms that are covered in this study 
are those of Section I that lists the so-called substantive rights of the Convention. 
Further rights of concurring or supplementary nature have been added to its text, 
such as the proprietary right under Article i of Protocol i . However, despite being 
undeniably important, this right can be compromised relatively easily by way of 
monetary compensation due to the wide discretion accorded to the state to pursue 
general socio-economic policies.'° Thus, different evaluative standards require 
separate studies. 
8 See, e.g., Article 30: 'Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal', Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (Official Journal of the European Communities, 
18.12.2000, C 364/3). 
9 In some circumstances, the states are also accountable for extraterritorial violations, see, 
e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 March 1995, no. 15318/89; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 22 December 2005, no. 46347/99; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 
Admissibility decision of 30 June 2009, no. 61498/08. See further B. Simpson, Human Rights 
and the End of the Empire (Oxford University Press, 2001); S. Helaoui, 'Respecting Human 
Rights Abroad? On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights' (Mphil, University of Lund 2005). 
»° See, e.g., James and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1986, no. 
8793/79, 'The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature 
in implementing social and economic poHcies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature's 
judgment as to what is "in . the public interest" unless that judgment be manifestly without 
reasonable foundation.', para; 46; Association of General Practitioners v. Denmark, Admissibility 
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II. International Responsibility and the General Scope of Human 
Rights Protection 
The scope of himian rights protection, against which the international Uability of the 
contracting state is arranged, is generally found in the tide of the Convention and its 
first provision (Article i ) . Both the title and the first Article are worded in broad 
terms allowing the Court to self-assert its autonomy and interpret the Convention as 
a 'living instrument'." 
Article 1 
The first Article is cited immediately before Section I and sets out the terms of the 
state's international responsibility as follows: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to eveiyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention./Les Hautes 
Parties contractantes reconnaissent a toute personne relevant de leur juridiction 
les droits et liberies definis au titre I de la presente Convention, 
Although both the English and the French text are official, it is widely accepted that 
it is the English version of 'shall secure' rather than the lighter wording of 
'reconnaissent' (recognise) that expresses the real scope and potential of the 
Convention.i2 The Court had the opportunity in an early case to clarify that 
Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more 
than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over 
and above a network of mutual, bilateral imdertaMngs, objective obUgations 
which, in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a "collective 
enforcement"...By substituting the words "shah secure" for the words 
"imdertake to secure" in the text of Article i (art. i) , the drafters of the 
Convention also intended to make it clear that the rights and freedoms set out in 
Section I would be directly secured to anyone within the jiuisdiction of the 
Contracting States (document H (61) 4, pp. 664, 703, 733 and 927)...The 
Convention does not merely obUge the higher authorities of the Contracting 
States to respect for their own part the rights and freedoms it embodies; as is 
shown by Article 14 (art. 14) and the Enghsh text of Article 1 (art. 1) ("shall 
secure"), the Convention also has the consequence that, in order to secure the 
decision 12 July 1989, no. 12947/87; Andersson and Others v. Sweden, Admissibility decision of 7 
January 1991, no. 14083/88; The Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece, Judgment of 23 
November 2000, no. 25701/94, para. 87; John and Others v. Germany, Judgment 30 June 2002, 
46720/99,72203/01 and 72552/01, para. 91; Walker v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of August 
2006, no. 37212/02, para. 33; Poznanski and Others v. Germany, Admissibility decision of 3 July 
2007, no. 25101/05. 
" Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 April 1978, no. 5856/72, para. 31; Pretty v. 
the United Kingdom, Judgment of 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, para. 54. 
« De Meyer, (note 3), p. 259. 
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enjoyment of those rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or 
remedy any breach at subordinate levels.« 
Title 
The title of the Convention reads as 'Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms'/'Convention de Sauvegarde des Droits de 1' Homme et 
des Libertes Fondamentales'. From this, one can discern the general nature of the 
Convention provisions, as well as the general purpose, namely their 'protection' 
('sauvegarde'). 
The title of the Convention is also convenientiy referred to as the 'European 
Convention of Human Rights' (La Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme), 
with fundamental freedoms being implied in these short titles. It shouJd be noted 
that unlike the French short title that remains unchanged wherever and whenever is 
used, the English version is also encountered as 'the European Convention on 
Human Rights'. The difference between a Convention 'of human rights, as opposed 
to a Convention 'on' human rights is nothing but fundamental. The former 
recognises its preponderant status close to the one and only document, while the 
latter version suggests a Convention on something among other things. In addition, 
as Pieter Drost has early explained 
A clear distinction must be made between treaties o/human rights and treaties 
on human rights. The first category creates individual rights; the second creates 
merely governmental obligations. If the international legal order has the 
essential function to afford protection against the state, ar^ d to guarantee the 
individual assistance by the state, it is necessary to create individual human 
rights under international law.n 
III. The Nature and Structure of the Convention Rights: The Centrallty 
of Private Life/Personality as a Core Value 
Section I of the Convention contains the substantive rights against which the state's 
international liability arises. The nature and structure of these rights can first be 
seen by a literal reading of their respective provisions, i.e. Article 2: the right to life; 
Article 3: prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, etc. At a basic 
level, the Convention is studied on an Article-by-Article basis, as reflected in the 
applicants' claims and Court's decisions. There are, however, broader issues of 
«Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 239. See 
also the quotation of Article 1 in the French translation of that judgment: 'Les Hautes Parties 
Contractantes reconnaissent - en anglais - "shall secure" - a toute personne (...) Convention.', 
para. 236. Both versions of Article 1 have been quoted in the previous page above. 
•4 Drost, (note 7), p. 174. 
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human rights protection in the wider context to which the apphcant's circumstances 
often relate and which require accordingly a broader approach. To this aim, it is 
important to note that the Convention is not simply a collection of various hvmian 
rights interests, but constitutes an integrated whole. As the Court constantly 
reiterates '[t]he Convention must also be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a 
way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions.' 
In this respect, due attention has to be paid to the first component of Article 8 
that guarantees respect for 'private hfe', a term whose broadness accounts by far for 
the most positive obligations claims.'^ The concept of private life has long been 
connected to the development of one's personality, an interpretation that 
satisfactorily encapsulates the ultimate core of a person's existence.It has been 
made clear since the early jurisprudence of the former European Commission of 
Human Rights (hereinafter the Commission)!^ that 
For numerous anglo-saxon and French authors the right to respect "private life" 
is the right to privacy, the right to live, as far one wishes, protected from 
publicity...(§) In the opinion of the Conunission, however, the right to respect 
for private Ufe does not end here. It comprises also, to a certain degree, the right 
to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, especially in 
the emotional field for the development and fulfilment of one's own 
personality.'? 
's Stec and Others v. tke\ United Kingdom, Applicability decision of 6 July 2005, no. 
65731/01, 65900/01, para 48. See also Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 
Judgment of 7 December 1976, no. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72, paras. 52 and 54; Klass and 
Others v. Germany, Judgment of 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71, para. 68; Soering v. the United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88, para. 103; Kudla v. Poland, Judgment of 26 
October 2000, no. 30210/96, para. 152. 
'6 L. Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights in Action (2004) 21RLR. 83-92 'In a 
dynamic instrument, Article 8 has proved to be the most elastic provision.', p. 84. 
'7 This approach has been influenced by the German constitutional provision of Article 2 of 
the Basic Rights iGrundrechte) of 1949: 'Everybody has the right to the free development of his 
personality, as long as he does not violate the rights of others and does not contravene the 
constitutional order or moral laws.' For analysis of early case-law, see Duffy, 'The Protection of 
Privacy, Family Life and Other Rights imder Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights' (1982) 2 YbkEL 191-238, pp, 191,194,224; L. Loucaides, Essays on the Developing Law of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 'Chapter 4: Personality and Privacy under the 
European Convention on Human Rights', pp. 83-107. 
'8 Under the provisions of Protocol 11, the European Commission and the European Court on 
Human Rights joined together in a single body, the European Court of Human Rights, in 1999. 
V. Iceland, Admissibility decision of 18 May 1976, no. 6825/74, p. 87, as quoted by 
Loucaides, (note 17), p. 87 who explains also that 'from the first years of application of the 
Convention [its organs] have felt the need to protect the right to privacy on the basis of the 
requirements of personality.' (citing an admissibility decision of 1969, no. 2929/66), pp. 99-100, 
see also pp. 86-7 with footnote 11. For earlier case-law, see Bruggeman and Scheuten v. 
Germany, Admissibility decision of 19 May 1976, no. 6959/75, para 57; McFeeley and Others v. 
the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 15 May 1980, no. 8317/78. See, recently, 
Taliadorou and Stylianou v. Cyprus, Judgment of 16 October 2008, nos. 39627/05 and 
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Under this clarification, the scope of Article 8 targets the necessary conditions that 
allow the individual to develop her personality, or put in negative terms (perhaps 
more accurately), those critical conditions without which the personality of an 
individual cannot develop. Such conditions have been recognised in Article 8 
case-law as including the 'ph)^ical and psychological integrity' of a person and the 
possibility to 'develop relationships with other human beings'. To the extent that 
these specific interests are vital to the development of one's personality, they are 
valued in their own right, something that is also confirmed by the fact that in some 
judgments direct reference to the more general and unifying core value of 
personality is often omitted.^o 
The generous interpretation of private life as the development of one's 
personality does not only succeed in specifying an otherwise open-ended term, but 
also, more importantly, interconnects all human rights around a central concept 
through which the long professed holistic reading of the Convention provisions can 
be achieved. As Commissioner Loukis Loucaides (as he was then) has noted in 
analysing earlier Article 8 jurisprudence 
[t]he personalised inclination of the system [of the Convention] is indicated by 
the particular human rights which are expressly recognised and protected and 
which constitute aspects of personality of the individual in a democratic and 
plurahstic society (the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence, freedom of thought, of expression and of association, the right 
to education, the right to marry, etc.). 
In that connection, the hohstic reading of the Convention concerns in essence a 
central protected interest (i.e. personality) around which various degrees of severity 
39631/05, paras. 52-4; Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, Judgment of 15 January 2009, no. 
1234/05, paras. 39,40; Bigaeva v. Greece, Judgment of 28 May 2009, no. 26713/05, para. 23. 
2° See, e.g., Niemietz v. Germany, Judgment of 16 December 1992, no. 13710/88, para. 28; 
Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87. It is further 
explained in Botta v. Italy, Judgment of 24 February 1998, no. 21439/93, that 'Private life, in the 
Court's view, includes a person's physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by 
Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings', para. 
32 (cited case omitted). 
2> Loucaides, (note 17), p. 85. It should also be stressed that freedom from expression and of 
association, as guaranteed by Articles 10-11 have a personal dimension in addition to their 
collective value for a democratic society. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, 
no. 9815/82, 'the Court has to recall that freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of 
Article 10 (art. 10-1), constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one 
of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual's self-fulfilment.' para. 41; Steel and 
Morris v. ihe United Kingdom, Judgment 15 February 2005, no. 68416/01, para. 101; Dlugolecki 
V. Poland, Judgment of 24 February 2009, no. 23806/03. See also Molka v. Poland, Admissibility 
decision of 11 April 2006, no. 56550/00, discussed in chapter 3. 
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and contextual applications are specified in the remaining rights whose exact scope 
is fixed in the Court's jurisprudence." 
Where contextual applications are concerned, such as the right to marry, 
preference is given to the lex specialis (Article 12) due to the degree of specificity 
entailed in the express provision.^s A Unk to the central protected interest of one's 
private life/personality, through a reference or a parallel examination of the lex 
I 
generalis (Article 8) will always be useful for a better appreciation of the 
interconnection and holistic reading of the Convention provisions.24 
IV. The Object and Purpose of the Convention 
It is important at this early stage of the study to acquire an understanding of the 
political significance of positive obligations that places the question of their 
legitimacy and far-reaching scope within the object and purpose of the Convention. 
The European Convention of Human Rights is first and foremost a peace 
project. It was founded as a regional international institution following the setting 
up of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 
aftermath of World War Two (WW2), an event that is remembered as the most 
catastrophic war in human history for the unprecedented number of casualties and 
the sickness and perversity of the atrocities committed. Within the geopolitical area 
of the Council of Europe, the Convention serves as an international forum for a 
peaceful adjudication of differences between its member states on issues having 
human rights implications.^'s The standing of the Convention as an international 
adjudicator has boldly been affirmed in cases concerning the preservation and actual 
enjoyment of property (including physical access) of individuals who have forcedly 
been displaced following a military operation. 
See, e.g., Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom; Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95. 
23 P. Duffy, (note 17). 
^ See, e.g. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 May 
1985, nos. 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81; Goodwin v. the United Kingdom. 
=5 Since it was set up in 1959, the Court has delivered judgment in three inter-state cases: 
Ireland v. the United Kingdom; Denmark v. Turkey, Judgment of 5 April 2000, no. 34382/97; 
Cyprus V. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, no. 25781/94. At the time of the recent application 
of Georgia v. Russia, lodged with the Registry on 26 March 2007, a further 17 inter-state 
applications were dealt with by the former European Commission of Human Rights. 
^ Loizidou V. Turkey; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey; Demades v. Turkey, Judgment of 31 July 
2003, no. 16219/90; Epiphaniou and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 22 September 2009, no. 
19900/92. The dissenting opinion of the French judge Pettiti in the Loizidou case has to be cited if 
only to show different visions about the role of the Court in international affairs and peace: 'The 
movement of displaced persons from one zone to another, an exodus which affected both 
communities, was the consequence of Internationa] events for which responsibility cannot be 
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However, the Convention's plan to advance the objective of peace goes beyond 
the international adjudication of human rights issues between the contracting states. 
As is clear from the preamble of the treaty, peace is the categorical and ultimate 
objective that has to be achieved through the intermediate objectives of democracy, 
human rights (and fundamental freedoms) and the rule of law. All these objectives 
are indispensable in guaranteeing a soUd institutionalised framework at ithe 
domestic level capable of inducing a civilised and advanced political culture. In other 
words, the Convention aims at the foundations of peace by creating a European 
culture that has a sweeping effect on whole generations of people, rather than 
serving as a mere adjudicator of human rights complaints after peace has been 
broken. Every single complaint brought by an individual residing within one of the 
contracting states is an opportunity to advance and continuously maintain the 
political culture of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Every victory won 
at the individual level is a victory towards an advanced civilised culture and, by 
extension, a victory towards peace. 
The realisation of the core intermediate objectives of the Convention 
presupposes an additional intermediate objective, which is the Convention itself. 
This fundamental assertion is highlighted as follows: 
European Human Rights law 
Democracy/Human Rights/Rule of Law 
Peace 
The Convention has first to estabUsh a supranational system that sets itself over and 
above national sovereignty. It produces European human rights law that constitutes 
an independent and supreme European public order. Such a system requires three 
main characteristics: 
ascribed on the basis of the facts of the Loizidou case but has to be sought in the sphere of 
international relations.' 
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1. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are binding.''^ The Court is 
able to order an award of just satisfaction under Article 41 and ask for action on the 
part of the respondent state where there is a continuing effect of human rights 
violation in the applicant's circiunstances.^s The Committee of Ministers supervises 
the state's compliance and intensifies its monitoring over repetitive cases concerning 
similar hiunan rights complaints against the same state. =^9 
2. The state shall secure the Convention rights to 'everyone', as expressly stated in 
Article 1 or implied and stated in paragraph 1 of other Articles ('everyone has the 
right to...', or 'no one shall be...').3o 
3. Individual Petition to the European Court is secured imder Article 34 (ex Art. 25), 
which has become obligatory since 1987,31 This right is complemented by 
corresponding rights of access to a human right claim under both admissibility 
criteria (Article 35.1) and procedural obligations for a domestic remedy (Article 
13).32 
These three characteristics of the Convention are closely interdependent and have a 
combining effect that comes down to one reality (the current living experience) that 
European hirnian rights law exists as an independent and supreme source of power 
that develops by the initiative of the ordinary individual. Therefore, the agenda for 
the development of European human rights law and, by extension, any advances 
27 Loucaides, (note 17) 'The provisions of the European Convention in contrast with those of 
the Universal Declaration, are legally binding and may be enforced through the judicial organs of 
the Convention.', p. 4. 
28 Fadeyeva v. Russia, Judgment of 9 June 2005, no. 55723/00. 
29 Broniowski v. Poland, Judgment 22 June 2004, no. 31443/96. Cf. Wolkenberg and 
Others v. Poland, Admissibility decision of 4 December 2007, no. 50003/99. 
30 Austria v. Italy, Admissibility decision of 11 January 1961, no. 788/60. 
3^  Before 1987, individual petition was available to those states that had opted it, e.g. the 
United Kingdom in the 1960s, France and Turkey in the 1980s. 
32 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens & Sons, 1964) 'this 
Convention signifies a revolutionary advance in the legal position of the individual. The right of an 
individual to bring complaints, culminating in the compulsory jurisdiction by a supra-national 
court, against violations of his rights by the state of his own nationality, is a derogation from the 
principle of absolute state sovereignty with regard to nationals,' p. 244. K. Boyle and H. Hannum, 
'Individual Applications under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Concept of 
Administrative Practice: the Donnelly Case' (1974) 68 AJIL 440-453 'The most distinctive feature 
of the European Convention on Human Rights is the optional procediu-e under [ex] Article 25', p. 
440. P. Drost, 7726 Crime of State: Penal Protection for Fundamental Freedoms of Persons and 
Peoples (A.W. Sijthoff, 1959) 'Human rights and fundamental freedoms, whether they are 
ordained in national constitutions or proclaimed in international conventions, in so far as they 
relate to norms of action and forms of organization of the state and do not confer rights and 
remedies to the private person at law, belong to the province of politics and economics more than 
to the department of law. [§] Constitutions and treaties often are not much more than empty 
words and printed paper. Words are usually plentiful and paper always patient', p. 82. 
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needed in the current human rights standards, are informed and pursued directly by 
the ordinary individual.33 It is within this context that the additional objective of 
'greater unity' between member states, as is also mentioned in the Convention's 
preamble, can best be appreciated. Unity is the result of the combining effort of 
European individuals who through their own initiative and persistence advance 
European hvmian rights law. Any given case that is pursued at the European level 
can have an effect on three levels: a) the applicant's circumstances, b) the 
respondent state's legal system and c) that of other member states falling short of 
the European standards (as they are exposed to similar complaints before the 
Court). Accordingly, the interrelation of the intermediate objectives that have to be 
secured in priority in order to safeguard the final objective of peace can be described 
as follows: 
Individual Petition 
European Human Rights law 
Unity 
a 
Democracy/Human Rights/Rule of Law 
Ppnr.p. 
It should be noted that in no period in the history of humankind the ordinary 
individual could exercise such a direct and personal pressure through a normal 
institutional framework to influence important constitutional issues at both national 
and international level. The emergence of the ordinary individual as an active 
international player in the shaping of the political culture is an overwhelming and 
unprecedented experience. It is this experience that explains the advanced and very 
33 X. Po^ctKri? (Ch. Rozakis) (current vice-president of the Court), H npoaraaia TCOV 
AvdpcdnWwv AacaicjfidTav ae iiia MeraPa^Mfievri Evpdim] (Avr.N. SdicKouXa, 1994). L. 
Wildhaber (former president of the Court), 'A Constitutional Future for the European Court of 
Human Rights?' (2002) 23(5-7) HRLJ 161-165 'the mechanism of individual applications is to be 
seen as the means by which defects in national protection of human rights are detected with a 
view to correcting them and thus raising the general standard of protection of human rights.', p. 
162. 
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advanced kind of human rights claims that are brought before the Court on the 
state's positive obhgations. In that connection, positive obligations reflect the 
Court's response to social forces, as expressed in individual petitions, in redirecting 
the Convention as a 'living instrument' accordingly. 
In turn, positive obligations acquire their own significance within the 
Convention's interconnected aims, whose structure begins and ends vrith the 
participation of the individual and the preservation of peace, respectively. As 
positive obligations concern the active protection of human rights in circumstances 
in which the state does not directly interfere, the participatory ability of the ordinary 
individual now extends to all areas in which human rights can be relevant, thereby 
signalling the most advanced review of the state's business ever attempted in 
international law. Therefore, when the legitimacy or the conceptual limits of positive 
obligations are discussed, it is important to have in mind the opportimities for the 
ordinary individual and, by extension, for international peace that have resulted 
from the development and application of positive obligations within the system of 
the Convention. 
D. The Doctrinal Justification of Positive Obligations 
I. Early Studies 
In this sub-section we give a brief accovmt of influential writings that heralded the 
application of positive obligations in the Court's jurisprudence in the late 1970s. The 
argumentation developed prior to that period exhibits the origins of the debate and 
help us understand that the core base of the current, more expanded scope of 
positive obligations has been and still remains the active protection of human rights 
from acts of interference of private parties. This is also an opportunity to pay 
homage to the scholarly debate of the 1960s and 1970s that took place at both 
national and international level and which cannot possibly be exhausted here. For 
our purposes, we need only to present key points of justification of positive 
obligations from the ground already covered in previous commentary, and move on. 
Some of the most important writings tackling the issue of human rights 
violations by private parties are contained in a book of individual articles entitled 
'Privacy and Human Rights'. In his contribution '"Twenty Years" Experience of the 
Convention and Future Prospects' Phedon Vegleris has pointed out that 
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The only qualitative difference between private infringements of this kind [on 
human rights] and those which may be perpetrated by pubUc authorities is that 
the private individual, unless he manages to estabhsh a de facto government, 
can never legally remove or impair any of these rights or freedoms, either 
generally or individuaUy.34 
This explanation affirms the basic point that when hiunan rights are violated by 
non-state actors, these rights have still a binding effect, and hence they are legally 
actionable. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the state to regiUate private conduct 
and duly enforce the regulated standards. In this regard, the sovereign state 
becomes accountable for acts of interference of private parties.ss 
It is worth noting that some of these contributions were written by self-exiled 
scholars in a Europe cheiracterised by commimist regimes in the East and 
dictatorships in the South. In such a bleak political climate, the protection of human 
rights against private actors was dynamically campaigned. 
Beyond general justifications, it is pertinent to establish that the Convention 
has the necessary internal resources to channel legitimately, as well as effectively the 
responsibility of the state within its supranational system. In the same book of 
articles, Jan De Meyer has argued that the protection of human rights from private 
interference should be organised by holding the state indirectly responsible. In 
particular, he wrote that 
without the text of the Convention having to be amended or a new protocol 
drafted, violation by private individuals of the rights protected by the 
Convention can be sanctioned indirectly, under the existing text, by the organs 
responsible for ensuring that the Convention is respected by the contracting 
States, if the responsibility of such a State is involved. Such a case could arise if 
a State had failed in its duty to provide due protection and, in particular, had 
failed to take care the necessary steps to prevent or punish the offence or ensure 
effective redress for the victim, for where the State's responsibility is involved in 
this way it follows that it is the State itself which has infringed the rights 
protected.36 
34 Vegleris, (note 3), p. 382. 
35 M-A Eissen, 'La Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme et les Obligations de 1' 
Individu: une Mise a Jour' in Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber Rene Cassin III: Protection des 
Droits de V Homme dans les Rapports Entre Personnes Privees (Pedone, 1971): 151-162 'How 
does a private individual encroach on the rights of another if the state does not authorise the 
individual's acts in the name of a private interest, which is both legitimate and sufficiently 
important?' (translation), p. 156. Malinvemi, (note 4), '...the Strasbourg organs have deducted 
from the Convention the obligation of the member states to make sure that the rights and liberties 
of the Convention cannot be prejudiced in any circumstance, irrespectively of whether the 
interference, which can be attributed to the State, originates from the State itself or a private 
individual or even from a state agent, which authorises or tolerates that act...If a violation of a 
fundamental right is caused by an act of a private individual, it is not him who should be 
responsible, but the State.' (translation), p. 559. • 
36 De Meyer, (note 3), p.273. 
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The author based his position on the express wording of the Convention rights and 
the background information of the drafting history. In particular, he explained that 
the state's indirect responsibility for human rights violations by private parties is 
deducted from the express wording of the following provisions: 
- Article i : To secure the Convention rights to everyone. 
- Article 13: To guarantee an effective remedy notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.37 
- Article 17: To prohibit abuse of the Convention rights by any state, group or 
person engaged in any activity.38 
- The terms 'Everyone has the right' in Articles 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9,10,11,13 or 'no 
one shall' in Articles 3,4.39 
Any of these provisions, taken alone or in combination, suffices to establish positive 
obligations as 'inherent' into the system of the Convention. 
In addition, De Meyer cites the drafting history of Article 8 from the travaux 
preparatoires to remind that a proposal to include 'the right to freedom from 
governmental interference' in the first paragraph of Article 8 was removed by the 
37 See also P. Mertens, Le Droit de Recours Effectif devant les Instances Nationales en cas 
de Violation d'un Droit de I'Homme (Editions de TUniversite de Bruxelles, 1973): no "The status 
of the actor of the violation is indifferent.' ('chapter HI, section III : L'article 13 de la Convention 
de sauvegarde et la responsabilite de la puissance publique'), and for analysis of earlier case-law 
see, pp. 111-141. The author quotes Henri Rolin at pp. 105-6 'It appears that from the moment that 
the states are under an obligation to ensure the protection of individuals against any violation, 
including those emanating from a state agent, it means that this protection is to prevent or 
sanction violations committed by parties other than State officials or agents, namely, by private 
individuals. It follows, therefore, that as far as they are concerned, there is also an obligation [for 
the State]. The State that ratifies the Convention links also its nationals, namely all individuals 
who reside in its territory' (translation), from the book of articles entitled La Protection 
Internationale des Droits de I'Homme dans la Cadre Europeen (Dalloz, 1961): 410. 
38 See also J . Rivero, 'La Protection des Droits de 1' Homme dans les Rapports enfre 
Personnes Privees' in.Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber Rene Cassin III: Protection des Droits 
de I'Homme dans les Rapports Entre Personnes Privees (Pedone, 1971): 311-322, 318. De Meyer, 
(note 3), p. 261. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), Article 4: 'Liberty 
consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the 
natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the 
society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law.' 
39 De Meyer, (note 3), p. 260, see also p. 162 and p. 275 The Council of Europe Consultative 
Assembly has since been moving unmistakably towards a progressive interpretation of Article 8 ; 
this is revealed especially clearly in its resolution of 23 January 1970, where it states explicitly that 
the "right to privacy aiforded by Article 8 of the Convention ...should not only protect an 
individual against interference by public authorities, but also against interference by private 
persons or institutions, including the mass media". 
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drafting Conference. 40 Although the drafting papers do not influence the 
interpretation of the Convention, which has long been treated by its Court as a 'living 
instrument', 4' they show nevertheless that even in those very early years the 
Convention was not meant to exclude protection of human rights from private 
interference. 
The influence of these writings on the application of positive obligations in the 
Court's jurisprudence can be seen in the connection between the above-mentioned 
book of articles submitted for an international conference in Brussels, the first case 
on positive obligations against Belgium (i.e. Marckx v. Belgium) and the express 
reference to one of the articles from that book by the lawyer representing Paula 
Marckx in the homonjonous case.42 It should also be noted that learned scholars and 
lawyers are often nominated by the states as judges or for other influential posts in 
the Convention's institution (e.g. Jan De Meyer, Torkel Opsahl, Marc-Andre Eissen). 
This final note adds nothing to the internal legitimacy of positive obligations but 
highlights the trading and streamline of thoughts and the human factor involved in 
the development of institutions.43 
II. The First Positive Obligations Cases 
The application of positive obligations in the Court's jurisprudence begins with the 
judgments in the cases of Marckx and AiVey in 1979. In both these cases, the Court's 
ruling should be considered quite ahead of its time, even by current standards, in 
that the issue of human rights protection against acts of interference ft-om private 
actors was either not relevant (as in Marcfcx) or did not concern the general question 
of state's indirect responsibility as such (as in^iVey). 
J . De Meyer, (note 3), p. 264. For discussion of earlier case-law, see Malinvemi, (note 4), 
P- 555-
41 See case-law cited in note 11 above. 
42 The applicant cites at p.iso of the Marckx v. Belgium, Admissibility decision of 29 
September 1975, no. 6833/74 the article of T. Opsahl, 'The Convention and the Right to Respect 
for Family Life Particularly as Regards the Unity of the Family and the Protection of the Rights of 
Parents and Guardians in the Education of Children' in A.H. Robertson (ed). Privacy and Human 
Rights (Reports and Communications Presented at the Third International Colloquy about the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Organised by the Belgian Universities and the Council of 
Europe, with the support of the Belgian Government: Brussels, 30 September - 3 October 1970), 
(Manchester University Press, 1973): 255-275. 
43 With reference to the previous note, see also the argument of commissioner Opsahl before 
the Court in Airey v. Ireland, Judgment of 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73: 'I do not think that this 
Court would accept any description of the European Convention as one containing essentially 
"negative" rights or endorse the out-dated laissez-faire concept of human rights which would find 
anything in order so long as there was no interference by a public authority in the particular 
situation.', Cour/Misc.(79)i9 (the Court's verbatim record), p.22. 
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However, as already noted, in spite of the current expanded scope of positive 
obligations, their core base has been and still is the active protection of human rights 
from acts of interference of private parties, whose causal relation to the violation 
complained of requires an effective response from the state (see detailed discussion 
in the following chapters). These issues would become more apparent in subsequent 
case-law, such as X and Y of 1985 in which positive obligations were examined in 
relation to a violation of a human right that was caused by a private individual.''^ 
For the purposes of the current study, the case ofX and F needs to be discussed 
first to preserve the order by which the understanding of positive obligations has 
developed since the beginning of the scholarly debate, making more accessible in 
that way the core principles and justifications of the state's positive obligations. It is 
only then that the judgments of Marckx and Airey should be introduced to stress the 
expanded scope of positive obligations that we elaborate in more details in the 
following chapters. 
XandY 
The case of X and Y concerned the rape of the second applicant (the incident 
occurred on the day after Miss V s sixteenth birthday) who could not initiate 
criminal law proceedings against the perpetrator due to her being mentally 
handicapped. The applicants complained that the state did not make available a 
criminal law remedy against rape in the circumstances of the victim. It was admitted 
by the government that rape attracted generally a punishment in criminal law which 
could not apply in her case due to the applicable procedural requirements. However, 
it argued that an alternative remedy was available in civil law, although if this had 
been a serious argument, a preliminary objection on the non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies would have already been made. 
When a private party violates a human right of another individual, the liability 
of the state is sought over its failure to protect the victim in the given circumstances. 
In the cases of rape or other forms of bodily harm, the basic content of protection 
and, by extension, of positive obligations is to regulate the commission of offences 
against the person and prescribe sanctions of an appropriate deterring effect that 
must be backed up by law-enforcement procedures in order to ensure due 
compliance of law. In X and Y, the fact that criminal law sanctions were not 
enforceable or applicable in the applicant's circumstances, meant in practice that no 
44 Xand Yv. the Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80. 
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prior regulation existed in criminal law. Only civil law remedies were available for 
which enforcement proceedings could be initiated. The state was found in violation 
of its positive obligations on the ground that the protection offered (i.e. civil law 
remedy) could not guarantee the appropriate deterring effect in relation to the 
human rights interest concerned (i.e. respect for private life under Article 8) and the 
higher degrees of severity therein (i.e. 'where fundamental values and essential 
aspects of private life are at stake').« 
The case of X and Y constitutes what can convenientiy be called the classic 
positive obligation case that arises when the state is rendered 'indirectiy' responsible 
for its failure to actively protect an individual, either at all or adequately (as in that 
case) from acts of interference of another private actor. 
Marckx 
The Court applied, for the first time, positive obligations as 'inherent' in the effective 
protection of human rights in the case of Marcfcx.'*^ The main complaint under 
Article 8 concerned the lack of appropriate administrative measures that would 
establish a legal bond between an unmarried mother and her child from the mere 
fact of birth. Positive obligations were justified by simply pointing to the first 
paragraph of the Convention right that was engaged in the applicant's 
circumstances. There was no need to seek additional justifications or the combined 
effect of various Articles, as had been seen in the analysis of Jan De Meyer. 
The Court's reasoning in that case closed conclusively the issue of legitimacy of 
positive obligations in the legal order of the Convention or, more accurately, that 
legitimacy was never questioned, given that positive obligations were recognised as 
'inherent' in the provisions of paragraph i of the substantive rights of the 
Convention. 
In order to illustrate this point further, the focus of the Court's approach has to 
be highlighted. The meiin defence in the government's submission was that the 
present domestic law favours the traditional family on grounds relating to morals 
and public order (as the legitimate aims of interference that are included in the 
second paragraph of Article 8).'»7 In addressing this argument, the Court did not rule 
on the legitimacy and justifiability of these aims, but concentrated on the question 
45 Ibid., para. 27. 
46 Marckx v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1978, no. 6833/74, para. 31. For earlier attempts 
to use positive obligations terminology, see the Belgian linguistic Case, Judgment of 23 July 1968, 
no. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 (Article 2 of Protocol 1). 
47 See also Marckx v. Belgium (dec). 
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that protection of the right to respect of family life applies to 'everyone', including an 
unmarried mother, The main issue was of how an 'illegitimate family' had been 
protected by the state, and not whether an interference could be justified. In 
particular, the Court reasoned that 
[the object of Article 8] does not merely compel the State to abstain from such 
interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be 
positive obUgations inherent in an effective "respect" for family life... As 
envisaged by Article 8 (art. 8), respect for family life imphes in particular, in the 
Court's view, the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render 
possible as from the moment of birth the child's integration in his family. In 
this connection, the State has a choice of various means, but a law that fails to 
satisfy this requirement violates paragraph i of Article 8 (art. 8-i) without there 
being any call to examine it under paragraph 2 (art. 8-2).49 
It is clear from this passage that since the state has 'inherent' positive obligations to 
actively protect the human rights of an individual, a core content of protection has to 
be guaranteed by virtue of paragraph i of the Convention right. The judgment in 
Marckx makes clear that the state is under a positive obligation to assist the 
integration of a child into a family environment, including the offspring of non-
marital women. If the measures taken by the state's administration do not comply 
with this obligation, they fall foul of the Convention without being necessary to 
examine any defences on a justifiable interference under the legitimate aims of 
paragraph 2 . 5 ° 
Having said that, it should also be noted that the state had expressly invoked 
paragraph 2 of Article 8 to support its position, as can be seen in the text of the 
Commission's admissibility decision. In principle, the legitimate aims listed in 
paragraph 2 can never be excluded from the judicial examination when they are 
relied upon in a state's defence. The state is entitled to argue its case and the Court 
should respond as to whether the arguments presented can or cannot be accepted. 
Of course, it can be argued that it was obvious that no legitimate aims of interference 
could be engaged in that case. In law, however, nothing is obvious until stated. If the 
48 Marckx v. Belgium, para. 31. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Dufry, (note 17) 'the subject matter of the positive obligation may be so fundamental that 
any failure to give it effect constitutes a per se violation of the Convention incapable of 
justification under paragraph 2. Support for this first explanation can be found in Marckx.', p. 
200. C. Forder, 'Legal Protection imder Article 8 ECHR: Marckx and Beyond' (1990) 37(2) NILR 
162-181 'The passage could be understood as stating that, as a result of certain value-judgments 
made by the Court, there is a core consisting of rights protected by Article 8 which are of such 
significance that no derogation whatsoever can be permitted under Article 8 (2). The rights which 
form this inviolable core are rights the existence of which is a pre-condition to the guarantee of 
the negative rights', p. 179. 
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obvious has been explained in previous jurisprudence, then express reference to 
these authorities should be made.si 
The key explanation of the Court's approach in Marckx is not that legitimate 
limitations cannot be justified, but that they are not relevant. The irrelevance of 
paragraph 2 aims is seen fi-om the fact that there is simply no issue of prior 
interference over which a limitation to a human right could be justified under one of 
the legitimate aims listed in that paragraph. In that respect, the main question 
before the Court concerned the positive obhgation to actively facilitate the 
integration of a family. The state was found in violation of Article 8 due to the 
inefficient manner of the applicable procedure, which was so cvmibersome that was 
leaving also the applicant's child motherless for certain days. 
The Court's reasoning, as quoted in the passage above, has confirmed that the 
protection of human rights has a universal application that cuts across the board. 
The fact that the freestanding imperative of human rights (i.e. not conditioned to a 
prior act of interference) can be discerned in the very first case in which positive 
obligations were imposed by the Court is of tremendous importance. 
The universal imperative of human rights protection does not, however, mean 
that universal legal principles and justifications apply in all circumstances. Clearly, 
when positive obligations are examined in relation to acts of interference by a 
private party, the existence of a causal link between the act complained of and the 
ensuing human rights violation creates a stronger imperative to react upon a given 
event. In contrast, where acts of interference are absent, the protection of human 
rights proceeds upon different justifications, and therefore different evaluative 
principles should apply. As a preUminary point, which is explored fully in the 
following chapters, the only possibility to restrict protection in Marckx under 
paragraph i of the Convention rights would be to show that a Convention right had 
not been engaged in the apphcant's circumstances or that the cost of protection 
would be disproportionate, and hence impractical. Neither of these parameters 
apphes in circumstemces such as those of Marckx and, therefore, a core positive 
obligation is imposed. 
51 Previous cases arising from the same context had been rejected or had reached an opposite 
outcome: Marckx v. Belgium, 'As recently as 22 December 1967, the Commission rejected under 
Article 27 (2) (art. 27-2) - and rejected de piano (Rule 45 (3) (a) of its then Rules of Procedure) -
another application (No. 2775/67) which challenged Articles 757 and 908 of the Belgian Civil 
Code; the Commission does not seem to have been confronted with the issue again until 1974 
(application no. 6833/74 of Paula and Alexandra Marckx).', para. 58. 
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Airey 
The case of Airey arose from a wife's decision to separate from her abusive 
husband.52 In this context of relationships between private individuals, the positive 
obligations of the state concern regulations that prescribe appropriate sanctions in 
the event of physical violence. If violence occurs within a marital relationship, then 
the possibility of separation should easily be accessible to the victim, without having 
to discuss that legal separation should also be available for no specific reason (see 
discussion above on the right to develop one's personality under the provisions of 
Article 8). The general question of whether such a situation raises the indirect 
responsibility of the state in the form of positive obligations was not discussed as 
such in the Court's judgment, but it was presupposed by both the applicant and the 
respondent state. 
Indeed, the main issue before the Court was whether legal separation was 
practically available to the applicant. As discussed in X and F above, the corollary of 
an effective regulatory framework is to guarantee enforcement and remedial 
procedures in order to implement in practice the regulatory standards of law. In 
Airey, legal separation had been regulated and existed as such in the domestic legal 
order, but was not practically accessible to the applicant due to the high financial 
cost of litigation. Consequently, the state was found in violation of its positive 
obligation under Article 8 on the grounds that the regulated measure was not 
effective in the applicant's circumstances. This case is further discussed in chapter 4, 
which is devoted to the procedural aspect of positive obligations. 
The favourable judgments of Marckx and Airey complete each other in covering 
both the substantive (in Marcfcc) and procedural (in Airey) content of positive 
obligations that is indispensable for the effective protection of human rights. Indeed, 
seizing the opportunity, as presented by the facts of these cases, the Court, in two 
judgments in the year of 1979, moved expeditiously to lay down the general 
framework and scope of positive obligations. The judgments of Marckx and Airey 
are not only the beginning of the application of positive obligations in the 
jurisprudence but reveal also their more expanded and sophisticated content that 
only the recent case-law has started to explore. 
Airey v. Ireland. 
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III. Recent Studies 
A major study that has exclusively been made on the state's positive obligations 
under the Convention is the doctoral thesis 'Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in 
der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention' (2003) by Cordula Droge. sa The 
author presents a 'normative' categorisation of positive obligations within which the 
study, understanding and development of positive obligations can be tmdertaken 
through a more 'holistic' hvmian rights theory as liberales, soziales und 
multidimensionales Grundrechtsverstdndnis Qiberal, social and multidimensional 
understanding of fundamental rights).54 The division of these categories breaks 
down to a 'horizontal' and 'social' dimension within which the case-law of the Court 
can fit. The former concerns the protection of human rights between private 
parties, 55 while the latter encompasses what does not fall within the former 
categoiys^ and 'comprise not only the so called economic and social rights, but also 
rights to legislative action, for example to enact the laws necessary for the enjoyment 
of right in a given national system.'57 
Another major study is the work of Alastair Mowbray, 'The Development of 
Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights' (2004) in which important cases are identified 
and categorised on an Article-by-Article basis.s^ Because of its more limited scope or 
it may have been a conscious choice by the author, it provides an unbiased account 
of the jurisprudence in a cases-and-materials fashion. Categorisations in horizontal, 
social, or any other dimension play no role at all, an observation which points to the 
fact that positive obligations are not exactiy the occasion that satisfies or links all 
previous literature on htmian rights. 
It should be noted that in those studies a critical explanation (exegesis) on the 
actual operation of positive obligations is largely absent, with the result that every 
positive measure may be classified as a positive obligation (see e.g. the case of 
McCann and Others) and/or categorised for the sake of categorisation.59 Although 
53 C. Drogue, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europaischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention (Springer, 2003). 
54 Ibid., p. 196. 
55 Ibid., p. 281. 
56 Ibid., p. 382. 
57 Ibid. 
58 A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Right (Hart, 2004), covering the 
jurisprudence imtil the year of 2002. 
59 Without having to go into a review, starting from the very first case that is covered by 
Mowbray, (note 58), p. 7, (i.e. McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 
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the point of the 'hoUstic' appreciation of human rights reflects the current pohtical 
cUmate, the term 'social' cannot be used every time a positive action is required from 
the state 'for lack of a better all encompassing description,..., to differentiate them 
from positive obligations of the horizontal dimension'.^° Indeed, there is no basis at 
all in putting the cases of Osman and Powell and Rayner in the 'horizontal' basket 
and Zand Others and Guerra and Others in the 'social' one.^ " 
In the following section, we deal with the issue of horizontality which has 
attracted considerable scholarly commentary, if only to show that the normal 
function of the state to regulate private activities has been marketed as a new issue 
under a new name (i.e. 'horizontality'), which is advocated as a new normative 
category recycling over and again the same question of i/the state must guarantee 
human rights in the relationships between private individuals. 
1. The Horizontality Issue: Forced or Dangerous? 
a) The Forced Debate 
One of the most widely cited books in recent times on the issue of horizontality is 
'Human Rights in the Private Sphere"^^ by Andrew Clapham from his doctoral thesis 
'The Privatization of European Human Rights'.^^ The author starts from the point 
that 'the State should not be considered to have a monopoly over the abuse of 
power'^ and sets off to 'challenge the presumption that the fundamental rights and 
freedoms contained in the European Convention on Human rights are irrelevant for 
cases which concern the sphere of relations between individuals.'^s He concludes 
that the 'thesis presented in this study is that the European Convention on Human 
Rights ought to be interpreted so that it is applicable where victims face abuse from 
private actors.'*^ He coins a more enhanced term which is explained as 'it is the 
application of human rights law to the actions of private bodies which I label 
September 1995, no. 18984/91), it is noted that the Court at no point refers to positive obligations 
in its judgment. An explanation is, therefore, required as to why McCann and Others is classified 
as a positive obhgation case. Cf. Discussion of McCann and Others in chapter 2, section B.I.i . 
6 ° Drogue, (note 53), 382. 
6' Ibid., pp. 381-2. 
*2 A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1993), cited 
by, inter alios. Drogue, (note 53), pp. 60, 82 and O. Cherednychenko, Towards the Control of 
Private Acts by the European Court of Human Rights?' (2006) 13 MJ 195-218,198. 
63 A, Clapham, The Privatization of European Human Rights' (DPMI thesis, Europeein 
University Institute 1991). 
*4 Clapham, Human Rights..., (note 62), p. 9. 
« 5 Ibid., p. 1. 
66 Ibid., p. 343. 
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"hximan rights in the private sphere" or "the privatisation of human rights".'^7An 
even more enhanced term is also discussed which is the 'ecological' liability of the 
state citing Evrigenis, who had argued that '[the State] is not merely answerable for 
violations committed by itself but also, in a more general sense, for all violations 
committed within its territory. One could say, indeed, that the modem State has a 
kind of "ecological liability" in the human rights field.'^^ 
The method used in taking up the research challenge is comparative, while the 
first Part of the thesis is devoted to the legal system of the United Kingdom. In the 
record of history, however, the assertion that the rights of individuals are violated by 
other individuals in the relationships between themselves, is as old as the first 
organised human society since times immemorial. That states regulate private 
relationships and behaviour is something that is also traced from those times.*^ with 
regard to the comparative study adopted, it is admitted that '[a]ll the above 
arguments have been taken out of context, and from various diverse traditions and 
disciplines, and none of them are really addressed to the question of human rights; 
but, the question of human rights in Europe does arise in each of the contexts 
referred to above - family life, work life, administrative life, sexual life'.^o 
From the limited discussion on 'human rights' and the 'international 
obligations' of the states under the Convention, it is suggested that the European 
Court should follow the development of the Inter-American Court of Himian Rights 
in the case of Velasquez Rodriguez in 1988,71 as 'in the Americas the Commission 
and the Court of Human Rights already deal with private action and the threat to 
human rights; therefore according to the European Court's own contextual evolutive 
67 Ibid., p. 1. 
68 Ibid., p. 183 citing D. Evrigenis, 'Recent Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 
on Article 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights' (1982) 3(1-4) H R U 121-139, 
137-
69 Vegleris, (note 3) ; De Meyer, (note 3), G. Tenekides, 'La Cite d' Athenes et les Droits de 1' 
Homme' in F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension, 
Studies in Honour of G. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 605-637.; Decalogue, etc. See, also, E . 
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New ed. Penguin, 1991) 'Not only freedom 
from the intrusions of the State but also belief in the equahty of rich and poor before the law was a 
source of authentic popular congratulation. Sensational reading-matter, such as the New Negate 
Calendar: or Male-factor's Bloody Register, recorded with satisfaction...such cases as that of 
Leeds' "domineering villanous lord of the manor" who was executed in 1748 for killing one of his 
own tenants in a fit of temper.', p. 90 and 'In 1776 Wilkes went so far as to plead in the House of 
Commons for the political rights of the "meanest mechanic, the poorest peasant and day 
labourer", who "has important rights respecting his personal liberty, that of his wife and children, 
his property however considerable, his wages...which are in many frades and manufactures 
regulated by the Parliament.", p. 91. 
70 Clapham, (note 62), p. 132. 
71 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July 1988,1 A . Ct. of Human Rights, 
Series C, No. 4; (1988) 9 H R U 212. 
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method of interpretation the European Court should similarly offer practical and 
effective protection even where the link to the state can not be easily established.'72 
However, it should be stressed that in that case the Inter-American Court examined 
the state's obligations in circumstances arising out of the disapperance of an 
individual. In scholarly commentary, the Velasquez case is merely discussed in 
relation to procedural obligations in the form of legal safeguards (e.g. investigations) 
that state agents must take in ex post facto circumstances in order to enforce the 
law.73 In Europe, the issue of human rights protection against non-state actors is not 
restricted to such basic issues, not to mention that private actors are not clearly 
involved in cases where a known disappearance phenomenon is observed.74 
Clapham closes the theory part of his study in French quoting a passage from a 
1971 article of Marc-Andre Eissen.75 However, the French article, which had been 
cited by Andrew Drzemczewski^ ^ in 1979 and later, once again, by Dean Spielmann 
in 1995 and 1998,77 does not deal with the general issue of i f the Convention rights 
are relevant for cases which concern the sphere of relations between individuals (the 
if question), as Clapham argues, but with the pertinent question of how human 
rights protection in private relationships can be organised within the supranational 
system of the Convention. All authors mentioned above had put forward a specific 
proposal (discussed below in the Drittwirkung section), taking the if question as 
their working base. 
72 Clapham, 'The Privatization...', (note 63), pp. 165-166. 
73 See, e.g., F. Ni Aolain makes a comparative reference to the case of Velasquez Rodriguez 
in analysing the development of ex post legal safeguards in justifiable lethal operations of the 
police, as seen in McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 'The Evolving Jurisprudence of the 
European Convention Concerning the Right to Life' (2001) 1NQHR 21-42,33 . 
74 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, paras. 119,147,150, 'The Court is convinced, and has so 
found, that the disappearance of Monfredo Velasquez was carried out by agents who acted under 
cover of public authority. However, even had that fact not been proven, the failure of the State 
apparatus to act, which is clearly proven, is a failure on the part of Honduras to fulfil the duties it 
assumed under Article 1 (1) of the Convention, which obligated it to guarantee Monfredo 
Velasquez the free and full exercise of his human rights.', para. 182. For the jurisprudence of the 
European Convention see, e.g., A. Reidy, F. Hampson, K. Boyle, 'Gross Violations of Human 
Rights: Invoking the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey" (1997) NQHR 
15(2) 161-173; C. Buckley, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Life in 
Turkey' (2001) 1 HRLR 35-65. See further discussion in chapter 4, section D. III . 
75 Clapham, (note 62) p. 133 quoting a passage from M-A. Eissen, (note 35), p. 162. For a 
translation of that passage in Enghsh, see J . Velu, 'The European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Right to Respect for Private Life, the Home and Communications' in A.H. Robertson (ed). 
Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 1973): 12-95. 
76 A. Drzemczewski, The European Human Rights Convention and Relations between 
Private Parties' (1979) 26(2) NILR163-181. 
77 D. Spielmann, 'L'Effet Potentiel de la Convention Europeenne des Droits de I'Homme 
entire Personnes Privees' (Nemesis - Bruylant, 1995) revised as 'Obligations Positives et Effet 
Horizontal des Dispositions de la Convention', in F. Sudre (ed) L'Interpretation de la Convention 
Europeenne des Droits de I'Homme (Nemesis - Bruylant, 1998): 133-174-
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In addition, the discussion of the Commission's inadmissibility decision in 1985 
in Van der Heijden, in which it was stated that '[the Commission] may not receive 
applications directed against individuals - in this case, Foundation, which is a 
private law corporation' due to the operation of the former Article 25, para. 1 
(current Article 34),7^ does not prove that human rights protection against private 
parties had not been recognised by the Convention so as to justify a comparative 
analysis that suggests the paradigm of VelasquezJ^ It comes as a surprise that the 
author himself is aware that positive obligations have already been part of the 
jurisprudence, as he gives a brief discussion of the relevant cases, such as Airey 
(1979); X and Y (1984); Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" (1988); Hughes (1986); 
Powell and Rayner (1990), which prove that the Court has answered the i/question 
by rendering the state indirectly responsible for violations of human rights by non-
state actors. °^ 
Moreover, the if question (i.e. whether human rights are relevant in private 
interactions) is not conditioned on the 'publicness' of private activities. From the 
limited discussion of the technical issue of how the protection of human rights in the 
private sphere can be organised under the capabilities of system of the Convention 
(the how question), special attention is given to the admissibility case of Hughesfi^ 
The case concerned a part-time cleaner at a private high school who had taken time 
off due to his suifering from chest pains but returned to the school to collect his 
wages and on that day he was discovered collapsed in the school's premises. The 
complaint before the Commission was about the failure of the domestic law to 
sanction in negligence any delays in taking prompt emergency steps to help the 
individual in such circumstances (i.e. to call an ambulance immediately). However, 
it cannot be said that the positive obligation of the state only arises because 
'education is usually considered a function of the state and all private schools are to 
some extent subsidised by the state whether through grants, scholarships and tax 
78 Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands, Admissibility decision of 8 March 1985, no. 
11002/84, 41 D- & R. 264 at 270 cited by Clapham, (note 62), p. 128. Cf. for analysis of earlier 
case-law, see De Meyer, (note 3), Malinvemi, (note 4), p. 560-61, Loucaides, (note 17), p.144. 
79 Cf. Mertens, (note 37), p. 109 'In fact, when private parties appear to be burdened with 
duties by virtue of Art. 13, then, as noted by Professor Rolin, there is no international sanction, 
strictly speaking, but rather a domestic "sanction that is internationally imposed" (translation), 
citing Henri Rolin in the book of articles La Protection Internationale des Droits de I'Homme 
dans la Cadre Europeen (Dalloz, 1961): 214. Malinvemi, (note 4), p. 560-61. 
80 Airey v. Ireland; X and Y u. the Netherlands; Hughes v. the United Kingdom, 
Admissibihty decision of 18 July 1986, no. 11590/85; Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, 
Judgment of 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82; Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, Judgment 
of 21 February 1990, no. 9310/81. 
81 Hughes v. the United Kingdom. 
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relief At no point in the Commission's reasoning the question of whether the 
school is public or private played any role in deciding the admissibility issue.^ s Not 
to mention that when a part-time cleaner collapses in a school or a cinema theatre, 
this fact alone does not bring the case within the context of education or culture. If 
the applicant's husband went to his workplace for purposes relating to the 
employment contract, then the corresponding context is that of health and safety in 
the workplace. Alternatively, if his contract had been suspended or not applicable in 
the circumstances concerned, then the case should be looked at in the context of 
occupiers' liability for accidents occurring in their premises. 
As regards the only pertinent question of how to determine the content of 
positive obligations, there is one single proposal that 'a "but for" test could be 
utilized to fix [the state's] responsibility where there was a high probability that the 
private violation could have been prevented by state action.'84 With reference to the 
case of Hughes,^5 it should be said that the domestic judge relied on medical 
evidence to find that 'even if an ambulance had been summoned immediately, it 
would have been too late.' As a result, the civU law action for compensation failed to 
establish an element of causation between the harm suffered by the individual and 
the employer's negligence. The Commission agreed with the domestic decision and 
stated that 'the existence of any express obligation to take prompt emergency action 
would not have been of any avail to the applicant's husband.' In analysing this point, 
Clapham explains that 
This phrase [Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law, under Article 2] 
would not seem to impose positive obligations or responsibility for omissions on 
private individuals. However, even if we grant that Article 2 implies that 
everyone is bound to take positive measures to guarantee other people's right to 
life, and that in these circumstances the teachers owed the deceased such a duty, 
we still have to show that but for the government's lack of legislation this 
particular duty probably would have been avoided. It is unlikely, with regard to 
the facts as they emerge from that decision, that legislation or other 
administrative measures would have had the effect of preventing the loss of 
life.86 
To check the seriousness of this approach, we have to contradict it vwth the following 
factual hypothesis: On the following day of the Commission's decision, another 
employee at the same private school is found on the floor. The staff again stay aloof 
82 Clapham, (note 62), p. 206. 
83 The same applies to the case of Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, from the same 
period. 
84 Clapham, (note 62), p. 214 referring to the case of Z a n d Yv. the Netherlands. 
85 For the application of this proposal to other cases, see, Clapham, (note 62), pp. 196-7,199, 
201, 206, 214,240. 
86 Ibid., p. 206. 
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of the incident and with a two-hour delay they call the police first (as in Hughes), 
although no criminal act is suspected. Once at the scene the police cah the 
ambtdance service (as in Hughes) and in hospital, the employee dies after some 
minutes. Medical evidence could well suggest this time that a prompt transfer to the 
hospital would have saved the employee's life. Therefore, can it ever be suggested 
that positive obligations in the form of a prior 'legislation or other administrative 
measures' arise for the state upon circumstantial chances of ex post results? 
The ex post assessment, which is perfectiy suitable for examining negligence in 
the duty of care in a civil law action for compensation, sits uneasily with the 
constitutional complaint before the Court which exclusively concerns the 
determination of the minimum structure of a system of protection that is 
presupposed to exist in known contextual circumstances. Indeed, when the Court 
considers the state's positive obligations, the examination focuses not on the 
individual responsibility of private parties, but rather on the state's prior regulations 
of health and safety standards and the relevant administrative practices that 
guarantee their implementation. In that connection, the ex post ad hoc result cannot 
be relied upon to negate the positive obligation that the Convention imposes on the 
state's legal system as a whole. Unlike tortious (civil law) principles that are 
designed to assess the level of compensation, at the European level, we are 
concerned with the preliminary issue of setting the very minimum standards against 
which any negUgence will come to be assessed ex post. In this account, the only 
pertinent question in Hughes is whether the state had regulated in advance health 
and safety standards in the workplace or occupiers' premises that are open to the 
public. The text of the Commission's decision does not inform of the applicable 
regulatory framework at the domestic level. Under current law, health and safety 
measures are duly regulated in the respondent state's legal system, and therefore, 
the "but for' causation test to examine a remedial action in ex post circumstances 
remains unchallenged.87 
The 'but for test' has also been argued, probably for the first time in history, in 
the context of violence against the person. With reference to the case of X and Y, it 
has been proposed that 'States will be liable under the Convention, where, "but for" 
87 K. Williams, 'Medical Samaritans: Is There a Duty to Treat?' (2001) 21OJLS 393-413, "The 
existence of duty does not necessarily lead to a finding of Uability, of course, since a claimant must 
go on to show breach and causation.', page with note 104. 
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the absence of legislation prohibiting the behaviour complained of, the violation of 
human rights would probably not have occurred.'^ ^ 
From the foregoing analysis, it can be said that the issue that 'the Convention 
rights are relevant for cases which concern the sphere of relations between 
individuals' concerns a message that was sufficiently communicated in informed 
scholarly commentary in the 1960s and 1970s. The debate closed after that message 
was officially announced in the judgments of Marckx and Airey in 1979 which made 
uneqvuvocaUy clear that the protection of himian rights against private actors raises 
the state's indirect responsibility in the doctrinal form of positive obligations. 
The reason why the study of positive obligations is not moving fast enough is 
because it is still trapped in the circular general debate over the very relevance of the 
Convention rights in the private sphere in which the same things are stated over and 
over in eternal perpetually setting the perspective from which himian rights 
protection within the system of the Convention has to be approached. In addition, as 
the subject matter of study is ultimately destined to lay people (as represented by 
legal practitioners), scholarly debate should be reasonably accessible to them. In this 
respect, the jargon of 'horizontality', 'privatization of human rights', and 'ecological 
liability of the state' for non-ecological issues, is far from helpful. 
Closing this sub-section, we adopt a rather fashionable technique by quoting a 
passage from an article by Murray Hunt who points out that 
The vocabulary of "horizontality" commits participants in the discourse to a 
prior assumption about the separateness of the public and private spheres 
which is highly controversial. It concedes the starting point in the debate to 
those who believe there to be a firm distinction between the public and the 
private spheres...The [geometric] metaphor presupposes that there is a 
fundamental distinction between public and private spheres of law's operation, 
and by framing the debate in this way it "assumes the very thing that needs to be 
debated".89 
b) The Dangerous Debate 
More recently, and in growing realisation (at last) that positive obligations are being 
imposed on the states to actively protect humem rights in the private sphere, the 
'horizontality' debate has turned to the alleged 'dangerous' or 'disastrous 
88 Qapham, (note 62), p.196. 
89 M. Hunt, "The 'Horizontal effect' of the Human Rights Act: Moving Beyond the Public-
Private Distinction' in J . Jowell and J . Cooper, Understanding Human Rights Principles (Hart 
Publishing 2001): 161-178, 173, citing S. Sedley, Freedom, Law and Justice (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1999): 23. See also D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Butterworths, 
1999). For a comparative study, see, recentiy, S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive 
Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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consequences' for the national private law. Some key arguments supporting this 
position have to be addressed here, as they re-open the question of legitimacy of 
positive obligations in the system of the Convention. 
In this section, we respond to the points raised by Olha Cherednychenko in the 
article Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human 
Rights?'^° in relation to the case of Pla and Puncemau. In that case, the Court dealt 
with a domestic courts' interpretation of a clause in a will that it found to be 
discriminatory in violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. The 
appUcants complained that in determining inheritance rights, the High Court of 
Justice and the Constitutional Court had breached their right to respect for private 
and family life by unjustifiably discriminating against the first applicant on the 
ground of his filitation (a distinction was made between adopted and biological 
children). 
We quote the passage from the judgment that was made the subject of 
particular discussion: 
Admittedly, the Court is not in theory required to settle disputes of a purely 
private nature. That being said, in exercising the European supervision 
incumbent on it, it cannot remain passive where a national court's 
interpretation of a legal act, be it a testamentary disposition, a private contract, 
a public document, a statutory provision or an administrative practice appears 
unreasonable, arbitrary or, as in the present case, blatantly inconsistent vnth the 
prohibition of discrimination established by Article 14 and more broadly with 
the principles underlying the Convention.'^ 
The author expressed strong concerns about 'disjistrous consequences' from such an 
approach for the private autonomy and freedom of contract, as guaranteed by the 
state's private law, citing in support Richard Kay's argument about 'the unsettling 
effect on private transactions' by 'the ubiquitous Convention rights'.?^ 
With regard to these legitimate concerns, it should be said, first, that there is no 
such a thing as absolute private autonomy. Private autonomy is cherished but is 
regulated by private law in accordance vrith the values of the society, as expressed by 
its constitution and the social pressure to which the legislator responds.'s Not only 
90 Cherednychenko, (note 62). 
91 Pla and Puncemau v. Andorra, Judgment of 13 July 2004, no. 69498/01, para. 59, (cited 
case omitted). 
92 Cherednychenko, (note 62), p. 207 citing R. Kay, The European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Control of Private Law" (2005) 5 E H R L R 466,479. 
93 Rivero, (note 38) 'those who would escape the state's arbitrariness, if only, to fall under 
the domination of private powers, vnll only manage to change master...To recognise but liberties 
that remain a dead letter in private relationships, would constitute an aberration or a hypocrisy 
from the part of the State, this hypocrisy that is precisely denounced by the Marxist critic of the 
bourgeois state.' (translation), p. 322. P. Benson, 'Equality of Opportunity and Private Law* in D. 
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do human rights help inform the content of private law, but also of social rights as 
well (see minimmn national wage implied in freely negotiated employment 
contracts).94 
The other argvunent about 'the unsettiing effect on private transactions' by 'the 
ubiquitous Convention rights' has to be addressed by analysing the word 'ubiquitous' 
with reference to the judges' own reasoning. 
The first point to note is that the Court did not review the clauses of the vdll, 
which is by its very natuure selective and 'discriminatory', and as Judge Garlicki said 
in his dissenting opinion '[t]he whole idea of a will is to depart from the general 
system of inheritance, that is, to discriminate between potential heirs.'^ s In that case, 
however, the clauses of the will in question did not provide for any distinction 
between biological and adopted children. It was the interpretation of the domestic 
court that made this distinction discriminatory within the scope of Article 14. In that 
respect, the European judges have treated the complaint as an express interference 
of the state, rather than as a positive obligation and reasoned that '[i]n the present 
case, the Court does not discern any legitimate aim pursued by the decision in 
question or any objective and reasonable justification on which the distinction made 
by the domestic court might be based.'^ ^ 
Moving beyond the observation that the Court has reviewed the domestic 
courts' approach rather than the private dealings, it can still reasonably be argued 
that by intervening in a case arising from a wUl dispute, the European judges may 
have gone too far. There is, however, a fundamental difference between criticising 
one isolated judgment and proclaiming 'disastrous consequences' and 'the unsettling 
effect on private transactions' by 'the ubiquitous Convention rights'. 
Friedmann, D. Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart, 200i):20i-243 'as an early 
instance of the State's exercise of its police power to regulate private transactions and property in 
furtherance of the common good and therefore as the exercise of a legislative function', p. 229 
referring also to early writings of B. Wyman The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust 
Problem' (1904) 17 H A R V . L . R E V . 156 and N. Arterbum, 'The Origin and First Test of Public 
Callings' (1927) 75 U P A . L R E V . 411 and courts decisions in Munn v. Illinois 94 US 113 (1876) (US 
Sup. Ct.) (per Waite, CJ) and People v. Budd (1889) 117 NY (NY CA) (per Andrews, J) . 
94 Rivero, (note 38), p 312. See also S. Simitis, "The Rediscovery of the Individual in Labour 
Law' in R. Rogowski, T. Wilthagen (eds), Reflexive Labour Law (Kluwer, 1994): 183-205 who 
starts from the point that '"Constitutionalization" emerges as the highest degree of juridification 
of labour relations.' (p. 183) to explain that The legislator was thus forced to override the 
otherwise infallible maxim "qui dit contractual dit juste" and in the name of social stabihty to 
impose the basic security which supposedly would have been provided to the employee through 
the individual agreement of his or her working conditions.', (p.185). 
95 Cf. Benson, (note 93), p. 227 citing G.W.F. Hegel, 'The Administration of Justice' in The 
Philosophy of Right (T.M. Knox, trans. Oxford University Press, 1952). 
96 Pla and Puncemau v. Andorra, para. 61 and see also para 46. 
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It should be recalled that positive obligations have emerged in the 1970s 
jurisprudence as a response to human rights violations by private parties. Therefore, 
as a matter of accuracy, there is no general 'Control of Private Acts by the European 
Court of Human Rights', but a 'Control of Private Acts that Interfere with Human 
Rights'. Even in Pla and Puncemau, it is clear that private law is subjected to the 
Court's scrutiny if its effect allows for a behaviour that is 'unreasonable, arbitrary or 
blatantiy inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination established by Article 
14 and more broadly with the principles underlying the Convention'.97 
But let us set aside isolated cases with wills and, say, that we deal with an 
express violation of a human right, actual or potential, arising out of the terms of a 
contract between private individuals. In such private dealings, the criticism about 
'the ubiquitous Convention rights', as quoted above, is misplaced, because the 
Convention rights are not ubiquitous, but come into play in so far as the relevant 
thresholds of applicability are met. These thresholds correspond to pan-European 
minima and concern basic human rights standards, Admissibility issues and 
actionable thresholds determining the scope of the Convention rights are 
preliminary questions in the Court's examination that have already been introduced 
above and are further discussed in the following chapters, as a part of the technical 
proposal for the management of the vride scope of positive obligations. 
The conclusion for the horizontality section concerns a critical starting point, as 
confirmed by Peter Benson, that 
the question is not whether private law in general or contract law in particular 
can be constrained by public policy or whether legislation may authorise and 
indeed bind courts to do so. It is uncontroversial that private law is and should 
be regulated by, and indeed be subordinated to, requirements of public policy.99 
In the system of the Convention, the European Court reviews the standards of the 
states' public policy on human rights and fundamental freedoms in relation to the 
activities and relationships between private individuals (including activities funded 
97 Ibid., para. 59, (cited case omitted). 
98 For earlier studies, see A. Cangado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of 
Local Remedies in International Law: its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual 
Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1983); T. Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights 
Petitions: the Case Law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), especially 'Chapter 3: Competence Ratione Personae' and 
'Chapter 5: Inadmissibili^ Related to the Merits'. 
99 Benson, (note 93), p.224; See also A. Reichman, 'Property Rights, PubUc Policy and the 
Limits of the Legal Power to Discriminate', in D. Friedmaim, D. Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights 
in Private Law (Hart, 2001): 245-280. See also the case of Van Kiick v. Germany, Judgment of 12 
Jime 2003, no. 35968/97. 
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or run by the state, such as schools, hospitals, industry, etc.)'°o It follows, therefore, 
that European human rights law does not target the intrinsic normative resources of 
private law, but only sets pan-European minimum standards of himian rights 
protection,as the states themselves have jointly required by setting up the 
Convention system. Thereafter, it is for the states, as the Commission early pointed 
out, 'to ensure that their domestic body of law is compatible with the Convention'.^ o^ 
IV. The Substantive Debate: The Co(i)nstitutional Guarantees 
It is the normal function of the state to regulate the activities of private individuals, 
whether the political regime is tribal theocracy, ohgarchy or democracy. The novelty 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as appeared few centuries ago, was to 
set constitutional guarantees in order to secure the emergence of citizens 
{demos/polites) in the control of power (crafos), and hence, the establishment of the 
natural political environment of democracy, with the principle of equality and the 
rule of law as the absolute corollaries. Within this reality, the next phase of political 
science concerns the question of how the various constitutional balances are to be 
arranged, first, between the state (the collective entity) and the citizen as the atomic 
unit of that collective, and secondly, and at the same time, between the citizens 
themselves. 
This question relates, in essence, to the institutional framework that offers the 
public authoritative forum in which various human rights issues are brought to the 
attention of the state so as to be debated (the absolute prerequisite), assessed and 
finally addressed. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are fundamental 
See, e.g., Hughes v. the United Kingdom; Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, Judgment 29 February 
2000, no. 39293/98; McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 June 1998, no. 
21825/93; 23414/94; Oneryildiz v. Turkey; Murillo Saldias and Others v. Spain, Admissibility 
decision of 28 November 2006, no. 76973/01 (available in French only); Danilenkov and Others 
V. Russia, Judgment of 30 July 2009, no. 67336/01. 
A. M. Donner, Transition' in F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds). Protecting Human Rights: 
The European Dimension, Studies in Honour of G. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 145-148 '[the 
Convention] presents minimal requirements, not as hmits but as minima. Every State is perfectly 
free to go beyond and create additional or broader guaranties than those provided for by the 
Convention.' (translation), pp. 146-7. 
De Becker v. Belgium, Admissibility decision of 9 June 1958, no. 214/56. C. Tomuschat, 
"What is a "Breach" of the European Convention on Human Rights?' in R. Lawson, M. de Blois 
(eds), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in Honour of H. G. 
Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): 315-337 '[Every state] has to adjust its domestic system to 
the consequences flowing therefrom and is precluded from arguing ex post that it is unable to 
estabUsh the judicial machinery required', p. 328. 
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guarantees forming part of the state's constitution which can only be implemented 
by an institutional framework (i.e. constitution as coii)nstitution(s))^°3 
At the European supranational level, the institutional forum and the 
constitutional guarantees are provided for by the Convention itself. All balances and 
technical details that the Court's judgments contain form the substantive law of the 
Convention that gives rise to negative or positive obligations for the contracting 
states. The content of positive obligations is not simply exhausted with the 
regulation of human rights standards for the operation of the activities of private 
parties. It encompasses indispensably the institutional forum that has to exist at the 
domestic level to enable a human right claim to be raised in the first place. Specific 
Convention provisions under Articles 35.1 (exhaustion of domestic remedies) and 13 
(domestic remedies) combined with Article 34 (individual petition) require that a 
basic institutional framework exist domestically. The institutional framework breaks 
down to public administrative structures and further procedural safeguards therein. 
In order to appreciate the advanced level at which positive obligations are 
examined and covered in subsequent chapters, it is necessary to discuss the Court's 
internal debate on the improvement of quality and effectiveness of its judicial 
supervision. Before that, two stops have to be made to include discussion from the 
parallel debates at national and international level that are constantly informed by, 
and constantly inform, the system of the Convention. 
1. The National Constitutional Debate 
The establishment of an international community of states through the setting up of 
international institutions in the aftermath of WW2 has provided the opportunity to 
reinforce the constitutional guarantees and the attached institutional framework in 
many countries (e.g. universal voting,i°4 Constitutional courts).^°5 
103 From Latin: consritutio, i-sri-tutio; Greek: systema, i-ste-mi; English: to sfand. 
104 In most of the European states, universal voting for all men and women of an adult age 
was recognised for the first time after WW2. See also Martin Luther King's campaign for electoral 
rights of black Americans in the USA in the 1960s. The emancipation of women through electoral 
rights and their active involvement in the constitutional debate that effectively ended the 
masculine monopoly of world pohtics, has yet to be evaluated given that it is only a phenomenon 
of modem history. It is no accident that the applicants in the first positive obligations cases (i.e. 
Marckx and and Airey) were women. See, generally, L. Snellgrove, Suffragettes and Votes for 
Women (Longmans, 1964). 
» ° 5 The appetite for unilateraUsm of some European states has not faded away immediately 
or completely. See, e.g. the Suez crisis, the war against Algeria, the invasion of Cyprus. 
Friedmann, (note 32), pp. 22-27. 
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However, the constitutional debate was seriously impaired because various 
intellectual schools, which had originally emerged from genuine internal social 
dynamics, were subsequentiy highjacked to serve as intellectual flags for the 
marketing of Cold War politics and its manicheistic propaganda that set artificial 
antagonistic fronts to benefit those maintaining power at both international and 
domestic level.i°^ Whether the justifications had been exaggerated or not, the fact is 
that, until very recently, in many European countries the concept of liberalism 
would be explored after the liberty (independence), actual or real, of the state. 
The end of the Cold War era has marked a period of international stability 
within which European politics live a phase of normalisation, as affirmed by the 
considerable expansion of the European Union and the Council of Europe 
eastwards. The peaceful climate that has been created and the foundation of 
institutional justice in the form of European international law, has reduced the 
historic role of the external enemy that has served, deservedly or not, as the ever-
available excuse or purpose of the state's affairs. i ° 7 International stability has 
allowed the domestic constitutional debate to concentrate more on an introspective 
and in-depth evaluation of the state's system that is constantly influenced by 
comparative examples (including the Convention's).As the external enemy is no 
longer omnipresent, the constitutional debate is moving beyond biased language^ Q^ 
to arrange objectively human rights guarantees in the great range of circumstances 
in which they are relevant."° The current advanced level and trends of constitutional 
Cold War: from December 1944 (Communists - members of the resistance movement 
against the German occupation - were hunted and killed in central Athens (aka the December 
events/Dekemvriana)) to November/December 1989 (the fall of Berlin wall that had marked the 
division between the Eastern and Western Germany). 
' ° 7 Heraclitus, 'War is the father of all'. On Nature cited by Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 48, 
p. 370, frag. 43; J . Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed), (Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), The Second Treatise of Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End 
of Civil Government, chapter III: Of the State of War', p. 278. See also online publication at 
<socserv.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/sUs/locke/govemment.pdf> . 
Mertens, (note 37), p. 7 quoting Elihu Lauterpacht, 'Some Concepts of Human Rights' 
(1965) 11 Howard Law Journal 265 'One of the most interesting phenomena in the history of the 
protection of Human Rights is the interconnection between national and international activity in 
the field. International consciousness of Human Rights has grown out of national consciousness 
of the problem; and, in turn, contemporary national concern -wixh the situation in many parts of 
the world itself stems from the extent of such international awareness'. 
109 c . Bird, The Myth of Liberal Individualism (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 'A 
fundamental prejudice of our time, perhaps attributable to the infilfration of a party political 
model of deliberation into intellectual consciousness, is the expectation that political programmes 
and ideals coalesce into distinct ideological traditions.', p.3. 
"° W. Lippmann, The Reconstruction of liberahsm' in C.H. McILwain (ed). 
Constitutionalism & The Changing World (Cambridge University Press, 1939): 283-293, 'In a 
word liberalism means a common welfare with a constitutional guarantee.', p. 286. Malinvemi, 
(note 4) 'Departing from the idea that the Convention contains fundamental rules that make up 
the State, several authors perceive fundamental rights as directions destined to shape the whole 
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debate can easily be seen in the proliferation of specialised publication fora and 
academic conferences. 
In the following, we bullet point a non-exhaustive list of the institutional 
guarantees though which various balances and arrangements of human rights are 
organised, and move on to discuss in more detail one of these guarantees that has 
influenced the discourse on positive obligations at the European level. 
National Parliament shapes private law in accordance with constitutional 
human rights provisions. Supreme Constitutional Courts are able to strike 
down unconstitutional legislation, or to issue declarations of 
incompatibility. 
- Human Rights Ombudsmen or specialised committees (e.g. independent or 
parliamentary) i) receive complaints ii) undertake their own case-studies, as 
informed by international developments iii) evaluate the Convention's 
jurisprudence, etc. iv) make specific proposals to the Parliament and other 
competent administrative bodies for new laws or amendments. 
Judges are empowered with broad and flexible interpretative tools to balance 
competing interests in accordance with the provisions of constitutional 
human rights. 
Rights of access are accorded to individuals i) by way of judicial review 
(presupposing that the state's authorities have assumed supervising control 
of the activities in which human rights issues are involved) or ii) through the 
possibility of invoking the human rights provisions of the constitution in 
legal disputes between private individuals {Drittwirkung der Grundrechte). 
set of the State's legal order and to affect all aspects of individuals lives.' (translation), p. 539 ; E -
U. Petersmann, 'State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual Sovereignty: from 
Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in International Economic Law?' 
(2006) European University Institute Working Paper Law No. 45 
<http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/i8i4/6446/3/LAW%2020o6-45.pdf>. 
See, e.g., K. Blank, A. Hable and U. Lechner, 'Europe's ConstitutionaUzation as an 
Inspiration for Global Governance? Some Viennese Conference Impressions' (2005) 6 G U 227-
43-
" 2 For the ongoing co(i)nstitutional debate at the domestic level, see, e.g., R. Masterman, 
'Determinative in the Abstract? Article 6(1) and the Separation of Powers' (2005) 6 EHRLR 628-
648. 
" 3 K-G. Zierlein, 'Functions and Tasks of Constitutional Courts' in P. Mahoney; F. Matscher; 
H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective: Studies in 
Memory ofRolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymaims Verlag, 2000): 1553-1562. 
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From the various institutional approaches listed above, it is Drittwirkung that has 
mostiy been associated with the discourse on positive obligations in scholarly 
literature. A brief account of the old discussion and a re-evaluation of its current 
relevance are presented in a separate section. 
The Drittwirkung Proposal 
An alternative solution for the protection of human rights from the acts of private 
individuals in the system of the Convention has been proposed in the form of 
Drittwirkung (i.e. the third party effect of Basic Rights). Originating in the German 
legal order, Drittwirkung is a judge-made constitutional guarantee that allows 
private individuals to invoke the human rights provisions of the national 
constitution to challenge in domestic courts the acts of other private individuals 
whether or not the state's private law applies under the circumstances. Drittwirkung 
has been proposed for the system of the Convention in various influential writings of 
the 1960s and 1970s, such as that of Eissen (1971), mentioned above, whose proposal 
was repeated by Drzemczewski (1979), and even post-Marcfcx by Spielmann (1995 
and 1998).The possibility of Drittwirkung could only be realised under two 
options: first, in direct application, by allowing private individuals to be challenged 
before the Court under a modification of Article 25 (current Article 34) that restricts 
petitions against the contracting states only; and secondly, in indirect application, by 
imposing the third party effect of Drittwirkung as a structural/institutional 
obligation on the state's legal order. 
Before analysing the merits of the Drittwirkung proposal, it is first noted that 
such a drastic institutional change was advanced by merely counting the countries in 
which Drittwirkung had been adopted, while, at the same time, it was admitted that 
that there was a 'complex problem' surronnding Drittwirkung.^^5 But a comparative 
approach in the absence of a prior technical analysis in the actual merits, the 
operating legal principles, and the difficulties involved, including the additional ones 
Eissen, (note 35), Drzemczewski, (note 76), Spielmann, 'L'Effet Potentiel de la 
Convention...,' (note 77) 'In future, therefore, it could be contemplated that the Court sanctions 
indirectly domestic courts decisions for refusing, to attribute the direct horizontal effect of the 
Convention in the circumstances concemed. This gives us the indirect horizontal effect of the 
direct horizontal effect.' (translation), p. 87. See also, P. de Fontbressin, 'L' Effet Horizontal de 
Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme et 1' Avenir du Droit des ObUgations' in G. 
Cohen-Jonathan, J -F . Flauss, P. Lambert (eds). Liber Amicorum Marc-Andre Eissen (Braylant, 
1995): 157-64-
Drzemczewsld, (note 76), p. 163. 
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regarding the transposition of external principles to the structures of the Convention 
system, cannot be justified. 
If Drittiwirkung was imposed at the domestic level as an institutional 
guarantee, then it would not be difficult to distinguish domestic cases on their 
particular facts, producing a mammoth case-law system in which it would be 
impossible to find the pan-European standard. As any judicial reasoning would be 
connected to the specific legal principles of the domestic legal order, there would be 
more points for distinction that would leave us with a collection of unconnected ad 
hoc decisions. With no European standards emerging, the Convention would loose 
its relevance. 
By contrast, if Drittwirkung was given direct application within the system of 
the Convention, justice would mainly be done at European level, with the Court 
acting as a federal court, which cannot be under current structures. For the history 
record, the Court decided that the best way forward is to question the responsibility 
of the state due to its indirect involvement in human rights violations by non-state 
actors, as had been proposed by, inter alios, De Meyer in the early 1970s. Therefore, 
the debate of Drittwirkung is now anachronistic, as far as its application to the 
system of the Convention is concerned. 
There are, however, further problems with the practical realisation of 
Drittwirkung at the domestic level that need to be addressed, because the domestic 
system is the main depository through which positive obligations are implemented 
by the state. At first, it is worth noting that the above-mentioned influential writings 
for the Drittwirkung proposal have come from non-German authors. This is 
probably because Drittwirkung in Germany has a real application and it has been 
made clear since the Liith case"7 _ introducing the constitutional principle that the 
German private law may not be in conflict with constitutional values - that the 
dispute between private parties 'remains substantively and procedurally a civil law 
dispute'.i^ s Indeed, a clear distinction between private and pubhc law is still widely 
observed in the German legal order."' 
For earlier bibUography for and against Drittwirkung, see Eissen, (note 35), pp. 154-155 
and footnote 8. 
" 7 BVerfG 15 January 1958, BVerfGE 7,198, at 205. BVerfG is an abbreviation of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany {Bundesverfassungsgericht), and BVerfGE that of a series of its 
decisions {Entscheidungen). 
" 8 See, e.g., Cherednychenko, (note 62), footnote 36. 
" 9 Kumm, "Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and 
the Constitutionalization of Private Law* (2006) 7 G U 341-370. 
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In addition, there are some critical parameters that prevent or facilitate the 
application of Drittwirkang domestically. By way of example, if Drittwirkung is 
proposed in the French legal system, then we need to see that in the German Basic 
Rights, the right to develop one's personality stands as a cornerstone value capable 
of inducing the development of more narrow human rights interests.^ ^o j f this is 
absent, then it is difficult to see against which value a constitutional balance will be 
assessed and how it will be explained in detail so as not to undeservedly interrupt 
the normal functioning of private law. And are such constitutional human rights 
balances explained or simply pronounced by the Conseil Constitutionnel? 
Accordingly, it is not the Drittwirkung that has been proposed but a profound 
change of the national legal structure. 
The wider effect of Drittwirkung on the vast field of private law has also to be 
discussed through factual examples. If there is a clause in an employment contract 
expressly stating the possibility of moving an employee to another workplace of the 
same company, can it be challenged under Drittwirkung? If such cases are treated 
as giving rise to human rights issues (e.g. respect for private and family life) due to 
the application of Drittwirkung, then it can fairly be maintained that social rights 
(and the attached socialist debate) are now being asserted through the back door of 
constitutional human rights. And if this is allowed, then human rights will be 
gradually diluted negating the benefit of hierarchy of fundamental values.^ ^^  In that 
account, what is important is not the theoretical value of Drittwirkung, but the 
technical principles of its exact application that need to be sufficiently explained. 
The judicial action between individuals over constitutional rights, as permitted 
by Drittwirkung, have additional implications that relate to the normal functioning 
of private law and the retroactivity of legal liability of private parties. One of the 
main functions of law is to educate people's behaviour and ensure a climate of 
^° German Basic Law: Article 2 (i): Everyone has the right to free development of his 
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional 
order or against morahty. 
M. Kimim, (note ii8), p. 367. 
1" S. Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen, 'Commmiity Labour Law: A Critical Introduction to its 
History* in P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S Sciarra, S. Simitis (eds), European Community Labour 
Law: Principles and Perspectives, Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, (Oxford -
Clarendon Press, 1996): 1-22 'Europe needs to find the reference points that it lacks at present. 
And those reference points should be the fundamental rights of the individual, with all that 
expression's wealth of meaning: rights which are fundamental in the hierarchical sense that they 
would have to be ranked highest, fundamental by virtue of the coherence they would give to the 
forms of regulation over which they would hold sway, fundamental in the sense of the unique 
dignity of the holders of these rights, i.e. human individuals, and fundamental because they are 
common to the majority of Member State systems.', p. 13 citing V. Champeils-Desplats, 'La notion 
de droit fondamental et le droit constituionnel fran^ais' [1995] Recueil Dalloz Chronique 323. 
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stability and economic development. An individual reasonably expects to know 
where her rights extend and where they are limited. An individual does not exactly 
violate a legal standard when that standard is discovered for the first time in the very 
judicial case against that individual. This is the logic behind the entrenched principle 
of nuZZa poena sine lege that has been codified under Article 7 of the Convention in 
respect of criminal liability, as follows: '[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence 
under national or international law at the time when it was committed.' 
Moreover, as a matter of general policy, the constitutional debate is not only 
made by putting private parties to fight in adversarial positions, because the direct 
adversarial contact contributes towards and exasperate old complexes of class 
divisions. The constitutional debate can be made in other ways (see some 
institutional options above) or in other fora, mainly, the Parliament that can 
regulate in advance the contextual application of human rights in private law and in 
a more informed and detailed manner. 
Despite the above criticism on the Drittwirkung constitutional principle, we are 
not entitled to conclude that the whole Drittwirkung proposal has been overrated. 
This is because Drittwirkung offers the unique possibility of institutionalising access 
to enforce the constitutional contract in the absence of institutional access (e.g. 
judicial review of the decisions of the competent public administration supervising 
the given activity of private parties). It is this uniqueness that captivated the minds 
of all those scholars who readily proposed its application in the system of the 
Convention.125 Drittwirkung does not wait for the Parliament to decide if and when 
»=3 Benson, (note 93) 'protected interests must be determinable as such independently of 
and prior to the defendant's wrongful action, intentional or not. This requirement reflects the 
logic of the fundamental idea at common law that there can be no liability for non-feasance.', p. 
221. 
"4 J . Rivero, (note 38), 'But it is the law, and the law only that can fix these borders. Thus, 
the liberal thought, in its most orthodox form, underlines the need to guarantee the peaceful co-
existence of hberties in the relationships between private individuals, while the state is conferred 
with an exclusive competence.' (translation), p. 316. In the case of Plattform "Arzte fur das 
Leben" v. Austria, the Court dealt with a complaint that the state did not guarantee the applicants' 
right to demonstrate (Article 11), as they were obstructed by a counter-demonstration. The 
government argued that unlike otiier provisions of the state's constitution that apply to relations 
between individuals, the corresponding provision to Article 11 of the Convention did not have this 
effect (para. 29). However, although no Drittwirkung effect could apply in such circumstances at 
the domestic level, both the Commission and the Court foimd that the state through the legislator 
had already regulated the private relationship concerned in criminal law and provided for 
enforcement duties of public officials empowering them to disperse an unlawful demonstration 
(para. 33). For a detailed account of the domestic legal framework, see the Commission's 
admissibility decision of 17 October 1985. 
125 K. Partsch, 'Written Communication' in A.H. Robertson (ed), Privacy and Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press, 1973): 275-282, 281. 
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it would be a good idea to address a human right issue in a given context of private 
relationships, nor is influenced by external considerations, such as the voting power 
of various social factions. 
The Drittwirkung debate has always been an enlightened one, since it was 
officially launched in the freedom of expression case of Liith. It should be noted that 
in cases that arise from special contexts^ e^ which conflicting constitutional rights 
(e.g. reputation v. freedom of expression) are involved, the intervention of the 
judiciary to determine legal balances is rather common ground'^ ? and pragmatic and 
has been the practice in many states.^ s^ gut to develop a fully fledged theory that has 
persisted and expanded for some decades and is celebrated in every occasion, must, 
first, be approached seriously as a declaration of the independence of the judiciary 
and the demos (within the meaning of the separation of powers) to develop and 
enforce the constitutional guarantees. 
For an informed and detailed discussion of Drittwirkung in the German legal order, see, 
B. Markesinis and S. Enchelmaier, 'Tiie Applicability of Human Rights as between Individuals 
under German Constitutional Law" in B. Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (Oxford University 
Press, 1999): 191-243. Most of the cases discussed in that contribution concern freedom of 
expression issues (expression v. reputation). From the very limited discussion of cases not arising 
from such a context, we note the action of a farmer against the granting of permission to a private 
power-generating company to build a nuclear power near a village. In such circumstances not 
involving competing constitutional rights, constitutional review was not allowed, as the 'court 
came to the conclusion that Parliament had done its utmost [through regulation] to prevent all 
reasonably foreseeable danger', p.220 citing BVerfGE 49/89 (Kalkar) at 141,142 (August 1978). In 
general, Drittwirkung has been and is still dominant when competing constitutional interests are 
involved, as in freedom of expression cases. As expression is infinite any disputes between private 
parties call for judicial intervention to determine the exact borders, while the ad hoc assessment 
of facts is pertinent. Commenting on the case of BVerfGE 93, 266 ('Soldiers are Murderers' II) , at 
292, 3 (October 1995), arising, once again, from the freedom of expression context, the authors 
admit that '[s]ince all circumstances of the case have to be taken into consideration, the result of 
such weighing is not predictable in advance.', p.233. 
"7 Most of the constitutional human rights are not absolute, e.g., Article 5 of the 1949 
German Constitution {Grundgesetz) protects firee speech, but Article 5 (2) makes protection 
subject to qualifications and provisions of law. See also Article 118 of the 1919 Weimar 
Constitution. See, much earlier. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), Article 
4 (quoted in note 38 above) and Article 11: The free communication of ideas and opinions is one 
of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print 
with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law. 
Rivero, (note 38) discussing an anti-demonsfration case (that is from the enlarged 
freedom of expression context) in a French adminisfrative court in 1933, p. 314. In the system of 
the Convention, positive obhgations were not developed from cases involving competing human 
rights interests, see, e.g., the freedom of expression case of Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 26 April 1979, no. 6538/74, which is from the same period in which positive 
obligations were applied for tJie first time in the cases of Marckx and Airey. See also early parallel 
developments in the jurisprudence of the USA Supreme Court in balancing competing interests in 
freedom of expression cases: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), concurring opinion by 
Frankfurter J ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (i959); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 
U.S. 36 (1961). L. Frantz, 'The First Amendment in the Balance' (1962) 71YLJ 1424. 
1=9 J . Bomhoff, 'Liith's 50* Aimiversary: Some Comparative Observations on the German 
Foundations of Judicial Balancing' (2008) 9 G L J 121-124 'Lilth, in this view, becomes the 
embodiment of the European legal culture's v^ dll to believe that a formal, legal conception of the 
judicial weighing of interests or values is possible. Balancing, in this German or Continental view. 
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In short, Drittwirkung can work well in a rigorous legal system where private 
relationships are regulated in advance by the legislator so as not to put the judiciary 
in a difficult position to hear a constitutional complaint due to the wide implications 
explained above. Accordingly, the open possibility of a constitutional claim 
motivates the state's legal mechanism to act in advance and realise the constitutional 
guarantees of which human rights are seen as basic. In that connection, the 
intellectual influence of Drittwirkung for the development of positive obligations of 
the state within the system of the Convention is undeniable and is continuous. 
2. The International Debate: International Responses to International 
Phenomena 
The protection of human rights of individuals from acts of other private parties 
should not be questioned as such, because this is one of the basic and natural 
functions of the modem state of citizens. It is argued, however, that these are 
matters for the national state to solve, meaning practically that positive obligations 
should not be imposed by the Convention. it is generally admitted that by 
engaging the state's liability for the acts of private parties, a great range of socio-
economic issues have passed under European supervision, whose standards may 
conflict with the public policies of the elected legislators. It suffices, however, to 
point that the Convention is an independent source of power to which the states 
have voluntarily consented and, therefore, wherever and whenever a human right 
violation occurs, the state is answerable to the Convention's system. However, 
additional justifications exist and should be stated, if only to appreciate the potential 
of positive obligations and their advanced application and development that we 
cover in the following chapters. 
At first, it should be stressed that human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
constitutional guarantees that cannot easily be swept away by majoritarian policies 
of the government of the day. Although the social revolutions of liberalism, socialism 
does not have to be about policy choices, compromises or ad hocery, but can be about 
interpreting constitutional rights within a pyramidal, "objective' system of values. Balancing is 
not a discretion or an option; it can be a necessity, a constitutional obhgation.', p. 124. 
130 Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 16 July 1986, no. 
9310/81 (Report adopted on 19 January 1989), 'In the submission of the Government, while the 
scope of Article 8 is wide, the Article could not on its proper construction be extended to provide 
guarantees against any act which directly or indirectly affects a person's comfort or enjoyment of 
his private or home life. Still less could the Article be interpreted as requiring a State to take 
positive steps to prevent or control the activities of non-Governmental bodies or private 
individuals which incidentally have, or may have, this effect.' 
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and feminism have essentially achieved one thing in common, namely universal 
voting, there are groups of individuals such as children, the disabled, the elderly, 
prisoners, immigrants whose ability to exercise social and political pressure is 
limited. 
The case of immigrants needs particular attention, as they concern individuals 
in normal condition of active adulthood. It should be mentioned that although 
immigrants are not given fuU or any electoral rights, this does not prevent host 
states from adding their gastarbeiters (guest-workers) to their overall population 
(numbers in mUlions) in order to acquire greater voting power at the European 
Union level. Because the mobility of individuals in Europe, and in the world in 
general, is an international phenomenon of massive proportions, basic human rights 
issues cannot simply be left to majoritarian domestic policies. In addition, the social 
classes, through which the domestic bargain had originally emerged and some 
human rights had been won, are now verging into extinction in some developed 
countries, leaving in the current social bargaining the heavy duty immigrant worker 
to influence majoritarian policies without electoral rights. In other cases, the 
economic potential of some countries, as reflected by the private sector being taxed 
in their jurisdiction, is often expressed through selling services around the world 
and/or moving manufacturing in non-EU or non-Convention countries where 
human rights standards are very relaxed. 
But even if we set aside for a moment the millions of immigrants that exist in 
member states, domestic bargaining policies are something that belongs to the era 
before the internationalisation of world's trade and labour. For more than one 
generation, a significant amount of important legislation that affects the lives of 
individuals within a given state, is taken, and more seriously, is negotiated beyond 
national frontiers. At the supranational level of the European Union, whose 
member states have all contracted to the Convention, a substantial number of 
economic and commercial issues are decided by European institutions. Therefore, it 
is expected that international phenomena should be tackled by international 
131 A. Yee, 'Wreckers in Deep Water: The Largest Ship Breaking Site in the World is Fuelled 
by Lax Standards. But times are changing' Financial Times (Special Report—Waste & the 
Environment), 18 April 2007. 
As early commented by Drost, (note 7), 'Integration and co-ordination of the means of 
production is nowadays envisaged on the international level. The organization of labour is not 
limited within political boimdaries, but extends over many countries of the world.', p. 196. G. 
Mundlak, 'Human Rights and the Employment Relationship' in D. Friedmarm, D. Barak-Erez 
(eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart, 2001): 297-328 'In the absence of collective backing, 
employees turn to courts, seeking public assistance to compensate for their alleged weakness in 
individual bargaining', p.303, see more in 'section 2: Juridification and the Breakdown of the 
post-Second World War paradigm of labour law", pp. 301-5. 
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responses. The Convention is this international institution/forum with the requisite 
leverage to influence international human rights standards for the activities of 
private individuals. ^3 A good example of the Convention's indirect influence on the 
European Union's economic policies, or simply the self-instinct to restore the 
participatory ability of the individual, who is regularly faced with international 
decisions involving human rights issues, can be seen in the safeguards of Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data. Although the exact merits of this most sophisticated document are beyond the 
confines of this study, it suffices for our purposes to note the same aim for which the 
extended scope of the Convention seeks justification, namely to secure the 
constitutionality of human rights in order to restore the participatory ability of the 
individual in the bargaining process which is no longer taking place at the domestic 
level.134 
It is easy, therefore, to note that it is the legal forum that has to be secured first 
in order to influence pan-European human rights standards in private sector 
activities. It pays, at this junction, to revisit the argument of the government in the 
case of Hatton and Others in which the Court was called to adjudicate whether the 
granting of permission for increased night flights to a private corporation, which 
controls and manages an airport in central London, violated the right to private life 
of some individuals who suffered sleep prevention as a result. The government's 
main argument was as follows: 
all other principal European hub airports had less severe restrictions on night 
flights than those imposed at the three London airports. Paris Charles de Gaulle 
and Amsterdam Schiphol had no restrictions at all on the total number of 
Chapter 3 aircraft which could operate at night, while Frankfurt had restrictions 
on landings by Chapter 3 aircraft between 1 and 4 a.m. If restrictions on night 
flights at Heathrow were made more stringent, UK airlines would be placed at a 
significant competitive disadvantage...If they were forced to operate during the 
'33 R. Lawson, 'Human Rights: The Best is Yet to Come' (2005) 1 ECLR 27-37; E-U. 
Petersmarm, (note 109) 'Human rights require the "constitutionalization" of international law', p. 
3-
134 As explained by Spiros Simitis, one of the architects of the European Data Protection 
project, with reference to the reinforced position of the individual employee 'With its 1995 
Directive on Data Protection, the European Union higUighted its commitment to the 
constitutionalisation of European law and, in particular, imderlined its vision of the individual 
European as a rights-bearing individual; empowered through "knowledge" and thus advantaged 
in communicative processes of political/social/legal bargaining. As such, the move to a data 
protection regime foimded upon notions of individual empowerment, also mirrors a recent and 
fundamental re-alignment in the guiding principles of regulative labour law, which has seen the 
paradigm of "collective laissez-faire" challenged, if not superseded, by a redirected emphasis upon 
the communicative empowerment of the individual employee rather than the representative 
function of employees' representatives.', 'Reconsidering the Premises of Labour Law: 
Prolegomena to an E U Regulation on the Protection of the Employees' Personal Data' (1999) 5 
E L J 45-62,45. See also Simitis, The rediscovery of the Individual...', (note 94). 
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day they could provide fewer viable connections with regional services at both 
ends, making London a less attractive place in which to do business.135 
It is clear from this passage that the government favours economic policies that are 
influenced by international competition. It should be reassuring for a government, 
even if it is found in violation of the Convention, that European uniform standards 
can be set with the adjudication of the given complaint. Within the geopolitical area 
of the Council of Europe, the European Court stands as a neutral player that can lay 
down minimum pan-European human rights standards to prevent the domino effect 
of human rights compromises, which are driven by competition responses.'ss The 
Court's ruling in an isolated case sets a uniform standard when individuals in other 
member states are able to bring their own complaint against similar compromising 
practices, thereby ensuring due compliance of European human rights law. 
If we have to choose one case fi-om the jurisprudence that summarises all points 
made above and further proves the potential of the Convention in fostering uniform 
human rights standards vis-a-vis the activities of private individuals, it is, perhaps, 
the case of Guerra and Others that does us this favour.'37 The applicants were 40 
inhabitants who lived in vicinity of a private chemical factory, which was classified 
as of high risk, according to the criteria of Presidential Decree no. 175 of 18 May 
1988 ("DPR 175/88") transposing Directive 82/501/EEC of the Council of the 
European Communities (the "Seveso" directive) on the major-accident hazards of 
certain industrial activities dangerous to the environment and the well-being of the 
local population. A committee of technical experts established that due to factory's 
geographical position, emissions from it to the atmosphere were often channelled 
towards the populated areas. The applicants complained that the state failed to 
provide information about the risks posed by the industrial activity and on how to 
proceed in the event of a major accident. Such measures were required also by 
Articles 11 § 3 and 17 § 2 of Presidential Decree no. 175/88 ("DPR i75/88").i38 
The Court found the state in violation of its positive obligation under Article 8 
to guarantee precautionary measures in the form of pre-emptive information about 
potential dangers emanating firom the industrial activity. Although such 
»35 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 August 2003, no. 36022/97, 
para. 107. 
S. Goulboume, 'Airport Noise and the Right to Family Life: A Legitimate Apphcation of 
Article 8 of the European Convention?' (2002) 24 LLR 227-236 'In view of the genuinely 
conflicting rights and duties, arguably the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is ideally 
placed to adjudicate on the competing claims, which may be at the centre of political or economic 
controversies within member states.', pp. 227-8. 
w Guerra and Others v. Italy. 
138 Ibid., para. 39. 
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precautionary measures had already been regulated at the binding level of EU law, 
but had not been implemented by the respondent state, the applicants did not 
pursue their complaints in the EU institutions.^? At the Convention's level, the fact 
that some measures had already been regulated was of no relevance, as positive 
obligations to actively protect individuals against the activities of private actors are 
inherent, and, therefore, they do not exist simply because of some prior national or 
international provisions. 
The action of the applicants in Guerra and Others manifests in the clearest way 
the increasing realisation by the ordinary individual of the unique opportunity of 
positive obligations that empower her, for the first time, to directly assert the 
protection of human rights in the activities of private parties that the state, as the 
collective political entity, must regulate and continuously guarantee. 
E. The On-going Debate: Re-Evaluating the Subsidiary 
Function of the Court 
The culmination and concretisation of all points made above should be reflected in 
the technical legal framework that determines positive obligations on the ground 
(the how question). While technical details will be covered in the remaining 
chapters, in the introductory chapter the basics of the Court's approach have to be 
discerned and secured as a point of reference. 
It is first noted that the European judges are continuously deliberating on the 
constitutional role^ o^ of the Court in btiilding a European public order of minimum 
pan-European standardsi4i in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in order to achieve and continuously maintain the object and purpose of the 
Convention. 
>39 M. Demerieux, 'Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (2001) 21 OJLS 521 and page 
corresponding to footnotes 125-128. 
S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 'No longer does [the Convention] express the 
identity of western European liberal democracy in contrast with the rival communist model of 
cenfral and eastern Europe; it now provides an "abstract constitutional identity" for the entire 
continent', pp. 170-171. 
L. Wildhaber, (note 33), pp. 162, 163, uses the term: 'common minimum standards', p. 
164, and points out that The Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 
2000, takes the Convention as setting out the minimum level of protection to be secured, while 
making clear that the minimum level did not prevent a higher level of protection.', p. 165. 
^2 See e.g. Loizidou v. Turkey, para. 75; Kakoulli and Others v. Turkey, Admissibility 
decision of 4 September 2001, no. 38595/97; Bosphorus Hava YoUan Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim 
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It is always possible to exact the technical framework by reference to the job 
that needs to be done by the European judges without adopting the term 
constitutional to describe the role of the Court.i^ s Adjectives, however, are used as 
convenient points of reference to short-cut details that would otherwise have to be 
repeated at every occasion. The Court has long been seen as a constitutional court 
simply because 'the issues which is called upon to decide are constitutional issues in 
so far as they concern fundamental rights within Europe.'i'*^  As the subject matter is 
itself constitutional, the Convention is in essence a constitutional document and 
therefore its institutional organ is described accordingly.That there may be some 
functions which national constitutional courts do not perform, or perform in 
addition, does not affect the constitutionality of Court's function.'^e it should also be 
stressed that the concept of constitution is not static so as to impose qualifying 
criteria of past traditions that no longer reflect current social and political realities 
and evolving practices and perceptions. What is currentiy observed, as Giorgos 
Pinakides has recently reaffirmed, is that 'international law is being 
"constitutionalised" and constitutional law is being "internationalised". Within this 
§irketi v. Ireland, Judgment of 30 Jime 2005, no. 45036/98, para. 156. See also CouncU of 
Europe's Recommendation Reci6o6(2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coimcil of 
Europe on areas where the European Convention on Human Rights cannot be implemented, 
adopted on 23 June 2003: 'All Member States of the Council of Europe have ratified the 
Convention which has gradually acquired, in the words of the Court, the status of a "constitutional 
instrument of European public order {ordre public) for the protection of individual human 
beings"; Memorandum by the European Court of Human Rights from the Third Summit of the 
Council of Europe, (First section: Long-Term Future of the Convention System, sub-section: The 
central role of the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights) The Court would emphasise 
"the central role that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) must continue to play 
as a constitutional instrument of European public order, on which the democratic stability of the 
Continent depends"'. Because of its pan-European dimension, moreover, the Strasbourg system 
provides the only framework within which it will be possible to develop a common European 
conception of human rights.', (footnote omitted) para. 1, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2005/April/SummitCourtMemo.htm>; Explanatory Report 
of Protocol No. 14 (GETS No. 194): Article 12 to the Amending Protocol, 'the purpose of this 
amendment is to...allow it [the Court] to devote more time to cases which warrant examination on 
the merits, whether seen from the perspective of the legal interest of the individual applicant or 
considered from the broader perspective of the law of the Convention and the European pubhc 
order to which it contributes.', para. 77. 
143 Wildhaber, 'section 1: A European Constitutional Court' (note 33), 'Whether the 
European Court of Human Rights is itself a "Constitutional Court" is largely a question of 
semantics.', p.i6i. 
144 Ibid. 
145 <i). BeyXeprig (F. Vegleris), 'H SunPaori xuv AiKaicondxcov TOU Av9p(bjiou K Q I TO EuvTay^a' 
[1976] ToE 385,394-
r. nivaKi5r|5 (G. Pinakides), 'H EirvxaYna-nKri Ycpr) xrig EupconaiKrig ZibuPaari? 
AiKaicotidxcjv xou AvGpwJiou' (2007) 33 AxA 71-95. 
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framework, established and accepted concepts that concern the organisation of the 
state re-open for discussion.'^ t? 
Either de jure or de facto, the system of the Convention has managed to 
establish itself through the binding judgments of its Court which have all been 
complied with, at least, at the ad hoc level (i.e. the applicant's claims) and very often 
at the structural level and over issues that involve positive obligations in a wide 
range of circumstances in which no national Constitutional court has competence or 
ever dared to reach (i.e. where mega-theories and principles have to meet 
practice).^8 The Convention is a supranational system that has set an independent 
and sovereign centre of power whose advent in the European legal order has not set 
antagonist fronts, but channels of co-operation with national systems and between 
them with the Convention as the common communication forum. Notable is the 
paradigm of English law in which the Convention's jurisprudence is directiy invoked, 
examined and analysed in litigation proceedings and judgments.149 Of course, such a 
national practice is the quintessence of a common European public order, as 
confirmed in the words of the former president of the Court, judge Luzius Wildhaber 
that '[if] the national authorities are in position to apply Convention case-law to the 
questions before it, then much, if not all, of the Strasbourg Court's work is done.' 'so 
Although the practice of the English courts may be seen as advanced, especially from 
the point of view of newer member states, it helps highlight the maximum practical 
result of the Convention's object and purpose that guides not merely the debate of 
whether the role of the Court is constitutional, but the more pertinent issues of the 
general and practical description of the constitutional job that needs to be carried 
out at the European level. And this job is about building a European public order 
that is needed as a qualitative standard-setting framework of human rights 
protection to guide and force changes at the domestic level, which is the only level at 
which human rights are a living experience. 
It may not be possible or desirable to engage in a debate of whether the 
Convention results in 'constitutional or individual justice'.'51 i t is the constitutional 
framework of the state that has to be targeted in order to secure justice to an 
»47 Ibid., p. 76 (translation), citing Eu. Bevi^ eXog, 'H Avroxn xou SuvraYlia-nKOU Oaivonevou 
oxri MExavecbxepTi Enoyf]' [2002] ToX 845, 855. 
See discussion on Drittwirkung above. 
•49 Human Rights Act 1998, sections 2.1, 3.1. See, e.g., R. v. British Broadcasting 
Corporation ex part Prolife Alliance [2003] UKHL 23 citing infer aZia Haider v. Austria (1995) 
83 DR 66, Huggett v. United Kingdom (1995) 82A DR 98, VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (2002), Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
^° Wildhaber, (note 33), p. 162. 
Greer, (note 139), Wildhaber, (note 33). 
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individual at the domestic level, and conversely, it is through the micro-level of 
individual justice that any defects in the constitutional fi-amework can be detected 
and addressed. As recently reaffirmed by the Court in the case of Karner 
its "judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before the 
Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules 
instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the 
States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties" (see 
Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, p. 62, § 154, and Guzzardi v. Italy, 
judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, p. 31, § 86). Although the 
primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its 
mission is also to determine issues on public-policy grounds in the common 
interest, thereby raising the general standards of protection of human rights and 
extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of 
Convention States.'s^ 
It should be seen as very basic that a supranational Court should look beyond the 
particular facts of an isolated complaint and deliver judgments that set standards 
and principles of broad reach in order to target structures and legal practices at the 
domestic level.'53 Such standards should be able to apply in all member states, 
otherwise neither their legitimacy is secured nor does any European standard 
emerge to define a European public order. A more conscious approach is now forced 
by the ever-increasing number of applications pending before a judicial formation 
that rose in 2009 by 23% to 119, 300.154 
Karner v. Austria, Judgment of 24 July 2003, no. 40016/98, para. 26. See also Capital 
Bank AD v. Bulgaria, no 49429/99, 24 November 2005, para. 79. The Commission had early 
observed that the 'interests served by the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Convention extend beyond the individual interests of the persons concerned; 
whereas they have led the member Parties of the Convention to establish standards forming part 
of the public law of Europe', H. G. and W. G. v. Germany, Admissibility decision of 16 December 
1964, no. 2294/64, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights Vol 8 1965, p. 320. 
See also Ireland v. the United Kingdom, para. 154. M. De Salvia, 'Illustration et Defense du 
Systeme Europeen de Protection Judicaire des Droits de I'Homme: Des Regies Precises pour des 
Obligations Claires et Partagees par les Etats' (2007) 69 RTDH 135-151 'the Court's business 
subscribes to the so-called framework of European public order, that is defined by its autonomy in 
relation to the national legal order. In this respect, the role of the Court can be of a constitutional 
nature. In fact, in interpreting the essential norms of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
the Court becomes implicitly involved in laying down principles, whose application goes beyond 
the given case that is brought for evaluation.' (franslation), p. 138. 
153 F. Tulkens (a judge of the Court), 'Human Rights, Rhetoric or Reality?' (2001) 9(2) ER 
125-134, p. 129, 'At the outset, it should be recalled that: "notwithstanding the vital role played by 
international mechanisms, the effective protection of human rights begins and ends at the 
national level"... Human rights are not just logos, they are also praxis. That consfraint means that 
the recognition of human rights is inseparable from the machinery used to ensure the rights' 
respect and protection.' citing the document of Coimcil of Europe 'The Effectiveness of Human-
rights Protection 50 years after the Universal Declaration' (1998). 
ECtHR Report: 'Analysis of Statistics 2009', p. 4, available at <www.echr.coe.int> 
(Reports section). R. Harmsen, The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement 
(2001) 5(4) IJHR 18-43 'Enlargement may see the Court escape these Qargely self-imposed) 
constraints, allowing it to (re)assume its rightful place as the constitutional court of a European 
public order.', p. 38. 
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The Court develops its approach in conformity with the subsidiary nature of the 
Convention. For this purpose, it has long relied on the judge-made principle of the 
state's margin of appreciation, whose application has not always been clear.^ ss What 
changes in the current technical approach, as observed in recent judgments and 
published commentary of judges writing in personal capacity, is a re-justification 
and re-orientation of the 'logic of subsidiarity', especially when reference is made to 
the case-law on positive obligations, which pose much bigger challenges due to the 
wide range of their application. ^ 56 i t should be noted that it is the 'logic' rather than 
the 'principle' that is stressed, reminding us that principles require a constant re-
justification and re-ihterpretation to accommodate current needs. In essence, the re-
alignment of subsidiarity marks the Court's abandonment of general margins 
allowed to the states in an effort to achieve the long-awaited quality of its reasoning 
and describe European human rights standards that educate the state and guarantee 
legal protection at the domestic level.^ s? in this account, subsidiarity is an end aim 
and not the starting point, as may have appeared in the past.^ ss what comes first are 
the domestic structures and legal principles that the Court needs to define in order 
for the Convention to become subsidiary to the state's legal system. 
•55 See, e.g., C. Feingold, The Little Red Schoolbook and the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (1978) 3(1) HRR 21-47; Lord Lester of Heme Hill, 'Universality Versus 
Subsidiarity: A Repl / [1998] EHRLR 73-81; R. Singh, M. Hunt, and M. Demetriou, 'Is There a 
Role for the "Margin of Appreciation" in National Law after the Human Rights Act' (1999) 1 
EHRLR 15-22; I. de la RasUla del Moral, 'The Increasing Marginal Appreciation of the Margin-of-
Appreciation Doctrine' (2006) 7 GLJ 611-624; Y. Arai-Takarashi, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 
2002); Greer, (note 139). 
Wildhaber, (note 33) p. 161, citing Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 
May 2001, no. 29392/95. 
«7 For insightful separate opinions in earUer case-law, see Fischer v. Austria, Judgment of 
26 April 1995, no.16922/90, per judge Jambrek: 'It seems to me that reasoning not solely 
restricted to the scope and the circumstances of the case would contribute better to the quality of 
the Comt's caise-law in the service of the Convention as a living constitutional instrument on 
EuLTopean public order.'; per judge Martens: 'This refusal to decide the question once and for all is 
(merely) based oh the Court's doctrine that the Court "shoiild confine itself as far as possible to 
examining the question raised by the case before it". This doctrine is in my opinion no more than 
a regrettable petitio principii. No provision of the Convention compels the Court to decide in this 
way on a strict case-by-case basis. This self-imposed restriction may have been a wise policy when 
the Court began its career, but it is no longer appropriate. A case-law that is developed on a strict 
case-by-case basis necessarily leads to imcertainty as to both the exact purport of each judgment 
and the precise contents of the Court's doctrine. ... The Court rightiy is wont to stress that the 
protection of the rights and freedoms imder the Convention falls primarily to national authorities. 
It should, however, not overlook that the reverse side of this coin is that national authorities are 
obliged to seek guidance in its case-law.', para. 16 (footnote omitted). F. Sudre, 'Les «ObUgations 
Positives* dans la Jurisprudence Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' in P. Mahoney; F. 
Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective: 
Studies in Memory ofRolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymarms Verlag, 2000): 1359-1376 'The affirmation 
that is regiilarly repeated by the Court that "it is not for the Court to determine the measures that 
have to be taken" by the convicted State, is a pretence [pseudo-appearance]' (franslation), p. 1375. 
See also Marckx v. Belgium, para. 58. 
See, e.g., Eckle v. Germany, Judgment of 15 July 1982, no. 8130/78, para. 66. 
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The general premises of the technical approach of the Court that affect the 
planning and application of positive obligations within the Convention system 
should be discussed here to support the choice in the structure of chapters and, also, 
to introduce the reader to some key technical issues that are fully elaborated in the 
following chapters. 
The Court determines first the substantive law of the Convention. It explains 
the scope of the Convention rights and the entitiement to human rights protection 
taking into account the principle of equality that reminds the European judges of the 
potential of their decision to set a pan-European precedent. In appropriate 
circumstances, the capabilities and natural limits of the Convention, as well as those 
of the states and the economic disparities between them are pertinent 
considerations in determining positive obligations in the wide range of 
circumstances in which the state does not directiy interfere. 
As long as the substantive law of positive obligations has been defined, the focus 
shifts on the procedural aspect of the state's obligations, that is the means by which 
domestic law can implement the substantive content of human rights protection. In 
addition, the substantive law is also defined through procedural safeguards, which 
are seen as inherent in the objective determination of the content of protection. As a 
result, the Court's review increasingly expands to the procedural framework through 
which interested individual are able to participate in the enforcement and 
implementation of positive obligations at the domestic level. This trend coincides 
v^th the process of the Court's continuous self-evaluation, which seeks to adjust its 
supranational supervision to the challenges of its ever-expanding business and the 
long-term effectiveness of the Convention. 
Appropriate procedures and structures induce the dialectics of justice at the 
domestic level, something that is particularly encouraged by the European 
institution. Thus, when a htiman right has been violated, the European judge 
ultimately checks what the last domestic judicial authority has ruled in order to 
assess, even at such a late stage, whether the applicant's complaint was examined 
within the state's system, and if so, whether that examination was effective. 
'59 See, e.g., Hendriks v. The Netherlands, Admissibility decision of 13 March 1980, no 
8427/78 'it might appear that the present state of the legislation in the Netherlands does not as 
such provide for the legal safeguards required by Art. 8 of the Convention to ensure that contact 
between a divorced parent not having custody and his or her child exists as a matter of right. 
However, in the context of the present case, the Commission finds that the problem does not arise 
insofar as the courts in the Netherlands have clearly treated the applicant's claim for access to his 
child in a way that recognised his entitiement to such access but have refused it in the interest of 
58 
A modern democracy should provide for, or a democracy is modern where there 
are institutional structures of procedural nature that allow the individual to initiate 
the social debate on the active protection of human rights and participate in the 
implementation of protection. It is the institutional level of access that determines 
and updates the content of positive obligations and it is the same level that 
guarantees their implementation in the domestic system. 
Without having to give examples from the jurisprudence, a job that is reserved 
for the following chapters, we confirm the above brief discussion of the Court's 
current approach and technical plan vdth reference to recent institutional 
developments, as have been highlighted by the new Protocol 14, which was adopted 
to further streamline the Court's supervision of the state's legal system.Both 
issues of substance and procedure are codified in the new admissibility criteria of 
Article 12 of Protocol 14 which amends paragraph 3 of the Article 35 of the 
Convention by inserting sub-paragraph b) as follows: 
12.3: The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted 
under Article 34 if it considers that: 
a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual 
application; or 
b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an 
examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be 
rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal. 
These criteria have stirred a fierce debate due to the uncertainty surrounding their 
exact application. However, it should be said that these criteria are already in 
application and, as this study will show, the existing principles can reach a very 
advanced level of specification and methodology. Some flexibility is also expected 
the child.', para. 106-07. See also the Court's examination of the trial stage at the domestic level in 
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, paras. 115,116. 
160 Protocol 14 amending the control system of the Convention (adopted on 13 May 2004). 
See also parallel Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on judgment revealing an 
imderlying systemic problem (adopted on 12 May 2004) with which they invite the Court: 'as far 
as possible, to identify, in its judgments finding a violation of the Convention, what it considers to 
be an underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in particular when it is likely 
to give rise to numerous applications, so as to assist states in finding the appropriate solution and 
the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments'. De Salvia, (note 151). See, 
e.g., Broniowski v. Poland; Lukenda v. Slovenia, Judgment of 6 October 2005, no. 23032/02; 
Cocchiarella v. Italy, Judgment of 29 March 2006, no. 64866/01. 
E . Savarese, 'II Protocollo N. 14 alia Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell' Unomo' [2004] 
RDI 714-729; L. Caflisch (a judge of the Court), 'The Reform of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond' (2006) 6 HRLR 403-415; Greer, (note 139); De Salvia, (note 
151). 
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until the Court is able to reach the required expertise (that is at the same time of 
considering the admissibility issue) in order to develop legal principles, whose 
clarity and consistent application will achieve the purpose of the new admissibility 
test.162 
Thus, it may transpire, as it often does in every science, that from whichever 
angle one departs, either to manage the large number of petitions or the big ideals of 
the object and purpose of the Convention or the technical demands of the legal 
science itself, in the final analysis everything comes down to the technical expertise 
and the methodological framework that have to be meticulously crafted. 
Under the current application of Article 35.1 on the exhaustion of effective domestic 
remedies, the Court has recently reiterated that 'the application of the exhaustion rule must make 
due allowance for the fact that it is being apphed in the context of machinery for the protection of 
human rights and that it must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive 
formalism.', Assocfarion of Citizens "Radko" and Paunkovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Admissibility decision of 8 July 2008, no. 74651/01. See also C. v. the United 
Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 14 December 2004, no. 14858/03; Wignall v. the United 
Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 26 October 2004, no. 3079/03. 
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2 
The Application and Development of 
Positive Obligations 
In this chapter we study the application and development of positive obligations in 
extending the scope of human rights protection in the wide range of circumstances 
in which private individuals interact. A coherent methodological framework is 
proposed to determine the content of positive obligations in a realistic, consistent 
and predictable manner. 
The general approach is to move beyond the basic and introductory Article-by-
Article study of the Convention in recognition that its provisions are mostiy broadly 
framed and the content of protection is naturally linked to other issues within the 
wide context of activities to which an applicant's circumstances often relate. 
Accordingly, the current study gives due weight to the well-known maxim that 'in 
law context is everything'^  in order to assert the content of positive obligations as a 
system of protection that is organised and implemented in various levels. 
At first, the distinctive character of positive obligations in imposing the active 
protection of human rights has to be established. Positive obligations co-exist with 
other obligations requiring the state not to interfere with human rights (i.e. negative 
obligations) but are not an extended interpretation of the latter, as has appeared in 
some case-law. For this reason, a specific content of positive obligations has to be 
identified and be required in its own right (section A). 
The current thesis advocates a manageable scope of positive obligations which 
has to be defined before going into the discussion of the specific content of 
protection. To this aim, pertinent principles of international law are revisited in 
order to establish the critical condition under which the state's liability can be 
engaged in the circumstances in which state actors do not directly interfere. In that 
respect, objective elements are inserted in judicial examination to narrow 
considerably the apparentiy open-ended scope of positive obligations (section B). 
' Taking this opportunity to pay homage to a learned judge, we only cite Lord Steyn in his 
opinion in R. v. Secretary for Home Department ex parte Daly [2001] UKHJ 26, paras. 27-28. 
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With reference to the discussion in the introductory chapter that the Court does 
not recognize conceptual hmits to the responsibility of the states for the acts of 
interference of private individuals, positive obligations are primarily managed vis-a-
vis the scope of the Convention rights against which these obligations arise. In that 
connection, technical rather than conceptual limits are identified which can 
strategically be adjusted to the capabilities of the system of the Convention, as well 
as those of the member states. Limits of practicality are additionally recognized in 
their own right. Their study is divided in accordance with critical points of 
distinction, as observed in various contexts in which the active protection of human 
rights is required. Having defined a manageable scope of positive obligations, the 
study moves on to the specific level of protection. Aiming at a system of human 
rights, the content of positive obligations is organized in relation to the complete 
range of protection, whose effectiveness depends on core aspects of the domestic 
procedural infrastructure through which a more specific and ad hoc response can be 
determined (section C). 
Further divisions are included to determine the content of protection in 
circumstances in which legitimate aims of interference with human rights are 
pursued by the state through the activities of private parties, or where there are 
conflicts of rights in some contexts of private interactions (section D). 
The long division of sections and sub-sections accounts for points of distinction 
that correspond to critical parameters and contextual differences, which affect 
considerably the planning of the application and development of positive obligations 
in the system of the Convention. In short, the chapter's proposal is embodied in a 
long prioritized, and yet interconnected, breakdown of critical parameters that are 
considered beyond ad hoc balances to assert a manageable content of positive 
obligations in accordance with their potential. 
Before going into the main text, it should be clarified that the discussion of the 
jurisprudence in this chapter does not intend to make an exhaustive presentation or 
collection of various approaches. Of course, other case-law can well be identified and 
interpreted in a different way so as to reach different conclusions. The main aim of 
this study is to reason a choice of principles and structures upon which to base a 
proposal for a coherent and workable legal framework and, therefore, our task is 
confined to locating 'existing',^ as opposed to exhaustive, norms. Guidance is also 
= J . De Meyer, 'The Rights to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and 
Communications in Relations Between Individuals, and the Resulting Obhgations for States 
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drawn from the wider objectives of the Convention, the on-going internal debate on 
the Court's function (as discussed in chapter i ) , and the Court's jurisprudence as 
nomologia whose authority is conditioned on a sufficient scientific reasoning ilogos) 
for the development and adjudication of law (nomos).3 
A. Establishing the Distinctive Nature and Potential of Positive 
Obligations in the Current Reasoned Phase of the 
Jurisprudence 
The study of positive obligations should cover the technical principles by which their 
content can be determined in the wide range of circumstances in which private 
individuals interact. The legal principles of the earlier case-law (which are still in 
circulation) will be discussed and juxtaposed with recent developments in the 
Court's legal reasoning. The discussion revolves around the judgments of Hatton 
and Others in 2001 and 2003 which mark the beginning of the modern 
jurisprudence* that has coincided with or has psychologically been influenced by the 
advent of the new century/millennium and the ever-increasing dynamism of 
European societies in the current era of the advanced internationalisation of human 
rights movements.5 The main purpose of this section is to establish the distinctive 
nature and potential of positive obligations in order to secure the perspective of the 
active protection of human rights (i.e. the substance of positive obligations) in the 
determination of the content of positive obligations in various circumstances. 
Parties to the Convention' in A.H. Robertson (ed.), Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester 
University Press, 1973): 255-275, 273. 
3 M. de Blois, The Fundamental Freedom of the European Court of Human Rights' in R. 
Lawson, M. de Blois (eds). The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in 
Honour of H. G. Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): 35-59 'This has to do with what I would like 
to call the quest for rationality which is a predominant factor in the theory of law. Judicial 
decisions are not acceptable only because the judge is invested with the power to decide.', p. 37. 
4 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 October 2001 and (Grand 
Chamber) Judgment of 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97. 
5 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, Judgment of 25 August 2009, no. 23458/02. For earlier 
insights, see statements by Prime Minister Olof Palme on the occasion of the commemoration of 
the Fortieth Anniversary of the United Nations on 21 October 1985, available at 
<www.olofpalme.org>. 
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I. The Merging of Positive and Negative Obligations: The Fair 
Balance Test 
In most of the case-law relating to human rights violations by private parties, the 
positive obligations of the state have usually been merged with negative obligations 
under the so-called 'fair balance test'. A case in which the fair balance test was 
elaborated and has since been widely cited as an authority for its application is Rees 
dated in 1986. The applicant, a post-operative transsexual, had been experiencing 
embarrassment and humiliation whenever the birth certificate had to be produced. 
He complained that his full integration into social life had been constrained by the 
state's refusal to take steps that would legally constitute him as a male (his new 
apparent sexual identity) on the birth certificate.^ 
Accepting the government's readily-given admission of its positive obligations, 
the Court laid down the legal test of positive obligations under Article 8, as follows: 
In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had 
to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual, the search for which balance is 
inherent in the whole of the Convention (...). In striking this balance the aims 
mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 8 (art. 8-2) may be of a certain 
relevance, although this provision refers in terms only to "interferences" with 
the right protected by the first paragraph - in other words is concerned with the 
negative obligations flowing dierefrom (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx 
judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 15, para. 3i ) .7 
It is clear that a merging solution was sought when the state's failure could be seen 
as an act or omission and, therefore, a negative or positive obligation could be 
argued. In that connection, the legitimate aims of interference in paragraph 2 of 
Article 8 were held to be of 'a certain relevance'. In applying the fair balance test, as 
defined in that case, the Court recognised a wide margin of appreciation to the state 
to dismiss the appUcant's claims.^  
6 Rees V. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 17 October 1986, no. 9532/81, para. 34. The 
Rees case is one of the classic authorities that has widely been cited in case-law for the application 
of the fair balance test, see, e.g., Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 
21 February 1990, no. 9310/81, para. 41; Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Judgment of 9 December 1994, 
no. 16798/90, para. 51; Hokkanen v. Finland, Judgment of 23 September 1994, no. 19823/92, 
para. 55; Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 96; O'Reilly and Others v. Ireland, 
Applicability decision of 28 February 2002, no. 54725/00; Fadeyeva v. Russia, Judgment of 9 
June 2006, no. 55723/00, para. 99. These cases serve in turn as authorities for the fair balance 
test, see, e.g. Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), citing Powell and Rayner, para. 98; 
Giacomelli v. Italy, Judgment of 2 November 2006, no. 59909/00 citing Powell and Rayner, 
para. 78; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 26 October 2006, no. 53157/99, nos. 
53247/99; 56850/00; 53695/00, citing Fadeyeva, para. 101. 
7 Rees V. the United Kingdom, para. 37. 
8 Ibid. 
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However, in that case, none of the legitimate aims of interference of paragraph 
2 justified the wide margin of appreciation, which was accorded to the state on the 
mere ground that a modification of pubhc record would have to be carried out by 
'detailed legislation' in order to address the implications involved. 
Without having to go into an analysis of how it is ever possible for detailed 
legislation to be the sole ground for refusing protection of a human right, and by 
extension, the very development of law,9 we proceed to discuss wider technical 
issues that have ensued firom the application of the merging balance test. 
The main technical problem with the fair balance test comes down to the simple 
point that since that test is not categorically conditioned on the justification of 
paragraph 2 legitimate aims of interference, its assessment is not clear, and hence 
the application of law is far from certain to be 'fair'. To put it straightforwardly, 
which are exactly the 'general interests of the community' for which the state is 
accorded a margin of appreciation? 
In scholarly commentary, informed criticism on the merging fair balance test, 
as that made by Caroline Forder, is rare. Her point is as follows: 
apart from the "general interest" aims laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 8, a 
second, more ill-defined "general interest" test, or reference to the "due regard 
to the needs and resources of the community" is emerging to apply to those 
cases to which Article 8 (2) does not apply. Apart from the obvious illogicality of 
creating a second general interest test in addition to an existing statutory one, 
these developments present a formidable threat to the protection offered by 
Article 8. There is a danger that the "general interest" test which is emerging is 
much wider than the aims prescribed in Article 8 (2) the pursuit of which may 
justify restriction of the rights protected and thus that restriction may be 
permitted in cases of positive obligations when it would not be permitted in 
cases of negative obligations. In conjunction with the possibility, explained 
above, that some claims may be described as positive or negative the 
circumscribed restriction permitted under Article 8 (2) is in danger of being 
converted into an unlimited one.'° 
What in essence is highlighted is that a balance test (i?ees style) has been allowed to 
operate through the state's margin of appreciation in the absence of concrete, and 
more importantly, binding legitimate aims. Consequently, that test constitutes an 
arbitrary deviation from the permanent provisions of the Convention and the 
predictability of its codified norms. 
9 Unlike the majority of the Court in Rees, the dissenting judges Bindschedler-Robert, Russo 
and Gersing considered alternatives and mitigating measures vis-a-vis certain contextual settings 
that would be affected if the applicant's claim was upheld. 
'° C. Forder, 'Legal Protection under Article 8 ECHR: Marckx and Beyond' (1990) 37(2) 
NILR162-181,179. 
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It is worth reiterating that in its classical form, the state's margin of 
appreciation is connected to the principle of proportionality. Proportionality 
presupposes 'a pressing social need' and mitigating measures or alternatives in order 
to justify an interference as being 'necessary' in a democratic society," under 
paragraph 2 of the Convention rights. In other words, the state's margin, which 
is a part of the proportionality assessment, cannot arbitrarily be elevated to 
autonomous status and operate independently of the very purpose for which it was 
originally invented and justified. 
Additionally, the fair balance test is said to balance the 'interests of the 
individual'. But how are the 'interests of the individual' balanced without examining 
what is at stake under the circumstances. Of course, as the case passes the 
admissibility examination, it can be assumed that there should be a negative impact 
on the applicant. However, the full extent of what is at stake for the individual 
concerned may not be reflected by the degree of severity of the admissibility 
threshold. In that respect, the impact assessment may not be exhausted with general 
estimations, for circumstances vary considerably and it is often necessary to involve 
expert opinion to establish the exact degree of severity of the negative consequences. 
Such considerations did appear in the Court's judgment in Rees, in which it was 
stated that 
the Court is conscious of the seriousness of the problems affecting these persons 
and the distress they suffer. The Convention has always to be interpreted and 
applied in the light of current circumstances (see, mutatis mutandis, amongst 
others, the Dudgeon judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, pp. 23-24, 
paragraph 60). The need for appropriate legal measures should therefore be 
kept under review having regard particularly to scientific and societal 
developments.'^ 
This passage recognises that the impact assessment should also rely on scientific 
opinion so as to incorporate objective elements in the judicial examination. It 
remains, however, an obiter dicta statement that is given after a decision of non-
violation of Article 8 has already been concluded in the immediately previous 
paragraph of the judgment. 
" L. Loucaides, Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 
'Chapter 9, section 10: The Principle of Proportionality'; Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR 
(Intersentia, 2002). 
^ Rees V. the United Kingdom, para. 47. 
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01. The Proposal to Determine Positive Obligations under the 
Paragraph 2 Provisions 
The uncertainty and unpredictability surrounding the 'fair balance test' was 
addressed in the concurring opinion of the judge Wildhaber in the otherwise 
unanimous decision of the case of Sljerna.^ In that case the applicant complained 
that the state's refusal to allow him to change his surname violated the right to 
respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The judge 
pointed out the difficulty for the Court to distinguish between positive and negative 
obligations. He stated that 'the dividing line between negative and positive 
obligations is not so clear-cut' and in the cases, such as that of Gaskin, 'the refusal by 
the British authorities to grant a former child in care unrestricted access to child-
care records covild be considered as a negative interference, whereas a duty on the 
State to provide such access could arguably be viewed as a positive obligation.'^ 
With regard to the more pertinent question about the determination of positive 
obligations through the fair balance test, the concurring judge found that 'the Court 
has in effect applied only the first paragraph (art.8-i) in such cases.' In the interests 
of avoiding an 'incoherent jurisprudence', and relying on the statements of the Court 
in Keegan, and Hokkanen >^  for a 'striking similarity between the applicable 
principles', he proposed a merging approach that defies a 'negative/positive 
dichotomy', stating that 
it would be preferable to construe the notion of "interference" so as to cover 
facts capable of breaching an obligation incumbent on the State under Article 8 
para, i (art. 8-1), whether negative or positive. Whenever a so-called positive 
obligation arises the Court should examine, as in the event of a so-called 
negative obligation, whether there has been an interference with the right to 
respect for private and family life under paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1), and 
whether such interference was "in accordance with the law", pursued legitimate 
aims and was "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of 
paragraph 2 (art. 8-2).i7 
'3 Stjema v. Finland, Judgment of 25 November 1994, no.18131/91. 
^ Ibid., citing the concurring opinion of judge Wildhaber; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 10454/83. 
15 Keegan v. Ireland, Judgment of 26 May 1994, no. 27229/95, para. 49. 
1* Hokkanen v. Finland, para. 55. 
17 Stjema v. Finland. P. van Dijk, '"Positive Obligations" Implied in the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Are the States Still the 'Masters' of the Convention?' in M. 
Castermans-Holleman, F. Van Hoof, J . Smith (eds), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st 
Century: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Law International, 1998): 17-33 'there is no 
reason not to use here, also by analogy, the same criteria borrowed from the limitation clauses of 
other provisions.', p. 32. 
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There are some points that need to be analysed and highlighted, as the proposal of 
judge Wildhaber for a complete merging of positive and negative obligations under 
the notion of interference has attracted particular attention and support in scholarly 
commentary. 18 
However, it has first to be noted that the principle of margin of appreciation 
arises in the third stage of the examination of paragraph 2. In addition, the first 
paragraph of the Convention rights does not relate to justifiable acts of interference 
by state actors. It cannot be said, therefore, that 'only the first paragraph' of a 
Convention right was applied in the earlier case-law. 
At times, there is confusion when the term 'margin' is used to describe a 'choice' 
of measures to guarantee the active protection of human rights under paragraph 1, 
as opposed to examining the necessity/proportionality of the interference under 
paragraph 2 to which the principle of margin of appreciation is connected. In the 
passage of Rees quoted above, the fair balance test and the certain relevance of the 
legitimate aims of paragraph 2 have been justified with reference mutatis mutandis 
to the earlier case of Marckx.^"^ However, as we have seen in the discussion of 
Marckx in the previous chapter, the Court expressly stated that 'the State has a 
choice of various means, but a law that fails to satisfy this requirement violates 
paragraph 1 of Article 8 without being any call to examine it under paragraph 2.'^° 
The 'choice of various means' is a choice from a range of measures that can be taken 
to actively protect the human rights of the individuals under paragraph 1 of a 
Convention right. This 'choice', which may have been worded as a 'margin of 
appreciation' in subsequent case-law or used to make an easy connection to the 
authority of Marckx, has nothing to do with the entrenched principle of margin of 
appreciation that arises exclusively under the third stage of the examination of 
paragraph 2 to assess the proportionality of the state's interference. 
Admittedly, judge Wildhaber's proposal for a complete merging of positive and 
negative obligations under the perspective of 'interference' aims at a 'coherent 
jurisprudence', through the certainty and predictability of the codified provisions of 
18 F. Sudre, 'Les «Obligations Positives* dans la Jurisprudence Europeenne des Droits de 1' 
Homme' in P. Mahoney; F. Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds), Protecting Human Rights: 
The European Perspective: Studies in Memory ofRolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2000): 
PP-1359-1376,1374; P. van I>ijk, (note 17) 'it would seem justified to bring the non-fulfillment of a 
positive obligation under the notion of 'interference.' [And referring to the opinion of judge 
Wildhaber in Stjema] 'it would be preferable "to construe the notion of interference" so as to 
cover facts capable of breaching the obligation incumbent on the State under Article 8 § 1, 
whether negative or positive.', p. 25. 
'9 Marckx v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1978, no. 6833/74. 
20 Ibid., para. 31. 
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paragraph 2 of the Convention rights. In that regard, the fair balance test will no 
longer be considered in abstracto, as seen in Rees above. Instead, only the 
exhaustively listed legitimate aims, the express stages and well-entrenched 
principles of paragraph 2 examination will have to be applied. It should be noted 
that under this proposal, the fair balance test adds nothing to the balance that is 
inherent in the proportionality principle.^i 
But with regard to the active protection of human rights that is the core 
meaning of positive obligations, paragraph 2 is not automatically relevant. In that 
respect, in the proposal for a complete merging of the state's obligations under the 
perspective of paragraph 2, the first criterion that the interference must be 
'prescribed by law' (or 'in accordance with law'), needs particidar attention. Pieter 
van Dijk has suggested that '[i]n those cases one must conclude that the 
"interference" which consists in the non-fulfilment of an implied positive obligation, 
finds its cause in the law and is, therefore, provided by law.'^ ^ It should be reiterated, 
however, that the standard of this criterion has early been interpreted as being very 
strict and qualitatively sophisticated so as to guarantee a satisfactory level of 
foreseeability and certainty of the content of law, and hence of the level of human 
rights protection, for the benefit of all interested parties.^ a More importantly, the 
issue of the active protection of human rights concerns a content of positive 
obligations that is first directed at the regulatory level.24 Accordingly, what needs to 
be prescribed by law are not simply the conditions that justify the 'non-fulfilment' of 
a positive obligation. 
III. The Stages before the Balance Test 
In recent jurisprudence, the fair balance test has increasingly being subjected to an 
objective assessment of evidence to guarantee an informed process for the merits 
examination of human rights claims. To the extent that specific intermediate steps 
(i.e. of public administration) have to be taken in order to produce the requisite 
Ruano Morcuende v. Spain, Admissibility decision of 6 September 2005, no. 75287/01 
(available in French only). 
" van Dijk, (note 17), p.26. 
^3 See e.g., Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 April 1979, no. 6538/74. 
^ See discussion in chapter 1, section B.II with regard to the case of X and Y v. the 
Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80. C. Drogue, Positive Verpflichtungen der 
Staaten in der Europaischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Springer, 2003) This [fair balance] test 
cannot be an exact rephcation of the test for negative obligations. Thus, positive obligations 
cannot fulfill the requirement of being "provided for by law" as they may indeed be obligations to 
enact legislative measures.', p 390. 
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evidence, these steps become in turn an indispensable part of the judicial 
examination. Although the discussion in this section is still placed within the 
structure of paragraph 2, the shift in focus towards an objective legal reasoning 
influences comparatively the development of positive obligations. 
The opportunity to improve the fair balance test arose vrith the case of Hatton 
and Others, in which the applicants complained of the state's failure to protect them 
from nuisance, which was caused by the commercial activities (night-flights) of a 
private corporation, Although the interference with the human right of the 
appHcants was directly attributed to a private party, it was the state's planning 
administration that had authorised the operation and expansion of the corporation's 
business. Before the Court, the state's endorsement of the corporation's activities 
was confirmed in the submission of the government, which expressly invoked the 
legitimate aim of 'the economic well-being of the country', as listed in paragraph 2, 
to justify its indirect involvement in the interference complained of. 
What will be looked at here is not a conclusive legal reasoning - given the two 
judgments of that case (the Chamber's finding of violation of Article 8 was reversed 
by the Grand Chamber) and the considerable number of influential concurring and 
dissenting opinions - but the occasion that has signalled an informed debate among 
the judges on the quality and intensity of their examination. The principal 
consideration is to achieve an objective legal reasoning and a more expansive review 
of the state's system in order to produce judgments, whose effects set standards that 
can apply to the wide context of private parties' activities (e.g. commerce or 
industry) to which the given individual case relates. 
The Court's examination in the case of Hatton and Others revolves around the 
fair balance test that is used as a unifying principle whether the state's failure is 
approached as an act of its agents or an omission to protect individuals from the 
activities of a private party.From the application of the balance test in that case, it 
is clear that the legitimate aims of paragraph 2 do not have a 'certain' or abstract 
relevance, since the Court's examines exclusively the legitimate aim of the 'economic 
well-being of the country'.27 What changes in the judicial examination is that well 
before a margin of appreciation arises for the state under the fair balance test, it 
should be established that the competing interests of litigant parties meet the 
=5 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom. A similar complaint was examined in the 
earlier case of Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom. 
2* Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 96; Hatton and Others v. the United 
Kingdom (GC), para. 98. 
=7 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, paras. 97,100,102,106-7; Hatton and Others 
V. the United Kingdom (GC), paras. 121-2,126. 
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applicable thresholds of significance in order to qualify for competing status. Thus, 
on one hand, the impact suffered (or to be suffered) by the individual should reach 
the threshold of severity that engages a Convention right. Analogously, on the other 
hand, the economic well-being of the country should be significant (the entrenched 
'pressing social need' threshold) in order to limit legitimately the scope of human 
rights protection. As this information has to be known in order to balance 
objectively, and hence 'fairly', the competing interests, it conditions whether the 
balance test or the state's margin can arise under the circumstances. Accordingly, 
the legal examination does not start from the balance test, but from the 
adminisfrative structures (i.e. to conduct investigations and studies) from which the 
requisite evidence emerges.^ ? 
The exact content of such administrative structures is assessed by the standard 
of effectiveness, whose examination targets those critical details affecting the quahty 
of evidence that is finally produced. What accounted for the different outcome 
reached in the judgments of Chamber and Grand Chamber was the different weight 
that was given to the critical importance of the public administration's failure to: a) 
examine sleep prevention when assessing the negative impact on the applicants and 
b) commission an independent (as opposed to industry-produced) evaluation of the 
benefits for the economic well-being of the country. 3° 
In the scholarly commentary of the post-Hatton and Others period, the 
evidence that is required to prove the relevance or legitimacy of the state's margin of 
appreciation, and the public administrative framework from which that evidence 
derives, are convenientiy termed as 'proceduralisation' or 'proceduralisation 
movement'. In commenting on the changing legal environment and the current 
=8 Loucaides, 'Chapter 9: section 10: The Principle of Proportionality', (note 11), 'The case-
law uses the test of proportionality in conjunction w i ^ the requirement of "pressing social need". 
The organs of the Convention must first be satisfied that there was a pressing social need for the 
measure under examination and then examine whether the particular measure was proportionate 
to that need.', p. 197. See also the joint dissenting opinion of judges Costa, Ress, Tiirmen, 
ZupanciS and Steiner in Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC) 'The margin of 
appreciation of the State is narrowed down because of the fundamental nature of the right to 
sleep, which may be outweighed only by the real, pressing (if not urgent needs) of the State.' On 
the threshold of 'pressing social need', see e.g., Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 27 September 1999, nos. 33985/96 ; 33986/96; Colaqo Mestre and SIC - Sociedade 
Independente de Comunicagao SA. v. Portugal, Judgment of 26 April 2007, nos. 11182/03 and 
11319/03-
29 Hatton and Others (GC), paras. 104,128; Giacomelli v. Italy, paras. 83-84. 
30 H. Post, 'Hatton and Others: Further Clarifications of the 'Indirect' Individual Right to a 
Healthy Environment' (2002) 2 N-SAIL 259-277 'Here, the Coiirt [Chamber] presumes that the 
UK has the duty to prove that no interference with the rights mentioned in Article 8.1, has taken 
place, and was not impressed by the quality of the research into the complaints of the applicants 
that the UK Government presented.', p. 273. A. Clack, 'Heathrow Case Challenged' The Guardian, 
23 May 2005. 
71 
technical approach of the Court in various key stages of its judicial examination, 
Frangoise Tulkens (a judge of the Court acting in personal capacity) and Sebastien 
Van Drooghenbroeck have explained that 
the benefits rest on the objectivity and credibility that the procedural approach 
brings to the controlling function of the Court...Under this perspective, the 
proceduralisation movement can explain the postponement of the margin of 
appreciation by inserting a preliminary condition: Before examining the issue of 
the States' appreciations, it has to be established that the chances of reaching a 
"good decision" have been multiplied by using a formal methodological 
framework through which the whole set of pertinent interests can be taken into 
account in an equitable and impartial manner. In a way, the development of 
procedural guarantees and the control that is exercised on them can appear as 
the natural and fruitful corollary of the doctrine of the states' margin of 
appreciation, and through which, of the subsidiary function that is assumed by 
the European Court of Human Rights, (translation) 31 
The shift in emphasis on the qualitative assessment of the administrative framework 
that secures the necessary evidence and which alone guarantees the objective 
evaluation of the merits involved, has been confirmed in the subsequent case of 
Goodwin, which concerned a complaint similar to that seen in Rees. In reversing its 
previous reasoning, as applied in Rees, the Court held that the respondent 
government can no longer claim that the matter falls within their margin of 
appreciation, save for the choice of appropriate means to guarantee the human 
rights interests of the individuals concerned (as in Marckx).^^ The reason that the 
state's margin did not arise in that case, compared with the approach taken in Rees, 
was the importance that was placed on the examination of evidence. The judges 
relied on evidence contained in a report of the Interdepartmental Working Group 
indicating that the number of potential applicants (i.e. post-operative transsexuals) 
is between 2,000-5,000 and, therefore, it could not be said that they 'pose the threat 
of overturning the entire system.'asAs '[n]o concrete or substantial hardship or 
detriment to the public interest has indeed been demonstrated [by the state] as 
likely to flow from any change to the status of transsexuals',34 the state could not be 
said to have either engaged a legitimate aim for its interference or established the 
threshold of a pressing social need (or as stated: 'substantial hardship or detriment 
to the public interest'). In the absence of the requisite evidential proof, the Court was 
31 F. Tulkens and S. Van Drooghenbroeck, 'L'Evolution des Droits Garantis et 
rinterpretation Jurisprudentielle de la CEDH' (Lecture speech at the University of Grenoble on 27 
September 2002) <http://webu2.upmf-gren0ble.fr/espace-
europe/acad2002/textes/tulkens.htm >. 
32 Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95, para. 93. See 
also discussion at pages with notes 19, 20 above. 
33 Ibid., para. 87, see also para. 92. 
34 Ibid., para. 91. 
72 
able to conclude unanimously that the state's assertions were 'framed in generial 
terms' and, therefore, it could not find that 'any real prospect of prejudice has been 
identified as likely to arise if changes were made to the current system.'35 In such 
circumstances, the stage for the margin of appreciation of the state could not be 
reached. 
The efforts of the European judges to restore certainty and predictability in the 
development and application of European human rights law are increasingly 
concentrating on the structures of the domestic public administration,36 which is 
responsible for furnishing the necessary evidences^  by which the state authorities 
will be able to objectively appreciate the necessity (i.e. pressing social need and 
proportionality) of limiting the scope of human rights protection in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim of interference.ss 
IV. A Firm Distinction between Positive and Negative Obligations 
Positive obligations are imposed on the state by virtue of paragraph i of the 
Convention rights. Accordingly, the cases discussed above, namely Rees, Gaskin, 
Powell and Rayner, Stjerna, Hatton and Others, Goodwin, in which positive 
obligations have been exartiined through a merging approach or otherwise, are not 
positive obligations cases. 
In Rees, the applicant's complaint concerned the state's express refusal to alter 
his birth certificate that would reflect his new gender post-operation status. In 
Gaskin, the Commission found that the refusal of the state authorities to allow the 
applicant access to his birth file was an interference with the right to respect for his 
private life and, therefore, its justification had to be made under paragraph 2 of 
Article 8. 
In all these cases, it is clear that the applicants did not argue on the state's 
positive obligations. That their complaints were examined as positive or positive and 
negative (in a merging fashion) obligations cases is due to the willingness of the 
35 Ibid., para. 87. 
36 See also E . Dubout, 'La Proceduralisation des Obligations Relatives aux Droits 
Fondamentaux Substantiels par la Cour Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' (2007) 70 RTDH 
397-425 'One of the notable consequences of extending the examination of procedural obligations 
is to "objectivise" - in a sense of rendering more objective - the judicial control of respect of 
fundamental rights which, to some extent, is left dedramatised [to be conducted in neutral terms]. 
The judge of liberties moves progressively to become judge of procedures.' (translation), p. 402. 
37 Fadeyeva v. Russia, 'the Court reiterates that the onus is on the State to justify, using 
detailed and rigorous data, a situation in which certain individuals bear a heavy burden on behalf 
of the rest of the community.', para. 128. 
38 See, recently, Ruano Morcuende v. Spain. 
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Court to adopt the governments' readily-given admission of their positive 
obligations. The substance of law, however, does not change by whichever way or 
from whichever angle one chooses to argue a legal case. 
When an individual can establish entitlement to a human right, for example, by 
meeting the threshold of negative impact engaging a Convention right, then the state 
is under a positive obligation to guarantee human rights protection to that 
individual by virtue of paragraph i of the relevant provision. If the state faUs to 
guarantee protection and, as a result, the individual is not able to enjoy it in the 
particular circumstances concerned, then the state's liability is raised under 
paragraph i of that right. In Stjema, a human right could not be engaged in the 
applicant's circumstances (see further discussion below) and, therefore, it is 
preposterous to examine positive obligations on something that is not there in the 
first place. 
The issue of perspective of the active protection of human rights can be seen in 
the Commission's opinion in Gaskin, in which it stated that 
respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details 
of their identity as individual human beings and that in principle they should 
not be obstructed by the authorities from obtaining such very basic information 
without specific justification.39 
To put it simply, the applicant in that case had sought access to his birth record, the 
claim fell squarely vrithin the scope of private life under Article 8 and, therefore, the 
state's first reaction would be to accord the individual access to his record due to his 
entitlement to a constitutional human right. 
The issue of perspective is in essence the constitutional perspective that 
imposes the priority of protection of human rights. Most human rights are not 
absolute and, thus, appropriate limitations are also provided. It is, however, of 
crucial importance to establish the perspective and priority of protection of human 
rights, as they affect the order fi-om which the legal examination is undertaken. 
The importance of the constitutional perspective can more easily be seen in the 
debate about the constitutionality of some rights. In discussing the protection of 
privacy (as linked to the general interest of private life within the meaning of Article 
8), David Feldman argued that 'P3]ecause claims to privacy-related rights can be 
deleterious to public life, or to individuals within a group, any attempt to exclude an 
area of human activity from public scrutiny needs justification...Rights in the private 
sphere are best justified, from the point of view of the community, by reference to 
39 Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, para. 39. 
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people's obligations when acting in different capacities.'^ o This kind of informed 
argumentation is clearly valuable before the right to privacy is included in a 
constitutional document. On acquiring constitutional status, the perspective is 
automatically reversed, namely that 'any attempt' to interfere with one's privacy 
needs justification, thereby securing a process of prior examination whose burden of 
proof lies primarily with the party that pursues the limitation of a constitutional 
right.4i 
Analogously, in the system of the Convention, the state can pursue a limitation 
to the scope of a human right under one of the legitimate aims that are exhaustively 
listed in paragraph 2 (where available) of the Convention rights. In all cases 
mentioned above (save for Stjerna which could have been resolved at the 
admissibility stage), the Court could have looked at the justifications argued by the 
state for not according human right protection to the individuals concerned. In that 
regard, the legitimate aims of paragraph 2 do not have a 'certain' relevance, but they 
constitute categorical criteria for strict observance. Accordingly, the connection that 
is made, in the judges' dissenting opinions in Hatton and Others,'^^ between the 
state's margin and the principle of proportionality to assess the 'necessity' of the 
interference aims at re-asserting the express criteria and structures of the 
Convention provisions (i.e. necessity).43 The same applies with the 'pressing social 
need' threshold engaging a legitimate aim of interference which was only reiterated 
in dissenting opinions, despite being well-entrenched in the jurisprudence.44 If it is 
not already clear from the foregoing analysis, and in order to remove any doubts, 
positive obligations are argued and are readily assumed by the governments' 
counsels in order to take advantage of the loose standards of the fair balance test. 
40 D. Feldman, 'Privacy-related Rights and their Social Value', in P. Birks. (ed), Privacy and 
Loyalty (Oxford - Clarendon Press, i997): 15-50, 25-26. 
4' In Stjema v. Finland, the Court pointed out that 'The fact that there may exist a pubhc 
interest in regulating the use of names is not sufficient to remove the question of a person's name 
fi-om the scope of private and family life, which has been construed as including, to a certain 
degree, the right to establish relationships with others', para. 37. 
4= See the joint dissenting opinion of judges Costa, Ress, Tiirmen, Zupancic and Steiner in 
Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC). 
"3 As explained by the Commission in the Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 'no other 
criteria than those mentioned in the exception clause itself may be at the basis of any restrictions 
and these criteria in turn must be understood in such a way that the language is not extended 
beyond its ordinary meaning.'. Series B, Vol. 28, p.9, quoted by Loucaides, (note 11), 'Chapter 9, 
section 5: Strict Interpretation of Limitations', pp. 185-186. 
•M For a quotation and citation of a passage from the dissenting opinion of the judges, see 
notes 28 and 42 above. 
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which has so far been allowed to compromise the express direction of the very text of 
the Convention in paragraph 2 provisions, 
It should also be mentioned that there are circumstances where the failure of 
the state to provide for the protection of a human right may not be attributed to a 
conscious and deliberate attempt to justify an act or omission (e.g. refusal), but to 
the mere fact of inaction or impracticality of protection. The latter ground is a 
pragmatic and inherent limitation of protection of human rights that will be 
discussed in more detail below. It suffices to say here that impracticality is often 
considered in relation to the extent of protection, rather than protection as such. By 
contrast, the failure of the state to guarantee protection, because of inaction, to an 
individual who is able to engage a human right, will automatically raise the state's 
liability under paragraph 1 of the Convention rights, meaning that the evaluative 
principles of paragraph 2 do not come into play. 
V. The Perspective of Human Rights Protection: The Rule or the 
Exception - The Contextual or the Ad Hoc Response? 
The issue of perspective concerns the fundamental point from which the scope and 
content of human rights protection is determined. I f the potential of positive 
obligations is to target a system of human rights, as opposed to some reactive 
responses, in order to guarantee the active protection of human rights, then the 
content of these obligations should be looked at before the incident of interference 
and in connection with the wide context of private interactions to which the given 
isolated case relates. 
In Hatton and Others, the positive obligation to regulate human rights 
protection in the whole context of industry had already arisen for the state under 
paragraph 1 of Article 8, that is prior to the decision of the planning authorities to 
grant a private corporation permission to extend its activities to the detriment of the 
applicants' human rights interests.46 in such circumstances, any decision to pursue a 
45 Forder, (note 10); Sudre, (note 18), 'In general, the [judicial] control of positive obligations 
lacks rigour and appears more uncertain than the control of negative obligations.' (translation), p. 
1373 ; Post, (note 30) This gave them more leeway than in the case of direct interference by a 
public authority", p. 264; D. Spielmann, 'Obligation Positives et Effet horizontal des Dispositions 
de la Convention', in F. Sudre (ed), L'Interpretation de la Convention Europeenne des Droits de 
I'Homme (Nemesis - Bruylant, 1998): 133-174,151. 
Post, (note 30) "The present judgment seems to contain all these elements, but not always 
in a very transparent format.', pp. 269-270, and The Hatton and Others judgment can be said to 
have further clarified what is required under Article 8.1: the State must carefully research and 
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legitimate aim of interference is an isolated issue of ad hoc nature^^ and, therefore, 
paragraph 2 of the Convention rights cannot be allowed to set the perspective from 
which the content of positive obligations can be determined. As pointed out by judge 
Costa, in his dissenting opinion in the Grand Chamber judgment, the negative 
impact on the applicants' private life could well have reached the level of severity 
contemplated by Article 3, for which no limitation exists. As far as other industrial 
activities are concerned, the right to life under Article 2 is also relevant. It follows 
that a system of human rights protection cannot be taken seriously when 
constitutional protection is only available through the process of justifying an 
isolated interference. 
The perspective of positive obligations is that of front door under which the 
protection of human rights is actively arranged as a whole system of protection that 
is built in relation to the given context of activities of private parties (e.g. industry), 
rather than as a collection of ad hoc responses to individual complaints (e.g. the 
expansion of a corporation's activities). It is the contextual approach that allows the 
holistic reading of the Convention rights (as discussed in chapter 1) so as to identify 
all relevant human rights interests, whose protection have to be guaranteed before 
the circumstantial issue of interference, in paragraph 2 terms, ever emerges. In 
short, the question of perspective of the active protection of human rights in the 
form of positive obligations is synonymous with the question of whether human 
rights are guaranteed by a system of protection that exists domestically or by ad hoc 
balances pronounced by the European judge at the occasion of isolated complaints. 
B. The Wider and Common Justification of the State's 
Obligations: The Critical Element of Knowledge of the Need of 
Human Rights Protection 
Approaching the positive obligations of the state from the perspective of paragraph 
1, whose effect arises first,48 it is clear that the Convention aims at a domestic system 
of protection that can address 'inherent' human rights issues, while due allowances 
assess, previous to decision making, whether policies might have adverse effects on the 
environment to the extent of violating the right to respect for privacy and family rights.', p. 273. 
47 K- Done, 'Farborough Faced to Turned Away Business' Financial Times, 11 February 2008 
'The airport applied in 6 October 2005 to double the weekend hmit to 5,000 flights within the 
28,000 quota. That was refused by the local authority. 
48 De Meyer, (note 2), pp. 262-264. See also discussion in chapter 1. 
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are made for legitimate limitations upon specific Gisted) aims that the state may 
decide to pursue (the circumstantial option of if and when) on the condition that the 
requisite safeguards can be met. 
However, this basic assertion has to be reconciled with the Court's repetitive 
statement that that the 'essential object' of the Convention rights is the state 
authorities' non-interference with human rights.49 Although positive obUgations are 
reasoned additionally as 'inherent',50 the constant reiteration of the 'essential object' 
of the Convention, explains, to a certain extent, why some of the current practices 
and proposals have adopted the paragraph 2 perspective. By way of analogy, the 
priority and perspective of paragraph 1 can be secured if they are grounded upon the 
same justification of 'essentiality' that the Convention rights have always 
presupposed. 
Looking more closely at the repetitive affirmation of the 'essential' object of the 
Convention rights, it can reasonably be said that the absence of an accompanying 
explanation indicates that its justification has always meant to be obvious. Because, 
obvious things must be stated, the only obvious explanation is that the state, as the 
initiator of the act complained of, knows of the likely interference with the human 
right of an individual. Whether or not the act of interference can be justified, 
knowledge of the very act automatically engages the state's obligation to abstain 
from interfering either at all or without the appropriate safeguards (as generally set 
out in paragraph 2 provisions and further detailed in the jurisprudence). In that 
connection, it is the element of that knowledge that exposes the state's involvement 
49 See, e.g., the Belgian Linguistic case, Judgment of 23 July 1968, 1474/62; 1677/62; 
1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, para. 7; Marckx v. Belgium, para. 31; Stubbings and 
Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1996, nos. 22083/93; 22095/93, para. 
62; Passannate v. Italy, Admissibility decision of 1 July 1998, no. 32647/96; Clunis v. the United 
Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 11 September 2001, no. 45049/98; Oneryildiz v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 18 June 2002, no. 48939/99, para. 144; Craxi (No. 2) v. Italy, Judgment of 17 July 
2003, no. 25337/94, para. 73; Van Kuck v. Germany, Judgment of 12 June 2003, no. 35968/97, 
para. 70; Surugiu v. Romania, Judgnient of 20 April 2004, no. 48995/99, para. 59, Moreno 
Gomez v. Spain, Judgment of 16 November 2004, no. 4143/02, para. 55; Adali v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 31 March 2005, no. 38187/97, para. 267; Maurice v. France, Judgment of 6 October 
2005, no. 11810/03, para. 114 Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Judgment of 11 January 
2006, no. 52562/99; 52620/99, para. 57; Uqar v. Turkey, Judgment of 11 April 2006, no. 
52392/99, para. 133; Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen (ASLEF) v. the 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 February 2007, no. 11002/05, para. 37; Tysiac v. Poland, 
Judgment of 20 March 2007, no. 5410/03, para. 109; Dickson v. the United Kingdom, Judgment 
of 4 December 2007, no. 44362/04, para. 70. 
50 See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, para. 31; Airey v. Ireland, Judgment of 9 October 1979, no. 
6289/73, para. 32; ; Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 19 February 1998, no. 14967/89, 
para. 58; McGuinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 Jime 1998, no. 21825/93, 
para. 98; Von Hannover v. Germany, Judgment of 24 June 2004, no. 59320/00, para. 57; Van 
Kilck v. Germany, para. 70; Siliadin v, France, Judgment of 26 July 2005, no. 73316/01, para. 58. 
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in all circumstances, marking as 'essential' the issue of human rights protection in 
the eyes of European human rights law. 
By contrast, the state's involvement is not clearly present when positive 
obligations are claimed. It has already been seen in the important article of Jan De 
Meyer in the early 1970s (discussed in chapter 1) that the internationEil liability of 
the state can be engaged when its responsibility is indirectly 'involved' in human 
rights violations that are caused by private parties.s^  Since a claim for a positive 
obligation to actively protect the human rights of an individual can be raised almost 
everywhere, the state may not be said to be 'involved' if knowledge of the need of 
human rights protection does not lie with its agents. Accordingly, the element of 
knowledge has to be established to prove that the state remains silent and passive to 
human rights violations, actual or potential, of which its agents have had prior 
knowledge. 
The element of knowledge in international law and in scholarly bibliography is 
not quite new. Various approaches have been worded advocating either a subjective 
element for a guilty 'psychological' aspect of an expressly intentional act or negligent 
omission,52 QJ. 3 ^ 'objective' element assessed by an obligation of result.53 For the 
purposes of the current study, as exclusively concerned with the Convention, we 
admit the usefulness of these propKJsals in inserting an objective factor in the 
determination of the state's liability, but we proceed to a:dopt a less strict approach 
for the Convention, which aims, as a 'living instrument', at constantly developing 
and homogenising European human rights standards.54 In that regard, a flexible 
examination of the element of knowledge will be taken below so as to allow 
intermediate and on-the-spot developments (i.e. standards developed at the very 
occasion of the adjudication of the applicant's claims). The main consideration is to 
justify the extended scope of the international liability of the state, while preserving 
the dialectics of justice in the law-making mission of the Convention.ss 
5> De Meyer, (note 2), p. 273. 
52 G. Perrin, 'Le Probleme de la Faute dans la Responsabilite Internationale de I'Etat' in W. 
Haller, A. Kolz, G. Miiller, D. Thiifer (eds), Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft (Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1989): 127-133. 
53 L. Loucaides, (note 11), 'Chapter 6: Responsibility under the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Objective or Subjective Test?'. 
54 c. Tomuschat, ""What is a "Breach" of the European Convention on Human Rights?' in R 
Lawson, M. de Blois (eds), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in 
Honour ofH. G. Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): 315-337. 
55 Wemhoff v. Germany, Judgment of 27 June 1968, no. 2122/64, 'Given that it [the 
Convention] is a law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the interpretation that is most 
appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the object of the treaty, not that v^ rhich would 
restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations undertaken by the Parties.', para. 8. 
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The existence of an objective element narrows considerably the apparently 
infinite scope of positive obligations. In this respect, the perspective of the active 
protection of human rights under paragraph i is secured by the practical a;nd 
manageable scope of positive obligations. In addition, to the extent that the element 
of knowledge conditions the state's liability, it is not only employed to engage the 
state's positive obligations in the circumstances concerned but remains pertinent in 
whichever stage and level their content has to be determined. 
In general terms, the element of knowledge is evaluated in relation to two 
separate identity types that reflect two corresponding conditions of proximity which 
are critical in the determination of the state's obligations. 
a) The identity of the individual(s) in need of human rights protection (the 
first condition of proximity) and/or 
b) The source of the threat to human rights (the second condition of proximity) 
In recognition that the element of knowledge of the need of human rights protection 
operates as an objective criterion of preliminary importance, it has first to be 
analysed as to its general application. As that element constitutes the common 
justification of the 'essential object of the Convention rights' for both positive and 
negative obligations, its relevance and application has to be discussed under both 
headings. 
1. T h e E l e m e n t of K n o w l e d g e in Negat ive Obl iga t ions c a s e s 
1. E x p r e s s Knowledge from Direct Interference with Known Resu l ts 
Knowledge of the need of human rights protection reasonably lies with the state, 
when it is its agents that initiate the very act of interference. Such a situation can be 
seen from the facts of the case of McCann and Others, which concerned a lethal 
operation of special anti-terrorists units to arrest and apprehend suspected 
terrorists. The applicants complained that the killing of their relatives by state 
agents violated the right to life under Article 2 . In such circumstances, an element of 
pre-meditation and intentional infliction of harm goes without saying from the very 
8o 
nature of the operation of the state officers.s^ The Court expressly described the use 
of lethal force as 'deliberate', a clear finding that has been highlighted in subsequent 
cases. In Ilhan, in which the applicant complained of a life-threatening assault by 
state agents, the judges particularly noted 
[the] situations where the initiative [for an effective investigation under Article 
2] must rest on the State for the practical reason that the victim is deceased and 
the circumstances of the death may be largely confined within the knowledge of 
State officials.57 
Therefore, in circumstances in which the state agents are the main actors interfering 
intentionally vdth the human rights of an individual, prior knowledge of that 
interference is presupposed. It is the express and specific knowledge of the 
upcoming interference that makes absolutely 'essential' for the state to protect the 
individual by making sure that appropriate safeguards have existed and duly 
implemented in conformity •with the requirements of paragraph 2. Every 
premeditated act of interference raises automatically the obligation of human rights 
protection, given that at its early stage, an act of interference is about to violate the 
human rights interests of some individuals, The justifiable nature of such acts 
connotes an additional element of knowledge about the content of protection, which 
is determined in relation to the permanent criteria of paragraph 2 and the attached 
principles and standards of the relevant jurisprudence. 
In such settings, the issue of protection is strictiy confined to the justification of 
the state's interference under the applicable safeguards of the Convention. Thus, 
although an actual violation of a human right occurs (as assessed by the harm 
sustained), a legal violation cannot be established against the state when the 
interference complained of has been justified under the legitimate limitations of 
paragraph 2. All in all, the 'essentiality' of the negative obligations of the state 
concerns the process by which the relevant standards are observed. 
In the subsequent case of Andronicou and Constantinou, which also concerned 
a lethal operation by the state agents, the Court's main task was to check whether the 
safeguards, laid down previously in McCann and Others, had been complied with by 
the state agents. As these standards had been met, a violation of Article 2 could not 
be found, despite the fact that the applicants' relatives were killed during the lethal 
56 McCqnn and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 September 1995, no. 
18984/91, para.150. 
57 Ilhan V. Turkey, Judgment of 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, para. 91. 
58 For potential human rights violations, see, e.g., Klass and Others v. Germany, Judgment 
of 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 
1981, no. 7525/76. 
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operation.59 In these circumstances, the issue of human rights protection arises only 
in relation to a very narrow framework in which an express act of an otherwise 
justifiable interference has already been initiated (or is about to) by state agents and 
concerns a content of measures to comply with the required safeguards. 
Thus, contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, cases such as McCann 
and Others cannot be classified as positive obligations cases, because the obligation 
to guarantee and implement some positive measures relates to the required 
safeguards that justify an interference and, therefore, this obligation arises, if and 
only if, an act of interference has been exercised or is about to.^" In that connection, 
the issue of protection of human rights does not concern active protection, but the 
due implementation of the requisite legal safeguards that justify a legitimate 
limitation to the applicable scope of a human right. 
The state's compliance with the entrenched standards of a justifiable 
interference in the context of lethal operations of the police has been examined in 
the more recent case of Makaratzis, in which the applicant complained about 
excessive use of firepower by the police officers who tried to stop him while he was 
dangeroi^ sly driving his car to escape from their control. In that case, the Court 
made, for the first time, some statements on positive obligations, courting the view 
of the Institut de Formation en Droits de I'Homme du Barreau de Paris, which was 
allowed as amicus curiae fi^ Admittedly, the first sentence of paragraph i of Article 2 
can be interpreted as giving rise to a positive obligation for the state to put in place 
an adequate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee the right to life.^^ 
However, in the context of the lethal operations of the police, the content of the 
state's obligation concerns the entrenched standards of organisation and control of 
the police operation which are required in order to justify the state's legitimate 
interference. In that respect, the content of these obligations has developed and 
develops independently of the general application of positive obligations. 
59 See, e.g., Andronicou and Constantitipu v. Cyprus, Judgment of 9 October 1997, no. 
25052/94-
6° For an informed analysis of the case-law on the lethal operations of state agents (esp. 
McCdnn and Others) and the remforced content of safeguards under paragraph 2, see F. Ni 
Aolain, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Convention Concerning the Right to Life' 
(2001) 1NQHR 21-42. See also C. Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Prevention of Terrorism' (1983) 32 ICLQ 82-119. Cf. F. De Sanctis, 'What Duties Do States Have 
with Regard to the Rules of Engagement and the Training of Security Forces under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights?' (2006) 10(1) IJHR 31-44.39-
("^ Makaratzis v. Greece, Judgment of 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99, paras. 45, 71. Such 
combined approaches have not been repeated in subsequent cases, Celniku v. Greece, Judgment 
of 5 July 2007, no. 21449/04 (available in French only); Leonidis v. Greece, Judgment of 8 
January 2009, no. 43326/05. 
62 Makaratzis v. Greece, para. 50,71. 
82 
It is important to maintain a firm approach on theses issues, because every 
positive measure of compliance vrith human rights standards could be classified as a 
positive obligation, a fact that would lead to the gradual dilution of positive 
obligations or to situations of conflict between positive and negative obligations. ^3 
2. Implied Knowledge from Incidental Interference with 
Known/Predictable Resu l ts 
Human rights complaints are not always clear-cut and an act of deliberation can be 
disputed on the ground that harm occurred unintentionally or accidentally. In the 
case of Ergi, the applicant complained that aii innocent woman (his sister) was 
killed in a cross-fire between security forces against PKK in the south-east of Turkey 
in violation of Article 2. From the evidence submitted it was not possible to prove 
that the applicant's sister was killed by state agents, let alone to show their intention 
to inflict harm. ^4 The Government denied its responsibility by distinguishing 
McCann and Others on the absence of premeditation from the part of its agents to 
harm the deceased.^ s The Court held that the state's liability for violation of Article 2 
could not be established in this part of the complaint. 
However, the European judges did not confine their examination to evidence of 
express intention, but looked at the issue of 'incidental loss of civilian life' in lethal 
operations to define the applicable safeguards in the form of 'precautions' against 
accidental harm. Thus, the state officers may not have intended to kill the 
deceased, but it was clear that their acts may result in accidental harm, and hence 
their knowledge of such a likely incident is reasonably presumed. To argue otherwise 
would exclude the state's liability in circumstances where, for example, in order to 
stop an armed fugitive running away on a crowded street, police officers could start 
firing indiscriminately and later assume that they did not know of any harm that 
^3 See also the partly dissenting opinion of judge Wildhaber joined by judges Kovler and 
Mularoni in Makaratzis v. Greece, 'Our Court's case-law states that a State may have a positive 
obUgation to protect the life of individuals from third parties (cf. §50). Concretely, this may mean 
that the police had to protect the lives of pedestrians, car drivers and their colleagues from the 
applicant. The Court's casedaw states at the same time that in exceptional circumstances, physical 
ill-treatment by State officials which does not result in death may disclose a violation of Article 2 
...If these two strands of case-law are overextended, they may ultimately overlap and come into 
conflict. The State might then paradoxically violate both its positive duty to protect the life of 
individuals from third parties and its obhgation to curb the use of force by the poHce. Obviously, 
such an overlap would be unfortunate. In extreme cases it can place the competent authorities in 
an impossible situation.' (cited cases omitted). See also Warbrick, The European Convention...', 
(note 60), p. 118. 
64 Ergi v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 July 1998, no. 23818/94. 
65 Ibid., para. 75. 
Ibid., para. 79. 
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could be caused to innocents bystanders. Therefore, the safeguards developed in 
McCann and Others include, in addition, precautionary measures to protect the life 
and limb of innocent bystanders. 
Moreover, precautions have also to be taken in relation to the lives of state 
officers, viewed as individuals/employees, who participate in dangerous operations. 
In the more recent case of Halit Dine a chief-^ sergeant was killed by other members 
of security force during a night operation against rebels in a frontiers zone. The 
Court reiterated that according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 2, the use 
of lethal force could only be justified if it was 'absolutely necessary' under the 
circumstances. In examining the state's liability under a 'strict interpretation' of 
proportionality of its agents' response, the Court found inter alia that the instruction 
to shoot did not provide for any guarantees to safeguard against arbitrary acts of 
state agents.^ 7 
From the analysis of the case-law in this section, it is clear that when an 
intentional interference is initiated by state agents, safeguards have to provided to 
cover all categories of individuals who can be exposed to any perceivable risk of 
harm, either directiy or indirectiy. Knowledge of the likely risks and of the categories 
of individuals to whom these risks apply can reasonably be implied from the nature 
of the activities concerned. For the lethal operations of security forces, the content of 
safeguards is assessed in relation to those individuals who are likely to be exposed to 
known threats, namely innocent bystanders, security officers and alleged suspects. 
3. Express / Impl ied Knowledge by Context and Comparat ive E x a m p l e s 
The state indirectiy interferes with huinan rights when it is its agents that have 
permitted the activity of a private party which causes the violation of the human 
rights of identifiable individuals. We have already seen in Hatton and Others that 
the private life of some individuals, living nearby an airport, was adversely affected 
by an increase in night flights. However, the private party's interference was made 
possible by the decision of the state's planning authority to grant permission for an 
extension of night flights in that airport. 
67 Halit Dine v. Turkey, Judgment of 19 September 2006, no. 32597/96, paras. 49, 55-56 
(available in French only). See also R. Norton-Taylor, 'Sending Troops into Battle without Proper 
Equipment Could Breach Rights, Says Judge' The Guardian, 12 April 2008; M. Hickley, 
'Neghgence over Soldier Son's Death in Iraq' Daily Mail, 19 August 2008. 
68 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom. See also Giacomelli v. Italy; Van Kuck v. 
Germany. 
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The element of knowledge can be imputed on the state if it is shown that the 
state authorities are aware that their dealings with private parties can negatively 
affect the human rights of other private individuals. Such will be the case when 
similar complaints have been reported in the past at both national and European 
level (empirical knowledge by context).^ 9 The element of knowledge can also be 
deduced from international reports and documents that have been adopted to raise 
awareness about the negative effects of some activities of private sector and to set 
minimum standards for their operation (comparative and contextual knowledge).7o 
4. E x p r e s s Knowledge from E x p r e s s Compla ints 
A great number of laws and administrative orders are adopted by the state with the 
aim to organise (and better organise) the society of its citizens. Given the diversity 
and large quantity of various measures that are produced by the state machinery, it 
can reasonably be argued that some negative effects on human rights may not 
always be known until an express complaint is raised. In other words, it may not 
always be possible for the state to contemplate the negative effects of all of its acts if 
no reaction is reported by the individuals concerned. 
In such circumstances, the element of knowledge of the need to protect human 
rights is present when an express complaint has been communicated to the 
competent administrative authority, either for the first time by the given applicant 
or by another individual in similar circumstances in the past. It would be unfair to 
automatically engage the international liability of the state without allowing the 
domestic administrative system a reasonable time to address a human rights 
complaint. This is the logic behind the provision of Article 35.1, which requires that 
domestic remedies be exhausted by the affected individuals so as to allow the state 
an opportunity to rectify any wrongs or failures.'^ ^ 
To the extent that 'effective' remedies must exist within the state's legal system 
in order for the individual to have access to an 'arguable' human rights claim, as 
*9 M. de Salvia, 'Ambiente e Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell' Uomo' (1997) 10(1) RIDU 
78-83; M. Demerieux, 'Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (2001) 21 OJLS 521. See also cases 
arising from the same factual situation/context establishing an awareness at both national and 
European level, e.g., Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom and Hatton and Others v. the 
United Kingdom (industrial activities, airport noise); Ergi v. Turkey and Isayeva v. Russia, 
Judgment 24 February 2005, no. 57950/00 (innocent bystanders in lethal operations). 
7° See, e.g., the Buttarelli report on Protection of Personal Data with regard to Surveillance 
[CJ-PD (2001)11 rev.], Council of Europe (for the Project Group on Data Protection). 
71 Selmouni v. France, Judgment of 28 July 1999, no. 25803/94, paras. 74-77. 
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required under Article 13 and the ensuing jurisprudence, 72 the very act of an 
individual's complaint in pursuit of domestic remedies amounts to an express 
knowledge of a likely interfering effect of the state's practices. Such an example is 
the case of Rees, in which the applicant had expressly requested from the state's 
administrative authorities to modify the public registration system with regard to 
post-operative transsexuals due to serious embarrassment and prejudice that was 
suffered when the birth certificate had to be produced. On such a notification, the 
state becomes expressly aware of the negative effect that its administrative practices 
have on the human rights of some individuals, and it can choose to: 
a) Question that the harm complained of exists or reaches the threshold of 
seriousness that engages the human right relied upon (the admissibility 
question); 
b) Modify its practice accordingly so as to remove the effect complained of 
either completely or, at least, below the actionable degree of severity; 
c) Uphold the practice in pursuit of the legitimate aims that are listed in 
paragraph 2 (if available) and establish the legal criteria justifying an 
act of interference.73 
5. E x p r e s s Knowledge from Prev ious D e c i s i o n s of Non-Justifiability of 
the Interference 
The element of knowledge has to be re-assessed when a subsequent judicial 
examination, in closely similar circumstances, concludes that an act of interference 
cannot be justified. 
Taking again the example of Rees, it can be said that the unfavourable outcome 
of that case has been felt across the member states by all those individuals being in 
the same circumstances with the applicant. In the subsequent case of Goodwin, in 
which the Court reversed its position in JRees, a new human right standard has been 
72 P. Mertens, Le Droit de Recours Effectif devant les Instances Nationales en cas de 
Violation d'un Droit de I'Homme (Editions de I'Univefsite de Bruxelles, 1973); J . Frowein, 'Art. 13 
as a Growing Pillar of Convention Law" in P. Mahoney; F. Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, 
(eds). Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective: Studies in Memory ofRolv Ryssdal 
(Carl Heyiharins Verlag, 2000): 545-550; R. Sapienza, Tl Diritto ad vm Ricorso Effettivo nella 
Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell' Uomo' (2001) 2 RDI 271-297. See detailed discussion of 
Article 13 in chapter 4. 
73 The 'prescribed by law" stage of paragraph 2 in entirely new claims may be reduced to the 
basic safeguard of'access to an arguable claim'. See discussion in chapter 4 on what constitutes an 
'arguable' human rights claim. 
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set under Articles 8 and 12 making clear that the public records of post-operative 
transsexuals have to be modified to reflect their new sexual identity, unless an 
insurmountable burden can be proved by the state. Provided that there is no change 
in the critical parameters upon which that conclusion was reached, it follows that the 
state is directiy and expressly informed of both the negative effect and the non-
justifiability of its practices in such circumstances. 
When a Court's decision sets a pan-European standard, knowledge of it does 
not solely lie with the respondent state, but with all member states, given that the 
human rights standards of the Convention constitute the common acquis of 
European human rights law (see also subsection 3 above). In essence, previous 
decisions of the Court, in which the issue of non-justifiability of interference has 
conclusively been resolved, amount to an express form of knowledge from the point 
of view of European judicial examination.74 
II. T h e E l e m e n t of K n o w l e d g e in Pos i t ive Obl iga t ions c a s e s 
1. Implied Knowledge from a Known Context of Private Part ies ' 
Interactions 
The element of knowledge can be assumed when the protection of human rights is 
examined in a context of private parties' interactions in which known human rights 
exist. Empirical social experience can be relied upon to confirm this knowledge from 
the standard of obviousness.75 In other words, a violation of a human right is just 
another case waiting to happen in the daily course of events. 
The Court has increasingly stressed the importance of context when is called to 
determine the state's positive obligations. In the case of Osman, the Court 
highlighted the context of violence against the person as involving well-known 
human rights issues. In particular, it stated that '[i]t is thus accepted by those 
appearing before the Court that Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain 
well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take 
74 See,recently, L. v. Lithuania, Judgment of 11 September 2007, no. 27527/03. 
75 See, e.g., laiowledge of previous incidents of human rights violations from the same or 
similar activities of private parties, Guerra and Others v. Italy; Tatar v. Romania, Judgment of 
29 January 2009, no. 697021/01 (available in French only). 
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preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk frorii 
the criminal acts of another individual.'^* 
Knovsm human rights issues exist also in the context of health care. The Court 
has equally made clear in its subsequent judgment in Calvelli and Ciglio that 
'[t]hose principles apply in the public-health sphere too. The aforementioned 
positive obligations therefore require States to make regulations compelling 
hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the 
protection of patients' lives.'T? 
In the more recent case of Oneryildiz, which concerned a fatal industrial 
accident that was caused by an explosion in a waste-treatment factory (the case is 
also discussed below), the Court has seized the opportunity to highlight the 
contextual reach of positive obligations. Moving beyond the narrow facts of that 
case, it has emphasised the element of knowledge with reference to 'the potential 
risks inherent' in the activity in question, as well as in 'the context of any activity, 
whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake, and a fortiori in the 
case of industrial activities, which by their very nature are dangerous'.^ ^ 
Other knowTi contexts are certainly those that are codified in the text of the 
Convention, such as family life (Article 8), correspondence (Article 8) and peaceful 
assemblies (Article i i ) . 
Where the element of knowledge is established from the presence of a known 
context of private parties' interaction, then both the source of the threat to human 
rights and the individuals who are likely to be affected, can reasonably be identified, 
whereby establishing a standard of proximity. Thus, to know that an industrial 
activity is dangerous identifies easily the individuals to whom a positive duty is 
owed, namely the factory's personnel and those living in the nearby area.79 
''^Osman v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, para. 115; 
MahmutKaya v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 March 2000, no. 22535/93, para. 85. 
77 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, Judgment of 17 January 2002, no. 32967/96, para. 49. 
78 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC), Judgment of 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99, paras. 65, 71. 
See also sections tides of the 'General Principles' of the Court: 'Principles relating to the 
prevention of infringements of the right to life as a result of dangerous activities: the substantive 
aspect of Article 2 of the Convention', before para. 89. For the application of the Court's reasoning 
in Oneryildiz (as quoted in the main discussion and cited in this note) in cases arising in other 
know contexts, see Kilinc and Others v. Turkey, 'Similar regulation can require the taking of 
practical measures in order to provide effective protection of those who are exposed to the 
inherent dangers of military life.' (translation), Judgment of 7 June 2005, no. 40145/98, para. 41 
(available in French only). 
79 Special attention should be given to children whose behaviour is not as predictable as 
those of adults, see, e.g., Pa§a and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 December 2006, no. 
51358/99 (available in French only). 
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2. Implied Knowledge from Context and Comparat ive E x a m p l e s 
When the issue of protection of human rights, as described in the applicant's 
complaint, is examined with reference to the wide context of private parties' 
activities to which the isolated case relates, it is possible to rely on comparative 
examples to determine the dual question of i f , and if so, to what extent, positive 
obligations can be imposed. 
The element of knowledge can be sought in the practices of member states (or 
even those of non-member states), in which similar human right issues have already 
been dealt with under a proven record of effectiveness.^ o The same applies where 
relevant national or international documents exist in the form of recommendations, 
resolutions or scientific studies and reports that have usually contextual targets.^ i 
It has also been observed that in the development of European human rights 
standards, the quality of practice rather than the quantity of similar approaches may 
be preferred. In analysing the Court's reasoning in the case of Siliadin,^^ which 
concerned the issue of slavery in private relationships, Holly CuUen has pointed out 
that despite the fact that only one state had at the time ratified the Council of 
Europe's new convention on people trafficking, member states have been presented 
with a challenge to adopt clearer and stronger laws to criminalise trafficking for 
forced labour. ^3 
The influence of comparative examples can be traced as early as the case of 
Marckx in which the Court expressly referred to two international conventions in 
order to point to the principle of mater semper certa est, as applied in the 
applicant's circumstances.84 The 'currently small number' of member states that had 
*° See, e.g., Pretty v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02. 
81 Guerra and Others v. Italy, para. 34; Oneryildiz v. Turkey, para; 58-59; Tatar and Tatar 
V. Romania, Admissibility decision of 5 July 2007, no. 67021/01, the Court quotes at paras. 44-45 
the following documents: Resolution no. 1430/2005 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe on industrial hazards; European Parhament's Resolution on 5 July 2001 (OJ C 65 E, 
14 March 2002, p. 382); Council Directive 85/337/EEC as amended by Council Directive 
97/11/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain pubhc and private projects on the 
environment; the UNECE Espoo Convention on Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment; Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances (Seveso I I Directive) and UNECE Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents; Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC Directive). See also Tatar v. 
Romania, paras. 26, 28,32, 91,95. 
82 Siliadin v. France, Judgment of 26 July 2005, no. 73316/01. 
83 H. Cullen, 'Siliadin v France: Positive Obhgations under Article 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2006) 6 HRLR 585^592,592. 
^'^ Marckx u. Belgium, para. 20 citing the Brussels Convention on the Establishment of 
Maternal Affiliation of Natural Children, which was prepared by the International Commission on 
Civil Status (entered into force on 23 April 1964), and the Convention of on the Legal Status of 
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ratified these conventions at that time did not prevent the Court from reasoning that 
'the existence of these two treaties denotes that there is a clear measure of common 
ground in this area amongst modern societies.'^ s Although this statement is made in 
the examination of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 (the anti-
discrimination provision), it should normally have also appeared in the preceding 
examination of Article 8 in which only some in-passing references were given to 
international instruments. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that the discrimination 
issue virtually overlapped with or was closely connected to the complaint under 
Article 8 taken alone. In addition, the use of some principles in Latin points to some 
millennia-old and tired issues that reinforce the argument of prior knowledge of the 
need of human rights protection in the context concerned. 
3. E x p r e s s Knowledge of an Identifiable Threat 
Although positive obligations can arise contextually, more personal issues can 
reasonably be addressed when an individual in need of human rights protection can 
be identified. There are, however, circumstances in which knowledge of the specific 
threat (i.e. the second condition of proximity is present) suffices by itself to engage 
the state's positive obligations vis-a-vis non-identifiable individuals (i.e. the first 
condition of proximity is absent).^ ^ 
An example of such a circurnstance is when a dangerous individual is found 
guilty for acts of violence and, therefore, a positive obligation arises automatically 
for the state to sentence and detain the convicted individual in order to protect the 
people at large. It is the known identity of the source of a threat that gives rise to a 
positive obligation to protect all members of the society against the dangerous 
individual by means of a prolonged detention. Indeed, detention of convicted 
criminals is the corollary obligation to enforce a sanction that has already been 
regulated by the state under its general positive obligation to provide in advance for 
deterring measures in the context of violeiice against the person. The deterring effect 
Children bom out of Wedlock, which was concluded within the Council of Europe (entered into 
force on 11 August 1978). 
85 Marckx v. Belgium, para. 41; P. Duffy, 'The Protection of Privacy, Family Life and Other 
Rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights' (1982) 2 YbkEL 191-238, 
238. 
86 See discussion in section B (before section I) above. 
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of a regulated measure is considered in relation to the type and intensity of legal 
sanctions. ^7 
In such a known context, a question is raised about the implications of granting 
prison leaves to serving offenders. Without having to go into discussion of the 
justifiability or merits of the prison leave scheme,^ ^ it can be asserted that when a 
decision is made to grant prison leave to a dangerous offender, the initial positive 
obligation of the state to protect innocent individuals at large against a known 
(identified) threat can never be negated. In this respect, it can reasonably be 
expected that when such a nieasure fails, and innocent individuals are harmed, a 
strict liability principle must apply to examine the state's response. 
However, from the complaints that have so far reached the Court, it is observed 
that the identification or foreseeability of a potential victim, is still required in order 
to engage the positive obligations of the state (i.e. the first condition of proximity 
should be present). In the case of Bromley, the applicant's daughter was IdUed by a 
psychopath and dangerous offender who had been released temporarily on prison 
leave, while he was serving a sentence for a serious offence. In her application, the 
mother claimed that there was 'a positive duty on tiie State to protect her daughter's 
life, which included the duty not to release prematurely those who constituted a risk 
to the life and limb of the public in general'.^' In examining the state's positive 
obligations in such circumstances, the Court limited its reasoning to the domestic 
civil law criteria that condition liability on the foreseeability or proximity of an 
identified individual, rather than of the people at large. What was not addressed was 
the fact that the state authorities were negligent in releasing the dangerous offender 
in the first place, and there was a causal link between the death of an individual and 
the state's involvement in the offender's premature release. 
Similar issues were dealt with in the case of Mastomatteo, in which the Court 
found again that there was no breach of the state's obligations when its authorities 
permitted a temporarily release of a convicted criminal who subsequentiy murdered 
the applicant's son. 9 ° This time, at least, the applicant's claim received a full 
judgment, as opposed to the adniissibility examination of Bromley, permitting the 
87 On the intensity of sanctions that form part of the state's positive obligations see, e.g., X 
and Y V. the Netherlands; Oneryildiz v. Turkey; Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy; Ilhan v. Turkey, 
Siliadin v. France, etc. Cullen, (note 83), p. 589. See also discussion in chapter 1, section D.II and 
chapter 4, section D. II . 
88 N. napaoKeuoJtouXog K Q I E . OuxpciKri, ' H «AuoTr|ponoinoTi» K Q I 01 ASeieg xcov 
Kpaxouiisvcov' EXEvdepowma, 16 November 2007. 
89 Bromley v. the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 23 November 1999, no. 
33747/96. 
9° Mastromatteo v. /taZy, Judgment of 24 October 2002, no. 37703/97, para. 95. 
91 
dissenting opinion of judge Bonello to be recorded. The judge reasoned that '[a] 
State, I submit, does not adequately ensure to everyone the enjoyment of the right to 
life when it puts in place machinery which benefits society and criminals if it works 
properly and, when it does not, overlooks the fate of its victims.'^' 
The point to make here is that when the state fails to act efficientiy in relation to 
an identifiable and hence known source of threat (e.g. to detain a dangerous 
individual for an adequate time), the application of the strict liability principle is 
warranted to ensure that the state does the last thing that is left to do in ex post facto 
circumstances, namely to provide adequate compensation to the victim's family 
members, irrespectively of whether the public officials involved in the release were 
also negligent. 
4. E x p r e s s Knowledge from E x p r e s s Complaints 
In most cases, a positive obligation for a more narrow and personal protection of 
human rights vrill arise for the state when the identity of an individual in need of 
protection is known. Whenever an individual expressly notifies the state about a 
threat to her human rights, the element of knowledge is established. As a result a 
positive obligation is imposed on the state to actively protect that individual, 
provided, of course, that a Convention right has been engaged under the 
circumstances.92 
Before going to discuss relevant case-law, it should be clarified that here we do 
not concern ourselves with the element of knowledge that is indirectiy established 
under Article 35.1, which conditions the individual petition upon the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, and hence knowledge of a human right issue surfaces somehow, 
mostiy ex post facto at the trial stage. The content of positive obligations that is 
looked at in this sub-section regards the active protection of human rights before 
harm is suffered. In general, it should be stressed that the active protection of 
human rights is not disputed as such. What is argued is that protection has not been 
provided in the end because the state authorities could not possibly have known of 
the identity of the individual in need of human rights protection. 
An important case, which has already been introduced above, is Osman whose 
facts concerned an express notification to the pohce about the threats that a family 
9» Ibid., para 9 of the dissenting opinion of judge Bonello. 
92 See discussion on the scope of the Convention rights in section C.I. below. 
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had been receiving from another individual. 93 The Court found that upon the 
applicant's notification, the police complied fully with their positive obligations, as 
could reasonably be required of them in such circumstances, namely to investigate 
incriminating evidence in order to proceed with an arrest or provide manned 
protection to the applicants' family. 9 4 Since such incriminating evidence (added 
knowledge) was not produced in the end, the content of the state's positive 
obligation was exhausted with the implementation of the core administrative 
practices of investigation (see further discussion bellow). 
In the subsequent case of Kilic, a journalist had informed the state's authorities 
about death threats against the staff of a newspaper.^ s The applicant's claim was 
examined against a background of serious incidents of killings and attacks of the 
newspaper's employees.^ ^ The Commission's findings in situ made specific reference 
to 'pattern of attacks', 97 as confirmed by a statutory report pointing to the 
seriousness of the situation in a region of the c o u n t r y . 9 8 c a s e , and unhke 
Osman, there was no need to establish incriminating evidence (the added 
knowledge) in order to define the content of state's positive obligations in the form 
of: a) manned protection of the newspapers' employees and b) further investigation 
to identity and apprehend the source of threat to the individual's life.99 
Similar considerations apply when the state's authorities are alerted to the 
disappearance of an individual that occurs against a background of killings of the 
people who disappear.^ o In such circumstances, the operational measures that are 
examined concern measures of investigation to locate criminal suspects and the 
whereabouts of the victims.i°' 
In exceptional circumstances, such as those characterised by specific patterns, 
an express notification may not be required. In Mahmut Kaya, the Court held that a 
positive obligation had arisen for the state's authorities to protect the life of a doctor 
in south-east region of Turkey where a Kurdish minority lives, despite the fact that 
there was no express request for protection. It was found that the doctor's life was in 
93 Osman v. the United Kingdom. 
94 Restraints are imposed on the powers of the police due to competing human rights under 
Articles 5 and 8, see Osman v. the United Kingdom, para. 116. 
95 Kilic V. Turkey, Judgment of 28 March 2000, no. 22492/93. 
9* Ibid., para. 66. The Court recalled previous case-law concerning the same factual 
situations. 
97 Ibid., para. 55. 
98 Ibid., para. 68. 
99 ftid., paras. 76,132. 
10° See, e.g., Koku v. Turkey, Judgment 31 May 2005, no. 27305/95; Osmanoglu v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 24 January 2008, no. 48804/99. See further discussion in chapter 4. 
Kilic V. Turkey, paras. 128,133. 
93 
danger due to previous incidents against individuals who had supported the cause of 
the Kurdish minority in that region. As the deceased doctor was known for such a 
support, it could reasonably be said that the state's authorities had knowledge of the 
heed for human right protection in relation to an identifiable individuai.i°2 
There are also situations in which threatening acts have ulterior aims, for 
example, to intimidate individuals from freely expressing their opinions, as seen in 
Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben", in which the applicants had informed the police 
that a counter demonstration from an opposing group would cross their scheduled 
route.i°3 In Ozgur Gundem, the applicants, owners and staff of a newspaper, had 
expressly requested protection from the state authorities against repetitive attacks 
that clearly aimed at preventing them from publishing.Other examples in which 
express notification establishes the element of knowledge of the individual's identity 
include the case of Moreno Gomez, in which an express call was made to the police 
to protect the applicants from noise emanating from an adjoining bar.'°5 
By way of contrast, such an element of knowledge of the individual's identity 
could not be established in the case of Gungor. The applicant complained about the 
state authorities' failure to protect his son who was murdered by unknown 
individuals in a high-profile residential establishment. The Court could not find that 
there was any specific threat of which the state's authorities 'had or ought to have 
had knowledge' so as to move expeditiously and offer practical protection to the 
individual concerned.i°^ As a result, the state's liability under the substantive aspect 
of the right to life could not be engaged. 
In the recent case of Opuz, an express complaint to the state authorities that 
was subsequently withdrawn did not negate the element of knowledge. The 
applicant complained that the state's inadequate response to the threats and 
incidents of violence by her abusive husband violated Article 2 (for the death of her 
mother) and Article 3 (for severe and repeative physical abuse of the applicant 
herself). The withdrawal of complaints to the domestic authorities did not absolve 
the state of its positive obligation to protect identifiable individuals, because 
knowledge of the threats involved could be established by previous incidents of 
violence and reported allegations for death threats.'°7 i n finding a violation of Article 
MahmutKaya v. Turkey. 
'03 Plattform "Arztefur das Leben" v. Austria, Judgment of 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82. 
»04 Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 March 2000, no. 23144/93. 
Moreno Gomez v. Spain. See also Tatar v. Romania (dec), para. 46. 
Gungor v. Turkey, Judgment of 22 March 2005, no. 28290/95, para. 60. (available in 
French only). 
'°7 Opuz V. Turkey, Judgment of 9 June 2009, no. 33401/102, paras. 147,173. 
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2 the Court reasoned that 'once the situation has been brought to their attention, the 
national authorities cannot rely on the victim's attitude for the failure to take 
adequate measures which could prevent the Ukelihood of an aggressor carrying out 
his threats against the physical integrity of the victim.''"^ 
III. The Autonomy of the Element of Knowledge 
The element of knowledge of the need of human rights protection reaches an 
autonomous status when its presence alone suffices to engage the positive 
obligations of the state. 
In the recent case of Budayeva and Others, the Court, for the first time in its 
jurisprudence, imposed positive obligations on the state to protect the lives of 
individuals from natural disasters of which its authorities had (or ought to have had) 
prior knowledge. The applicants complained under Article 2 that the state 
authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligations to take appropriate 
nieasures to mitigate the risks to their lives against natural hazards. 
In establishing whether a positive obligation can arise in such a context, the 
Court has relied on the authority of the case of Osman to reiterate that 'this positive 
obligation entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a legislative 
and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against 
threats to the right to life'."° To reinforce this position, it quoted from its judgment 
in Oneryildiz, that '[t]his obligation must be construed as applying in the context of 
any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake'."' 
Looked at more closely, 'effective deterrence' or to protect individuals against 
'any activity' does not apply to the facts of Budayeva and Others, in that there is no 
issue of deterrence against threats of private parties, or any private/public 'activity' 
involved, in the protection of individuals' lives from natural hazards. It is only the 
element of knowledge of the incoming natural disaster and the corresponding need 
of human rights protection that engages the state's positive obligations to actively 
protect individuals in such circumstances. The main question examined in that case 
was the extent of protection that relates to the more specific content of positive 
obligations that we cover in the following section. 
Ibid.„p.ara. 153 (cited case omitted). See also paras. 168,173 (under Article 3). 
109 Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 20 March 2008, nos. 15339/02; 21166/02; 
20058/02; 11673/02; 15343/02. 
"° Ibid., p. 129. 
Ibid., p. 130. 
95 
C. The Content of Positive Obligations under Paragraph 1 of 
the Convention Rights 
Positive obligations are imposed by virtue of paragraphs i of the Convention rights. 
Whether or not the state authorities decide to pursue a legitimate aim of 
interference, positive obligations may have already arisen contextually engaging the 
state in the active protection of human rights. 
The content of positive obligations can be determined in various interconnected 
and prioritised stages under which the active protection of human rights is 
organised contextually, as a system, and ad hoc, as a personal form of assistance. 
In every stage, the evaluative principle that is employed is that of effectiveness 
that cuts across the b o a r d . y ^ ^ y by which this principle applies or the exact 
occasion of its application varies from case to case depending on the focus of the 
judicial examination. In the interests of predictability and exactness, the 
principle of effectiveness is approached as an objective factor to guide the 
determination of the content of positive obligations.^s 
In this section, the examination of the content of positive obligations is 
organised by addressing the following issues: i ) the scope of the Convention rights 
against which positive obligations can only arise, 2) the scope of protection under 
paragraph 1 of the Convention rights, 3) limits of practically implied in paragraph 1, 
4) the core content of protection (the contextual level), 5) the practical measures of 
protection (the ad hoc level). 
It should be recalled that the study of positive obligations in this chapter 
concentrates on their substantive content. The additional and concurring content of 
positive obligations that concerns effective remedies is examined separately in 
chapter 4. The content of positive obligations in circumstances where limitations to 
Airey v. Ireland, 'The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical 
or illusory but rights that are practical and effective', para. 24; Marckx v. Belgium, para. 31; 
Colder v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70, para. 35. 
"3 Warbrick, The European Convention...', (note 60), 'The utility of the principle of 
effectiveness for the interpretation of the Convention is rooted in the constitutional nature of its 
provisions—general prescriptions of indeterminate extent—but the other qualifying conditions are 
absent.', p. 96. 
1^ van Dijk, (note 17), 'First of all, there are no clear-cut criteria for determining whether and 
when effectiveness vrill have been achieved', p. 22. 
i»5 See Meitens (note 72), pp,8i-82 quoting M.J. Toiiscoz, 'It is mainly about the quality of a 
judicial principle that fulfils objectively its social function' (translation), and R-J. Dupuy, 
'Effectiveness is not about a legal principle, it comes before it. It is a primordial rule, an inherent 
justification of the reality of a norm or that of an institution.' (translation), both passages from M. 
J . Touscoz, Le Principe d'Effectivite dans I'Ordre International (LGDJ, 1964), preface and p. 1, 
respectively. 
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the scope of human rights are justified under paragraph 2 of the Convention 
provisions or where a conflict of rights gives rise to a conflict of positive obligations 
is addressed subsequently in section D below. 
I. The Preliminary Question of the Scope of Human Rights: 
Assessing the Negative Impact Involved 
The protection of human rights arises as a legal issue over the specific rights that are 
enshrined in the text of the Convention. Accordingly, positive obligations can be 
imposed on the state in so far as a Convention right can be engaged, at least, in 
'arguable' terms. I f a Convention right cannot be engaged in the applicant's 
circumstances, the petition will be rejected as 'manifestly ill-founded' under Article 
35-3-4- In such a case, the question of the state's positive obligation is not reached. 
In spite of its preliminary relevance, the question of the scope of a human right 
has sometimes been overlooked or not given the necessary weight that it deserves. 
Alpha Connelly has early highhghted that this question has to be approached 
consistently and be considered first, rather than 'jumping' the express stages of the 
Convention provisions and examining the impact question under paragraph 2."7 
The scope of a Convention right concerns mainly the conceptual meaning of a 
human right that can be discerned fi-om the literal reading of the relevant provisions 
and their judicial interpretation."^ Under that process, thresholds of negative impact 
are set in relation to each of the Convention rights in order to define the actionable 
level of applicability."9 Wherever the human rights interests of Articles 2 and 3 are 
The qualifying adjective 'arguable' is inserted by the requirements of Article 13, as 
interpreted by the Court. See discussion in Chapter 4. In Marckx v. Belgium, it was foumd, in 
relation to a parallel claim, that 'it is hot a requirement of Article 8 that a child should be entitled 
to some share in the estate of his parents or even of other near relatives', para. 53. 
"7 For a study of earlier decisions of the Commission, see A. Corinelly, 'Problems of 
Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1986) 3 ICLQ 567-593, 
pp. 580, 590. See also C. Warbrick, The Structure of Article 8' (1998)1 EHRLR 32-44, 
'[i]ncoherence arises when the Court collapses the examination of whether there is a positive 
obligation imder Article 8(1) with the question of whether it has been breached, an Article 8(2) 
matter. The approach is analytically misfounded because of the lack of substantive distinction 
between positive and negative obhgatipns.' p. 43. 
"8 p. Duffy, (note 85), 'It will also be recalled that the Article 8 (1) rights are subject to 
limitations in their very definition, or, as the Court put it in Golder, there are 'bounds delimiting 
the very content of any right'.', p. 204. 
"9 See, e.g., the Greek case, Commission's Report of 5 November 1969, Yearbook XII (1969), 
p. 501; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 162; 
Fadeyeva v. Russia, para. 69, 70. For a study of the decisions of the Commission, see Loucaides, 
(note 11), 'Interpretation of the scope of the right is to some extent influenced by the facts of the 
cases, especially by the degree of severity of the consequences of the particular situation to which 
the complaint refers.', p. 181. See also discussion in chapter 3, section B.I.1.2: 'Setting Actionable 
Thresholds'. As already discussed in chapter 1, section E , Protocol 14 has inserted sub-paragraph 
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engaged, a greater content of protection has to be prescribed due to their semi-
absolute and absolute status, respectively. 
In order to explain that the scope of a human right is a preliminary question for 
the determination of the positive obligations of the state, relevant case-law has to be 
discussed and analysed in relation to the two pertinent issues: the conceptual aspect 
of the Convention rights and their threshold of negative impact. 
Important issues about the conceptual meaning of the Convention rights were 
dealt with in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali."° The applicants 
complained about the state's practice, as authorised by statutory law, of not granting 
residence permit to their foreign husbands (and fiance for the second applicant, Mrs 
Cabales). All applicants were also foreigners themselves who had acquired indefinite 
residential status in the respondent state before entering into a marital relationship 
at a later point in their lives. In addition, in the case of Mrs Balkandali, the applicant 
had a son (who had the right to abode in the state concerned) with Mr Balkandali. In 
examining the applicants' complaints under Article 8 (the 'family life' component), 
the majority of the Court asked whether the state met its positive obligation to 
respect family life in such circumstances. The applicability of Article 8 was easily 
established in relation Mrs Abdulaziz and Mrs Balkandali, as 'whatever else the word 
"family" may mean, it must at any rate include the relationship that arises from a 
lawful and genuine marriage.'i^i Applicability was also recognised with regard to Mrs 
Cabales for a genuinely committed cohabiting relationship (ended subsequentiy in 
marriage). 
However, the real issue of the applicability of Article 8 was determined, as 
follows 
The duty imposed by Article 8 (art. 8) cannot be considered as extending to a 
general obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by 
married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the 
non-national spouses for settlement in that country.'^s 
This conclusion should be contrasted with the concurring opinion of judge 
Bernhardt who reasoned that 
b) in Article 35.3 that allows the Court to declare the case inadmissible if the 'apphcant has not 
suffered a significant disadvantage'. 
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United /iTingdom, Judgment of 28 May 1985, 
nos. 9214/80 ; 9473/81; 9474/8i (1985). 
"1 Ibid., para. 62. 
Ibid., paras. 62-65. The relevance of Article 12 was also noted by the Court. 
"3 Ibid., para. 68 
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According to the present judgment. Article 8 para, i (art. 8-1) is applicable but, 
if taken alone, is not violated because there is no "lack of respect" for family life. 
This reasoning excludes the application of Article 8 para. 2 (art. 8-2), and it in 
fact places inherent limitations upon the rights guaranteed in paragraph 1 of 
Article 8 (art. 8-1). In my opinion, the measures in question can only be, and 
indeed are, justified by the application of Article 8 para. 2 (art. 8-2).'^ 
The point that there cannot be 'inherent limitations upon the rights guaranteed in 
paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)' is also confirmed by the Court's admission that a 
marital relationship is, in every circumstance encountered, 'family life' within the 
meaning of Article 8. In essence, the inclusion of 'famUy life' in the wording of 
Article 8.1 serves as a contextual specification of the broader right of respect for 
private life, so as not to re-argue and re-discover the core aspects of private life in 
every given case, 
To decide that the scope of Article 8 does not extent to the applicants' 
circumstances negates the very substance of Article 8. Another way to put it, the 
question of negative impact regards the non-enjoyment of a family life to which the 
applicants are already entitled by definition under the very wording of paragraph 1 
of Article 8. This also transpires from the arguments of the government in relation to 
one of the applicants for whom indefinite leave was granted 'essentially on the 
ground that [the applicant] was an unmarried woman with little prospect of 
marriage'.Therefore, it is unthinkable, even for the state officials, that the state 
can impose limitations on the choice of marriage partners. That some public officials 
with the task of examining an indefinite leave application betted the marriage 
chances of the applicant is not an issue that should concern the European 
community. The states are absolutely free to shape their own immigration policies, 
as 'the right of a foreigner to enter or remain in a country was not as such 
guaranteed by the Convention, but immigration controls had to be exercised 
consistently with Convention obligations.' To put it straightforwardly, either 
immigrants are not welcome or, if they are, they have to be admitted with full 
respect of their human rights (tiie whole package), as guaranteed by the basic level 
of the Convention. 
Ibid., para. 1 of the concurring opinion of judge Bernhardt. Judge Thor Vilhjalmssoh 
pointed to the legitimate aim of economic well-being of the country. The judges did not elaborate 
much on the justifiability of that aim under the circumstances. 
"5 The emphasis is reasonably put on marriage than co-habitatipn. The former reassures the 
state for a genuine and strong commitment, while the latter can be seen as ephemeral and 
temporary. 
^^Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkdndali v. the United Kingdom, para. 39. 
"7 Ibid., para. 59; East African Asians v. the United kingdom, 'No right to enter and to 
reside in a particular country is, as such, guaranteed by the Convention.', Admissibilily decision of 
10 October 1970, nos. 4403/70; 4404/70; 4405/70... 4530/70, para. 184. 
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The question of the conceptual meaning of a human right has mostly been 
encountered in relation to Article 8 due to the broadness of the term 'private life'. 
For reasons of consistency, it should be recalled from the discussion in chapter i that 
since early jurisprudence, the Court has connected this term to the notion of 
development of one's personality. Although the Court always takes a pragmatic 
approach in evaluating the various claims under Article 8, it has been suggested that 
in order to manage the application and development of positive obligations in a 
more certain and efficient manner, it maybe useful, in appropriate circumstances, to 
firame the question in negative terms, namely to look at those critical conditions 
without which the personality of an individual cannot develop. 
In the current phase of the jurisprudence, the preliminary question of the scope 
of a human right is likely to be more pressing in the examination of the threshold of 
negative impact that engages a Convention right. Such a question arose in the case of 
Costello-Roberts, in which the applicant complained that the corporal punishment 
inflicted on him as a disciplinary measure in a private school was a treatment that 
gave rise to a violation of Articles 3 and 8. The Court reiterated first that, although 
the treatment complained of was the act of a headmaster of a private school, the 
state's responsibility may be engaged if private acts were allowed to violate human 
rights. It specified also that in order for the punishment to be 'degrading' within the 
meaning of Article 3, 'the humiliation or debasement involved must attain a 
particular level of severity and must in any event be other than that usual element of 
humiliation inherent in any punishment'."^ The particular facts of the case were 
pertinent to the assessment of negative impact, but other factors were also taken 
into account, such as 'the nature and context of the punishment, the manner and 
method of its execution, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some 
instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim'." ' i n the end, the Court 
found that, in the peuticular circumstances of the case, the minimum threshold of 
severity had not been reached. A similar conclusion was drawn in relation to the 
applicant's parallel claim under Article 8. I t is worth pointing out that if the Article 8 
threshold cannot be engaged in the applicant's circumstances, this finding will also 
suffice to negate the parallel claim under Article 3 due to the higher threshold of 
negative impact that applies to its provisions. 
Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87, para 
30. 
"9 Ibid. See, recently, Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia, para. 90. 
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Similar issues have been underlined in subsequent jurisprudence, such as the 
case of Stjerna, in which a proposal for a complete merging of positive and negative 
obligations has been argued in a separate opinion of the judgment. With reference to 
our discussion above, it is recalled that the case concerned a complaint about the 
state's refusal to allow the applicant to change his surname. The Court could not find 
'that the sources of inconvenience the applicant complained of are sufficient to raise 
an issue of failure to respect private life under paragraph i (art. 8-i)'^3°A reference 
was also made to the similar assessment of the Cornmission that the inconvenience 
suffered was 'not significant e n o u g h . ' I t is clear, therefore, that since the 
Commission had already reached the same conclusion, the whole case could well 
have been rejected as manifestly ill-founded at the admissibility stage.^ saAs far as the 
general conceptual question is concerned, it was held that the applicant's claim was 
'sufficient to raise an issue of failure to respect private life under paragraph 1 (art. 8-
i ) ' , '33or 'an individual's name does concern his or her private and family life'."34 i t 
was, however, the critical parameter of the actionable threshold of the negative 
impact involved that determined the real applicability of Article 8 in that case.^ ss 
If the negative impact in the applicant's circumstances was actionable, then 
with his claim the individual had 'notified' (the element of knowledge) the state's 
authorities of a human right issue. In that respect, a positive obligation arises by 
virtue of a personal entitlement to a legal right under paragraph 1 of the relevant 
provision.^^ 
From the discussion of the case-law in this section, it is clear that there is a 
great need for consistency in the application of legal principles and the priority of 
their judicial examination. A firm approach in the examination of the scope of 
human rights and, especially, of the critical determinative of the threshold of 
negative impact, will benefit the development and application of positive obligations 
in the system of the Convention. 
'30 Stjema v. Finland, para. 42. 
'31 Ibid., paras. 41,42. 
132 Ibid., para. 41. 
« 3 Ibid, para. 42. 
'34 Ibid., para. 37. 
'35 See, recentiy, Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia, para. 100. 
'36 Connelly, (note 117), 'the first question is whether the complaint relates to the individual's 
private sphere. The second question, however, is not whether there has been any interference by 
the State in this sphere, but rather what (if any) action on the part of the State is required by 
respect for this sphere/, p.572. 
101 
The two principal questions of knowledge of the need of human rights protection 
that conditions the state's liability (as discussed in section B), and the scope of the 
Convention rights against which positive obligations arise (as discussed in this sub-
section), form the general preliminary framework of technical principles that can 
manage objectively and also flexibly the broad nature of positive obligations. Having 
secured the basic foundations, we move on to discuss the more specific content of 
positive obligations. 
1 
II. The Scope of Protection: The Underlying Aim of Prevention of 
Human Rights Violations 
The beginning and end of positive obligations is paragraph i of the Convention 
rights which imposes the active protection of human rights in various circumstances 
where private parties interact. However, active protection of human rights does not 
simply mean some ex post facto relief to the victim. Even if we assume that the 
admissibility criterion for a victim status under Article 34 is interpreted very strictly 
(which it is not),i37 tiiere is nothing to prevent the Court, in its ex post judicial 
examination, from targeting an ex ante system of human rights protection. From 
whichever angle the state's positive obligations are approached, it is inescapable to 
conclude that the issue of the active protection of human rights arises first. In short, 
the quintessence of protection under the state's positive obligations concerns the 
prevention of human rights violations. 
The most basic level of prevention, as evaluated by the minimum standard of 
effectiveness, is to regulate appropriate sanctions that will be enforced ex post in the 
event of a violation. Under this content of positive obligations, prevention is realised 
through the deterring effect of the regulated sanctions. 
Beyond the (absolutely) basic ex post level, the issue of prevention concerns 
mainly the protection of individuals before an actual violation of a human right 
occurs. Under this aim, the effectiveness of protection is evaluated in relation to 
precautionary measures and human rights standards that condition the activities of 
«7 Monnat u. Switzerland, Judgment of 21 September 2006, no. 73604/01 'the word 
"victim" in the context of Article 34 of the Convention denotes the person directly affected by the 
act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of the Convention being conceivable even in 
the absence of prejudice (see iBrumarescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 50, ECHR 1999-
VII). An applicant cannot claim to be a "victim" within the meaning of Article 34 of the 
Convention unless he is or has been directly affected by the act or omission in question or runs the 
risk of being directly affected by it', para. 31 (cited case omitted). 
«8 Osman v. the United Kingdom, para. 115; MahmutKaya v. Turkey, para. 85. 
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private parties. Compliance vvith such regulatory measures is guaranteed by the 
positive involvement of public administration in all those feasible stages in which 
the activities of private parties can reasonably be subjected to their supervision and 
control. 
The meaning of the active protection of human rights as the actual prevention 
of human rights violations has boldly been affirmed in the case of E and Others. The 
applicants were children who suffered repetitive sexual abuse by another individual 
in their family environment. They complained that the state, through its local social 
services department, failed to protect them from inhuman and degrading treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3 and from damage to their private life under Article 8. 
The argument of the government under Article 8 was that 'deterrent sanctions 
against sexual and physical abuse and the statutory system of child protection 
fulfilled any positive obligation imposed by this provision to protect the applicants 
from abuse by W.H.''39 This is the formal submission of the government's counsels 
on the scope of the state's liability for violations of human rights by private parties. 
The fact that the Court ignored it in its entire judgment, confirms the point that the 
serious meaning of the active protection of human rights under paragraph 1 of the 
Convention rights is the actual prevention of sexual abuse and its reoccurrence. 
Indeed, the Court pointed to the finding of violation of Article 3, whose scope is 
absolute and its threshold degree of negative impact is higher than that under Article 
8. 
The state was held responsible because although incidents of sexual and 
physical abuse of the children by the same individual had occurred in the past, the 
social services failed to take practical steps, as could reasonably be required in such 
circumstances. In particular, it was found that the authorities did not monitor the 
perpetrator's behaviour in the aftermath of his conviction for the past abuse, neither 
talked individually to the children despite the recorded disturbed behaviour of some 
of them. I t should also be noted that the government's argument on the ex post facto 
framework of deterring sanctions did not reflect the actual practice in the state's 
systern. It is clear from the facts that the social services had not been inactive and 
regular visits had been arranged to review the well-being of the family. However, 
their positive duty of care was assessed against a specific, and yet basic, content of 
precautionary measures that had to be implemented as obligations of means in the 
circumstances concerned (see further discussion below). 
«9 E and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 November 2002, no. 33218/96, 
para. 104. 
103 
The issue of prevention of human rights violations arising under paragraph i of 
the Convention rights has more recently been seen in the Grand Chamber judgment 
of the case of Oneryildiz.^'^° The reasoning of the Court makes unequivocally clear 
that the principal content of positive obligations is directed at all those stages of 
protection before a human rights violation occurs. Although statements on 
prevention have appeared in previous case-law,'4i in Oneryildiz, prevention is the 
starting point that is highlighted in the section titles of the judgement. 
The facts of that case concerned the death of thiriy-nine people following an 
explosion at a waste-treatment factory. The applicant lost nine of his close relatives 
who were living in the nearby area. According to the information contained in the 
judgment, the factory in question had operated vrith technical problems since its 
early years. The state's authorities had failed to check the safety of the factory and 
enforce compliance with the appropriate technical standards. They also allowed 
inhabitants to settle on the adjoining land. It was also proved that although public 
officials had been made aware of the existence of a recent experts' report pointing to 
serious dangers for the local population, no measures were taken within the scope of 
their powers to prevent fatal harm being inflicted upon innocent individuals. 
The applicant complained about the state's failure to protect his relatives in 
violation of Article 2, pointing to negligent omissions from the part of the state 
authorities. In finding a violation of Article 2, the Court examined the state 
authorities' negligence against a specific content of positive obligations (as in E and 
Others) which concerned measures, whose scope was both contextual (i.e. industrial 
sector) and specific (i.e. the particular activity of waste-treatment). 
The contextual determination and application of positive obligations is justified 
by the fact that, often, more than one human right may be threatened from a given 
activity. The applicant's complaint about the death of his relatives was brought 
under Article 2, but precautionary measures in the form of warning information 
were defined vrith reference to the earlier authority of Guerra and Others, in which 
the applicants, who were potential victims, had their claim examined under Article 
8.143 
Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC). 
•4' Osman v. the United Kingdom, paras. 103,107,115; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, para. 101; 
L.C.B. V. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 June 1998, no. 23413/94, para. 36. 
142 See, subsequentiy, Fadeyeva v. Russia, 'the Court's first task is to assess whether the 
State could reasonably be expected to act so as to prevent or put an end to the alleged 
infringement of the applicant's rights.', para. 89. i 
'43 Guerra and Others v. Italy, discussed in chapter 1, section D.IV.2. 
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These issues have also been exemplified in the cases of Taskin and Others and 
Ockan and Others, both arising from the same facts. The applicants complained 
about the state's decision to authorise a private gold mine, whose operation was 
posing known risks to the physical integrity of the local population.^ The applicants 
were not actual victims of a human rights violation and, therefore, their complaints 
concerned pre-emptive actions about a future violation.^^s Their complaints about 
physical harm were based on both Articles 2 and 8. The Court had only to examine 
the lowest threshold of 1 negative impact that could potentially be involved in the 
applicants' circumstances, which was that under Article 8.^ 46 Relying on the evidence 
submitted, the European judges were able to easily estabUsh that the potential 
negative impact was actionable under Article 8, and as a result, a positive obligation 
has arisen for the state to prevent a human rights violation. 
Therefore, it can be said that the content of positive obligations can be 
determined by various means, but the maximum potential of protection is the actual 
prevention of human rights violations. In the analysis of the case-law, it has been 
shown that prevention is not an abstract notion but regards a specific content of 
positive obligations that has first to be detennined contextually. In that account, the 
issue of the active protection of human rights moves beyond ad hoc responses to 
target a whole system of protection that is organised and implemented before the 
isolated issue of interference ever emerges. Such a system should cover all human 
rights interests that can potentially be involved in the given context of activities of 
private parties. It has been explained in various instances above, that the scope of 
Article 8 entails a lower degree of negative impact on individuals' physical and 
psychological integrity than those contemplated by Articles 2 and 3. I t is reasonable 
therefore to expect that the organisation of prevention of human rights violations 
•44 Taskin and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 November 2004, no. 46117/99, para. 48; 
Ockan and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 March 2006, no. 46771/99 (available in French 
only). The main difference between these two cases is in the number of applicants that joined the 
petition that corresponded to 10 and 314 individuals, respectively. See, more recently, Lemke v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 5 June 2007, no. 17381/02 (available in French only). 
145 The Court did not accept the government's submission on the non-applicability of Article 
8 when they argued that 'the risk referred to by the appUcants was hypothetical, since it might 
materialise only in twenty to fifty years. This was not a serious and imminent risk. In addition, the 
applicants could not point to any specific fact concerning an incident directly caused by the gold 
mine in question.', Taskin and Others v. Turkey, para. 104. See, more recently, Tatar v. 
Romania, paras. 97,106-7. 
146 See also Tatar and Tatar v. Romania (dec), para. 47. For the threshold of severity under 
Article 8, see Lopez Ostra v. Spain 'Naturally, severe environmental pollution may affect 
individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect 
their private and family life adversely, without,; however, seriously endangering their health.', 
para. 51. Fadeyeva v. Russia, 'Even assuming that the pollution did not cause any quantifiable 
harm to her health, it inevitably made the applicant more vulnerable to various diseases.', para. 
88. 
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starts with lowest threshold of negative impact that can potentially be actionable in 
the contextual circumstances concerned. 
III. Limits of Practicality in the Protection of Human Rights 
Inherent limitations to positive obligations under paragraph i of the Convention 
rights are recognised in relation to the states' capabilities (i.e. public funds and 
administrative resources) to practically realise the protection of human rights. 
Contextual differences exist and must be taken into account, because Umits of 
practicality do not attract the same justifications everywhere. Accordingly, the 
general position of the Court that positive obligations should be interpreted in a way 
which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on state 
authorities^7 should be examined under the following division of sections: 
1. Protection against Acts of Interference by Private Parties 
1.1 Acts Taken in Accordance with the Laws of the State 
When human rights are violated by acts of private parties, it is often the case that 
although the violation is actually caused by a private party, it is the state that allows 
the interference complained of through a direct and conscious endorsement^^s or 
inaction^' or various combinations of both.^so j n such circumstances, the causal link 
is no longer confined to the relationship between the activity of the private party and 
the ensuing violation of a human right, since that activity operates legally within the 
state's legal order. In Hatton and Others, the private corporation increased the 
quota of night flights causing unbearable noise problems to some local residents, but 
in no circumstances did its directors pursue the maximisation of the corporation's 
profits in defiance of the state's legal standards and procedures. 
Limitations to the liability of the state due to its limited resources cannot easily 
be accepted when human rights are violated by an activity of a private party 
operating lawfully within the established legal order. This is because the financial 
cost of protection is mainly borne by the private party. The positive obligation to 
>47 Osman v. the United Kingdom, para. ii6; Edwards v. the United Kingdom, para. 55; 
Bone V. France, AdmissibiUty decision of 1 March 2005, no. 69869/01 (available in French only). 
^ Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom. 
•49 Guerra and Others v. Italy; Oneryildiz v. Turkey. 
»so Oneryildiz v. Turkey; Taskin and Others v. Turkey. 
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prevent a human rights violation can be discharged by such measures, such as i ) 
refusing the setting up of a private activity during the licensing stage; 2) denying 
expansion plans; 3) requiring the closure of business premises for as long as human 
rights standards have been complied with; 4) enforcing the withdrawal of dangerous 
products or services; etc. All these measures constitute absolutely basic steps for 
which no serious argvunent of an unnecessary or insurmountable burden on the 
state's resources can be raised. 
In principle, the fact that the protection of human rights may incur a 
considerable financial burden on a private party does not negate per se the binding 
effect of these rights. Of course, this does not mean that a very high cost of 
protection should always be imposed, for a great range of daily activities involve 
various risks to human rights. I t is reiterated that the protection of human rights is 
objectively evaluated by the standard of effectiveness (effective protection) that is 
employed to define the content of various measures against which the financial cost 
of protection arises. The content of protection is usually evcduated by contemplating 
the end result, namely not to suffer a violation of human rights by a given activity. 
The end result examination is a helpful tool to determine what is below or in excess 
of what is required to ensure human rights standards in the operation of the 
activities of private sector. 
I t should be noted that although our discussion is placed in section C that 
covers 'the Content of Positive Obligations under Paragraph 1 of the Convention 
Rights', the points raised here are also relevant where the activities of private parties 
can be justified by the state in pursuit of the economic well-being of the country, 
which is a limitation to the scope of Article 8 expressly recognised in the provisions 
of its paragraph 2. In such circumstances, all financial issues involved (i.e. benefits 
or burdens) have to be taken into account. 
However, where the state takes a decision to allow the interference of a private 
party in pursuit of the economic well-being of the country, this does not change the 
fact that it is still the activity of a private party that directiy causes harm to some 
individuals and it is private than public funds that are required to cover the cost of 
human rights protection. 
Both these parameters reasonably influence the examination of proportionality 
of the state's indirect interference. I f the state fails the proportionality stage, then, at 
that very moment, public authorities will remain under a positive obligation to 
guarantee the protection of human rights against the activities of a private party. For 
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this reason, it is important to know what the current standards of proportionality 
are. 
One of the most relevant contexts of private interactions, in which the economic 
well-being of the country can be engaged as a legitimate limitation to the scope of 
protection under Article 8, concerns the activities of industry and commerce. The 
standard of proportionality test (or its other name: fair balance) can be seen in the 
recent case of Fadeyeva, in which the applicant successfully complained of a 
violation of Article 8 as a result of the state's failure to protect her private life and 
home from severe environmental nuisance that was caused by the activities of a 
private steel plant.^^ 
The government was able to establish easily the applicability of the economic 
well-being of the country as the legitimate aim for the interference of the private 
company .^2 tha t case, the economic benefit derives from a mega-scale steel plant 
(the main employer of approximately 6o,ooo people), as opposed to unfounded 
arguments on the country's well-being from some night flights (within the meaning 
of the 'pressing social need' threshold) and the industry-produced evidence that we 
saw in Hatton and Others.^^ 
In examining the necessity of the interference, the Court first noted that the 
state authorities had applied a sanitary security zone and, thus, 'the existence of 
such a zone is a condition sine qua non for the operation of a dangerous enterprise -
otherwise it must be closed or significantiy restructured. 'The standard of 
proportionality that applied in establishing the necessity of the interference has 
involved two options for the state: helping the applicant move from the dangerous 
area or taking effective measures to reduce industrial pollution to acceptable 
levels.155 I t is clear that although, in Fadeyeva, the state succeeded in engaging the 
economic well-being of the country under the paragraph 2 Umitations, the 
'5' Fadeyeva v. Russia. 
For the 'pressing social need' threshold of a legitimate aim of interference, see note 28. 
'53 For the quality of evidence submitted by the government in Hatton and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, see note 30 above. 
•54 Fadeyeva v. Russia, para. 116. See also para. 119. 
155 Ibid., paras. 133,142. The Court's approach in Fadeyeva can be traced in the separate 
opinion of judge Costa in the Chamber judgment of Hatton and Others in 2001, that is a 
dissenting opinion, since the Grand Chamber reversed the Chamber's decision in 2003. In 
particular, the current president of the Court reasoned that' it has to be one thing or the other: 
either the number of potential victims of night flight noise is limited and the iDeneficiaries" of 
those flights can compensate them, or it is too high for the level of compensation to be financially 
viable for the beneficiaries, whereupon night flights need to be reviewed in their entirety.' 
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protection of human rights was riot excluded because of the financial burden that 
was imposed on the operation of the industrial plant in question.^ ss 
It can, therefore, be said that when we examine limitations to the cost of human 
rights protection under the legitimate aim of the economic well-being of the country, 
in practice we are mainly concerned with the extent of protection. Protection cannot 
be excluded because: 
a) A positive obligation has already arisen for the state to guarantee the 
active protection of individuals under paragraph i of a Convention 
right, that is before the incidental decision of a public authority to 
pursue the legitimate aim of the economic well-being of the country. 
b) In view of the high threshold of the 'pressing social need' engaging a 
legitimate aim of interference and the equally high standards of 
proportionality, the state remains under the positive obhgation 
described in a) above, until its indirect interference can be justified. 
c) I f a justification can be made under paragraph 2, it will mean that 
substantial protection of human rights has been provided to meet the 
proportionality standard. 
1.2. Acts Taken in Defiance of the Laws of the State 
Limitations to the protection of human rights where a disproportionate financial 
burden on the state's resources is involved, can more easily be recognised in 
circumstances where human rights are violated by private parties acting in defiance 
of the standards prescribed in domestic law. Admittedly, it is not expected that the 
state should prevent the actual vioktion of hunian rights in the infinite range of 
relationships between private parties. Although the scope of the state's liability is 
controlled by the element of knowledge of the need of human rights protection, such 
as, for example, when a specific request for protection is made to state authorities 
(the element of express knowledge), there are still limits to public funds and 
administrative resources that influence the scope of positive obligations. 
The same reasoning applied in the subsequent case of Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia, 
which arose from the same facts. Reiterating that in Fadeyeva, the European judges 'considered 
two alternative avenues that could have been employed by the authorities in order to solve the 
applicant's problem: the resettlement of the appHcant outside the zone and the reduction of the 
toxic emissions.', the Court concluded on the violation of Article 8 offering the same options for 
the state, paras. 103, 110, 117. In addition, due to the continuous effect of the interference, the 
state's response will be monitored by the Committee of Ministers, para. 117. 
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Acts taken in defiance of law will usually require a reactive response by the 
enforcement authorities (e.g. the police), whose efficiency has limits and a 
predefined operational budget. It is with reference to this context that statements on 
the limited availability of the state's resources have mostly been seen in the 
jurisprudence. In the Osman case, the applicant had notified the police about threats 
of violence to his family by another individual. On such an express notification, a 
positive obligation was imposed on the state authorities to investigate the applicant' 
s call for help, but 'such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.'i57 
Importantly, it should be noted that limits of practicality relate to the extent of 
protection, rather than to the general issue of protection as such. In contexts where 
there are known human rights issues, a core content of positive obligations is 
presupposed to exist in the form of regulations and enforcement procedures (see 
discussion be low) . In Osman, it was not disputed that there was a core positive 
obligation on the state agents to gather incriminating evidence through operational 
steps of investigation, but rather which and how extensive these steps should be to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the investigation.159 The same reasoning can be seen 
in the earlier case of Plattform "Arzte far das Leben", in which the police was called 
to intervene in order to protect the applicants' demonstration from an opposing 
counter-demonstration. The applicant (an association) complained before the 
Commission that it had not had sufficient police protection during its 
demonstrations. However, the decisive issue, as seen in the Court's examination, 
was not simply that the police were under a positive obligation to intervene in order 
to protect the applicant's Art 11 interests, but rather the number of police officers 
that had to be summoned and being present on the ground. Based on the facts, 
the Court found that the state authorities did not failed to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures. 
2. Protection when an Act of Interference is Absent 
It has been seen in the case of Budayeva and Others above that positive obligations 
are imposed on the state to protect individuals from natural disasters, provided that 
Osman v. the United Kingdom, para 116; Mastromatteo v. Italy, para. 68; Mahmut Kaya 
V. Turkey, para. 86. 
•58 Ibid., para. 115. 
«9 Osman v. the United Kingdom, paras. 104-5. 
Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, paras. 35-39. 
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knowledge of the risks involved can be established under the circumstances. In such 
a context, the issue of the active protection of individuals is not examined in relation 
to a previous act of interference that is attributed to the activities of a private 
party. 
More notable are the cases in which various individuals, who are not able to 
enjoy human rights due to their own circurnstances of personal vulnerability 
(physical and psychological condition), claim direct assistance from the state. An 
example from the jurisprudence is the case of Zehnal and Zehnalova, in which the 
applicants complained imsuccessfully about inter alia the lack of disabled access to 
transport stations which is vital for facilitating social relationships, and hence the 
development of personality within the meaning of Article S.^ ^^  
In such a context, the protection of human rights is mostly dependent on direct 
monetary contribution by the state. In view of the non-uniform landscape of 
financial resources of member states, the financial cost of human rights protection 
constitutes an inherent limitation to positive obligations, wherever this cost is 
considerable, the Court will have first to justify the legitimacy of its intervention 
before determining the content of positive obligations. Chapter 3 is devoted entirely 
to the state's positive obligations to protect vulnerable individuals in circumstances 
where a prior act of interference is absent. 
3. Conditioning Positive Obligations on a Minimum Scope of 
Protection: The Bottom-Up Justification 
The scope of positive obligations under paragraph 1 of the Convention rights relates 
to a content of protection that can realistically be secured by the state's resources. 
Where the protection of a human right cannot be guaranteed by the state, positive 
obhgations may not arise for reasons of impracticality. If, however, some form of 
protection is possible, then provided that it satisfies the minimum level of 
effectiveness, a positive obligation wiU arise in relation to that form of protection. 
Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 'In this respect an impossible or disproportionate burden 
must not be imposed on the authorities without consideration being given, in particular, to the 
operational choices which they must make in terms of priorities and resources...This 
consideration must be afforded even greater weight in the sphere of emergency relief in relation to 
a meteorological event, which is as such beyond human control, than in the sphere of dangerous 
activities of a man-made nature.', paxa. 135. 
Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic, Admissibility decision of 14 May 2002, no. 
38621/97, discussed in chapter 3. 
See, e.g., Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova, AdmissibiUty decision 4 January 2005, 
no. 14462/03. 
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Thus, although the extent of protection may vary from one context to another and 
with the circumstances of each particular case, it is important to establish a 
minimum content of protection in order to deal with positive obligations in a non-
theoretical manner. 
The active protection of human rights in any given circumstance can be realised 
through a content of measures that can be illustrated as follows: 
Extent of Protection = Measurei + Measure^ + ...+ Measuren 
If the state's resources cannot cover all these measures, it does not mean that 
positive obligations are not imposed. If only Measure, is possible, then positive 
obligations can arise and be accordingly imposed in relation to this measure alone, 
provided that the effectiveness of protection is guaranteed. 
Specific examples have to be discussed following the contextual differences on 
which the categorisation of limitations was based in the previous subsections. When 
the protection of human rights is examined against natural disasters (the non-
interference context), it can reasonably be said that to inform promptly the local 
population of any risks to their safety and how to proceed in an emergency situation 
is a measure that does not impose an impossible burden on the state's resources.!^ 
To the extent that this measure offers effective protection, albeit basic, it amounts to 
Measurei of a realistic and manageable content of protection, which alone gives rise 
to a corresponding positive obligation under paragraph i of the relevant Convention 
rights. By contrast, if no measure can be taken which has some effective contribution 
to the human rights issue concerned, then positive obligations may not arise for 
reasons of impracticality. 
Analogous considerations apply to the protection of human rights against acts 
taken in defiance of the laws of the state. By way of example, if there are likely 
incidents of violence on the occasion, say, of a football match, which cannot be 
controlled by a reasonable expedition of police force {Measurei), then effective 
protection in such circumstances can be guaranteed by cancelling the activity in 
question (Measures). Because to cancel an activity or postpone it until safety 
standards are implemented, amounts to an effective protection, which does not 
impose an unrealistic burden on the state, positive obligations can legitimately arise 
in relation to Measures. 
Budayeva and Others v. Russia, para, 152. See also Albekov and Others v. Russia, 
Judgment of 8 October 2008, no. 68216/01, para. 88. 
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The same factual example falls also within the category of lawful activities of 
private parties. Because a sports event concerns an activity, which is run as a lawful 
business (whether or not it is funded by public or private money), positive 
obligations are asserted against a greater extent of protection for which the financial 
cost involved is not borne of the state's resources. In that regard, a more enhanced 
content of protective measures can be imposed to implement health and safety 
standards in premises open to the public (i.e. stadiums), such as medical units 
{Measures), emergency exits iMeasure4), etc. 
IV. The Core Content of Human Rights Protection: The Legislative 
Framework 
In most circumstances, a regulatory framework can be imposed as a core content of 
positive obligations under paragraph i of the Convention rights. Regulations of 
human rights standards to educate the behaviour of private parties or to condition 
the operation of their activities, are the first and most basic content of positive 
obligations. Their implementation is guaranteed through a parallel regulation of 
sanctions of an appropriate deterring effect whose enforcement is made ex post. The 
legislative framework arises as a core positive obligation when the element of 
knowledge of the need of human rights protection can be established contextually. 
Such a context in which the interaction of private parties involves known risks 
to human rights, is of course that of violence against the person. Positive obligations 
in the form of sanctions of an appropriate deterring effect (e.g. jail sentences) and 
due enforcement procedures have early been recognised in the Court's 
jurisprudence. It has been seen in the discussion of X and Y in chapter i , that a 
criminal than civil law remedy should first be available to the victims of rape under 
Article S.^ s^The issue of protection is particularly pressing when innocent life is 
threatened. The Court repeatedly reiterates that the state's positive obligation 
'involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place 
effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the 
person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression 
and punishment of breaches of such provisions.'>^^ 
'^sx and Yv. the Netherlands. See also M.C. u. Bulgaria, Judgment of 4 December 2003, 
no. 9272/98. 
Osman v. The United Kingdom, para. 115; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, para 85; Kilic v. 
Turkey, para. 62; Kontrova v. Slovakia, Judgment of 31 May 2007, no. 7510/04, para. 49. 
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Another example of a known context of private interactions in which a positive 
obligation arises for the state to regulate human rights standards is that of trade 
union representation. The actions of a trade union have long been recognised as a 
special aspect of freedom of association that is guaranteed by paragraph i of Article 
11.1^ 7 A relevant case in this context is Wilson, the National Union of Journalists and 
Others, in which the applicants complained that the state has allowed employers to 
use financial incentives in order to induce employees to surrender important trade 
unions rights. In addition, they could even discriminate (e.g. constructive 
dismissals) against those employees who have chosen to pursue the advantages of 
union membership (e.g. collective representation). In that case, there was no 
argument about the legitimate aims of interference under paragraph 2. For the 
government, this was an issue of collective bargaining to be resolved between the 
interested parties, leaving 'each side to persuade the other'.^ s^ However, although the 
state has not directly been involved in labour disputes, it has failed in its positive 
obligation to protect the Article i i interests of the applicants, as '[i]t is the role of the 
State to ensure that trade union members are not prevented or restrained from 
using their union to represent them in attempts to regulate their relations with their 
employers.''^ 9 
Regulations of human rights standards as core positive obligations have also 
been seen in the more recent case of Oneryildiz that concerned, as discussed in 
various sections above, a fatal industrial accident in which 39 individuals lost their 
lives. In the context of industrial activities in which well-known hazards exist, the 
Court was able to define easily both the contextual and particular content of 
measures that the state is expected to regulate in advance. In what may have been 
one of the most comprehensive and all-encompassing statements on the content of 
positive obligations arising under paragraph 1, the Court (in its Grand Chamber 
capacity) described, first, the general content of the regulatory framework in the 
form of various critical administrative steps, stating that 
^(•T National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, Judgment of 27 October 1975, no. 4464/70, 
para. 38; Swedish Engine Drivers Union v. Sweden, Judgment of 6 February 1976, no. 5614/72, 
para. 39. Wilson, the National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 2 July 2002, nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96, para. 48. In his concurring 
opinion judge Gaukur Jonmdsson stressed that 'the case-law has clearly concluded that a right to 
be heard (as a collective representation) is protected by Article 11. One can say, therefore, that this 
right is a minimum which should be protected.' 
168 wibon, the National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 39. 
Ibid., para. 46. See also Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 30 July 2009, no. 
67336/01, paras. 120-1,136. 
114 
The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the 
purposes of Article 2 (see paragraph 71 above) entails above all a primary duty 
on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed 
to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life ... [§] This 
obligation indisputably applies in the particular context of dangerous activities, 
where, in addition, special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to 
the special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the 
level of the potential risk to human lives. They must govern the licensing, setting 
up, operation, security and supervision of the activity [in question] ...^70 
It that passage, it is clear that administrative steps have to be regulated in advance in 
the context of dangerous activities, such as those of industry. The dangerousness of a 
given activity is assessed with reference to 'inherent risks' that establish a contextual 
knowledge of the need of human rights protection. ^ 71 
Continuing from the last quoted sentence of the passage above, the Court moves 
on to specify practical measures that form part of the content of regidations. In 
particular, it has stated that 
...and must make it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical 
measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be 
endangered by the inherent risks. [§] Among these preventive measures, 
particular emphasis should be placed on the public's right to information, as 
established in the case-law of the Convention institutions. 172 
The Court highlights precautionary ('preventive') measures with reference to the 
whole context of industrial activities and specifies the measure of warning 
information, which is well-entrenched in the relevant jurisprudence.173 Additional 
practical measures have also to be regulated in relation to the particular nature of 
the activity concerned (i.e. waste-treatment).i74 The content of regulated measures 
and standards of human rights protection is not only addressed to the state 
authorities, but also to the private parties, who are directiy responsible for the 
human rights violations. 7^5 A more detailed discussion of administrative and 
practical measures is presented in sections V and VI, respectively. 
From the foregoing analysis of the case-law, it can generally be asserted that in 
contexts of private interactions in which known human rights issues are involved, a 
positive obligation arises for the state to regulate in advance individual conduct and 
>7o Oneryildiz v. Turkey, (GC), paras. 89-90. 
171 Ibid., para. 71. 
Ibid., para. 90. 
See, e.g., Guerra and Others v. Italy and, more recently, Tatar v. Romania. 
'74 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC), paras 58,108. 
'75 See, recently, Tatar v. Romania, Thus, Article 8 could apply to environmental issues, 
whether the state has directly caused the pollution or its responsibility derives from the lack of 
adequate regulation of the private sector's activities.' (translation), para. 87. 
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the operation of the activities of private parties, as well as the duties of the state 
authorities in relation to the acts of the former. The exact content of regulations may 
vary from one context to another, but a common denominator exists in the form of 
the standard of effectiveness. 
V. The Core Content of Human Rights Protection: The 
Administrative Framework 
The core content of positive obligations includes also administrative structures to 
implement and enforce the human rights standards that have been regulated by the 
state in advance. As in previous sections, the content of administrative structures is 
examined under the prism of prevention of hurhan rights violations. 
Although the content of administrative measures varies with context due to the 
wide range of private activities, a common approach can be discerned. For reasons 
of consistency, it should be reiterated that positive obligations raise the state's 
liability in circumstances in which its agents are not directly involved. As discussed 
in section B above, the state's involvement can only be exposed when the element of 
knowledge of the need of human rights protection lies with its agents. In this 
connection, the content of administrative measures targets those procedural 
structures through which the crucial element of knowledge can be established. 
Accordingly, the administrative framework serves as an institutionalised 
intermediate level of effectiveness that sits between the regulated standards and the 
practical measures of protection. 
In the following, a common approach to the determination of the administrative 
framework is sought in various contexts of private interactions, such as criminal 
violence, children in unfavourable family environments, and industrial activities. 
Particular attention is drawn to the standard of effectiveness, whose application 
affects the scope and content of administrative structures. 
Violence against ttie Person 
Administrative structures as part of the core content of positive obligations have 
been exemplified in the case of Osman. As discussed above, the applicant's had 
called the pohce for help against the threats of an identifiable individual. In 
evaluating the content of protective measures in such circumstances, the Court has 
laid down a test (hereinafter the Osman test), as follows 
ii6 
In the opinion of the Court where there is an allegation that the authorities have 
violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their 
above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person (see 
paragraph 115 above), it must be established to its satisfaction that the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real 
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals firom the 
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the 
scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to 
avoid that risk.176 
The Osman test revolves around the element of knowledge that is pertinent in the 
determination of the state's positive obligations. It contains, however, some 
technical details that can affect considerably the scope of the administrative 
framework and its function as a core intermediate stage of positive obligations. 
Therefore, the exact relevance and application of that test needs a careful analysis. 
According to Jeremy McBride, the passage quoted above, sets a general test to 
examine the question of when a positive obligation has arisen imder the 
circumstances. It could be used as a 'causal test' in every context when the right to 
life (Article 2) is concerned, "because life is not less valuable in some situations than 
in others.'i77 The relevance of that test is examined in relation to the rejection, by a 
majority Court, of the applicant's submission that the police could have better 
assessed the threat to his family if they had taken more effective measures of 
investigation. In particular, it is argued that 'it [the Court] appears to confuse the 
question of what the existence of a duty to act requires with, whether such a duty 
exists; if there was no basis for believing there to be a serious threat then it is 
irrelevant that there were constraints on taking the action suggested.'^ s^ 
The suggestion for a causal test, which is elevated to a status of broad 
applicability, has to be critically evaluated. If the quoted passage above can be used 
ais an ever-available 'causal test' that transcends context, then it affects the whole 
application of positive obligations. Although, undeniably, the general element of 
knowledge is of broad applicability, the Osman test contains calculating parameters 
of 'seriousness' and 'immediacy' that confine the scope of positive obligations to 
mere reactive responses. In this respect, it is not difficult to see the downgrading of 
'76 Osman v. the United Kingdom, para. 115. A similar test had been used in the Corfu 
Channel case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Reports, 1949, p.4) discussed by 
Loucaides, (note 11), p. 148. 
>77 J . McBride, 'Protecting life: A Positive Obligation to Help' (1999) 24 E L R (SUPP HR) 43-
54, 45. In addition, the adjective 'real' of the Osman test is interpreted as 'at least compelling', p. 
46. We do not share this view, as the proposed interpretation deviates from the literal meaning of 
the express word used in that test. The judges, as legal scientists, could well have adopted the 
proposed adjective if they had thought tliat a more restrictive element of knowledge had to be 
conditioned 
178 Ibid., p. 48. 
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the administrative framework from core intermediate stage of a system of protection 
to ad hoc measures of incidental relevance. 
If the Court has 'confused the question' of positive obligations, as argued, then 
we reach a paradoxal situation in which, when the police are notified of threats 
against some individuals, European human rights law would merely require the 
officers to hold a meeting over their desks to discuss whether 'a real and immediate 
risk' exists, instead of going out to actively conduct their own investigation for the 
requisite evidence. 
The passage from the Osman case, as quoted above, sets a test for coercive 
action upon incriminating evidence in the context of the police only.'79 Given that 
reactive 'protective policing measures''^ " go without saying,i8i it becomes clear that 
the judicial examination of the state's positive obligations should start with the 
intermediate core stage of administrative steps (i.e. investigation), because it is these 
steps that often condition the reactive response. indeed, in Osman, the main 
focus of the Court was on the effectiveness of the initial investigation, which looked 
for the requisite incriminating evidence.^ ss The majority of the Court found that such 
an administrative step existed in the form of an entrenched procedure of various 
operational measures, which had sufficientiy been implemented under the 
circumstances. 
Cliildren under Social Care Supen/ision 
The core relevance of the administrative framework has also been elaborated in the 
context of unfavourable family environments. An important case in this context is Z 
and Others. The applicants were four children who have been subjected to 
'79 D. Xenos,. 'Asserting the Right to life (Article 2, ECHR) in the Context of Industry' 
(2007) 8 GLJ 231-254, 239-241. 
A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Right (Hart, 2004): 15. 
Osman v. the United Kingdom, 'Article 2 of the Convention may imply a positive 
obligation on the authorities of a Contracting State to take preventive measures to protect the life 
of an individual from the danger posed by another individual.' (quoting the government's 
submission), para. 107. Cf. Opuz v. Turkey, para. 145. 
'82 There is a substantial body of jurisprudence regarding critical steps and standards of 
police investigations, see, e.g., the numerous cases against Turkey and Russia. See also discussion 
in chapter 4, section D. III . 
»83 See the submission of the applicant in Osman v. the United Kingdom, paras. 104-5 and 
the partly dissenting, partly concurring opinion of judge De Meyer joined by judges Lopes Rocha 
and Casadevall. 
Z a n d Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 May 2001, no. 29392/95. N. Mole, 
'Z and Others v UK and TP and KM v UK' [2001] I F L J 117-123; A Di Stefano, 'Public Authority 
Liabihty in Negligence e Diritto ad im Ricorso Effettiyo nell' Ordinamento Britannico: Nota all 
Sentenza della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell' Uomo nel Caso Z e altri c. Regno Unito' (2003) 1 
RIDU 97-127. 
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prolonged neglect and abuse in their family environment, and as a result, they 
suffered physical and psychological injury, whose degree of severity reached the 
threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment that is prohibited by Article 3. 
Although the state's social care authority had assumed responsibility to supervise 
the welfare of the children of this family,i85 they failed to take the necessary steps to 
protect them. It should be noted that in such a context of private relationships, 
human rights issues are not unlikely to emerge. Accordingly, a positive obligation 
arises for the state to protect the children of those families that are under the 
supervision of its agents. In such contextual circumstances, the first administrative 
step is to set up effective monitoring practices that are capable of finding alarming 
evidence of any actual or potential abuse (i.e. the more specific knowledge). It is 
through such an administrative practice that the requisite evidence can be 
established so as to trigger, subsequentiy, a reactive response in the form of direct 
and personal assistance. In finding a violation of Article 3, the Court reasoned its 
decision on the 'failure of the [state's] system' (as opposed to some ad hoc and 
reactive measures) highlighting in that way the multilevel framework of positive 
obligations that the state has to implement in such a known context of private 
relationships. 
The scope of the administrative framework has further been elaborated in E 
and Others, which also dealt with the issue of abuse of children in unfavourable 
family environments. It is recalled from previous discussion that the state was found 
in violation of Article 3 on the ground that its social services failed to adequately 
monitor a family with a recorded history of sexual and physical abuse of children. 
In such a context of private relationships, a positive obligation arises for the state to 
take steps to prevent human rights violations. The (additional) positive obligation to 
react upon a specific threat that is 'serious' and 'immediate' (e.g. to take children 
into community care) was, as in the Osman case, beyond question. 
What precedes in examination is the existence of a 'system' of protection that 
consists of core administrative steps to monitor the behaviour of suspects and family 
members. In that regard, the government's argument that 'the social services did not 
have knowledge of any continuing abuse' at the material time, is deprived of its 
relevance, as this knowledge derives from its agents' own work during core 
185 z and Others v. the United Kingdom. N. Mole, 'Z and Others v UK and TP and KM v UK' 
[2001] I F L J 117-123; A. Di Stefano, 'Pubhc Authority Liability in NegUgence e Diritto ad un 
Ricorso Effettivo nell' Ordinamento Britannico: Nota £dl Sentenza della Corte Europea dei Diritti 
dell' Uomo nel Caso Z e altri c. Regno Unito' (2003) 1 RIDU 97-127. 
186 E Qjid Others v. the United Kingdom. See also discussion in sub-section II above. 
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administrative steps that are already required as core positive obligations. Of equal 
irrelevance is the 'but for' causation test of ex post facto results that '"but for" the 
failing or omission of the pubUc authority ill-treatment would not have happened'.187 
Because the Convention is not a fourth instance forum, the administrative steps of 
investigation and evaluation of findings are imposed as core positive 'obligations of 
means'188 to ensure the 'proper and effective management of [the state authorities'] 
responsibilities' against the principal aim of prevention of human rights violations 
(i.e. 'to avoid, or at least, minimise the risk or the damage suffered.')!^ ^ 
Industrial Activities 
The question of positive obligations in the form of core administrative steps is 
particularly pertinent in the context of industrial activities, since any risk to human 
rights can potentially affect a great number of people. Administrative obligations 
have been exemplified in the Oneryildiz case, in which the applicant complained of 
the state's failure to prevent a fatal industrial accident. In the quoted passage from 
Oneryildiz in sub-section IV above, it is clear that a core administrative framework 
must be regulated and implemented in advance governing 'the licensing, setting up, 
operation, security and supervision' of industrial activities. 
As already discussed, the starting point of Court's examination is the prevention 
of human rights violations and the contextual reach of the state's obligations. It is 
worth, however, visiting the government's main argument in order to further stress 
the importance of some technical details that are pertinent to the scope of the 
administrative framework. In the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber, the 
government argued that the Chamber failed to apply the 'immediacy' and 'reality' 
criteria of the Osman test when examined the responsibility of the state authorities 
in the fatal industrial accident. Despite this express submission by the government, 
the Grand Chamber did not examine the Osman test, but seized the opportunity to 
lay down the core administrative content of positive obligations that had to be 
implemented well before the threats to human rights became 'immediate'.'90 
In Taskin and Others, another important case in the context of industry 
(discussed above), the focus of judicial examination shifts exclusively on the 
187 E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 99. The government argued that 
'notwithstanding any acknowledged shortcomings it has not been shown that matters would have 
turned out any differently", para. 99. 
'88 B. Hofstotter, 'Positive obligations in E . and others v. United Kingdom' (2004) 2(3) I 
CON 525-560. 
'89 E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 100. 
'9° Xenos, (note 179), pp. 239-240. 
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implementation of administrative procedures that are required in order to assess the 
dangerous effects of an industrial activity. In that case, the applicants were not 
actual victims, since their complaints concerned potential harm. In such 
circumstances, the positive obligation to prevent a human rights violation can only 
be determined by evaluating the effectiveness of the environmental impact-
assessment, which establishes the specific knowledge of the gravity of the threats 
involved.Such an administrative practice is core to the 'supervisory' role of the 
public administration that functions as a system of protection of human rights in the 
context of dangerous industrial activities. 
In appropriate circumstances, it is expected that a core content of 
administrative steps can be regulated, additionally or otherwise, against the private 
parties that control the operation of dangerous activities, provided that the state 
retains a supervisory function.'^ a in order to reduce the cost of public supervision or 
because experts with high technical knowledge may be needed, private parties can 
legitimately be required to fund, either alone or collectively, the investigation and 
research of the negative effect of their activities on human rights. Every expert that 
is sub-contracted during these investigations will also be bound by legal standards of 
professional negligence for which a parallel framework of regulations and 
enforcement procedures is secured by the state. 
The Scope of Effectiveness: Determining the Content of Administrative 
Measures 
The content of the administrative framework is determined by evaluating the 
standard of effectiveness. Departing from the aim of prevention of human rights 
violations, the scope of effectiveness involves both a general and a specific level. At 
the general level, effectiveness justifies the administrative framework as an 
indispensable core stage of positive obligations and defines the main structures 
therein. Such administrative obligations include inter alia a supervisory and 
investigatory mechanism, which is a common requirement in various contexts of 
private interactions, as discussed above. At the specific level, effectiveness targets 
those critical steps and parameters upon which the effectiveness of the general 
Taskin and Others v. Turkey, para. 111. See, more recently, Budayeva and Others v. 
Russia, para. 136; Tatar v. Romania, paras. 88,101,112,114,122. 
R. Smith, The Public is Being Regularly Deceived by the Drug Trials Funded by 
Pharmaceutical Companies, Loaded to Generate the Resxilts they Need' Guardian, 14 January 
2004; R. Evans and S. Boseley, '"Drug Firms" Lobby Tactics Revealed' Guardian, 28 September 
2006. 
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administrative structures depends. Accordingly, a more specific content of 
administrative safeguards has to be described. 
The intensity of review of the exact content of adminisfrative obligations can be 
seen in the cases already discussed above. In Osman, the applicant expressly 
criticised the effectiveness of the investigation system of the police in order to prove 
that the state had failed in its positive obligations under Article 2. In a majority 
ruling, the Court found that the steps taken by the state agents were what could 
reasonably be expected under the contextual circumstances concerned. It is noted, 
however, that the Court did not elaborate much on the exact steps and standards of 
the investigation process. ^ 93 
In Oneryildiz, the Court pointed out, in a more informed way, that due 
allowances should be made for such structures that are capable of 'identifying 
shortcomings in the processes concerned and any errors committed by those 
responsible at different levels'. in this connection, individual access in the 
decision-making process of the administrative framework for comments, 
information, and the right to challenge - through courts or otherwise - the 
effectiveness of the overall process is, as stated in Taskin and Others, "beyond 
question'.i95 
These developments of the case-law reflect a more sophisticated and objective 
evaluation of the standard of effectiveness which coincide with the growing 
realisation that the protection of human rights is primarily secured in the domestic 
than the European level. In this respect, the content of positive obligations extends 
to the critical details of the multilevel framework of public administration. In 
addition, appropriate safeguards are required to circumvent cumbersome 
procedures and improve current practices so as to update accordingly the content of 
the administrative framework at the regulatory level.196 
'93 For dissenting and concurring opinions about the effectiveness of investigation in Osman 
V. the United Kingdom, see note 168 above. See also Opuz v. Turkey, para. 135. 
'94 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC), para. 90. 
'95 Taskin and Others v. Turkey, para. 116; Lemke v. Turkey, para. 41; Tatar v. Romania, 
section title of the judgment: 'E . Access to information and the participation of individuals in the 
prehminaiy decision-making process authorizing the operation [of these activities]' (translation), 
paras. 20-23, 88,101. See also discussion of Taskin and Others in chapter 4, section C. 
'96 Fadeyeva v. Russia, 'However, this proves only that the Severstal steel-plant has failed to 
comply with domestic environmental norms and suggests that a wider sanitary security zone 
shoiid perhaps have been required.', para. 119. 
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VI. The Content of Human Rights Protection: The Extent of 
Protection - Practical Measures 
The content of positive obligations includes practical measures of protection, as can 
be required in the applicant's circumstances. In many cases, these measures are 
reactive in nature and can take the form of direct action to stop a private party from 
harming another. It has been seen in the foregoing analysis of case-law that the first 
question is whether there is an issue of human rights protection of which the state 
authorities should reasonably know. Knowledge of the need of human rights 
protection is actively looked at by the state's adminisfrative mechanism, which 
constitutes a core content of the state's positive obligations. 
In the cases of Osman, Z and Others, E and Others, Oneryildiz, Taskin and 
Others that are discussed above, the reactive response of the state to take practical 
measures of protection is depended on the element of knowledge that conditions 
that response. In some cases, such as those concerning dangerous industrial 
activities, one of the entrenched measures of practical protection is to inform the 
local population of any risks to their health and safety.'97 in this context of private 
activities, the exclusive or partial content of such information is the very knowledge 
of the need of human rights protection that the state authorities are under a prior 
obligation to find during the administrative steps of supervision and controL^ s^ 
In addition to reactive responses, practical protection can be defined in the 
form of precautionary measures where contextual knowledge suffices per se to 
establish the need for protection of human rights. Such a content of protection is 
w Guerra and Others v. Italy; Oneryildiz v. Turkey. 
'98 Xenos, (note 179), sub-section: 'Informing the local population', pp. 243-5. In Tatar v. 
Romania, in finding the state in violation of Article 8, the Court held that the state authorities 
failed in their duty to inform the local population of any (past, present or future) risks to their 
health and well-being and of any preventive measures in the event of an accident (para. 124). This 
conclusion is based on the Court's previous conclusion that the state's administrative authorities 
had failed to evaluate in advance, and in an efficient manner, the potential risks from the 
industrial activity in question (para. 112). See also paras. 101,113-4,122. 
« 9 See also A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in 
International Law (Kluwer Law International, 2002); S. Flogaitis, 'Les avahces du principe de 
precaution en droit public grec' (2006) 59 RHDI 449-470. See, more recently, the case of 
Tatar v. Romania, The principle of precaution requires that the states should not delay to adopt 
effective and proportionate measures, which aim to prevent a serious and irreversible damage to 
the environment, because of lack of certainty in scientific or technical knowledge.' (translation), 
para. 109. See also section B of that judgment: 'Relevant International Law and Practice': 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (3-14 June 1992); a case 
decided by the International Court of Justice on 27 September 1997 regarding the project 
Gabcikovo Nagymaros; Resolution no. 1430/2005 of the Parliamentary Assenibly of the Council 
of Europe on industrial hazards; the principle of precaution in E U law (Article 174 (ex 130) of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (5 mai 1998, The 
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justified by the principal aim of prevention of human rights violations that is central 
to the nature of positive obligations. In this respect, a first content of warning 
information can often be established by the general nature of the activities in 
question.200 
Practical measures of protection can be required and accordingly regulated 
against private parties, as well as the state officials in charge of control and 
supervision of the activities of the former. The exact content of practical measures 
will vary with context and the particular nature of the activity concerned, while the 
state has a general discretion over the choice of these measures, ^ o' As with any 
content of protection, the choice of measures is reviewed against the standard of 
effectiveness, which aims, consciously or unconsciously, at an end/complete result 
{tel(e)os). In appropriate circumstances and in order to make the most of the 
occasion of the appUcant's complaint, the European judge, having the benefit of 
hindsight, can adopt a teleological approach to determine measures that set the 
minimum pan-European standard of human rights protection in the context 
concerned. The Court's reviewing task is often aided by comparative examples fi-om 
the practice of mernber states and the recommendations or resolutions of relevant 
international documents.^ o^ 
D. A Synthesis of Hunfian Rights Protection 
The distinct nature of the state's positive and negative obligations needs particular 
attention in circumstances in which the state assumes, dh-ectiy or indirectiy, the 
interfering acts of private parties in pursuit of the legitimate aims of paragraph 2 of 
the Convention rights. Any act of the state that confirms, maintains and ultimately 
permits a private party's interference with a human right is to be directiy attributed 
to the state. The state's involvement can be seen in the form of a piece of 
legislation,203 a judicial decision,204 ah administrative order,2°5 or any combination 
United Kingdom/Commission, C-180/96, Rec. I-2265 ; 5 mai 1998, National Farmer's Union, C-
157/96, Rec. I-2211). 
200 Bone V. France. 
2°' Markcx v. Belgium; Osman v. the United Kingdom. 
202 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC), paras. 59-62; Tatar and Tatar v. Romania (dec), 'Section C: 
European Law". 
203 Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 13 August 1981, nos. 
7601/76 ; 7806/77; Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark; Wilson, the National Union of 
Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom. 
Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, Judgment of 13 
July 2004, no. 69498/01; Van Kuck v. Germany. 
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of them. Wherever an act of interference (directly caused by a private party and 
indirectly allowed by the state) can be justified under the criteria of paragraph 2 of 
the Convention rights, an entitlement to a human right is reduced either at all or to 
some extent. As a result, positive obligations are also reduced, as the issue of the 
active protection concerns a human right whose scope has legitimately been limited 
in the circumstances concerned. Analysing the earlier jurisprudence, Peter Duffy 
pointed out that 'it is inconceivable that positive obligations could ever be inherent 
in an effective respect for Article 8 rights under circumstances in which a State 
would be justified in interfering with these rights under paragraph 2.'^ °^  
However, the current caseload of the Court no longer reflects the small number 
of annual petitions of the earlier jurisprudence. In order to secure its own long-term 
effectiveness, the Court should make the most out of the given complaints and adjust 
the focus of its judicial examination on principles and standards that have a wide 
reach. 
Although positive obligations may be restricted by a justified limitation to the 
scope of a human right under paragraph 2, they remain 'inherent', by virtue of 
paragraph i which will always arise for the state, unlike acts of interference that can 
only come into play under exhaustively listed aims, if available, if relevant, if 
reachable, and if decided to be pursued by the state agents.^ ^^  More importantly, it 
has been shown in previous sections that positive obligations have a core content, 
which has to be discharged in advance in order to guarantee the prevention of 
human rights violations. In other words, a core content of human rights protection is 
due for implementation much before an act of interference is ever attempted. In that 
account, unlike the legitimate aims of paragraph 2 that the state may decide to 
pursue, there is nothing optional about its positive obligations arising under 
paragraph i of the Convention rights. 
Accordingly, where both positive and negative obligations can be relevant in a 
given circumstance, they have to reach a synthesis of human rights protection. The 
starting point is that the protection of human rights cannot be organised through 
Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom; Fadeyeva v. Russia. 
=06 Duffy, (note 86), p. 200. 
207 An act of interference is only permissible if it is taken within the limits specified in 
paragraph 2. See the judgment of the Golder v. the United Kindom, para. 44; Klass and Others v. 
Germany, This [second] paragraph [of Article 8], since it provides for an exception to a right 
guaranteed by the Convention, is to be. narrowly interpreted.', para. 42. Connelly, (note 117), p. 
570; P. Duffy, 'The Sunday Times case: Freedom of Expression, Contempt of Court and the 
European Convention on Human Rights' (1980) 1 HRR17-53; Loucaides, 'Chapter 9. Restrictions 
of Limitations on the Rights Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, section 
5. Strict Interpretation of limitation', (note 11), p. 185. 
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incidental questions of justifiability of acts of interference, without recognising that 
protection has already arisen as an obhgation for the state much before the isolated 
interference. In technical terms, the question is posed as follows: how can the core 
content of the state's positive obligations arising under paragraph i of the 
Convention rights in a known context of activities of private parties (the contextual 
level) maintain the priority of its implementation when examining the justifiability 
of a private party's interference that the state pursues under one of the legitimate 
aims of paragraph 2 (the ad hoc level)? 
I. The Point of Synthesis: Positive Obligations as the Entrenched 
Safeguards to be 'Prescribed by Law' 
1. Positive Obligations as Legal Safeguards that Condition and Justify 
an Act of Interference 
The state has a positive obligation under paragraph i of the Convention rights to 
implement a core content of administrative steps in order to identify and assess the 
negative impact that some activities of private parties (operating in a known context) 
can have on the human rights of individuals. 
Such core administrative steps have been required in the landmark case of 
Hatton and Others to guarantee the requisite evidence that substantiates the state's 
margin of appreciation for the necessity of an act of interference. As already 
discussed, the examination of necessity is usually made by an overall proportionate 
(fair) balance between competing interests (exhaustively Usted). It cannot, therefore, 
be said that the proportionality/necessity stage has the appropriate resources to 
impose the strict examination of the details of the core administrative structiu-es, as 
well as the priority of their implementation. 
If the positive obligations of the state are examined first, the reviewing task will 
start with the negative impact on the individuals fi-om the given activity complained 
of and will focus on the administrative steps that undertake this assessment. As 
pointed out by judges Costa, Ress, Tiirmen, Zupancic and Steiner in their joint 
dissenting opinion in the Grand Chainber judgment of that case, the negative impact 
could well have reached the Article 3 threshold, whose binding effect is absolute.208 
In essence, what is stressed is a system of human rights protection that is capable of 
208 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), para. 13 of the joint dissenting opinion. 
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addressing in advance various effects of interference in a given context of private 
interactions. 
One of the points that split the Court in both the Chamber and Grand Chamber 
judgment (including the respective separate and dissenting opinions) concerned the 
critical details of the administrative practice establishing the negative impact from 
the operation of the private activity (i.e. night flights). It was found that the state 
authorities had not considered sleep prevention during the evaluation process.^ o^  i f 
this detail is critical for that evaluation, it means that the administrative practice 
concerned fails the standard of effectiveness, and the judicied examination stops 
automatically there and then. It is, therefore, difficult to see how due attention can 
be paid to core administrative obligations, if these obligations are only examined 
indirectly at the overburdened, by any means, proportionality stage, at which a 
balance for an overall justice prevails. This is evident from the majority decision of 
the Grand Chamber that 'in substance' the authorities did not overstep their margin 
of appreciation, despite the shortcomings of the administrative practice.^ io 
In order to move from a collection of ad hoc decisions to pan-European 
standards that target a domestic system of human rights protection, it is necessary 
to adopt a more strict examination of the core content of the state's positive 
obligations, whose implementation arises in priority in known contexts of private 
interactions. 
Accordingly, the proposal that is made here is that, provided that the state can 
establish the 'pressing social need' threshold to engage a legitimate aim of 
interference (where available), the administrative steps, which are core positive 
obligations under paragraph i , can be incorporated as legal safeguards that have to 
be 'prescribed by law', (or 'in accordance with law' in Article 8 (2))^" under the first 
criterion of paragraph 2. Thus, when such safeguards do not exist or have not been 
implemented to the standard of effectiveness, the merits and the justifiability of the 
given interference are simply not reached. In practice, this means that no act of 
interference can be considered if appropriate administrative safeguards have not 
been regulated and implemented in advance. 
2 0 9 i b i d . , para. 105. 
Ibid., para. 129. See also discussion in sections A.IV andV above. 
Malone v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, no. 8691/79, 'the expression 
"in accordance with the law/ prevue par la loi" in paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2) should be 
interpreted in the light of the same general principles as were stated in the Sunday Times 
judgment of 26 April 1979 (Series A no. 30) to apply to the comparable expression "prescribed by 
law/ prevues par la loi" in paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2).', para. 66. 
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The first criterion of the paragraph 2 (i.e. to be 'in accordance with law' or Tbe 
prescribed by law') regards the certainty and foreseeability of legal safeguards that 
all interested parties should be able to understand in various contextual 
circumstances.212 In that account, the state is under an obligation to 'prescribe by 
law' legal safeguards that have to be implemented before an act of interference is 
attempted. Administrative steps, which are core positive obligations under 
paragraph i , are exactly those legal safeguards that the law has to prescribe in a 
foreseeable and certain manner and implement in practice.^^ 
The 'provided by law' criterion is expressly stated first in paragraph 2 provisions 
and, therefore, it has to be exhausted first. It is fair to say that although this criterion 
has been examined in the jurisprudence, little attention has been paid to its 
importance and potential due to preference to the fair balance test and the state's 
margin of appreciation. The task, at this junction, is to discuss relevant case-law in 
which the lack of adequate safeguards that the law has to prescribe or the 
ineffectiveness of their implementation, leads to a finding of a violation without 
having to examine the particular merits or the necessity (proportionality) of the 
interference. 
Examples fi-om the jurisprudence include the complaints about surveillance 
practices that state authorities have adopted in pursuit of a legitimate aim of 
interference, such as the interests of national security, public safety, the protection 
of health, the prevention of disorder or crime, as provided for under Article 8 (2). 
The particular facts of the surveillance practices will not be discussed, as what is 
looked at are preliminary questions of legal principles that are raised before the facts 
2 " With regard to the Hatton and Others case, Post, (note 30) has pointed out that 'They 
[applicants] submitted that the interference was not "in accordance with the law" (as Article 8.2 
demands). Domestic law did not offer adequate protection against the interference with their 
rights under Article 8.1. Also, the law must be accessible and its consequences foreseeable.', p. 
263. For earUer case-law, see Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 'In the Court's opinion, the 
following are two of the requirements that flow from the expression "prescribed by law". Firstly, 
the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is 
adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm 
cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen 
to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail.', para. 49. See also Malone v. the United Kingdom, para. 67; Rotaru v. Romania, 
Judgment of 4 May 2000, no. 28341/95, para. 55. P. Duffy, The Case of Klass and Others: Secret 
Surveillance of Commimications and the European Convention on Human Rights' (1979) 4(i) 
HRR 20-41,26. 
2 « Klass and Others v. Germany. Duffy, 'The Case of Klass and Others...', (note 212). 
214 Leander v. Sweden, Judgment of 26 March 1987, no. 9248/81, 'accoimt must also be 
taken of adininistrative practices which do not have the status of substantive law, in so far as 
those concerned are made sufficiently aware of their content', para. 51. Loucaides, 'Chapter 9, 
section 6: Prescribed by law", (note 11), pp. 188-9. 
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examination. Such questions appeared in the case of Rotaru, in which the Court 
found that 'the holding and use [by the state's intelligence service] of information on 
the applicant's private life were not "in accordance with the law"'. As a result, a 
violation of Article 8 was concluded on this ground alone without reviewing whether 
the aim pursued was "necessary in a democratic society".2i5 i t is important to note 
that the requirement of 'law', as the first criterion of paragraph 2, is examined as to 
the 'gua/ify'of legal safeguards.^ !* 
The content of these safeguards is constantly updated in the relevant 
jurisprudence. It is often the case that a measure or practice, which the law has to 
'prescribe' as a legal safeguard, has first been elaborated at the examination of the 
proportionality criterion of paragraph 2. Thus, with regard to similar contextual 
circumstances, the proportionality examination that can serve as a dialectic 
(elaborative) stage at which arguments and practices are explored. 
In the early case of Klass and Others, the content of legal safeguards for the 
state's surveillance measures was examined under the necessity/proportionality of 
the interference, Some years later, in Malone, which concerned equally 
surveillance practices, the Court confined exclusively its review at the 'in accordance 
with law' stage. In that case, 'law' was examined at as to its existence, as such, and 
not as to its qualitative content. It was only judge Pettiti in his concurring opinion 
who cited comparative examples^ ^^  to assert the point that 'a "law", within the 
meaning of Article 8 paras, i and 2 (art. 8-i, art. 8-2), contains detailed rules which 
do not merely legalise practices but define and delimit them.' The judge went on to 
lay down a list of core administrative practices as 'a panoply of requirements' against 
which the quality of law (as the content of legal safeguards) should be assessed.^ ^^  in 
Rotaru V. Romania, para. 62. See also the concurring opinion of judge Lorenzen who 
reasoned his decision not to join the concurring opinion of judge Wildhaber on the ground that 
'The reason why I have not joined it is solely that the Court has consistently held that when an 
interference with the rights under Article 8 is not "in accordance with the law", it is not necessary 
to examine whether the other requirements of Article 8 § 2 are fulfilled. I consider it essential to 
maintain that case-law.' 
==1* Ibid., paras 52, 56. See, recently. Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 
1 July 2008, no. 58243/00, para. 59. 
=^ 17 Klass and Others. Cf. P. Diiffy, 'The Case of Klass and Others...', (note 212) 'In its opinion 
in Klass the Commission said that the requirement of legality "must be taken to mean that the law 
sets up the conditions and procedures for an interference"', p. 24. 
The work of the Coimcil of Europe (Orwell Colloquy in Strasbourg on 2 April 1984, and 
Data Bank Colloquy in Madrid on 13 Jime 1984), the Council of Europe Convention of 1981 
(Private Life, Data Banks), Recommendation R (83) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Coimcil and the approach taken by the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court vis-a-vis the concept of 
"informational self-determination". 
See also the cases cited in the concurring opinion of Judge Wildhaber in Rotaru v. 
Romania; Loucaides, (note 11), pp. 188-9. Leander v. Sweden, para. 51 and the quotation in note 
214 above. 
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Rotaru, the legal safeguards, which were previously seen at the 
necessity/proportionality stage in Klass, have been entrenched for the examination 
of the 'quality' of law at the 'in accordance with law' stage, at which core 
administrative procedures of supervision were specified.^ ^o 
An analogous process of moving (in order to entrench) the examination of 
administrative practices in earUer stages - from the third stage of the 
proportionality/necessity criterion to the first stage of the legal safeguards to 'be 
prescribed by law' criterion - has been seen in the context of lethal operations of the 
police against dangerous individuals. In such circumstances, interference has 
usually to be justified under Article 2 (the right to life), whose corresponding 
'prescribed by law' stage is inserted in paragraph 1 as '[e]veryone's right to life shall 
be protected by law.', which constitutes a natural point of synthesis of legal 
safeguards. 
In the important case of McCann and Others (discussed earlier above) the 
applicants contested the quality of 'law' inter alia on the ground that 'the law did not 
require that the agents of the State be trained in accordance with the strict standards 
of Article 2 para. I ' .^^i In the Court's view, these were issues to be evaluated under 
paragraph 2. The judges laid down core administrative safeguards for the planning 
and control of the lethal operations of the police to assess the proportionality of the 
state's response to the perceived threat. Since the content of these safeguards 
concerned administrative practices (as opposed to ad hoc measures), they have been 
reaffirmed in subsequent jurisprudence to judge the proportionality of the state's 
interference.223 
As the legal safeguards became entrenched, in the more recent case of 
Makaratzis (that concerned equally a lethal operation by the police), the Court was 
able to come full cycle the applicants' submission that had rejected in McCann and 
Others and found a violation of Article 2 on the quality of 'law' (i.e. the 
administrative safeguards which had been entrenched at the proportionality stage 
since McCann), without having to assess the particular merits of the case or the 
The indirect influence of comparative examples and entrenched practices has to be noted 
with reference to the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and the joint work of the 
European Union and Council of Europe in this area, see, e.g., the Buttarelli report, (note 64). 
McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 151. 
^^^^  NB: the standard of absolute necessity apphes under Article 2 (2). 
2=3 See e.g. Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus. See also R. Crawshaw, 'International 
standards on the Right to Life and the Use of Force by Police' (1999) 3 IJHR 67-91; Ni Aolain, 
(note 55). 
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necessity of the interference.224 JQ appreciate the strictness of that approach, one 
has only to distinguish that, unlike McCann, there were identifiable individuals in 
immediate danger from the applicant's behaviour, the applicant was not killed 
during the lethal operation, and the police officers did not have time to plan their 
operation in advance.^ s^ It should also be said that the individual liability of a public 
officer who does not act in a proportionate way cannot be raised, when it is the 
quality of the domestic law' with which the public officer has used to comply and 
complied in the given case.^ a^ T ^ J S presumption reasonably applies in international 
law, since if the individual officer had acted below the standards imposed by the 
domestic law, the case would have already been resolved at the state's level.^ ?^ 
From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that a synthesis of human 
rights protection can be achieved when the core positive obligations required under 
paragraph 1 of the Convention rights (e.g. administrative steps) are incorporated in 
the quality assessment of safeguards that the law has to 'prescribe' and implement 
under the first criterion of paragraph 2. Falling foul of this criterion, an act of 
interference becomes automatically unlawful irrespectively of the merits of its 
necessity. 
It should be clarified that this proposal is not ever-available so that it can be 
used to negate the dialectics of the process in which the European judges deliberate 
and test in practice which standards need to be entrenched in the case-law. The 
presence of a known context, comparative qualitative examples and common sense 
are always the safest principles for guidance. 
2. Positive Obligations as Legal Safeguards to Maintain the Initial 
Justification of Interference 
A justified act of interference can create a new situation in which additional human 
rights issues will come to be involved. Such issues are particularly pertinent in 
circumstances where there is an interference with the right to liberty of an 
224 Makaratzis v. Greece, paras. 70-2. 
" 5 A parallel point can be made with the case of Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands, 
Judgment of 10 November 2005, Judgment of 15 May 2007 (GC), no. 5239i/99> in which the lack 
of independence in the investigation sufficed per se to find a violation of the procedural hmb of 
Article 2, despite the fact that the Court did not question the assessment of facts and the legal 
principles applied at the domestic level. 
Leonidis v. Greece, para. 65. 
" 7 Loucaides, (note 11); Tomuschat, (note 54). 
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individual, who is lawfully detained by the state authorities.^ ^s Thus, on day one the 
state acts in accordance with its negative obligation not to interfere with the right to 
liberty and security (Article 5) without the requisite safeguards and, as a result, the 
authorities are entitied to detain individuals for a prescribed time. But, on day two, 
the previous-day interference has to be re-examined to address human rights issues 
that are involved in the new situation ensuing from the justified act of interference. 
Despite some views that Article 5 contains express positive obhgations,229 tiiese 
obligations only arise following a prior act of direct interference by the state and, 
therefore, they amount to codified safeguards for a legitimate deprivation of 
liberty.230 in this context, the state's obligations are positive, in the literal meaning of 
word, but they should not be confused with the positive obligations under paragraph 
1 of the Convention rights that require the state to actively protect human rights in 
order to prevent their violation. 
An illustration of these points can be seen in the case of Price, in which a 
severely disabled individual complained that her detention to a police station and 
prison, which lacked appropriate facilities for her special needs, amounted to a 
treatment contrary to Article 3. The Court criticised the sentencing judge for not 
ascertaining, before ordering immediate imprisonment, whether the prison could 
ensure facilities adequate with the level of her disability. It was unanimously decided 
that Article 3 was violated on the grounds that 'to detain a severely disabled person 
in conditions where she is dangerously cold, risks developing sores because her bed 
is too hard or unreachable, and is unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the 
greatest of difficulty, constitutes degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention.'231 In such well-known contextual circumstances, it can reasonably be 
asserted that additional safeguards are required to maintain or re-affirm the initial 
justification of the state's interference in lawfully depriving an individual from her 
liberty. These issues are more pertinent in relation to the right to life (Article 2) and 
the fi-eedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3). Both 
these rights are repeatedly labelled as the 'fundamentd rights' of the Convention in 
recognition of their serni-absolute and absolute status, respectively, and their non-
228 Golder v. the United Kingdom, T o this extent, but to this extent only, lawful deprivation 
of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 does not fail to impinge on the appUcation of Article 8.', 
para 45. For earlier discussion of case-law concerning the conflict of human rights interests imder 
Articles 8 and 5 in the context of prisoners, see Duffy, "The Protection o f ( n o t e 85), pp. 214-5. 
229 Mowbray, (note 180), 'chapter 4: Article 5', p. 67. 
230 J . Murdoch, 'A Survey of Recent Case Law under Article 5 ECHR' (1998) 23 E L R (SUPP 
HR) 31-48. 
=^ 3» Price V. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 July 2001, no. 33394/96, para. 30. 
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derogable nature.232 i f Articles 2 and 3 rights cannot be guaranteed, then the initial 
justification of interference must re-open to examine additional safeguards in 
relation to these additional Convention rights that are implied in the new setting of 
circumstances. In this account, the original justification of the jailed confinement of 
convicted individuals is maintained and further conditioned on the understanding 
that the state is able to guarantee the fundamental rights of Articles 2 and 3 for 
which no legitimate aim of interference is available in the context of (otherwise) 
lawfully detained individuals. 
The existence of such a known context in which the state exercises a significant 
control of individuals' lives presupposes an administrative mechanism that is 
capable of identifying particular human rights needs for each individual. Core 
administrative steps have been examined in the case of Edwards, which concerned 
the murder of a prisoner by a dangerously unstable inmate. The state was found in 
violation of Article 2 on the ground that the screening process of prisoners during 
their arrival to prison was not efficient under the circumstances.233 
The same principles apply to all those contexts in which individuals are placed 
under an advanced and, yet lawful, control of the state, such as in police custody or 
prisons, 234 mental institutions, 3^5 immigration centres, 3^6 military bases (during 
=32 See, e.g., Soering v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88; Pretty 
V. United Kingdom, paras. 37,49; Solomou and Others u. Turkey, Judgment of 24 June 2008, no. 
36832/97, para. 63. 
=33 Edwards v. the United Kingdom, para. 64. 
=^ 34 See, e.g., Kotalla v. the Netherlands, Admissibility decision of 6 May 1978, no. 7994/77; 
Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v. Germany, AdmissibiUty decision of 8 July 1978, no. 7572/76; X. v. 
the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 10 July 1980, no. 8158/78; Aerts v. Belgium, 
Judgment of 7 July 1997, no. 25357/94; Hhan v. Turkey, (note 52); Kudla v. Poland, Judgment of 
26 October 2000, no. 30210/96; Dougoz v. Greece, Judgment of 6 March 2001, no. 40907/98; 
Papon V. France, Admissibility decision, 7 Jime 2001, no. 6466/01; Keenan v. the United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95; Price v. the United Kingdom; Kalashnikov v. 
Russia, Judgment of 15 July 2002, no. 47095/99; Muisel v. France, Judgment of 14 November 
2002, no. 67263/01; Farbtuhs v. Latvia, Judgment of 2 December 2004, no. 4672/02 (available 
in French only); Riviere v. France, Judgment of 11 July 2006, no. 33834/03 (available in French 
only); Koval v. Ukraine, Judgment of 19 October 2006, no. 65550/01; Vincent v. France, 
Judgment of 24 October 2006, no. 6253/03 (available in French only); Serifis v. Greece, 
Judgment of 2 November 2006, no. 27695/03 (available in French only); Holomiov v. Moldova, 
Judgment of 7 November 2006, no. 30649/05; Huylu v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 November 2006, 
no. 52955/99 (available in French only); Tarariyeva v. /?ussfa. Judgment of 14 December 2006, 
no. 4353/03; Istratii and Others v. Moldova, Judgment of 27 March 2007, no. 8721/05 ; 8705/05 
; 8742/05; Paladi v. Moldova, Judgment of 10 July 2007, no. 39806/05; Kucheruk v. Ukraine, 
Judgment of 6 Septemebr 2007, no. 2570/04; Yakovenko v. Ukraine, Judgment of 25 October 
2007, no. 15825/06; PiZcic i;. Croatia, Judgment of 17 January 2008, no. 33138/06; Mechenkov 
V. Russia, Judgment of 7 February 2008, no. 35421/05; Scoppola v. Italy, Judgment of 10 Jime 
2008, no. 50550/06 (available in French only); Guuec v. Turkey, Judgment of 20 January 2009, 
no. 70337/01; Gron v. Albania, Judgment of 7 July 2009, no. 25336/04. Recommendation 
Rec(20o6) 2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the European Prison 
Rules (amending Rec(ig87) 3), adopted on 11 January 2006; 'Children and Juvenile Justice: 
Proposals for Improvements' CommDH/IssuePaper(2009)i. See also Mowbray, 'chapter 2: 
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military service),237etc. In all these circumstances, individuals have lawfully been 
deprived of their liberty (Article 5) and of other concurring interests under Article 8 
(i.e. family life). As these individuals are brought to a new situation in which 
additional human rights are involved (including other aspects of the same human 
right (e.g. Article 8)), the protection of these rights must also be guaranteed. 
If the issue of human rights protection is approached as new, then a separate 
action under the state's positive obligation can be pursued. In such a case, the 
content of a positive obligation is determined under paragraph 1 of the Convention 
rights. At that stage, inherent limits of practicality are also recognised. By contrast, if 
the issue of protection concerns simply a new situation tiiat is already expected in a 
known context, then all obligations have to be addressed at the same time during the 
original examination of the interference. In that respect, a synthesis of protection 
can be adopted by incorporating positive obligations as entrenched safeguards that 
the law hais to 'prescribe' in order to justify a legitimate interference or to maintain 
the initial justification (although, practically, there is no difference between the two). 
As the positive obligation is secured as an entrenched safeguard to justify an 
interference under paragraph 2, its content can be determined as an obligation of 
results to require a higher level of protection by the state. 
Another benefit of this approach is that the dual nature of the state's obligations 
remains distinct. As already pointed out, positive measures of protection do not 
necessarily concern positive obligations. Because positive obligations terminology 
has been used in the context of detained persons, it has led some commentators to 
invoke cases, such as Price, in order to assert general positive obligations towards 
disabled individuals. But no such connection can be made, simply because in Price, 
there is a causal link between the harm complained of and the act of detaining an 
individual without providing appropriate facilities. Such a causal link (directly 
Article 2 (section: provision of medical services)' and 'chapter 3: Article 3 (section: Provision of 
Adequate Medical Treatment for Detainees)', (note 180), pp. 22,52. 
235 Slawomir Musial v. Poland, Judgment of 20 January 2009, no. 28300/06; Mojsiejew v. 
Poland, Judgment of 24 March 2009, no. 11818/02. 
236 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kdniki Mitunga v. Belgium, Judgment of 12 October 2006, no. 
13178/03; Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, Judgment of 24 January 2008, nos. 29787/03 and 
29810/03;JV. LI. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 May 2008, no. 26565/05; S.D. v. Greece, 
Judgment of 11 June 2209, no. 53541/07 (available in French only). Recommendation 
Reci327(i997) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Protection and 
Reinforcement of the Human Rights of Refugees and Asyliim-Seekers in Europe, adopted on 24 
April 1997. 
237 Tastan v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 March 2008, no. 63748/00; Chember v. Russia, 
Judgment of 3 July 2008, 7188/03; Yurekli v. Turkey, Judgment of 17 July 2008, no. 48913/99 
(available in French only). Additional case-law is cited in note 240 below. 
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attributed to the state) is spectacularly absent in the claims of human rights 
protection of disabled individuals at large. 
The main point presented here is that in circumstances where the state 
exercises an advanced control of the individuals' lives, additional human rights 
interests, such as those under Articles 2 and 3, can clearly be contemplated when 
considering the initial justification of the state's interference. To take the point made 
by Colin Warbrick in commenting earlier case-law 
[The state] did have an obligation to organise the detention of the defendants so 
that their health might be protected as far as possible in all 
circumstances.. Again, the need for constant control and review of the prisoners' 
conditions was a requirement of Article 3. The result, that prisoners can present 
almost insoluble dilemmas for the States by reason of their own conduct without 
sacrificing the basic protection of the Convention, is a consequence of the very 
idea of human rights.^ss 
The obligation to protect the physical and psychological integrity of a prisoner, as 
guaranteed under Articles 2, 3 and 8,^ 39 may not mean the automatic release of 
detained individuals, but neither that their detention can be justified or maintained 
without guaranteeing safeguards in relation to other higher or concurring human 
rights interests, which cannot, simply and plainly, be compromised. Thus, a 
detained individual may die in prison as a natural course of events, but it is the fault 
of the state when the loss of human life is attributed to a lack of appropriate and 
basic facilities or a failure to screen dangerous inmates.240 
II. The Point of Synthesis—Special Contexts Involving Competing 
Positive Obligations Claims 
There are some circmnstances in which a positive duty of protection under 
paragraph 1 of a Convention right can be owed to different individuals with 
diametrically opposing human rights interests against each other. When such a 
conflict of rights exists, a corresponding conflict of positive obligations is inevitable. 
For this reason, the text of the Convention recognises 'the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others' as a legitimate aim of interference in some paragraph 2 
provisions. General directions are also highlighted in Article 17 (prohibition of abuse 
238 Warbrick, "The European Convention...', (note 60), 'Section: Treatment of Detained 
Persons', p.107. 
239 Branduse v. Romania, Judgment of 7 April 2009, no. 6586/03 (imder Article 8). 
See similar issues in the context of military service, Kilinc v. Turkey; Salgin v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 20 February 2007, no. 46748/99 (available in French only), Hasan (^aliskan and 
Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 27 May 2007, no. 13094/02 (available in French only); Abdullah 
Yilmaz v. Turkey, Judgment 17 June 2008, no. 21899/02 (available in French only). 
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of rights) and Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) that serve as 
guiding principles in appropriate circumstances.241 
A conflict of rights has been observed in the cases of Keegan and Hokkanen, 
which have been cited by judge Wildhaber in his concurring opinion in Stjerna to 
support a proposal for a complete merging of positive and negative obligations 
imder 'the notion of interference' in paragraph 2 terms.242Cases that have arisen 
from a dispute over the custody of children, their reunion with their parents 
iHokkaneri) or their adoption {Keegan), concern contexts that are special due to the 
existence of a direct conflict of human rights. In such contexts, the Court vdU look at 
the human rights interests of the child but also those of the mother and the father 
(usually against each other). As Alpha ConneUy has pointed out in analysing earlier 
case-law 
[s]ometimes, the same complaint may be double-sided and call for the 
application of both [positive and negative] approaches. That the two approaches 
can be complementary, each tuned to providing an answer to different aspects 
of the same grievance, was seen above [the Hendriks case] in relation to the 
complaint of a divorced man that had been denied access to his child. 243 
Where a conflict of human rights exists, the measures that the state authorities are 
under a positive obligation to take in order to guarantee the human right of one 
individual may be seen as acts of interference with the human right of another 
individual. In order to manage the difficulties surrounding opposing human rights 
interests, a flexible approach should be adopted when applying the fair balance test 
or the criteria of the paragraph 2 provisions. In that respect, what is required is a 
specialised study that accords due weight to contextual differences and 
combinations of rights in order to achieve a synthesis of the state's obligations under 
a taUor-made working framework. 
In this section, our sole aim is to present examples of conflict of rights in private 
interactions and identify' common approaches in the judicial examination. The 
contexts covered here are far from exhaustive and their discussion is exclusively 
made in order to prove the point that some case-law concerns special contexts (and 
yet important ones) and, therefore, legal principles that have been elaborated there 
cannot readily travel and be transposed to other contexts not concerning a conflict 
241 Loucaides, (note 11), 'Chapter 9, section 11: ImpUed Limitations, Section 14: Forfeiture of 
Rights imder Article 17, section 15: Abuse of power' (Article 18); See, Garaudy v. France, 
Achnissibilify decision of 24 June 2003, no. 65831/01. 
242 See discussion in section A. II above. 
243 Connelly, (note 117), p. 589 citing Hendriks v. the Netherlands, Admissibilify decision 
(Commission's Report) of 8 March 1982, no 8427/78. 
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between Convention rights. The principles and content of positive obligations 
analysed in earlier sections may inform the legal tests where a conflict of rights 
exists, but not the opposite. It is for this reason alone that competing positive 
obligations are only discussed at the very last section of this chapter. 
1. Examples of Contexts with Conflict of Rights 
Family Disputes: Custody and Adoption cases 
Competing human rights interests are involved in circumstances where a parent 
seeks contact or reunion with his/her child after a decision of custody,244 or where 
children of unfavourable family environments are taken into community care 
(including adoption arrangements). In such circumstances, the human rights of the 
father may conflict with those of the mother and/or with those of the children. 
As discussed in Z and Others and E and Others above, the state is imder a 
positive obligation to protect the physical and psychological integrity of children in 
their family environments when the element of knowledge of the need of human 
rights protection can reasonably be imputed on the state authorities. In H. K., the 
state authorities had to place the applicant's daughter in public care due to 
suspicions of sexual abuse by her father, having evaluated evidence that the child 
was exhibiting signs of disturbance. 245 in Kutzner, the appUcants' parental 
responsibility was withdrawn by the state on evidence showing that the children's 
development had become considerably retarded.246 
Once a chUd is placed in public or private care, a competing positive obligation 
arises for the state to safeguard the parent's right of respect for private and family 
life by taking appropriate measures to facilitate the reunification of the family.^7 At 
the same time, a competing positive obligation exists to protect a child who has lived 
for some time with other persons. In Hokkanen, the reunion of the natural parent 
244 Duffy, The Protection of Privacy...', (note 85), p. 208; M. Buqmcchio de Boer, 'Children 
and the European Convention on Hiunan Rights: A Survey of Case-law of the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights' in F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds). Protecting Human 
Rights: The European Dimension, Studies in Honour ofG. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 73-89; U. 
Kakelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (Ashgate, 1999); H. Fenwick, 
'Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act' (2004) 67 MLR 889. 
245 H. K. v. Finland, Judgment of September 2006, no.36065/97. 
246 Kutzner v. Germany, Judgment of 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99, para. 116. 
Ibid., para. 61; Hokkanen v. Finland, para. 55; Eriksson v. Sweden, Judgment of 22 June 
1989, no. 11373/85, para. 71. 
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with the child was also examined in relation to preparatory measures that safeguard 
the interests of the latter.248 
Where such a conflict of rights exists, opposing positive obligations can give rise 
to corresponding negative obligations. Thus, a measure that is taken for the 
protection of the right of one individual is also an act of interference with the right of 
another. In such circumstances, a fair balance test applies flexibly in view that 
'[w]hilst the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under 
this provision do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles 
are similar.'^9 
Free Expression and Defamation 
Conflict of rights are often encountered when the freedom of expression that one 
individual exercises under Articles 10 encroaches oh the right of respect for private 
life of another individual under Article 8. In such a well-knovm context, the positive 
obligations that arise in relation to Articles 10 and 8 conflict against each other.^ so 
Examples from the abundant jurisprudence of expression v. reputation context have 
to be discussed to show the general opposing perspectives of positive obligations. 
In the case of Kanellopoulou the applicant had criticised in a pubhshed 
interview the responsibility of a medical practitioner for the bodily harm she 
suffered. The Court found the state in violation of Article 10, because the criminal 
sanctions imposed on the applicant in defamation proceedings against her were 
disproportionate. 251 More common is the case when a media company is sued, 
directly or vicariously, for an expression that has been communicated to the pubUc. 
In Cumpana and Mazare, a local newspaper claimed a violation of Article 10 for its 
conviction in defamation proceedings that concerned the publication of a satirical 
cartoon portraying a former legal expert of the city council. In such circumstances 
the question before the Court is essentially of 
248 Hokkanen v. Finland, para. 58. 
249 Ibid., para. 55; Kutzner v. Germany, para. 62; Keegan v. Ireland, para. 49 
250 See, recently, Krasulya v. Russia, Judgment 22 February 2007, no. 12365/03; 
Gorelishvili v. Georgia, Judgment of 5 June 2007, no. 12979/04; Sanoclci v. Poland, Judgment of 
17 July 2007, no. 28949/03; Ormanni v. Italy, Judgment 17 July 2007, no. 30278/04; Peev v. 
Bulgaria, Judgment of 26 July 2007, no. 64209/01; Chemodurov v. Russia, Judgment of 31 July 
2007, no. 72683/01; Dyuldiri and Kislov v. Russia, Judgment of 31 July 2007, no. 25968/02. See 
H. Rogers H. and H. Tomlinson, 'Privacy and Expression: Convention Rights and Interim 
Injunctions' [2003] E H R L R (SPI) 37-53. 
251 JCaneZ/opouZou v. Greece, Judgment of 11 October 2007, no. 28504/05, para. 40 
(available in French only). See also the joint dissenting opinion of judges Loucaides and Kovler. 
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whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between, on the one 
hand, the protection of freedom of expression as enshrined in Article lo, and on 
the other hand, the protection of the reputation of those against whom 
allegations have been made, a right which, as an aspect of private life, is 
protected by Article 8 of the Convention (...). That provision may require the 
adoption of positive ineasures designed to secure effective respect for private life 
even in the sphere of the relations of individuads between themselves...^52 
In practice, disputes often arise because the balance between the competing 
interests was not proportionate under the circumstances. 
The conflict of positive obligations can also be appreciated from the perspective 
of an Article 8 complaint. In Von Hannover, it was the turn of a private party, whose 
reputation was injured in a publication, to claim protection under Article 8. Again, 
from this angle, 'protection of private life has to be balanced against the freedom of 
expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.'^ ss in such circumstances, the 
Keegan case can be cited as an authority for the fair balance test between the 
competing interests involved.^ s^  
There are also circumstances where the reputation of an individual, as 
guaranteed by Article 8, is connected to the record of her expression. This means 
tha;t, in an action for defamation, there are in essence two competing expressions. In 
252 Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania, Judgment of 17 December 2004, no. 33348/96, para. 
91 and para.113 (cited cases omitted); Ormanni v. Italy, para. 67. See also Leempoel & SA. ED. 
Cine Revue v. Belgium, Judgment of 9 November 2006, no. 64772/01 'Where there is a conflict 
between the right to communicate the information and that of protecting the reputation and the 
rights of others, the Court reiterates that [the Court] it has already indicated that, in certain 
circumstances, a person has a legitimate expectation to have his private hfe protected and 
respected.' (translation), para. 78 (available in French only); Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, 
Judgment of 16 November 2004, no. 53678/00, para. 42; Colago Mestre and SIC - Sociedade 
Independente de Comunicagao SA. v. Portugal, Judgment of 26 April 2007, nos. 11182/03 and 
11319/03. 
253 Von Hannover v. Germany, para. 58; Gourguenidze v. Georgia, Judgment of 17 October 
2006, no. 71678/01 '[the Court] has therefore examined the question of respect of positive 
obUgations that are incumbent on the defendant State under the circumstances, when the 
pubUcation does not originate from an activity or collective effort of the State organs.' 
(translation), para. 57 (available in French only); Pfeifer v. Austria, Judgment of 15 November 
2007, no. 12556/03; Marin v. Romania, Judgment 3 February 2009, no. 30699/02. Schussel v. 
Austria, Admissibility decision of 21 February 2002, no. 42409/98 The Court recalls that Article 
8 taken in conjunction with the obligation to secure the effective exercise of Convention rights 
imposed by Article 1 of the Convention, may involve a positive obligation on the State to provide a 
measure of protection for an individual's private life in relation to the exercise by third parties of 
the right to freedom of expression bearing in mind the duties and responsibilities referred to in 
Article lb.' 
254 Von Hannover v. Germany, para. 57; Leempoel & SA. ED. Cine Revue v. Belgium, para. 
78; Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, para. 42. For the judicial evaluation of the balance of 
competing interests in the Von Hannover case, see the concurring opinion of judge Cabral 
Barreto on privacy, kings and queens, Monte Carlo and Monte Carlo Beach Club; Pfeifer v. 
Austria, para. 38. See also the dissenting opinions of judges Loucaides and Schaffer. 
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such a case, a clash of different rights (Art. 8 v. Art .10) is also a clash of the same 
right (Art 10 v. Art 10) of different individuals.^ ss 
Counter-Demonstrations/Assemblies 
The right of a group of individuals to hold a demonstiation or assembly, as 
guaranteed by Article 11, is one to which an opposing group of individuals is equally 
entitied to exercise, either at the same timers* or as a continuous manifestation of 
expression in any given moment.^ s? 
A known case in this context is Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben", in which the 
applicant (an association) complained about the state's failure to adequately 
guarantee their right to demonstrate in circumstances where a counter-
demonstration was also taking place. In setting out the general principle of law that 
should apply in such circumstances, the Court explained that individuals must be 
able to hold a demonstiation without fearing to be subjected to physical violence by 
their opponents. It reasoned that 'genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly 
cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to 
interfere... Like Article 8 (art. 8), Article 11 (art. 11) sometimes requires positive 
measuires to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals'.^ ss 
More complicated appears to be the Ollinger case, in which the applicant 
complained about the state authorities' refusal to grant permission for an assembly 
in a cemetery on all Saints' Day (a religious holiday) in order to commemorate the 
Jews killed by the SS during the Second World War. The assembly would coincide in 
place and time with the gathering of a registered association (Comradeship IV), 
which, on that day, conunemorates for more than forty years the SS soldiers killed in 
that war. Under statutory law, the association's gathering is classified as a 'popular 
ceremony', and hence it is excepted from permission. In addition, the same 
Convention right (Article 11) of those visiting the cemetery, either occasionally or on 
the specific religious day in which the dead are commemorated, has also to be taken 
into account. Moreover, an additional positive obligation arises under Article 9 
(freedom to manifest his/her religion) to protect the cemetery-goers against 
255 Sanocki v. Poland, Judgment of 17 July 2007, no. 28949/03 (available in French only); 
Karman v. Russia, Judgment of 14 December 2006, no. 29372/02, para. 35; Azevedo v. Portugal, 
Judgment of 27 March 2008, no. 20620/04; Sorguc v. Turkey, Judgment of 23 June 2009, no. 
17089/03. 
256 Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria. See recently, Barankevich v. Russia, 
Judgment of 26 July 2007, no. 10519/03. 
257 Ouranio Toxo v. Greece, no. 74989/01, Judgment of 20 October 2005. 
258 Plattform "Arztefur das Leben" v. Austria, para. 32 (cited case omitted). 
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deliberate disturbances that may result fi-om the gathering of opposing groups of 
individuals. The Court summarised the various conflicts of the state's obligations, 
pointing out that 
As regards the right to freedom of peaceful assembly as guaranteed by Article i i , 
the Court reiterates that it comprises negative and positive obligations on the 
part of the Contracting State. t§] On the one hand, the State is compelled to 
abstain from interfering with that right ... On the other hand, States may be 
required under Article i i to take positive measures in order to protect a lawful 
demonstration against counter-demonstrations... Turning finally to Article 9 of 
the Convention... the responsibility of the State may be engaged where religious 
beliefs are opposed or denied in a manner which inhibits those who hold such 
beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold or express them. In such cases the 
State may be called upon to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right 
guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs...^59 
The balancing of the state's positive obligations against different groups of 
individuals with clashing human rights interests requires a careful examination to 
explore various alternatives that are open to the interested parties. The need for 
clear evaluative principles that will dictate priorities for taking or excluding some 
measures, as well as the stage(s) at which these measures will have to determined, is 
particularly pressing. 
2. General Evaluative Principles 
2.1. Tlie Evaluation of the Priority of Protection: Using a Hierarchy of 
Rights 
In the various contexts of private interactions in which a clash of rights is observed, 
the determination of positive obligations may need a hierarchy of interests to guide 
the organisation of human rights protection. At first, the idea for a hierarchy of 
rights is evident in the Court's frequent labelling of the right to life (Article 2) and 
the prohibition of tortvure and inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3) as 'the 
most fundamental provisions in the Convention' for which no derogation is 
permitted during wartime, This idea has also increasingly been advocated in 
259 Ollinger v. Austria, Judgment of 29 June 2006, no. 76900/01, paras. 35, 36,37,39. 
260 Ibid., see the dissenting opinion of judge Loucaides who has focused on Article 9, while 
exploring alternatives accommodating the competing interests under the Articles 10 and 11. 
261 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, para. 88; Pretty v. United Kingdom,, paras. 37, 49; 
Kakkoulli v. Turkey, 22 November 2005, ho. 38595/97, para. 106; Estamirov and Others v. 
Russia, Judgment of 12 October 2006, no. 60272/00, para. 98; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 
Judgment of 11 January 2007, no. 1948/04 , para. 135; Jsaaifc v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 June 
2008, no. 44587/98, para. 103; Solomou and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 June 2008, no. 
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scholarly commentary, proving the growing perception, or common sense, that some 
rights are more important than others. This is particularly obvious with regard to 
the right to life, as it is life that conditions the relevance of the rest of human 
rights.263 In these terms, a hierarchy of rights can generally be deduced following the 
higher degree of negative impact that is involved in the particular circumstances,^^ 
including circumstances of conflict between Articles 2 and 32*5 and even where only 
one individual is concerned.^^* 
To take the examples of the case-law above, the right to demonstrate is 
legitimately exercised under Article 11, but when the physical integrity of some 
individuals are threatened in the course of events. Article 2 and Article 8 (as 
guaranteeing the physical and psychological integrity of a person) come into play to 
override Article 11, in appropriate circumstances, due to the higher degree of 
negative impact that is contemplated by their scope.^ *^ 
In principle, the same process of evaluating the higher negative impact can 
apply when conflicts arise in relation to the same right that can be engaged by 
36832/97, The Court.reiterates that Article 2, which safeguards the right to Ufe and sets out those 
circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental 
provisions in the Convention, to which no derogation is permitted. Together with Article 3, it also 
enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.', 
para. 63. 
Loucaides, 'Chapter 9, section 3: Rights Subject to Special Protection', (note 11), p. 182; F. 
Sudre, 'Droits Intangibles et/ou Droits Fondamentaux: Y a-t-il des Droits Preeminents dans la 
Convention Europeenne des Droits de I'Homme?' in G. Cohen-Jonathan, J-F. Flauss, P. Lambert 
(eds), Liber Amicorum Marc-Andre Eissen (Bruylant, 1995): 381-398 ; S. Greer, The European 
Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). See also Warbrick, The European Convention...', (note 60) 'The "fundamental" 
rights clash one with another and a balance needs must be struck between them in particular 
cases. Neither the eiiimierated rights themselves nor the balance which must be struck between 
them are "neutral" between possible ways of organising society or values which may be pursued.', 
p.85. 
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, The Court's case-law accords pre-eminence to Article 2 as 
one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention (...). It safeguards the right to life, 
without which enjoyment of any of the other rights and freedoms in the Convention is rendered 
nugatory.', para. 37 (cited case omitted); K.-W. v. Germany, Judgment of 22 March 2001, no. 
37201/97, 'the right to life is... the supreme value in the hierarchy of human rights.', para. 75; 
Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Judgment of 22 March 2001, nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 
and 44801/98, para. 94. 
264 Opuz V. Turkey, 'In any event, the Court would underline that in domestic violence cases 
perpetrators' [Article 8 rights, i.e. family life] carmot supersede victims' human rights to life and 
to physical and mental integrity", para. 147 (cited case omitted). 
265 p. Vegleris, "Twenty Years" experience of the Convention and Future Prospects' in 
A H . Robertson (ed.). Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 1973): 341-412 
The fact remains that this limitation [of death penalty under paragraph 1 of Article 2] is out of 
keeping with the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment, to which no 
reservation or exception is allowed (Article 3).', p. 350. Soering v. the United Kingdom; Ocalan v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, no. 46221/99. 
Pretty v. the United Kingdom. 
^^yPlattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria. 
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different individuals against each o t h e r . i n such circumstances, the assessment of 
the actual or potential negative impact on all individuals concerned, can guide the 
priority or exclusion of protection. Thus, in the family context under Article 8, what 
is best for the interests of the child takes precedent over competing rights of the 
parents, simply because the negative impact on the child is greater. 
The position, however, is different where conflicts involve the freedom of 
expression. In general, unless Articles 2 and 3 can be engaged, due weight is 
accorded to the collective value of freedom of expression (i.e. Articles 10, 11) that 
guarantees democracy that guarantees the rest of human rights.270 Different types of 
expression attract greater or lesser protection depending on the collective benefit to 
the public interest that is underlined. 271 Political speech is revered in the 
jurisprudence and usually takes priority over interests of personal reputation in 
opposing human rights claims under Article 8.^72 in that respect, the type of 
expression serves as an additional criterion for the balance and prioritisation of the 
competing human rights.273if speech is not political and has, for example, to do with 
religious issues, the disruption of public order may be valued more, although there is 
no definite standard due the evaluation of various ad hoc parameters that can be 
present in any given situation.274 
See, e.g., Hendriks v. the Netherlands; H. K. v. Finland. 
Hendriks v. the Netherlands, '[The Commission] notes that feelings of distress and 
frustration because of the absence of one's child may cause considerable suffering to the non-
custodial parent. However, where, as in the present case, there is a serious conflict between the 
interests of the child and one of its parents which can only be resolved to the disadvantage of one 
of them, the interests of the child must, under Art . 8 (2), prevail.', para. 124. See also Hokkanen 
V. Finland, para. 58; Kutzner v. Germany, para. 76. 
270 Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom; Gorelishvili v. Georgia, Judgment of 5 June 
2007, no. 12979/04. 
271 Saygili and Falakaoglu v. Turkey, Judgment of 21 October 2008, no. 39457/03-
272 Lingens v. Austria, Judgment of 8 July 1986, no. 9815/82, 'Freedom of the press affords 
the pubUc one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes 
of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of 
a democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention. The limits of acceptable criticism 
are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual.', para. 
42; Lyashko v. Ukraine, Judgment of 10 August 2006, no. 21040/02, para. 41; Dabrowski v. 
Poland, Judgment of 19 December 2006, no. 18235/02, para. 28; Gorelishvili v. Georgia, (note 
226), para. 35; Feldek v. Slovakia, Judgment of 12 July 2001, para. 74; Lombardo and Others v. 
Malta, Judgment of 24 April 2007, no. 7333/06, para. 54; Dlugoleclci v. Poland, Judgment of 24 
February 2009, no. 23806/03. 
273 Lyashko v. Ukraine, Judgment of 10 August 2006, no. 21040/02, 'Freedom of the press 
affords the pubUc one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and 
attitudes of poUtical leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the 
concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention. The limits of 
acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a pohtician as such than as regards a private 
individual.', para. 41, Gorelishvili v. Georgia, para. 35. 
274 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria Judgment of 20 September 1994, no. 13470/87; Cf. 
Ollinger v. Austria. 
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2.2. A Content of Due process 
In the contexts of private interactions in which known issues of conflict of interests 
exist, the protection of human rights cannot solely be guaranteed by some positive 
reactive responses and ad hoc balances. As already discussed above, the content of 
positive obligations is determined as a system of protection. In that respect, a 
competent administrative mechanism may be required to undertake the necessary 
evaluation assessment within a framework of due process. The procedural steps, by 
which this assessment is undertaken, constitute a core content of obligations of 
means.275 
The exact content of due process emerges gradually with the development of the 
Court's jurisprudence. In Keegan, the examination of the state's obligations was not 
confined to a balance of interests at the time of the guardianship and custody. The 
Court particularly stressed 'the fact that Irish law permitted the applicant's child to 
have been placed for adoption shortly after her birth without his knowledge or 
consent.'276 In this regard, there was a procedural failure on the critical step of 
informing the parent, when the child was taken from his custody. In Scozzari and 
Giunta, the content of due process concerned safety standards when children are 
placed into community care institutions. Such steps included inter alia monitoring 
child-related convictions of staff and informing the parents in full of any incidents or 
malpractices encountered.277 
An indispensable part of due process is the administrative practice through 
which a hierarchy of competing interests is established for the purposes of the 
prioritisation of protection. As long as due process has been observed, it is primarily 
for the state's authorities to strike the fair balance of competing interests, due to 
their better position to evaluate in detail the plethora of ad hoc information of each 
case.278 
275 Kutzner v. Germany, 'whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the 
decision-maMng process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford 
due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8', para. 56, H. K. v. Finland, para. 111. 
A standard of promptness is also an indispensable part of the due process, Keegan v. 
Ireland, para. 55. In Kosmopoulou v. Greece, Judgment of 5 February 2004, no. 60457/00, the 
Court reasoned that 'it is of paramount importance for parents always to be placed in a position 
enabling them to put forward all argiunents in favour of obtaining contact with the child and to 
have access to all relevant informaition which was at the disposal of the domestic courts (citation 
omitted)...Thus, she did not enjoy the appropriate procedural guarantees which would have 
enabled her to challenge effectively the suspension of her visiting rights.', para. 49. 
=77 Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, Judgment of 13 July 2000, nos. 39221/98; 41963/98. See, 
recently, Saviny v. Ukraine, Judgment of 18 December 2008, no. 39948/06. 
278 Ignacollo-Zenide v. Romania, Judgment of 25 January 2000, no. 31679/96, para. 94; 
Kosmopoulou v. Greece, para. 45; Chassagnou and Others v. France, Judgment 29 April 1999, 
nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, 'Where these "rights and freedoms" [of others] are 
144 
2.3. The Paragraph 2 Perspective 
The justification for examining the paragraph 2 structures in positive obUgations 
claims, whose binding force is grounded on paragraph i , is the co-existence of 
competing positive obhgations that turns the active protection of a hvunan right to 
an interference with an opposing right. However, the interfering effect of a given 
measure does not automatically impose the typical negative obligation approach. 
Even if it is assumed that the state acts in order to guarantee the 'rights of others' 
(these 'rights of others' being necessarily the opposing Convention rights), as 
provided for under paragraph 2, this does not mean that a negative obligation is 
involved. Although in negative obligations cases the state has always a free choice of 
whether or not to pursue a legitimate aim of interference, the state's positive 
obligation to intervene in order to guarantee the protection of human rights is not 
optional. 
In short, competing human rights interests give rise to positive obligations, 
whose compliance appears as interference with opposing human rights. In that 
regard, the measures of protection have to be justified under the three-stage 
structure of paragraph 2. The 'prescribed by law' stage can serve to entrench 
administrative practices that form the core content of due process in the context 
concerned.28olt is also expected that a certain degree of discretion should be allowed 
to the state organs in order to strike a fair balance between the competing human 
rights interests involved, in recognition of the great number of ad hoc parameters 
that are usually present in any given complaint.^^' 
E. Conclusion 
Positive obligations arise under paragraph i of the Convention rights engaging the 
state in the active protection of human rights. The main justification of positive 
themselves among those guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted that 
the need to protect them may lead States to restrict other rights or freedoms likewise set forth in 
the Convention. ... The balancing of individual interests that may well be contradictory is a 
difficult matter, and Contracting States must have a iDroad margin of appreciation in this respect', 
para. 113. 
279 A. Connelly, The Protection of the Rights of Others' (1980) 5(2) HRR117-140. 
280 Keegan v. Ireland, para. 53; Hokkanen v. Finland, para. 64. 
Leempoel & SA. ED. Cine Revue v. Belgium, 'In this regard, the Court reiterates that it is 
perhaps difficult, in the context concerned, to draft laws with total precision and a certain 
flexibihty may prove to be desirable in order to allow the domestic courts to develop the law 
according to what they judge as being the necessary measures in the interests of justice...and the 
changing conceptions of the society.' (translation), para. 59 (cited case omitted). 
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obUgations is the presence, actual or potential, of an act of interference with a 
human right (as with negative obligations), with the difference that that interference 
originates from a private individual (including a state actor when operating as a 
private party). If a violation of a human right occuris, the state becomes indirectiy 
responsible for failing to protect the individuals concerned, as could reasonably be 
required under the crreiunstances. 
For the most part, the Court has approached the application and development 
of positive obligations by merging positive and negative obligations through a fair 
balance test that has loosely been based on paragraph 2 provisions of the 
Convention rights. Thtis, it is not only that positive obligations do not originate from 
or are not related to paragraph 2, but clear complaints on the state's negative 
obligations have not been examined under the strict criteria of paragraph 2 
provisions and the entrenched principles of the jurisprudence. As a result, the 
potentid of positive obligations is clearly undermined by a jurisprudence that is 
built up as a collection of ad hoc balances of justice. 
If paragraph 1 has not so far been accorded due weight in judicial examination, 
it is because of the open-ended scope of positive obligations. It is argued that the 
distinctive nature of positive obligations, reflecting the active protection of human 
rights, can be secured by the same ground justifying the essentiality of negative 
obligations, namely the element of knowledge of the need of human rights 
protection. The presence of such knowledge reinforces the legitimacy of positive 
obligations by 'involving' the indirect responsibility of the state in the human rights 
violation of private parties. Such an objective element becomes a condition sine qua 
non of the state's liability that narrows considerably the apparentiy open-ended 
scope of positive obligations. 
In addition to the element of knowledge, positive obligations can be managed 
through a flexible interpretation of the Convention rights against which these 
obligations only arise. Actionable thresholds of negative impact that define the scope 
of the Convention rights can be adjusted to the level at which positive obligations are 
manageable within the system of the Convention, Accordingly, the planning of the 
development and application of positive obligations is organised strategically 
through the most important and preliminary questions. 
Having established the foundations for the planning and control of positive 
obligations, the determination of the specific content of these obligations is made in 
accordance with their potential to improve and further expand the protection of 
human rights. When the applicant's complaint relates to a context of private parties' 
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interactions in which known human rights issues exist, positive obligations concern 
a whole system of protection. Such a contextual reach reinforces the permanence 
and priority of paragraph i and, by extension, of the state's positive obligations. A 
core content of positive obligations can reasonably be identified in the form of a 
legislative and administrative framework. Their particular structures are organised 
around the crucial elenient of knowledge of the need of human rights protection that 
is required in both the general and specific level of protection. In that way, the more 
specific form of protection is determined through core interconnected steps that are 
implemented in intermediate levels. 
Both the general and specific content of positive obligations is organised against 
the ultimate aim of the actual prevention of human rights violations, which is what 
real protection means under paragraph i of the Convention rights. Thus, whether or 
not, the examination of an applicant's complaint takes place ex post facto at the 
European level, the state's Uability is assessed against a content of measures that 
have to be taken before a violation occurs. This position further confirms the 
potential of positive obligations to target a system of protection, rather than some ad 
hoc responses. 
In all circumstances, positive obligations are evaluated by the standard of 
effectiveness that provides an objective base to determine both the general and more 
specific content of positive obligations in whichever level and stage they are 
exaiiiined. This standard serves to set the minimum level of protection that can 
reasonably be required under the circumstances in view of the limited availability of 
the state's resources. In this connection, limits of practicality are also recognised as 
inherent in paragraph i of the Convention rights. The application and justification of 
limitations is divided in accordance with critical contextual differences. Limits of 
practicality are calculated differently where a prior act of interference exists 
(establishing an element of causation) and where it is absent. The former is further 
subdivided between acts taken in conformity with the applicable domestic legal 
standards and those taken in defiance of these standards. 
The subdivision of contexts is also required in order to test the applicability of 
various legal principles or the exact manner or stage of their relevance. Such issues 
are particularly pertinent where an act of interference of a private party is indirectly 
pursued by the state under the legitimate airns of paragraph 2. When such a 
situation emerges^ it is important to distinguish between the ad hoc and contextual 
level of human rights protection. If a known context of private interactions is 
concerned, the core content of positive obligations may be due for implementation 
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much before the isolated decision of the state authorities to justify the interference 
of a private party. In such circumstances, a synthesis of human rights protection can 
be achieved by incorporating the core content of positive obligations that pre-exist, 
as the quality of safeguards that the domestic law has 'to prescribe' and implement 
under the first criterion of paragraph 2 provisions. The proposed synthesis applies 
also in circumstances in which a justifiable interference by a state actor creates a 
new situation in which positive obligations are involved (e.g. the medical care of 
prisoners) or where conflicting positive obligations arise in relation to various 
individuals (e.g. free expression and defamation). Differences in critical contextual 
parameters induce a narrower examination of positive obligations to guarantee an 




Protection in the Absence of Interference 
The positive obligations of the state have been extended to cover issues of human 
rights protection that do not concern acts of interference directly or indirectly 
attributed to the state. The Convention is now relied upon by various individuals to 
assert a state's assistance in circumstances of their own personal vulnerability 
(mental and physical conditions). The economic status of a vulnerable individual 
may or may not be relevant, depending on the contextual circumstances in which 
human rights are considered. Where it is relevant, the lack of monetary resources 
may be directly attributed to the personal conditions that describe vulnerability and 
classify accordingly the individual concerned. From the cases that have so far been 
dealt with by the Court, we note claims that relate inter alia to housing 
accommodation, medical care, and access facilities for the disabled, for which the 
state has been called to defend alleged failures of its positive obligations to assist 
vulnerable individuals to enjoy human rights. 
It should be clarified from the outset that such claims are diametrically different 
from those of earlier jurisprudence in which the state's positive obligations are 
examined over the failure of its agents to protect 'everyone' (hence including also 
vulnerable individuals) fi-om acts of interference by a non-state actor,' or in those 
exceptional circumstances in which individuals are legitimately put under the 
control of the state (i.e. detained persons, asylum seekers, individuals during 
military service, etc.). ^ It is established jurisprudence that in such contexts the state 
1 See, e.g., Airey v. Ireland, Judgment of 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73; X and Y v. the 
Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80; Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87; A. v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 23 September 
1998, no. 25599/94; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 May 2001, no. 
29392/95; Ivison V. the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 16 April 2002, no. 39030/97; 
E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 November 2002, no. 33218/96. See, also, 
B. Hofstotter, 'European Court of Human Rights: Positive Obhgations in E . and others v. United 
Kingdom' (2004) 2 I CON 525-560; H. CuUen, 'Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations imder 
Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights' (2006) 6 HRLR 585-592. 
2 Price V. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 July 2001, no. 33394/96; Muisel v. France, 
Judgment of 14 November 2002, no. 67263/01; Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. 
Belgium, Judgment of 12 October 2006, no. 13178/03; Huylu v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 
November 2006, no. 52955/99; Mechenkov v. Russia, Judgment of 7 February 2008, no. 
35421/05; Tastan v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 March 2008, no. 63748/00; Yeter v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 13 January 2009, no. 33750/03; Guvec v. Turkey, Judgment of 20 January 2009, 
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is directiy or indirectiy responsible due to its sovereign aibility to regulate and 
sanction all activities within its jiirisdiction and ultimately to set up an effective 
system to prevent human rights violations. 
The extension of the state's positive obligations in the form of direct assistance 
to actively protect individuals in circumstances arising out of their own personal 
vulnerability reinforces the constitutional imperative of human rights as free-
standing minimum priorities that the society as a whole aims to realise. It is 
important to note the willingness of the Court to entertain the human rights claims 
of vulnerable individuals, which, at times, it amplifies on its own initiative under a 
self-asserted autonomy couched in j u r a novit curia terms. 3 In essence, the 
expansion of the Convention, as effectuated by the dynamic perspective of the active 
protection of human rights - representing a new generation of human rights claims 
that correspond to developments in civil society in various corners of Europe - has 
meant, in practice, that the source of the threat to human rights, be it a state or non-
state actor, is no longer the categorical determinative of the state's international 
liability, although it remains unchallenged that to abstain from interfering is the 
essential object of the Convention provisions. ^ 
More notable is the provision of prohibition of torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, as guaranteed by Article 3, given the express reference to a 
'treatment', and therefore a prior act of interference from a particular source is 
reasonably implied. In this respect, the recent clarification by the Court of the scope 
of Article 3 in the case of L . is of particular relevance. In responding to an Article 3 
claim concerned with the possibility of securing medical treatment (see further 
discussion below), the Court pointed out that 
Article 3 entails a positive obligation on the part of the State to protect the 
individual from acute iU-treatment, whether physical or mental, whatever its 
no. 70337/01; Gagiu v. Romania, Judgment of 24 February 2009, no. 63258/00; Poghosydn v. 
Georgia, Judgment of 24 February 2009, no. 9870/07; S. D. v. Greece, Judgment of 11 June 
2009, no. 53541/07. See case-law and materials cited in chapter 2, notes 234-7. 
3 See, e.g., MoZfca v. Poland , 'In respect of the applicant's allegation that he was deprived of 
his right to vote on account of his disability, the Court raised of its own motion a complaint under 
Article 8 of the Convention', Admissibility decision of 11 April 2006, no. 56550/00; Botta v. Italy, 
Admissibility decision of 15 January 1996, no. 21439/93, The Commission considers that the 
complaints which the appUcant has brought imder Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention should be 
examined under Article 8 of the Convention alone.'; Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova, 
Admissibility decision of 4 January 2005, no. 14462/03, Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 
19 February 1998, no. 14967/89, para. 44. 
4 See, e.g., the Belgian Linguistic case. Judgment of 23 July 1968, 1474/62; 1677/62; 
1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, para. 7; Marckx u. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1978, no. 
6833/74, para. 31; Moreno Gomez v. Spain, Judgment of 16 November 2004, no. 4143/02, para. 
55; Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Judgment of 11 January 2006, no. 52562/99; 
52620/99, para. 57-
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source. Thus if the source is a naturally occurring illness, the treatment for 
which could involve the responsibility of the State, but is not forthcoming or 
patently inadequate, an issue may arise under this provision.s 
Admittedly, such an expanded scope of the Convention can have wide implications, 
and it is not difficult to contemplate a floodgates effect that could result in 
impossible and impractical situations, especially in areas of overlap with social 
rights. However, even in circumstances in which there can be a genuine overlap 
between social and human rights, this does not change the fact that a human right 
can still be involved. Notable is the rush of states to label the apphcants' claims as 
'social' so that they are automatically rejected as manifestiy ill-founded under Article 
35-3-4-^ But, mere labelling does not answer the question of whether a human right 
issue is or is not engaged under the Convention, and whether, and to what extent, a 
positive obligation might be imposed in the circumstances concerned. 
Because human rights are legal rights, albeit of constitutional nature, the state's 
assistance in circumstances of personal vulnerability is not claimed as a charity, but 
as a right to which the individual is entitied by law. The critical detail in the case of 
human rights is that they are usually broadly framed and, as a result, they require 
further elaboration to determine their scope in concrete circumstances. At the 
European level, the European judge interprets human rights under a law-making 
plan that has long treated the Convention as a 'living instrument' in order to address 
new challenges to human rights and adapt to rapidly changing social perceptions of 
their fundamental significance.^ Under the supranational deal of the Convention, the 
Court is conferred with power to determine minimum priorities for the states in the 
area of human rights and fundamental freedoms that cannot generally be 
compromised or neglected by majoritarian policies of the elected representatives of 
the day. Accordingly, the development and application of the Convention affirm a 
basic and permanent ground of human rights protection that does not have to be 
negotiated with the demos at every electoral occasion but it is assumed to exist as a 
constitutional contract. 
5 L. V. Lithuania, Judgment of i i September 2007, no. 27527/03, para. 46 citing also D. v. 
the United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 May 1997, no. 30240/96, paras. 51-54 and Pretty v. the 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, paras. 49-52. 
6 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic, Admissibihty decision of 14 May 2002, no. 
38621/97, '[The Government] argued that Article 8 of the Convention was not applicable in the 
instant case as the rights claimed by the appUcants were social rights, the scope of which went 
beyond the. legal obligation inherent in the concept of "respect" for "private life" within the 
meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Convention.'; Botta v. Italy, Judgment of 24 February 
1998, no. 21439/93, para. 29. 
7 See, e.g., Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 April 1978, no. 5856/72, para. 31, 
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, para. 54. 
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It pays, however, to recall that the critical justification of constitutional human 
rights imposing minimum priorities for the state has always been based on the 
liberal perspective of there being an act of interference, actual or potential, that is 
causally attributed to the state or non-state actors, including also very special 
circumstances in which the state legitimately exercises advanced control of some 
individuals' lives (e.g. prisoners). As human rights protection now extends to active 
assistance in circumstances of personal vulnerability, the element of causation 
cannot be established in the absence of an act of interference. As a result, the courts' 
independence in imposing positive obligations on the state in a non-interference 
context calls for a renewed justification under the principle of the separation of 
powers, as clearly there is a fundamental difference between reacting to an act of 
iiiterference (a caus£il link exists) and intervening directly in the legislator's agenda 
(a causal link is absent). In principle, what is opposed is not the protection of the 
vulnerable a^ s such, but the distribution of the liniited resources of states, especially 
when the financial cost involved is substantial. Such considerations are particularly 
pertinent at the European level given the economic disparities that exist between 
member states. 
Thus, in circunistances of non-interference, it can generally be said that when 
the cost of human rights protection of vulnerable individuals is likely to put an 
unnecessary or impractical burden on the state's resources, a democratic limit is 
irnposed on the Convention vis-a-vis the budgetary choices of the elected 
representatives of the state. In most cases, the cost of protection is calculated by 
taking into account the number of all those individuals who have similar human 
rights needs with the isolated applicant and who can equally claim protection frorn 
the state. In these terms, the legitimacy for the Court to intervene and impose 
positive obligations may only arise when the financial burden on the state will not be 
great. In short, it is not the financial cost attached to human rights protection of a 
vulnerable individual that is precluded as such by the scope of the Convention,« but 
rather the size of that cost, which, if is large (due to the large number of potential 
applicants), cannot legitimately be imposed by the non-elected judiciary. 
8 In Airey v. Ireland, the Court has made clear that 'Whilst the Convention sets forth what 
are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic 
nature. The Court therefore considers, like the Commission, that the mere fact that an 
interpretation of the Convention may ejctend into the sphere of social and economic rights should 
not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating 
that sphere from the field covered by the Convention.', para. 26. See also Botta v. Italy, para. 28; 
Sfec and Others v. the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 6 July 2005, no. 65731/01, 
65900/01, para. 52. 
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The task of this chapter is to present and further discuss general principles that 
the Court has developed for the examination of the human rights claims of 
vulnerable individuals in circumstances where a prior act of interference is absent 
(section A), and, subsequentiy, to analyse in more depth pertinent variables that can 
provide a more reasoned framework for an objective adjudication and management 
of such claims within the system of the Convention (section B). 
A. General Principles 
I. The State's Margin of Appreciation in Striking a Fair Balance 
between Competing Interests 
In dealing with the human rights claims of vulnerable individuals, the Court often 
examines whether a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests of 
the individual and of the community as a whole, and accords the state a margin of 
appreciation.9 To mention but one example, the Court applied the balance test in the 
case of O' Reilly and Others, which concerned a joint application of various 
individuals complaining that their private life was adversely being affected by the 
almost unusable state of a communal road (i.e., a bus refused to pass from the road 
to collect a handicapped resident, some school children fell on the road, etc.). The 
Court reiterated that as far as the state's positive obligations are concerned 
regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole and to 
the margin of appreciation enjoyed by states in determining the steps to be 
taken to ensure compliance with the Convention (Rees v. the United Kingdom 
judgment of 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106, § 37).^° 
However, it should be remembered that the fair balance test has its origins and has 
extensively been applied in cases in which an act of interference can directly or 
indirectly be attributed to the state.^ ^ When this test is transposed to a different 
context in which the issue of interference cannot be said to be relevant in the human 
9 Botta V. Italy, para, 33. Sentges v. the Netherlands, Admissibility decision of 8 July 2003, 
no. 27677/02; Molka v. Poland; Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova; Zehnalova andZehnal v. 
the Czech Republic. For an updated study on the principle of the margin of appreciation see, e.g. 
Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in 
the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002); S. Greer, The European Convention on 
Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
1° O'Reilly and Others v. Ireland, Admissibility decision of 28 February 2002, no. 54725/00. 
" For detailed discussion of the fair balance test, see chapter 2, section A. 
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rights claims of vulnerable individuals, its conceptual and technical justifications 
have to be revisited. 
Starting from the technical issue which is practically pertinent, it should be said 
that the state's margin of appreciation and the fair balance test have originally been 
connected to the legitimate aims of interference that are exhaustively listed in the 
second paragraph of Article 8, as seen for example in the case of Rees which is cited 
as an authority in the passage above.^ ^ clearly, when there is no issue of interference, 
the legitimate aims of the second paragraph (i.e. the community's interests) cannot 
be applicable. It follows, as a result, that in the absence of specified community 
interests, the fair balance test is considered in abstracto. In addition, the state's 
margin of appreciation is never absolute, but is closely connected to the principle of 
proportionality.'3 However, since that no legitimate counter-interests are specified 
in the examination of the human rights claims of vulnerable individuals, the 
principle of proportionality becomes disconnected from the operation of the state's 
margin of appreciation, a fact that adds to the uncertainty of the balance assessment. 
It can thus be argued that the emphasis should not be on a fair balance test, 
which sits uneasily in contexts in which no prior acts of interference with human 
rights exist but rather, on the democratic limit to the scope of the Convention that 
applies in such contexts. Accordingly, the pertinent question is whether the Court is 
able, having estimated the borders of this limit, to determine a legitimate scope for 
its intervention to impose positive obligations. This question is not confined to the 
circumstances of the individual applicant, but concerns, by virtue of the principle of 
equality, the overall management of analogous claims of other vulnerable 
individuals, not necessarily belonging to the same group. 
The shift in emphasis on the justification of the Court's intervention, rather 
than on the absurd application of the state's margin, is more obvious when the 
protection of a vulnerable individual is examined in connection to the human rights 
interests of Articles 2 and 3, whose semi-absolute and absolute status, respectively, 
precludes the state's margin by definition. Thus, although a margin cannot arise for 
the state in relation to these two Articles, this does not automatically mean that 
" Rees V. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 17 October 1986, no. 9532/81, para. 37. See also 
Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1990, no. 9310/81, para. 41; 
Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 10454/83, para. 42, Hatton and 
Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 August 2003, no. 36022/97, para. 98. For informed 
criticism of the balance test, see C. Forder, 'Legal Protection under Article 8 ECHR: Marckx and 
Beyond' (1990) 37(2) NILR162-181,179. 
13 See, recently, Ruano Morcuende v. Spain, Admissibility decision of 6 September 2005, no. 
75287/01 (available in French only). 
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positive obligations can be imposed by the European judge. This position is further 
reinforced by the fact that in most cases the examination of the claims of vulnerable 
individuals are exhausted at the admissibility level, which proves per se that the 
pertinent question is hot the merits assessment of the fair balance test (which is 
exactiy what the fair balance test is about in the established case-law), but rather to 
find and define the legitimate ground of the Court's intervention, starting from 
preliminary issues of the applicable scope of the Convention provisions (see 
discussion below). 
The adversarial competition of the interests of an individual against those of the 
whole community, within which the balance test frames the exanaination of the 
human rights claims of vulnerable individuals has also to be justified from a 
conceptual point of view, which is equally pertinent given that no legitimate aims are 
specified as community interests for which a balance is required. It is, therefore, 
asked how the individual and the community can ever be subjected to such a rigid 
division, as if the community is not an inclusive entity for all individuals. Does a 
vulnerable individual exist in isolation, or there are also other vulnerable individuals 
in the same or analogous circumstances? Are these individuals alone in the world 
or part of a nexus of a family that revea;ls additional individuals who are also 
affected? As the community is the whole set of individuals (conveniently illustrated 
as A +...+ Z = AZ), the 'fair' balance test regards, in essence, the interests of the 
vulnerable added together as A + B + C... (A, B and C being groups of various 
vulnerable individuals in need of human rights protection) against the interests of 
the rest A Z - (A + B + C...). A question, therefore, is addressed to the [AZ - (A + B 
+ C. . .)] community of whether there can ever be an adversarial competition of 
interests in the protection of basic human rights. Of particular relevance to this 
question is the basic fact that human life is not static. A classic illustration of this 
starting point is the sphinx's riddle: 'what animal goes on four legs in the morning, 
two legs at noon, and three legs in the evening?' As Oedipus answered that animal is 
man in various stages of age - i n childhood crawling, in adulthood walking and in 
old age using a cane. Therefore, individuals firom the [AZ - (A + B + C. . .)] 
community are unlikely to accept an actual competition with the interests of, say, 
disabled individuals, as disability comes also with age and illness or accident, £md as 
a result a member of the [AZ - {A + B + C. . .)] community is very much a 
prospective member of the (A + B + C. . .) community. Also, informed individuals 
understand very well that various dramas and tragedies lie ahead during the course 
of life and, therefore, by not supporting the interests of the {A + B + C. . .) 
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community they would effectively undermine their own entitlement to basic human 
rights protection if they or their family members should come, whether it is likely or 
not, at some point to be classified among the minority part of the community. There 
is no need to say more on the conceptual justification of the balance test or the use in 
that test of the term 'community', which derives frona the word common describing 
the essential characteristic of what a community is about, given that its technical 
merits have already been criticised above. 
From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that it is not so much a 
question that the state has a margin of appreciation in striking a balance between 
'competing' interests, but whether the Covut is capable of estimating the borders of 
its democratic limit and determining accordingly the exact point of its legitimate 
intervention to impose positive obligations on the states vis-a-vis the himian rights 
of vulnerable individuals. 
I I . The Setting of a pan-European Minimum 
The human rights claim of one vulnerable individual reveals usually a group of 
individuals with similar needs. Under the principle of equality, it is expected that the 
European judge will contemplate the macro-level effect of her decision before setting 
a precedent that could open the floodgates of litigation and impose a 
disproportionate burden on the states. The Court has expressly anticipated such an 
effect in the case of Sentges, in which a severely disabled individual complained of 
the state's refusal to fund the cost for a sophisticated robotic arm. The same 
reasoning applied in Pentiacova and 48 Others, in which a group of individuals 
suffering from liver insufficiency claimed that the state should fund three, instead of 
two, haemodialysis sessions per week. In both cases, the Court reflected that 'whUe it 
will apply the Convention to the concrete facts of this particular case in accordance 
with Article 34, a decision issued in an individual case will nevertheless at least to 
some extent establish a precedent.''^ 
Such anticipatory considerations can be traced as far back as the first case on 
positive obligations in Marckx, in which the Court pointed out that 'it is inevitable 
that the Court's decision will have effects extending beyond the confines of this 
particular case,' citing also the practice of the European Court of Justice, which had 
•4 Sentges v. the Netherlands, and Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova. See further 
discussion of these cases below. 
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recalled in its case-law that 'the practical consequences of any judicial decision must 
be ca.refully taken into account'.^s 
With regard to the retroactive effect of a Court's decision, the position of the 
government deserves due attention. In pairticular, it was argued that 
if the Court were to find certain rules of Belgian law to be incompatible with the 
Convention, this would mean that these rules had been contrary to the 
Convention since its entry into force in respect of Belgium (14 June 1955); the 
only way to escape such a conclusion would be to accept that the Convention's 
requirements had increased in the intervening period and to indicate the exact 
date of the change.. .^ ^ 
If we apply this argument to the human rights claims of vulnerable individuals, the 
retroactive effect of the Court's decisions can be encountered in two instances: first, 
as additional or reinforced claims for harm (i.e. non-enjoyment of a human right) 
suffered prior to the new standards of law that often develop at the occasion of the 
applicant's case. Secondly, when claims concern lack of appropriate facilities in 
public or private buildings, a successful outcome could potentially require their 
alteration. In that regard, it is easy to note that the retroactivity of positive 
obligations furiher accentuates the quantitative element of the financial cost that 
already accrues from extending an isolated human right claim to those of a whole 
group of individuals, and which can suffice by itself as a ground for precluding 
positive obligations. Therefore, a clear and firm statement to 'indicate the exact date 
of the change' and the corresponding non-retroactivity of positive obligations rnay 
offer a pragmatic, forward-looking approach to controlling and managing the 
quantitative element so as to accommodate realistically, and hence legitimately, the 
protection of human rights of the vulnerable. 
A parallel example of non^retroactivity when a positive obligation constitutes a 
development of the existing human rights standards, has been seen in the case of 
Goodwin in which the Court overruled its previous decision in Rees, opening the 
way for a new positive obligation of states to implement the recognition of gender 
change of post-operative transsexuals.^^in examining the parallel clairn for an award 
of damages under Article 41, the Court did not dispute that the applicant had 
suffered distress and anxiety in the past, but stressed that until that time similar 
issues were found to fall within the state's margin of appreciation. It went on to 
reason that the finding of violation, with the consequences which will ensue 'for the 
^ Marckx v. Belgium, para. 58. 
'^Ibid. 
17 As recently confirmed in L. v. Lithuania, para. 56. 
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future', from introducing new European human rights standards at the very occasion 
of the apphcant's case, constitutes in itself just satisfaction. This insightful 
approach succeeds in reconciling the autonomous developrnent of European human 
rights law that contemplates the future with the legitimate expectation of the state to 
understand the scope of its international liability in advance. 
III. A Multi-speed Commitment of the States 
In a supranational system such as that of the Convention, the uniform application of 
European human rights law is essential to its purpose. However, a slight 
(contextual) deviation from this prerequisite should be considered, as far as the 
positive obligations of the state towards the vulnerable are concerned. In such a 
context, and unlike iany other, there is no question whether or not vulnerable 
individuals have to be protected. In practice, everything comes down to the limited 
availability of the state's resources, the prioritisation of their allocation, and the 
financial disparities that exist between member states. Arguably, as no uniform 
standards can be imposed, it is difficult to see how a pan-European minimum of 
human rights protection can ever ernerge. 
To circumvent this reality, the Court considers uniform legal standards only in 
cases in which a general framework of protection has already been provided for at 
the domestic level. This has fnostiy been seen in the context of medical care whose 
relevance to human rights is established by the very nature of its business. The 
European judges may refrain from imposing a positive obligation on states to set up 
a health care system but, if such a system exists, they have shown themselves 
capable of reviewing minimum human rights standards therein. In that way, the 
initiative of allocating the state's resources remains with the representatives of the 
state but, subsequentiy, the judiciary is entitied to intervene to clarify human rights 
priorities. 
Thus, although the Court starts from the point that it is unfortunate that in the 
contracting states many individuals do not have access to a full range of medical 
treatment because of lack of resources and therefore, 'the Convention does not 
guarantee as such a right to free medical care', it leaves the possibility open when 'it 
is shown that the authorities of a Contracting State put an individual's life at risk 
through the denial of health care which they have undertaken to make available to 
18 Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Judgement of 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95, para. 120. 
158 
the population generally.'^ ^ However, beyond tiiis general position, there is an urgent 
need for specification and exactness under concrete principles that will shed more 
light on the human rights protection that can be afforded in such a context. 
IV. The Existence of a Direct and Immediate Link 
In a number of cases, the Court has been called to determine the scope of Article 8, 
which accounts for the most positive obhgations claims due to the broadness of the 
term 'private life', which has been connected, since early jurisprudence, to the 
development of one's personality.^ o In Botta, in examining the disabled apphcant's 
claim for access to a private beach at a holiday resort, the Court for the first time 
reasoned that 'a State has [positive] obligations of this type where it has found a 
direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an applicEmt and the 
latter's private and/or family life.'^^ In applying this test to the facts of the case, it 
held that there was no violation of Article 8, because no such a direct link could be 
deducted from 'interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate scope'.^ ^ 
The 'direct and immediate link' has been examined also in subsequent cases 
involving disabled individuals^s but it remains unclear how much reliance is put on 
this test. Indeed, the finding of 'interpersonal relations of such broad and 
indeterminate scope' would suffice by itself to conclude that the applicant's claim 
couJd not faU within the scope of 'private life' under Article 8. A more informed 
explanation on the scope of Article 8 was given in Zehnalova and Zehnal, which 
concerned a disabled individual's claim (the first applicant) for access to a number of 
public and private buildings. The Court explained that 
'9 Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova; Nitecki v. Poland, Admissibility decision of 21 
March 2002, no. 65653/01; Makuc and Others v. Slovenia, Admissibility decision of 31 May 
2007, no. 26828/06, para. 176; Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, ho. 25781/94, para. 
219; Gheorghe v. Romania, Admissibility decision of 22 September 2005, no. 19215/04 (available 
in French only). This statement is usually made under the heading of the right to life (Article 2 of 
the Convention), but also has a practical application vmder Article 8, whose 'private life' 
component has long been interpreted as covering a person's physical and psychological integrity, 
see, e.g., the parallel claim under Article 8 in Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova. 
20 For commentary and analysis of earher case-law, see P. Duffy, The Protection of Privacy, 
Family Life and Other Rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights' 
(1982) 2 Yearbook of European Law 191-238; L. Loucaides, Essays on the Developing Law of 
Human Rights, Chapter 4: Personality and Privacy under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995): 83-107. 
Botta v. Italy, para. 33-4. 
Ibid., para. 35. 
23 See, e.g., Marzari v. Italy, Admissibihty decision of 4 May 1999, no. 36448/97; 
Maggiolini v. Italy, Admissibility decision of 13 January 2000, no. 35800/97 (available in French 
only); Sentges v. the Netherlands; Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic; Molka v. Poland. 
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Article 8 of the Convention cannot be taken to be generally applicable each time 
the first applicant's everyday life is disrupted; it applies only in exceptional 
cases where her lack of access to public buUdings and buildings open to the 
public affects her life in such a way as to interfere with her right to personal 
development and her right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings and the outside world (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 
2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002-ni).24 
Accordingly, it might be better to rely first on the already established principles and 
conceptual understanding of the Convention provisions before inserting additional 
parameters that have yet to be clarified sufficiently. 
Looked at more closely, the 'direct and immediate link' test emphasises 
calculating pararneters of 'directness' and 'immediacy' that call for a careful 
evaluation and in-context application. It should be noted that the authorities cited in 
Botta to justify that test, namely Airey,'5X and Y,'^^Lopez Ostra,^'^Guerra and 
Others,concern circumstances in v^ rhich there has been an act of interference by 
third parties for which the state is niade indirectly responsible for not intervening to 
protect the injured party as required.^ ^ Clearly, when there is an issue of interference 
the elements of 'directness' and/or 'immediacy' are usually established from the real 
consequences of that interference. As already stressed above, the position is 
different when individuals claim assistance from the state due to their ovm personal 
vulnerability in order to be able to enjoy human rights. 
The point that this sub-section intends to make is not against the application of 
the 'direct and immediate link' test as such, but about the exact context and stage of 
its judicial examination. An alternative (useful) appUcalion of that test could be in 
claims to protect the physical and psychological integrity of individuals under Article 
8, including also the right to life (Article 2). Such claims can be seen, for example, in 
the context of medical care, whose field involves by definition the physical and/or 
psychological integrity of individua;ls. Thus, in order to control the quantitative 
element involved in the number of potential claims, the European judge can use the 
'direct and immediate link' test as an adjusting principle that manages the standard 
of remoteness so as to identify accordingly a legitimate scope for the Court's 
intervention.30 This point is further explored below. 
24 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic. 
'^^Airey v. Ireland. 
"^Xand Yv. the Netherlands. 
=7 Lopez.Ostra v. Spain, Judgment of 9 December 1994, no. 16798/90. 
=8 Guerra and Others v. Italy. 
29 Botta V. Italy, para. 34. 
30 See, e.g., the applicants' claims under Articles 2 and 8 in Pentiacova and 48 Others v. 
Moldova. 
i6o 
V. The Discrimination Issue 
The lack or insufficiency of protection of vulnerable individuals has always been 
argued as an indirect, and for some, direct form of discrimination that is tolerated in 
society. For the purposes of this study, which is exclusively concerned with the 
system of the Convention, the issue of discrimination will be approached from its 
legal and hence technical eispect, as the rights enshrined in the treaty give rise to real 
and binding resvdts, albeit in the context of European international law. The 
discussion is restricted to concrete proposals, such as that made by Olivier De 
Schutter, who has argued that the anti-discriminatory right under Article 14 could be 
interpreted in such a way so that the requirement of non-discrimination includes an 
obligation to accommodate disabled people.31 The commentator relies on the Court's 
decision in Thlimmenos in which it was stated that '[t]he right not to be 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the 
Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable 
justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly 
different.'32 It is suggested that under that statement an apparently 'neutral measure' 
can now be seen as a disadvantage and therefore 'the failure to provide effective 
accommodation [of the needs of the disabled individuals] is a failure to create an 
exception.'33 
Admittedly, this is a generous approach whose adoption has yet to be 
elaborated by judges and legal practitioners alike. However, some difficulties in the 
articulation of a more specific proposal have to be noted. At first, it should be 
recalled that Article 14 is not free-standing but comes into play in conjunction with a 
substantive right.34 This means in practice that if a positive obligation to protect a 
disabled individual cannot be imposed by a substantive right in the particular 
circumstances complained of, then the claim wiU be rejected as manifestly Ul-
founded under Article 35.3-4. Also, unlike the facts in Thlimtnenos, we deal here 
with the question of the active protection of vulnerable individuals who are not able 
by themselves to enjoy human rights. In this respect, the existence of a prior act of 
interference, direct or indirect, that can be attributed to the state, as seen in that 
310. De Schutter, 'Reasonable Accommodations and Positive Obligations in the European 
Convention on Human Rights' in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds), Disability Rights in Europe: 
From Theory to Practice (Hart, 2005): 35-64,52. 
32 Thlimmenos v. Greece, Judgment of 6 April 2000, no. 34369/97, para. 44. 
33 De Schutter, (note 30), p. 53. 
34 Botta V. Italy, para. 39; Thlimmenos v. Greece, para 40; Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the 
Czech Republic; Molka v. Poland. 
i6l 
case, concerns an entirely different context (see discussion above). Accordingly, the 
Convention does not concern itself with 'neutral' measures but either with issues of 
interference by a state or non-state actor, or with the non-enjoyment of human 
rights in circumstances of personal vulnerability. By way of example, where a 
railway station is built by the state without providing access for the disabled, the 
state cannot be said to have acted in order to interfere with the private life of 
disabled individuals. Equally, where the state's failure is seen as an omission, no 
issue of discrimination can arise if the state is not under a prior positive obligation to 
build appropriate access facilities for the disabled. This is also clear in the judgment 
of the case of Zehnalova and Zehnal, in which, in rejecting the applicants' Article 14 
claim in conjunction with Article 8, the Court reiterated that 
Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and 
its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in 
relation to the enjojonent of the rights and freedoms safeguarded by those 
provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach 
of those provisions - and to that extent it is autonomous - there can be no room 
for its application unless the facts of the case fall within the ambit of one or 
more of the latter (see, mutatis mutandis, Botta, cited above, p. 424, § 39).35 
By contrast, the force of the discrimination argtmient is more pressing where it can 
be shown that the protection claimed has already been offered to other vulnerable 
individuals in similar contextual circumstances. In Pentidcova and 48 Others, a case 
arising in the context of medical care (discussed above), it was additionally argued 
under Article 14 that other hospitals in the same city were better financed or that 
their patients received better treatment. The European judges showed themselves 
willing to consider this argument that, nevertheless, was rejected because the 
applicants failed to submit supporting evidence. This course of argumentation is 
promising and can either be transposed and added to the multi-speed commitment 
of the states, as discussed above, or be elaborated further under Article 14, given that 
this Article has an autonomous application irrespectively of whether there has been 
a breach of one of the substantive rights (provided, at least, that the facts of the case 
fall within its scope). 36 Having said that, it should be sfressed that, in the 
examination of the state's positive obligations under a substantive right, the 
questions of what is a 'breach' and what is the 'scope' of that right, as seen in the 
passage quoted immediately above, are often two sides of the same coin. Thus, a 
better understanding of the underlying parameters that determine the imposition 
35 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic; Makuc v. Slovenia, paras. 214-5. Molka v. 
Poland. 
36 Botta V. Italy, paras. 35 and 36. 
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and extent of a positive obligation under the substantive rights wiU be valuable in 
appreciating the concurring potential of the anti-discriminatory provision of the 
Convention. 
B. Moving Towards an Objective Legal Reasoning 
Beyond the 'how often-cited' status of the general principles lie the details that 
determine the positive obligations of the state. The task in the following sections is 
to elaborate more on objective variables that already form part of the development 
of the relevant jurisprudence in order to make a coherent proposal for a workable 
framework within which the adjudication of the human rights claims of vulnerable 
individuals can be effectuated in a consistent and predictable manner. 
I. The Positive Obligation Equation 
The positive obligations of the state to protect individuals who cannot enjoy human 
rights due to their own circumstances of personal vulnerability may only arise as an 
issue under paragraph i of the substantive rights of the Convention whose 
provisions engage the active protection of human rights. Although most of the 
discussion revolves around the financial cost that is attached to implementing a 
positive obligation, it should be recalled that a financial cost for the protection of the 
Convention rights has always been presupposed.37 Indeed, what is really debated is 
the size of that cost due to the underlying democratic limit of the Convention in 
circumstances where an act of interference by a private or pubUc actor is absent (i.e. 
the non-interference context). Importantly, although the financial cost is a pertinent 
variable, it is not the only one or even the first to examine in the legal equation that 
determines the state's positive obligation. The calculation of a positive obligation 
under paragraph i of the Convention rights incorporates both qualitative and 
quantitative elements whose examination exhausts the former in priority. Thus, if 
we abbreviate for reasons of convenience - positive obligation (po), human right 
(hr) and financial cost (fc) - the combined effect of these elements can be reflected 
in a methodological equation that determines a positive obligation as follows: 
37 See also note 8. 
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hr 
P0 = — 
fc 
In this equation, the qualitative element is the human right of the Convention that is 
relevant in the circumstances complained of, the quantitative element being the 
financial cost of the practical implementation of that right, which can vary from one 
claim to another, but is never de minimis. Although the quantitative element is a 
dominant variable, it is the qualitative element that reveals how pertinent the issue 
of human rights protection is or not under the circumstances, which if is not, the 
applicant's claim will not fall within the scope of a Convention right. As a human 
right cannot be engaged (hr = o), a positive obligation will not arise for the state, 
reflecting accordingly the equation that po = o/fc => po = o. 
The qualitative element is assessed under its own quantified aspect, which is the 
degree of the negative consequences on the individual concerned. The examination 
of this element is pertinent in two levels: first, to determine the applicability of a 
human right (a threshold of severity of consequences operates), and, secondly, to 
reinforce the prospects of imposing a positive obligation with any increase in the 
measurement of the quantified unit (i.e. negative consequences) exceeding the 
actionable threshold. The latter is particularly pertinent when the applicant's claim 
wdU ultimately have to be compared with the meritorious claims of other vulnerable 
individuals and an informed decision will have to be made as to which interests 
should be protected. Accordingly, high thresholds of applicability of the Convention 
rights limit the flow of claims that will pass the admissibility stage, providing in that 
way a natural barrier that reduces the quantitative element of the financial cost that 
is associated with the number of potential applicants. 
There are cases, however, in which the protection that one individual seeks 
from the state will also meet the needs of other vulnerable individuals without their 
having to pursue a separate action. In such a situation, the qualitative element does 
not solely concern the human right of one person/the applicant (hn), since there are 
other potential beneficiaries, whose needs {hrs, hrs,..., hrn) relate to the same human 
right interest (/in = hrs =...= hrn). Such an instance will arise in a claim for disabled 
access to transport stations, which, although, in practical terms, is pursued by one 
disabled individual, the qualitative element can be evaluated by taking into account 
the same human rights needs of other individuals, given that their protection does 
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not incur an extra financial cost. In such cases, the positive obligation equation po = 
hrilfci reflects virtually po = (hr, + hrz +...+ hrn)/fci = n hr/fci. 
The financial cost is a separate variable that merits additional examination in its 
own right, provided that the qualitative element has first been established (i.e. a 
human right can be engaged in the applicant's circumstances). In the positive 
obligation equation, the financial cost serves as the quantitative element that is set 
in inverse proportion (.i/fc) as po = hr/fc = hrxi/fc in order to reflect the democratic 
limit of the Convention and, conversely, its corresponding legitimacy to impose 
positive obligations when this cost is not disproportionate nor likely to impose an 
unrealistic and unnecessary burden on the state. 
In the following, we analyse the qualitative and quantitative elements that 
determine the state's positive obligations with reference to specific examples from 
real claims, as pursued by various applicants before the Court. 
1. The Qualitative Element 
1.1. The Conceptual Question 
It has already been discussed in the introductory chapter that the Convention rights 
can be given a holistic reading through the central concept of private life, which has 
been interpreted, since early jurisprudence, as the development of one's personality. 
Under this clarification, the scope of Article 8 targets the necessary conditions that 
allow the individual to develop their personality, or, put in negative terms (perhaps 
more accurately), those critical conditions without which the personality of an 
individual cannot develop. Such conditions have been recognised in Article 8 
case-law as including 'the physical and psychological integrity' of a person and the 
possibility to 'develop relationships with other human beings'. 38 The former interest 
3^ See e.g., Botta v. Italy; Sentges v. the Netherlands, Molka v. Poland; Zehnalova and 
Zehnal v. the Czech Republic; Niemietz v. Germany, Judgment of i6 December 1992, no. 
13710/88. For commentary and analysis of early case-law see, Duffy, (note 19); Loucaides, (note 
19). See also the submissions of both the government and the applicant in Botta v. Italy, 
(admissibility decision), which confirms the well-entrenched interpretation of 'private life' as the 
development of one's personality and the specification of the necessary condition to develop 
relationships with others, (a) per government: 'As to the substance of the case, the Government 
consider that the domain of private life is closely bound up with a person's emotional life. They 
emphasise that, according to the case-law of the Convention organs and academic opinion, the 
function of the protection of private life is to ensure that an individual has the opportunity to 
develop his own personality in relationships with other persons, without any external 
interference'; (b) per appUcant: 'According to tbe applicant, the heart of the concept is that the 
individual should have the opportunity to establish and develop relationships with other human 
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can additionally relate to Articles 2 and 3 whose scope involves higher degrees of 
negative consequences on one's physical and/or psychological integrity. 
Before examining actionable degrees of negative consequences under Articles 2, 
3 and 8, whose provisions are mostly relevant in the circumstances of vulnerable 
individuals, we should note that the holistic reading of these Articles offers a natural 
priority franiework of human rights protection. Such a framework is best 
appreciated when applies to claims arising out of the same context. In the context of 
health care, for example, it can reasonably be maintained that the organisation of 
medical services has to adjust to the degree of seriousness of the patients' 
conditions. In addition, the higher the degree of consequences that reflects the scope 
of a Convention right, the smaller the number of potential applicants that can be 
implied in an isolated complaint, a fact that justifies a priority framework among the 
Convention rights from the angle of the quantitative variable also, that is the 
financial cost of protection which is calculated beyond the circumstances of the 
given applicant. 
1.2. Setting Actionable Thresholds 
Under the current structure of the Convention rights, the negative impact threshold 
of Articles 2 and 3 is higher than that of Article 8 because the preservation of life and 
freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment reflect graver 
consequences for the person.39 Aiming at some general observations when various 
human rights claims are assessed within the same contextual situation, it can 
reasonably be said that the interconnected structure of Articles 2, 3 and 8 underlines 
a hierarchical relationship.40 In practice, when an individual fails to engage Article 8 
then higher claims under Articles 2 and 3 cannot possibly be pursued. A more in-
beings, an opportunity which is essential for the development of personality". In the judgment of 
Botta V. Italy, the Court provided a complete explanation that includes also the additional 
condition of one's physical and psychological integrity, 'Private life, in the Court's view, includes a 
person's physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the 
Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the 
personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings.', para. 32 (cited case 
omitted). 
39 Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88, para, 88; Pretty v. 
United Kingdom, paras. 37, 49; Estamirov and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 12 October 2006, 
no. 60272/00, para. 98; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 11 January i2007, no. 
1948/04, para. 135; Solomon and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 June 2008, no. 36832/97, 
para. 63. 
40 Loucaides, (note 19), 'Chapter 9, section 3: Rights Subject to Special Protection', p. 182; F. 
Sudre, 'Droits Intangibles et/ou Droits Fondamentaux: Y a-t-il des Droits Preeminents dans la 
Convention Europeenne des Droits de I'Homme?' in G. Cohen-Jonathan, J-F. Flauss, P. Lambert 
(eds), Liber Amicorum Marc-Andre Eissen (Bruylant, 1995): 381-398; Greer, (note 9). 
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depth look at the practice of the Court should be made in order to elaborate more on 
the scope of these Articles, whose applicability is organised through actionable 
thresholds reflecting respective degrees of the negative impact on the individuals. 
Article 8 should be examined first due to the lowest liability threshold involved. 
Article 8 
In the cases of Botta, O'Reilly and Others and Zehnalova and Zehnal (discussed 
above), the disruption of private life and, as generously interpreted, one's 
development of personality did not reflect an impact that was of such severity to 
bring the applicant's circumstances within the scope of Article 8. Although, 
admittedly, for the applicants such a response may sound legalistic since there was 
undeniably a negative impact on their circumstances (being 'unable to enjoy a 
normal social life' or 'to lead an active life while retaining her independence and 
dignity', as argued in Botta and Zehnalova and Zehnal, respectively), it is the 
function of law, and it is more so at the European level, to determine legal 
thresholds that correspond to various degrees of negative impact. For reasons of 
coherence, we note again the Court's clarification in Zehnalova and Zehnal that 
disruptions to personal life which affect the development of one's personality apply 
to exceptional Gircumstances.4i Accordingly, the actionable degree of negative impact 
under Article 8 is assessed in negative terms, namely to identify the critical level at 
which an individual cannot develop her personality. Although this explanation 
entails a considerable degree of subjectivity, its value hes in securing an objective 
base upon which the parties' arguments will have to be placed and actionable 
thresholds can be flexibly fixed to adjust to the quantitative element also. 
In Marzari, the Court has made clear that the claim of the severely disabled 
applicant for housing accommodation adequate to his condition has to be examined 
under an impact-based assessment. In particular, it considered that 
although Article 8 does not guarantee the right to have one's housing problem 
solved by the authorities, a refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this 
respect to an individual suffering from a severe disease might in certain 
circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the 
impact of such refusal on the private life of the individual.42 
41 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic. See quotation of the relevant passage fro the 
Court's judgment at page with note 23. 
Marzari v. Italy (cited case omitted); O' Rourke v. the United Kingdom, Admissibility 
decision of 26 June 2001, no. 39022/97. 
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In the absence of a negative impact of rather a high degree of severity, a prospective 
applicant will not manage to engage Article 8, meaning that her claim is not 
actionable in the eyes of law and, as a i-esult, will be rejected as 'manifestiy i l l -
founded' under Article 35.3-4. Otherwise, the general position is that stated recently 
by the Court in Makuc case that '[wjhile it is clearly desirable that every human 
being have a place where he or she can live in dignity and which he or she can call 
home, there are unfortunately in the Contracting States many persons who have no 
home'.43 
By Gonfrast, the situation is different when a homeless person becomes i l l , as 
seen in the case of 0' Rourke, in which the impact on the applicant from the alleged 
refusal of the state to offer accommodation had to be objectively assessed by medical 
experts in order to establish its severity.^ ^ Following a medical diagnosis that found 
the applicant with asthmatic condition and chest infection, expert opinion advised 
for his urgent housing. However, the appUcant's claim failed before the Court, as 
temporary accommodation had been made available, thereby discharging the state's 
positive obligations in these circumstances. Therefore, it can reasonably be said that 
a valid human rights claim for housing accommodation can be raised as long as the 
impact on the apphcant's physical and/or psychological integrity has reached and 
maintains the level of severity contemplated by Article 8. The threshold of actionable 
level of severity under Article 8 can, of course, be flexibly set high, provided that it 
does not negate the very substance of that right and is lower than the applicable 
thresholds under Articles 2 and 3. 
Importantly, it should be noted that in the cases of Marzari and O' Rourke the 
assessment of the level of severity in the applicants' circumstances has presupposed 
a core adminisfrative process at the domestic level, which involves expert opinion in 
order to guarantee an objective base for the merits examination of various claims. In 
appropriate circumstances, the evidential proof binds also those claiming human 
rights protection. In O'Reilly and Others (discussed above), the Court did not 
undertake an impact-based examination and merely observed the 'hardship and 
inconvenience' on the applicants. This kind of reasoning can be explained by the fact 
that the case concerned a joint application in which different people had submitted 
different claims some of which cannot be said to concern the domain of human 
rights at all (e.g. some school children had to cease cycling to school because of the 
bad state of the communal road). As a result, littie attention was paid to more 
43 Ma^c and Others v. Slovenia, para. 171 (cited case omitted). 
44 O'Rourke v. the United Kingdom. 
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worthwhile claims (e.g. the movement of disabled residents on that road). In 
Zehnalova and Zehnal, the burden of proving the negative impact from the lack of 
access to some buildings was passed on to the applicants, who, as the Court noted, 
failed to furnish persuasive evidence and give precise details of the alleged obstacles. 
Such a large number of buildings were cited that the Court particuleu-ly doubted the 
first applicant's need to visit them on a daily basis. This establishes a parallel link 
with O'Reilly and Others as to the imprecision and broadness of some claims that 
eventually undermine any effort to prima facie engage an arguable claim under 
Article 8. 
Article 2 
Claims under the right to life are usually straightforward given the precision of its 
wording. Because of the irreversible consequences from the loss of human life and 
the basic truth that without life there can be no development of one's personality, 
the negative impact on individuals is undisputed in all circumstances. The role of 
expert opinion is equally vital here in assessing the seriousness of the applicant's 
condition, as can be seen for example in complaints about the suitability or adequacy 
of a medical treatment.^ s 
The main difficulty with the Article 2 claims lies in the fact that a great range of 
events can ultimately have an impact on one's life, and hence the Court's 
pragmatism that 'the Convention does not guarantee as such a right to free medical 
care'.^^In Pentiacova and 48 Others, the Court rejected the applicants' claim that 
the state was under a positive obUgation to fund three haemodialysis sessions per 
week, not because the third haemodialysis was not required for their condition, 
which was already recognised as a 'very serious progressive disease', but due to the 
applicants' failure to adduce evidence that their lives had been put at risk. Because to 
suffer from a 'very serious progressive disease' establishes per se a risk to life 
without the need for further evidence, the other critical parameter is the 
'progressiveness' of the disease that denotes a standard of remoteness.' As suggested 
earlier above, it may be useful to insert the parameters of 'directness' and 
'immediacy', explored elsewhere, in order to identify a manageable and hence 
legitimate scope for positive obligations in such a context.47lf these parameters were 
45 Nitecki .v Poland, Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova, Scialacqua v. Italy, 
Admissibility decision of 1 July 1998, no. 34151/96. 
46 Makuc v. Slovenia, para. 177. 
t7 See discussion on the parameters of 'directness' and 'immediacy' at pages with notes 20-
29. 
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considered in that case, the applicants would have to establish that their lives were 
put at an imminent risk. 
Such underlying considerations can be seen in the recent case of Gheorghe, in 
which a haemophiliac individual complained that the suspension of preventive 
medical treatment put his life at risk, While recognising the gravity of the 
appUcant's condition due to the irreversible nature of his illness, the Court, 
nevertheless, limited itself to a statement regret about the lack of permanent and 
preventive medical treatment that could eventually slow dovm the disease. The 
parameter of an imminent risk to life clearly underlined the judicial decision, as the 
Court was satisfied that free medical treatment was available for bleeding incidents, 
which is the more advanced stage of the disease. According to the evidence 
submitted by the respondent state, the applicant had access to such treatment on the 
numerous occasions for which his hospitalisation was required. 
From the case-law analysed above, it is clear that it is the quantitative element 
of financial cost, as reflected in the number of potential applicants, that restricts the 
scope of the state's positive obligations. It is suggested that the threshold of 
actionable level of severity under Article 2 is set high enough to cover the most 
severe impact whose determination can objectively be made by emplojdng a 
standard of remoteness in examining the parameters of directness and immediacy of 
a risk to human life. In that way, the Court is able to control the number of potential 
applicants and identify accordingly a legitimate scope for its intervention in order to 
pronounce on the state's positive obligations. 
Article 3 
When a claim is brought under the heading of torture of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, as specified in Article 3, it must be shown that the negative impact 
involved in the applicarit's circumstances reaches the requisite degree of severity 
that the Court is setting at a high level due to the absolute nature of this provision. 
In Zehnalova and Zehnal, the Court has reiterated that 'ill-treatment must attain a 
minimum level of severity if it is to fall vdthin the scope of Article 3 of the 
Convention',49 that mininium being the high threshold of negative impact that has to 
48 Gheorghe v. Romania. 
'^9 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic. See, e.g., L. v. Lithuania, para. 47; Makuc 
and Others v. Slovenia, para. 199; O'Rourkev. the United Kingdom. 
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be reached in the circumstances complained of and 'involves actual bodily injury or 
intense physical or mental suffering'.so 
In order to secure an objective evaluation process, the Court takes into account 
various parameteris such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental 
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the applicant, etc.si The 
Article 3 jurisprudence suggests that the only successful complaints involving 
vulnerable individuals have been in cases in which an act of interference has, 
directiy or indirectiy, been attributed to the state including special contexts in which 
individuals are legitimately put under the control of the state (e.g. in prisons, 
immigration centres).^ ^ An act of interference is in essence a prior 'treatment' within 
the meaning of Article 3, which is the basic determinative of the sitate's international 
liability under the Convention and, therefore, it amounts to a critical factor of 
considerable weight in assessing the threshold of impact under Article 3. Given that 
such a prior treatment is absent in the free-standing claims of vulnerable individuals 
for active assistance from the state, it is not difficult to see that Article 3 is likely to 
be engaged when extremely exceptional circumstances are present. A rare example 
from the jurisprudence is the euthanasia claim of the applicant in Pretty, which, 
nevertheless, failed due to conflict with Article 2.53 
2. The Quantitative Element 
In general, the financial cost of guaranteeing real, as opposed to theoretical, human 
rights has always been presupposed.54 However, due to the limited availability of the 
state's resources, the economic disparity between member states and the democratic 
limit of the Convention in circumstances in which an act of interference is absent, 
the human rights protection of vulnerable individuals depends in inverse proportion 
on the financial cost involved. 
The Court is particularly mindful of unwarranted implications of precedent that 
is likely to place a disproportionate burden on the states. As the individual who 
50 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, para, 52. 
5^Makuc and Others v. Slovenia, para. 199; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 
January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 162, Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, para. 30. 
52 See note 2 above and in chapter 2, notes 210-212 and, especially, Keenan v. the United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95; Price v. the United Kingdom; Muisel v. 
France; Farbtuhs v. Latvia, Judgment of 2 December 2004, ho. 4672/02; Mubilanzila Mayeka 
and KanikiMitunga v. Belgium; Mechenkov v. Russia. 
53 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, para. 54. 
54 See, e.g., Bqtta v. Italy, 'fulfilment by States of their domestic or international legislative 
or administrative obligations depended on a number of factors, in particular financial ones.', para 
28. See also note 8. 
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seizes the authority of the Court is just another member of a group of individuals 
with similar human rights needs, and that group is along with other groups, the 
vulnerable members of the society all having analogous claims for human rights 
protection, the judge has the arduous task of developing a reasoning of broad 
applicabihty due to the principle of equality that binds the institution of justice. 
Accordingly, the financial cost involved can quantitatively be assessed by estimating 
the number of persons being in similar circumstances to the applicant. 
It should be reiterated that the quantitative element is only examined when the 
qualitative element of the appUcable scope of a human right can successfully be 
established in the applicant's circumstances. It has already been noted above that 
the setting of actionable thresholds of human rights applicability leaves a degree of 
subjectivity that allows the judge some room for flexible adjustments that, 
consciously or unconsciously, involve quantitative calculations that may not be 
always expressly stated by reason of not undermining the parallel effort to establish 
the general conceptual understanding of a Convention right, which is of broad 
applicability and transcends context. 
However, there conies a point that leaves no more room for manoeuvre in 
defining the scope of a human right without undermining its very substance or the 
certainty and coherence of the jurisprudence, and here the Court will have to make a 
separate statement on the scope of the state's positive obligation. As recentiy 
admitted by the Court in Zehnalova and Zehnal, 'the sphere of State intervention [as 
protection] and the evolutive concept of private life do not always coincide with the 
more limited scope of the State's positive obligations.'ss In that account, a wide 
margin of appreciation is accorded to the state to decide on the allocation of its 
limited resources and the assessment of the funds that are available to that group or 
other groups of vulnerable individuals, The state's margin is in essence the 
manifestation of the democratic limit of the Convention when human rights 
protection (iii the non-interference context) involves numbers that cannot 
legitimately be handled by the unelected judiciary, let alone the international judge. 
And conversely, therefore, no such a margin can be said to exist when a manageable 
number of individuals are involved. 
In the following, we look at issues concerning human rights claims that 
correspond to small numbers of interested individuals, a possible exception to the 
55 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic. 
56 Sentges v. the Netherlands; Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldavia; Molka v. Poland. 
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dernocratic limit of the Convention, and the relevance of engaging private resources 
to cover the financial cost of protection. 
2.1. Small Numbers of Potential Applicants 
When a small and/or otherwise manageable number of individuals are indirecfly 
implied in the human rights claim of one isolated vulnerable individual (i.e. the pilot 
case), then the financial burden on the state from similar potential claims may not 
be disproportionate or impossible. In such a case, the democratic limit does not 
apply, as small numbers of likely applicants preserve the legitimacy of the 
Convention enabling the European judge to intervene and pronounce on the state's 
positive obligations. 
In L., the Court dealt vsdth a complaint about the state's failure to guarantee a 
medical operation (i.e. gender-reassignment surgery) to a transsexual that would 
reflect his new sexual identity. Had such an operation been accessible to the 
applicant, he would be able to update his new sexual identity in the public 
certificates pursuant to the domestic law that applies to post-operative transsexuals, 
and thus, be spared the daily humiliation and the legal and social osfracism that 
have left him, as submitted, in a permanent state of depression with suicidal 
tendencies. Although it is established case-law under Article 8 that the new sexual 
identity of post-operative transsexuals must be recognised by the state,57 the issue of 
funding the medical operation for a gender reassignment was dealt with in that case 
for the first time. Relying on the evidence before it, the Court found that, given the 
small number of potential applicants ifi similar conditions (some 50 people), the 
budgetary burden on the state would not be expected to be unduly heavy. 58 As a 
result, the Court was able to pronounce on the positive obligation of the state to 
guarantee the medical operation to the individual concerned. It also held that if this 
cannot be possible in view of the uncertainty of the medical expertise cunrentiy 
available at domestic level, the positive obligation could be met by having the final 
stages of the necessary surgery performed abroad and financed, at least in part, by 
the state. The Court went as far as to make a conditional award of EUR 40,000 in 
57 Goodwin v. the United Kingdom; Van Kiick v. Germany, Judgment of 12 June 2003, 
no. 35968/97; Grant v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 23 May 2006, no. 32570/03; L. v. 
Lithuania, para. 56. 
58 L. V. Lithuania, para. 59. 
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pecuniary damage if the state fails to discharge its positive obligation towards 
applicant, as defined in that judgment.s^ 
Another point that needs particular aittention is that in order to evaluate the 
wider quantitative element involved the Court relied on unofficial estimates pointing 
to some 50 people who are in similar circumstances. This information was held 
admissible due to the lack of counter-evidence from the state to challenge that 
number. It can reasonably be asserted, therefore, that the burden of evidential proof 
is always on the state, as it is the state that argues the disproportionate financial cost 
involved.*° 
2.2. The Exception to the Democratic Limit 
In the human rights claims of vulnerable individuals arising in a non-interference 
context, the democratic limit of the Convention that restricts the Court's 
intervention is subject to an exception when what is claimed is the very access to the 
democratic process or to the institution of justice that adjudicates on the applicable 
law of the state. From all claims for physical access to various buildings that the 
applicants pursued in Zehnalova and Zehnal that regarding disabled access to a 
court is of particular importance, in that physical access to a court means basically 
access to legal rights. Unfortunately, this particular aspect of the applicants' 
complaint was not sufficiently stressed by their legal representation and it was 
largely buried by the unsuccessful effort to solve all problems of the physical access 
of the disabled in one single petition. 
The exception to the democratic limit was equally pertinent in the case of 
Molka, in which the Court asked on its own initiative under the jura novit curia 
principle whether the lack of disabled access to a polling station during local 
elections (see the main claim under Article 3 of Protocol 1) was an issue within the 
scope of the concept of 'respect' for 'private life' set forth in Article 8. After a brief 
impact-based evaluation of the facts, the Court pointed to 'feelings of humiliation 
and distress capable of impinging on his personal autonomy, and thereby on the 
quality of his private life', reiterating also that 'the very essence of the Convention is 
respect for human dignity and human freedom'. In the end, the Court accorded a 
59 Ibid., paras. 58,74. 
*o A similar reasoning applied in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom. In rejecting the state's 
margin of appreciation in that case, the Court noted that '[n]o concrete or substantial hardship or 
detriment to the public interest has indeed been demonstrated [by the state] as likely to flow from 
any change to the status of transsexuals', para. 91. 
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wide margin of appreciation to the state in assessing the allocation of its limited 
resources. It failed, however, to make a direct connection to the least and most basic 
right of physical access to the democratic process, that is the very process froin 
which the representatives of the people emerge, whose elected status entitles the 
state to a wide margin to appreciate and decide on the allocation of public funds for 
the protection of vulnerable individuals. Also, the point that the applicant's 
complaint concerned one isolated incident is not convincing if juxtaposed with the 
practical realities that the voting power of the demos is exercised after long intervals. 
Perhaps, it would be more straightforward to reject the complaint on the same 
grounds as those reasoned under the examination of Article 3 of Protocol 1, in which 
it was found from the evidence submitted that the elections of the institutions in 
question did not form part of the respondent state's 'legislature' \yithin the meaning 
of that Article and hence they were not the occasion that could qualify for an 
exception to the democratic limit of the Convention.^ i 
2.3. Passing on the Financial Cost to Private Parties 
Although a high financial cost associated with the active protection of vulnerable 
individuals may preclude positive obligations, the position is different where this 
cost is claimed from various private parties whose activities it is the responsibility of 
the state to regulate. In Bofta, the positive obligation of the state was examined over 
its failure to implement and enforce a disabled access policy to seaside resorts that 
are administered by private companies. In Zehnalova and Zehnal, disabled access 
was also claimed in relation to some buildings in the private sector (e.g cinemas, 
lawyers' offices, doctors' surgeries). It was argued that 'there were no budgetary 
implications for the State as the costs were borne by the owner.'^ 2 However, it should 
be pointed out that these arguments were never addressed because, as discussed 
above, the Court had already found that the applicants' circumstances did not reach 
the applicable threshold of severity engaging a Convention right, that is the question 
of the qualitative element which arises in priority. 
The possibility of enjojdng human rights in venues controlled and administered 
by private interests is clearly legitimate, given that all activities form part of the 
organised society within which the individual interacts and develops her personality. 
However, although passing on the financial cost to private parties does not put a 
^' Molka V. Poland. 
62 Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic. 
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financial burden on the state, it may be unreasonable to expect that all private 
businesses have the financial resources to accommodate the human rights needs of 
vulnerable individuals. As pointed out above, a more realistic solution should be to 
restrict, as far as possible, the retroactive effect of any future decision of the Court 
which constitutes a development in the Convention's human rights standards.^ 3 
To elaborate further on v^hich private businesses may be targeted, it can easily 
be recognised that, given the modern structures of urban environments, the use of 
public transport by persons with disabilities is necessary in order for them to 
establish relationships with other individuals and, by extension, to develop their 
personality. In many member states, public transport is controlled and administered 
by private interests. The main argument for the privatisation of public transport was 
to secure funding from private resources, rather than from the limited budget of the 
state. Within that policy framework, the financial burden on private companies that 
is incurred by making available special access facilities can be offset by passing on 
that cost to all customers using their services. Indeed, this may have been the 
underlying aim of the legislator in Botta and Zehnalova and Zehnal in passing 
relevant law regulating disabled access standards in some activities of the private 
sector that, eventually, were not implemented in the end. '^' Therefore, it can 
reasonably be maintained that, incrementally at least, there is fair room for 
development to address the human rights interests of vulnerable individuals when 
the financial cost involved is borne by private parties. 
II. The Extent of Human Rights Protection 
A critical detail in the adjudication of claims of vulnerable individuals is that human 
rights protection is not often considered in absolute terms (whether to protect), but 
as to what extent protection has to be guaranteed to the individuals concerned (how 
much to protect). The issue of the extent of protection is present in those cases in 
which the state has already provided for the human rights of vulnerable individuals 
either collectively by reference to the needs of a group of individuals or on a more 
narrow and personal basis. For example, in claims for medical treatment under 
Articles 2 or 8, as seen in Pentiacova and 48 Others, the state's assistance has 
*3 See discussion on the retroactive effect of newly developed human rights standards at 
page with note 17 above. 
64 Botta V. Italy, paras. 17, 27; Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic, 'B. Relevant 
domestic law: 2. Building legislation'. 
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already been provided, but not to the extent claimed by the applicants.^ s Expert 
opinion can be required to show whether what is claimed, or what is given, is what is 
required in the applicants' circumstances. It is also assumed, where appropriate, 
that income-based criteria are regulated by the state to assess the practical effect of 
vulnerability. 
In La Parola and Others, the applicants (unemployed parents) claimed that the 
state had failed to guarantee their right to life and health in the form of assistance 
for the medical, housing and economic needs of their severely disabled child (the 
third applicant).*^ However, it was found in the examination of their claim under 
Article 8 (Article 2 held not relevant) that the applicants had already received 
economic assistance from the state in relation to the third applicant, and the amount 
offered was found to be of a level that effectively discharged the state's positive 
obligations under the minimum standards of the Convention. 
Looked at more closely, it is argued that the claims of vulnerable individuals can 
be subjected to an objective assessment of evidential proof that can be required by 
all litigant parties. In Sentges, a severely disabled individual complained of the 
state's refusal to cover the cost of a robotic arm, but his claim failed because a wide 
margin of appreciation was accorded to the state to deterrnine its budgetary 
priorities for the protection of disabled individuals as a whole. Beyond circular 
reasoning to the effect that the state should enjoy a margin of appreciation when it 
invokes its margin of appreciation in matters where a margin of appreciation is 
generally recognised, it is important to note that the Court's relied also on the 
finding that the applicant had already received some assistance (i.e. an electric 
wheelchair with an adapted joystick) having met the applicable disability and 
income-based criteria. However, the Court's scrutiny could have been more intense 
in assessing whether the assistance offered was the protection required under the 
minimum requirements of the Convention. In that respect, evidential proof could be 
required from both parties in the dispute to substantiate their respective arguments. 
Thus, a question could be raised of whether the robotic arm claimed was the 
required protection in such circumstances. If we apply the positive equation po = 
hr/fc to this question, evidential proof is required to support the examination of 
both variables, namely the Convention right {hr) and the financial cost (fc) involved. 
As a human right (here Article 8) entails a threshold of negative impact, the 
*5 See also Nitecki v. Poland. 
La Pdrola and Others v. Italy, Admissibility decision of 30 November 2000, no. 39712/98 
(available in French only). 
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assistance already offered calls for a re-calculation of the degree of severity that 
applies in the applicant's circumstances in order to assess the remaining inipact. If 
that impact is stiU within the threshold of severity, and hence is still actionable, then 
the examination can continue to evaluate the financial cost that is attached to the 
human rights protection. From the expert evidence submitted by the applicant, it 
was shown that his dependence on the constant presence of carers would be reduced 
by at least one to three hours a day. In principle, it is for the Court to set the 
applicable thresholds of the Convention provisions and decide whether or hot one to 
three hours' autonomy per day for a 100% disabled individual is so critical for the 
development of his personality, within the meaning of private life under Article 8.*^  
If (and only if) this question can be answered in the affirmative, then the negative 
impact involved in the applicant's circumstances should be re-examined to subtract 
the assistance already offered, assessing anew whether the impact is still within the 
threshold of severity afforded by Article 8 so as to update the current status of the 
applicant. 
In addition, the variable of the financial cost (fc) needs also to be considered, 
and it is for the state to provide the requisite evidence to justify its margin of 
appreciation. From the information provided in the judicial decision, it appears in a 
report of the Health Care Insurance Board {College voor zorgverzekeringen) that 
between 150 and 400 persons a year might be eligible for a robotic arm whose 
individual cost would amount to EUR 10,900 per year. As these numbers are clearly 
comparable to the 50 individuals and the conditional award of EUR 40,000 for the 
cost of medical operation that the Court considered in L., it reasonably follows that it 
was the difference in the measurement of the quantified aspect of the qualitative 
element under Article 8, that is the negative impact exceeding the actionable 
threshold of severity under that Article, that justified the different outcome reached 
inL. 
The emphasis upon an evidential base to guarantee an informed assessment of 
the human rights claims of vulnerable individuals is also evident in the Court's 
admissibility decision in Marzari. In examining the severely disabled applicant's 
claim for accommodation adequate to his disability, the Court found that the 
accommodation offered was dictated by expert opinion. Having evaluated the 
applicant's disability based on an impact assessment of his personal conditions, 
specific housing arrangements and alterations were made by the state!s authorities 
67 The young age of the applicant (17 years old) is one of the parameters against which the 
negative impact can be evaluated. 
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in order to meet his needs. In that regard, the protection offered is not what is 
claimed but what is required according to the applicable thresholds of impact and 
the evaluation of objective evidence. 
The difference between what is claimed, offered, required or can be required 
needs careful consideration by interested individuals who are contemplating 
bringing a complaint under the Convention's provisions. Claims with far reaching 
implications upset both variables of the positive obligation equation, as seen in 
Zehnalova and Zehnal and Molka above. An informed approach could be to frame 
human rights claims more narrowly, targeting one public building, rather than all 
buildings, that could be specially designed to accommodate or coordinate the public 
service needs of vulnerable individuals. Alternative measures in the form of public 
service (including voting) through the internet or post could also be argued. In that 
way, a realistic claim of protection retains the legitimacy of the Court's review that 
guarantees a process to evaluate the direct (as opposed to broadly argued) negative 
impact on the applicant, thereby enabling the European judge to examine what the 
state has already offered or can offer, instead of rejecting the applicant's claim 
outright for reasons of impracticality and hence inadmissibility under the scope of 
the Convention's rights. 
C. Conclusion 
The adjudication of claims for state's assistance to those individuals who cannot 
actually enjoy certain human rights due to their own personal vulnerability reflects a 
growing recognition of human rights as freestanding constitutional imperatives. The 
broad scope of human rights in the system of the Convention requires a carefully 
crafted technical framework to provide a realistic, and hence legitimate, ground for 
the protection of the vulnerable. 
The critical detail in the case of vulnerable individuals is that the protection of 
human rights often arises as an issue due to their own physical and/or psychological 
conditions. As a result, their claims do not arise from acts of interference attributed 
directly or indirectly to the state, or from special circumstances in which individuals 
are legitimately put under the control of the state. Additionally, under the principle 
of equality, the protection of one vulnerable individual is viewed through its 
collective dimension to encompass all individuals having similar or analogous 
hurnan rights needs. Cumulatively, the macro-level effect of one isolated human 
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rights interest coupled with the absence of a causal link imposes a democratic limit 
on the Convention in relation to issues that can potentially put an unnecessary and 
impossible burden on the limited resources of the state. For this reason, the 
Convention accords the state a wide margin of appreciation to decide on such issues. 
Conversely, the position is different when the human rights claims of vulnerable 
individuals v^ dll not impose a disproportionate burden on the state's resources. In 
that connection, the Court can legitimately intervene in order to define positive 
obligations for the state in appropriate circumstances. In these terms, the question 
of the human rights of the vulnerable is closely dependent on the legal methodology 
by which the Court can justify the legitimacy for its intervention. 
A careful study of the relevant jurisprudence can reveal an added emphasis on 
the calculation of a whole string of closely interwoven parameters through which the 
state's margin is subjected to an objective assessment that Ls additionally supported 
by the inventive ability of the European judges to manage pan-European minima in 
areas in which the commitment of the contracting states cannot realistically be 
uniform. Building on this trend towards objectivity, a more sophisticated 
determination of the state's positive obligations can be guaranteed by carefully 
evaluating qualitative and quantitative elements that reflect the actionable 
thresholds engaging Convention rights and the corresponding financial cost that is 
attached to their practical realisation in concrete circumstances. The combination of 
these elements allows flexible adjustments to be made between them with the 
ultimate aim of securing an objective franiework within which the human rights 
claims of vulnerable individuals can be examined. This aim is aided by, if not 
conditioned upon a sufficient evidential proof that has to be provided by all parties 
in litigation to support their respective arguments. In short, what is proposed is a 
systemic approach to supersede ad hoc balances of competing interests that usually 
lead to uncertain results. 
In spite of the fact that only a small number of cases are expected to succeed at 
the European level, the benefit of working with objective variables lies in securing a 
methodological framework for intensified evidential proof within which the human 
rights claims of vulnerable individuals will have to be assessed. It is this process that 
locks the protection of human rights of the vulnerable as a permanent issue to be 
constantly examined through an evaluation system that the European judge can 
reasonably require to exist at the domestic level. 
i8o 
4 
Access Points of Domestic Implementation 
The positive obligations of the state must produce a practical result.' This result is 
considered in relation to the subsidiary nature of the Convention, whose Article 35.1 
requires that the aggrieved parties exhaust effective domestic remedies as a 
preliminary condition of admissibility. ^  Provided that the substantive content of 
positive obligations is reasonably certain, the direct result to which the whole system 
of the Convention is ultimately destined is the actual implementation of the state's 
obligations at the domestic level. For this purpose, an institutionalised procedural 
mechanism must be in place to provide access to interested individuals. 
Accordingly, the Court's scrutiny necessarily extends to the state's procedural 
structures, which implement the substantive law of positive obligations. It is 
pertinent, therefore, to ask what the degree of this scrutiny should be. If 'the 
starting-point and subject matter of the international control is always the domestic 
proceedings', as reaffirmed by Wolfgang Strasser, then European scrutiny on 
procedural structures should be intensified consistenfly.3 A shift in emphasis on the 
domestic procedural mechanism will strengthen the subsidiary nature of the 
Convention and lead to a more effective management of its caseload.^  However, this 
aim is undermined, when the judicial control does not maintain the close 
relationship that exists between the substantive and procedural aspect of human 
^Airey v. Ireland, Judgment of 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73 'The Convention is intended to 
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.', 
para. 24; Marckx v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1978, no. 6833/74, para 31; the Belgian 
Linguistic case, Judgment of 23 July 1968, 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 
2126/64, paras. 3 and 4; Golder v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1975, no. 
4451/70, para. 35. 
2 Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 May 2001, ho. 29392/95, 'It is 
fundamental to the machinery of protection established by the Convention that the national 
systems themselves provide redress for breaches of its provisions, the Court exerting its 
supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiarity.', para. 103. 
3 W. Strasser, The Relationship between Substantive and Procedural Rights Guaranteed by 
the European Convention on Human Rights' in F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds), Protecting Human 
Rights: The European Dimension, Studies in Honour of G. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 595-604, 
595;. R. Sapienza, 'II Diritto ad un Ricorso Effettiyo neUa Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell' 
Uomo' (2001) 2 RDI 271-297 'In general, it should be noted that the usual means of the 
international protection of rights are not the international recourse mechanism, but the recourse 
in the state's legal order.' (translation), p. 283. 
4 Strasser, (note 3), pp. 603-4. 
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rights protection. If procedural issues are not adequately addressed, how can 'a 
correct and just result' be achieved?5 Strasser has proposed that 
all these difficulties could easily be avoided if the concentration on procedural 
issues was carried one step further and if it was made the primary field of 
examination in these cases, while the ruling on the substantive issue was 
reserved...[In this respect,] it would become necessary in each case to examine 
first of all whether the relevant procedural requirenients had been met,* 
This general proposal stresses the preliminary importance of the procedural aspect 
of human rights protection which has to be recognised accordingly in the order by 
which the judicial examination is structured. The need to intensify the review of 
procedural issues is also highlighted in the provisions of the new Protocol 14 and the 
various working papers and reports on the subject of the domestic implementation 
of the Convention's standards that are corrunissioned by the Council of Europe.^  
Moving from general to specific applications, it is expected that positive 
obligations should first be reasonably certain as part of the substantive law of the 
Convention. Since the procedural aspect of human rights protection concerns 
procedural structures that implement the substantive law, the latter should exist and 
be clear in the first place. As already discussed in previous chapters, the substantive 
law of positive obligations involves a core content of protection where the applicant's 
circumstances relate to a wide context of private interactions in which known human 
rights issues exist. A narrower and more specific content of protection is defined in 
the Convention's jurisprudence, taking account of comparative examples. 
Accordingly, the content of procedural structures has to be examined in close 
relationship to the substantive content of protection. Where protection of human 
rights concerns direct assistance to vulnerable individuals, the substantive content 
of positive obligations develops incrementally, and hence the procedural issue may 
not, as yet, be pertinent, although a procedural framework for an objective 
evaluation of critical parameters is increasingly confirmed. 
The task in this chapter is to identify and analyse domestic procedural 
structures that can serve as access points for the participation of interested 
individuals in the enforcement and implementation of positive obligations. What is 
looked at here is the European minimum procedural measure that is critical to the 
standard of effectiveness and, therefore, our analysis is not in principle affected by 
5 Ibid., p.603. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See, e.g., 'Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights', Working 
Paper of the General Assembly of the Council of Europe, AS/Jur (2005) 32 of 9 June 2005. 
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general statements on the state's margin of appreciation.^ PreHminary issues have to 
be discussed first in relation to the general procedural framework of the Convention 
(section A) and the basic working principles that are employed in the judicial 
examination (section B). In recognition that the substantive law of positive 
obligations can ultimately be directed to the actual prevention of human rights 
violations, a first content of procedural structures concerns access points through 
which substantive positive obligations can be enforced before a violation occurs 
(section C). In the event of a violation, such access should be provided to the victims 
in order to maintain a continuous and uniform compliance of the standards of 
human rights protection (section D). 
A. The General Framework 
I. Procedural Rights of Access 
Procedural rights of access are mainly seen in the provisions of Articles 6 and 13.9 
Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair trial, while Article 13 requires an effective 
remedy in the event of a human rights violation whether or not direct responsibility 
lies with a private or public actor. All procedural obligations faU within the scope of 
Article 13, which serves as the lex generalis.^°As a result, Article 13 is also examined 
in conjunction with Article 6 in claims for a violation of the latter." The codification 
of a lex specialis in the forrn of Article 6 highlights access to a judicial tribunal as the 
most fundamental remedy, for which specific standards of procedural fairness are 
prescribed.^ 2 
8 See Sapienza's conclusion on the state's margin of appreciation under the procedural right 
of Article 13, 'Probably, the idea...according to which the states enjoy a niargin of appreciation in 
the application of Article 13, does not practically make sence under the strict application of the 
doctrine. The interpretation of Article 13 can only be that of the Court due to the particular 
function of that Article.' (translation), (note 3), p. 297. 
9 Procedural rights of a narrow contextual application exist also under Article 5. 
'° Sapienza, (note 3), p.281; J . Froweih, 'Art. 13 as a Growing Pillar of Convention Law' in P. 
Mahoney; F. Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European 
Perspective: Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2000): 545-550 
'Indeed, Art. 13 should be seen as one of the most important guarantees to make Convention law 
effective and real in the legal order of member states.', p. 550. 
" See, e.g. Kudla v. Poland, Judgment of 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96 and, fnore 
recently, Laghouati and Others v. Luxembourg, Judgment of 5 April 2007, no. 33747/02 from 
the context of industrial accidents (available in French only). Sapienza, (note 3), pp. 293-294. 
C. Rouiller, 'L'Influence de I'Article 6 de la Convention Europeeime des Droits de THomme 
sur les Procedures Nationales', in P. Mahoney; F. Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds). 
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There are, however, important limits to the scope of Article 6, since its 
application is restricted to 'civil rights and obligations' that must already exist in the 
domestic legal system. ^3 Although the right to a fair trial has an independent 
standing (i.e. not confined to human rights issues),^ it only appUes when there is a 
substantive base of a given right or obligation in the state's legal system. In Z and 
Others, the Court reversed its previous position in the Osman case and held that the 
failure of social care agents to protect children from abuse could not be challenged 
under Article 6. Whether or not the majority of judges have narrowly interpreted the 
substantive national law of liability in negligence, which binds all professionals but, 
not apparently, some civil servants, the Court's ruling has showed the limits of 
Article 6, at least, in relation to Article 13.15 In the examination of Article 13, the 
Court reviewed the procedural standard of ex pos? compliance of positive obligations 
independently of the content of the domestic law. The state was found in violation of 
Article 13 on the ground that the applicants did not have access to hold public 
officials accountable for their failure to implement the substantive content of 
positive obligations under the circumstances. 
Because ex post compliance is an indispensable framework of law that is 
presupposed in all circumstances in which human rights standards are regulated, 
procedural guarantees are also examined under the substantive rights of the 
Convention.!^ Whether or not Article 13 is raised by the applicant, the Court can 
examine the procedural aspect of the substantive right and, often, repeat this 
examination under Article 13 (in conjunction with the substantive right) since the 
scope of Article 13 is laroader',!^ or give a summary conclusion under Article 13 
Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective: Studies in memory ofRolv Ryssdal (Carl 
Heymanns Verlag, 2ooo):i225-i233. 
'3 Golder v. the United Kingdom. 
•4 See, e.g., Le Compte, van Leuven and de Meyere v. Belgium, Judgment of 23 June 1981, 
nos. 6878/75; 7238/75; Benthem v. Netherlands, Judgment of 23 October 1985, no. 8848/80; 
Deumeland v. Germany, Judgment 26 May 1986, no. 9384/81; Editions Periscope v. France, 
Judgment of 26 March 1992, no. 11760/85; Menchinskaya v. Russia, Judgment of 15 January 
2009, no. 42454/02. 
^ Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 103. See also the dissenting opinion of judge 
Rozakis jointed by judge Palm and also the partly dissenting opinion of judge Thomassen joined 
by judges Casadevall and Kovler. For detailed commentary, see A. Di Stefano, 'Public Authority 
Liability in Negligence e Diritto ad un Ricorso Effettivo nell' Ordinamento Britaimico: Nota all 
Sentenza della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell' Uomo nel Caso Z e altri c. Regno Unito' (2003) 1 
RIDU 97-127-
'* See, e.g., Silih v. Slovenia, Judgment of 28 June 2007, no. 71463/01, para. 103. D. Xenos, 
'Asserting the Right to Life (Article 2, ECHR) in the Context of Industry' (2007) 8 G L J 231-254, 
pp. 247-250; E . Dubout, 'La Proceduralisation des Obligations Relatives aux Droits 
Fondamentaux Substantiels par la Cour Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' (2007) 70 RTDH 
397-425-
•7 Silih v. Slovenia, para. 103. 
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pointing to the procedural examination under the substantive right.'^ Article 13 can 
also be examined in conjunction with a substantive right that has exclusively been 
found applicable under its procedural aspect for an ex post remedy (e.g. 
investigation). 19 i f the applicant does not invoke Article 13, the Court will examine 
the procedural issue under the substantive nght.^° 
The examination and interpretation of procedural rights and obligations is not 
affected by the different meaning of the word 'recours' and that of 'remedy' that 
appear in the French and English versions of Article 13, respectively, because 
procedural obligations are inherent in the structures of the institution of Law.^ ' 
The main question before us is how to connect the substantive law of the 
Convention that imposes specific positive obligations on the states, with the 
procedural system of compliance at the domestic level.^ ^ In technical terms, this 
means that both the 'broad scope' of Article 13^ 3 and the inherent procedural aspects 
of the substantive rights have to be adjusted to the specific content of positive 
obligations.24 
II. Actions against Private Parties and Public GIFficials (in Relation to 
the Acts of the Former) 
As with every provision of law, a positive obligation can only be a legal obligation if 
its content can be enforced by judicial action. Article 13 is the key procedural 
18 M.C. V. Bulgaria, Judgment of 4 December 2003, no. 9272/98. 
'^Menson and Others v. the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 6 May 2003, no. 
47916/99. Cf. Mantog v. Romania (No. 2), Judgment of 11 October 2007, no. 2893/02, para. 77. 
=° Makaratsis v. Greece, Judgment of 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99. 
P. Mertens, Le Droit de Recours Effectif devqnt les Instances Nationales en cas de 
Violation d'un Droit de IHomme (Editions de TUniversite de Bruxelles, 1973) 'In the strict sense, 
the term "recours" is understood as access to a right that constitutes an acrion (administrative or 
judicial), as opposed to an exception. The use of the term "remedy" in the English version 
indicates, however, that the word merits a broader interpretation.' (translation), p. 68. C.f. J . 
Raymond, 'A Contribution to the Interpretation of Article 13 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (1980) 3 HRR161-175,165-7. 
=2 Strasser discusses the 'common aim and purpose' that links the procedural and 
substantive guarantees, (note 3), p. 602. 
23 See, e.g., Kilinc and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 7 June 2005, no. 40145/98, para 93, 
Mahfnut Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 March 2000, no. 22535/93,para 126; Koku v. Turkey; 
Judgment 31 May 2005, no. 27305/95, para 182; Musayev and Others v. Russia, Judgment 26 
July 2007, nos. 57941/00; 58699/00; 60403/00, para. 173; Isayeva v. Russia, Judgment 24 
February 2005, no..57950/po, para. 227. 
24 Di Stefano, (note 15), p. 126. See also Sapienza, (note 3) 'Indeed, the Court affirms that the 
interpretation of Article 13 should be in harmony with the rest of the Convention that has to be 
read as a whole.' (translation), p. 288, commenting on the case of Klass and Others u. Germany, 
Judgment of 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71. 
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provision that expressly requires the state to make available an effective remedy.=5 In 
order for a positive obligation to be guaranteed at the domestic level, this remedy 
should connect the Convention's substantive law of positive obligations to the 
possibility of challenging the direct and indirect responsibiUty of private parties and 
public officials, respectively. In particular, an action is expected to be available at the 
domestic level against: 
a) The private party who directly causes the violation of a human right^^ 
and/or 
b) The public officials who are in charge of the actual implementation of 
the substantive positive obligations of the state in the given 
circumstances (e.g. against the acts of the private party). 
Early examples of such actions have been seen in the Article 13 jurisprudence on 
positive obligations, such as Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben"^^ and Powell and 
Rayner.^^ In the former case, the applicants challenged the effectiveness of the 
police officers' response to the threats of counter-demonstrators (the (b) type 
action). In the latter case, the applicants complained that the state did not provide 
access to challenge a private party, whose activities were causing continuous 
nuisance (the (a) type action). 
Whether the aggrieved individual decides to pursue an action against the 
private party or the public officials, or both, it is necessary that their respective 
obligations are effectively regulated in advance. As seen in the discussion of known 
contexts of private interactions in chapter 2, a substantive content of positive 
obligations must be implemented in the form of core administrative steps. 
Accordingly, an action to challenge the performance of public officials, who are in 
=5 Article 13 is one of those provisions that justify positive obligations as 'inherent' in the 
system of the Convention, see, discussion in chapter 1, pages with note 37 referring to the writings 
of J . De Meyer, 'The Rights to Respect for Private and Family Life, Homie and Communications in 
Relations Between Individuals, and the Resulting Obligations for States Parties to the Convention' 
in A.H. Robertson (ed.), Privacy and Human Rights, (Manchester University Press, 1973): 255-
275 and Mertens, (note 21). Froweiri, (note 10), 'It took imfortunately much too long imtil the 
importance of Art. 13 was recognised in Convention law.', p. 546. 
26 A pubhc entity that is engaged in private activities (e.g. as those of private sector) is also a 
private party, a fact that is confirmed by the uniform regulation of standards of professional 
negligence. See, e.g., Vo. v. France, Judgment of 8 July 2064, no. 53924/00, para. 89; Oneryildiz 
V. Turkey (GC), Judgment of 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99, para. 71; Tatar v. Romania, 
Judgment of 27 January, no. 67021/01, para. 7 (available in French only), Wojtas-Kaleta v. 
Poland, Judgment of 16 July 2009, 20436/02. 
Plattform "Arztefur das Leben" v. Austria, Judgment of 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82. 
28 Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1990, no. 9310/81. 
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charge of the job of human rights protection, can only be possible or effective, if 
their negligent liability in the state's law has previously been defined in connection 
to the administrative steps of which the substantive content of positive obligations 
consists. 
Such a requirement has first been seen in the jurisprudence of negative 
obligations. In Halford, the Court had to deal with a complaint about the 
interception of telephone calls by state agents in the applicant's workplace. In such a 
setting, direct interference is attributed to state agents and has to be justified under 
the safeguards of paragraph 2 of Article 8. In that case, the state agents' interference 
could not be justified, because their practice had not been regulated 'in accordance 
with the law', as required by paragraph 2.^9 This conclusion reasonably influenced 
the examination of the parallel claim for an effective remedy. In finding a violation 
of Article 13, the Court reasoned that the applicant could not challenge the practice 
complained of or seek appropriate relief, since 'there was no provision in domestic 
law to regulate' the state agents' interference.30 
Thus, whether pubhc officials are involved in a direct interference or in the 
active protection of human rights, a remedy can only be possible, if their conduct is 
subjected to prior regulations that define the practice and the standards of duty of 
care against which their liability can only arise. The same applies to the private 
parties that directly cause the violation of a human right. Private parties can only be 
challenged if their human rights obligations and standards of conduct have been 
regulated in advance. In addition, in order for a remedy against private parties and 
public officials to be effective, it is necessary that the content of these regulations is 
linked to the substantive content of positive obligations in the circumstances 
concerned. 
29 Halford v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 June 1997, no. 20605/92, paras. 56-1. 
30 Ibid., para. 65; Liberty and Others v. the United kingdom, Judgment of 1 July 2008, no. 
58243/00, para. 73. See also discussion of Makaratzis v. Greece, Judgment of 20 December 
2004, no. 50385/99 in chapter 2, pages with notes 224-7. 
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B. Bas ic Working Principles 
I. Pursuing an 'Arguable' Human Rights Claim 
The right to an effective remedy, within the meaning of Article 13, presupposes 
access to a legal claim, as without such access, no remedy can be guaranteed.31 A 
critical parameter is the victim status, which is an admissibility criterion at the 
European level (only). Under Article 34, petitions are accepted from an individual 
(including a collective body) who 'claims' to be a victim of a violation of a 
Convention right.32 The Court has early clarified that under Article 13 an effective 
remedy (e.g. access to court proceedings) must be made available at the domestic 
level to the individual who has an 'arguable' claim.ss Because an 'arguable' human 
rights claim is not less open-ended, accessibility is reasonably dependent on the 
criteria qualifying a claim as arguable. In some cases, 'arguability' has been 
connected to the examination of whether a claim is manifestiy ill-founded under 
Article 35. 3-4 (former Article 27. 2). 34 in the foUowihg, we analyse relevant 
jurisprudence in which Article 35.3-4 has been employed as a condition of 
accessibility for an arguable human rights claim. 
In Powell and Rayner (arising from a complaint of nuisance, similar to that 
seen in Hatton and Others), the Coiut stated that '[w]hatever threshold the 
Commission has set in its case-law for declaring claims "manifestiy ill-founded" 
under [the former] Article 27 § 2 (art. 27-2) [current Article 35. 3-4], in principle it 
should set the same threshold in regard to the parallel notion of "arguabiUty" under 
31G. Malinvemi, 'Variations sur un Theme encore Meconnu: 1' Article 13 de la Convention 
Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' (1998) 33 RTDH 647-57 'No one can establish a violation 
before a national authority if he or she is not able to seize that authority in the first place.' 
(translation), p. 650. 
32 In appropriate circumstances, an individual can claim to be a potential victim of an act of 
interference, which has been initiated but has not caused any harm yet. See, e.g. Klass and Others 
V. Germany; Cambell dtid Cosans v. the United Kingdom, Commission' Report of 16 May 1980, 
Series B.42, p. 36; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1981, no. 7525/76, 
JVoms V. Ireland, Judgment of 26 October 1988, no. 10581/83; Monnat v. Switzerland, 
Judgment of 21 September 2006, no. 73604/01, para. 31. 
33 See, e.g., Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 27 April 1988, nos. 
9659/82, 9658/82, para. 54; Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, para. 31; Gungor v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 22 March 2005, no. 28290/95 (available in French only), para. 94; Z and 
Others v. the United Kingdom, para. 108; Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), 
Judgment of 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97, para. 137. Sapienza, (note 3), pp. 290-3; Malinvemi, 
(note 31), p. 652; Frowein, (note 10), p. 546. 
34 Frowein, (note 10), p. 549. 
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Article 13 (art. 13).'^ s At the admissibility stage, the Commission rejected the 
applicants' complaint under Article 8 after a merits evaluation of the facts, but 
allowed their claim for an effective remedy under Article 13. In examining Article 13 
in conjunction with Article 8, the Court did not find a violation of Article 13, since no 
violation of Article 8 could be established after a detailed examination of the merits 
of the Article 8 claim under the heading of Article 13. However, when access to an 
arguable human rights claim is conditioned on a merits evaluation of the facts, the 
following paradox applies: as a merits evaluation needs a process to evaluate the 
merits of the applicant's claim, how then can access to such an evaluation process be 
dependent on the prior evaluation of the merits involved? 
The applicants' complaint for access to an action in nuisance against the private 
party - the private corporation controlling Heathrow airport - had revolved around 
the exclusionary effect of section 76(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. The effect of 
that statutory law was addressed subsequently in the similar case of Hatton and 
Others. Unlike Powell and Rayner, the Court found a violation of Article 13, despite 
its opposite conclusion under Article 8. The issue of arguability was presumed by the 
mere fact that Article 8 was applicable for a merits evaluation. Applicability of 
Article 8 was grounded on the undisputed fact, by all htigant parties, that the 
applicants' private and family life was adversely affected when the private 
corporation extended its business activities during the night. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the state is under a positive obligation to regulate 
appropriate human rights standards in the operation of industrial activities. If 
interested individuals are not able to access a court in order to assert their human 
rights and, by extension, to challenge the current practices, then positive obligations 
exist only in the sphere of theory. To the extent that a core content of protection is 
already due for implernentatibn, access to a legal claim to enforce that content is not 
excluded because of the occasional decision of the state agents to pursue a legitimate 
interference through the activities of a private party. In addition, acts of interference 
that are directly or indirectly attributed to the state, as seen in Powell and Rayner 
and Hatton and Others, can only be justified on the condition that the relevant 
criteria and safeguards of paragraph 2 limitations can be met. Therefore, can there 
ever be an arguinent that the evaluation process of justifying an interference is not 
open to a challenge by the party whose human rights interests are compromised? 
35 Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, para. 33; Boyle and Rice v. the United 
Kingdom, 'oh the ordinary meaning of the words, it is difficult to conceive how a claim that is 
"manifestly ill-founded" can nevertheless be "arguable", and vice versa', para. 54. 
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From the foregoing analysis, it can reasonably be said that the arguability of a 
human rights claim that conditions access to a court to assert an effective remedy 
cannot be dependent on a prior merits evaluation for the purposes of Articles 13 and 
35.3-4. This assertion conforms also to the new sub-paragraph b) that is inserted in 
Article 35. 3 by Protocol 14 to codify the impact examination (i.e. to suffer a 
'significant disadvantage') which has long been developed in the case-law of the 
Court for the applicability of a Convention right. 36 The new provision makes 
unequivocally clear that 'no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been 
duly considered by a domestic tribunal.' 
From this general position, an exception should be made where the 
examination of Article 35.3-4 concerns the detrmination of the very scope of a 
Convention right. In such a situation, the Court, before deciding whether the 
applicant's claim fall within the scope of a Convention right, has first to deal with the 
preliminary strategic issue of what the scope of that right should be. Such issues are 
expected to be more relevant in new claims, as opposed to well-known contexts of 
private interactions. 37 Examples comprise the totality of the cases discussed in 
chapter 3 (direct assistance to vulnerable individuals), unless the applicant's claim 
targets an entrenched process of evaluation of objective parameters that are 
pertinent to the examination of the scope of a Convention right.3^ 
II. Legal Aid 
Individuals increasingly claim legal aid as an intermediate procedural right to access 
the main human rights claim.39 In this subsection, we highlight some cases, which 
36 For the relevanant amendments introduced by Protocol 14, see discussion in chapter 1, 
section E , pp. 60-1. 
37 See, recently, in Kontrova v. Slovakia, Judgment of 31 May 2007, no. 7510/04, paras. 43-
44, 61 in which the Court found that the apphcant rightly did not exhaust domestic remedies that 
could possibly develop the domestic law at the occasion of her very case. The European judges 
accepted the applicant's argument that her complaint should not be tiie occasion to achieve avant-
guard interpretations. Clearly, the existence of a well-known coritext (violence against the 
person/protection from the police) has influenced the Court's decision in favour of the applicant. 
See also the admissibility decision of 13 Jime 2006, no. 7510/04. 
38 Zehnalova and Zehndl v. the Czech Republic, AdmissibiUty decision of 14 May 2002, no. 
38621/97; O'Reilly and Others v. Ireland, Applicability decision of 28 February 2002, no. 
54725/00 ; Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldavia, Admissibility decision 4 January 2005, no. 
14462/03; O' Rourke v. the United Kingdom, Admissibility decision of 26 June 2001, no. 
39022/97. By way of example, in rejecting the applicants' Article 13 claim in Zehnalova and 
Zehnal v. .the Czech Republic, the Court simply stated that 'the applicants have not raised any 
arguable grievances in the instant case as the Court has held that all their complaints are either 
incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention or inadiiiissible as being 
manifestly ill-founded.' 
39 M. Puechavy, 'L'Acces figal de Tous a la Justice (2003) 19 AiA 743-765-
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have successfully been asserted before the Court in order to include legal aid as one 
of the factors determining effective access to a remedy in appropriate circumstances. 
In the text of the Convention, the right to legal aid is expressly guaranteed to 
those charged with a criminal offence (Article 6.3.(c)). The expansion of legal aid 
beyond this narrow context has been prompted by the case of Airey, in which the 
Court confirmed the inherent nature of the state's positive obhgations in the system 
of the Convention (see also discussion in chapter The applicant complained 
about the prohibited cost of litigation that prevented her from petitioning for judicial 
separation against her abusive husband. In such a context, the state is under a 
positive obligation to regulate various aspects of private relationships that have 
human rights implications.^! In order to ensure that the Convention does not contain 
rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective, the 
content of positive obligations is examined in relation to those critical details that 
determine the standard of effectiveness.42 In this respect, it is for the state to 'make 
this means [judicial separation] of protection effectively accessible, when 
appropriate, to anyone who may wish to have recourse thereto.'^ s In that case, 
although judicial separation was generally available, it was not practically accessible 
to the applicant due to the high cost of litigation. Consequently, the state was found 
in a violation of its positive obligation under Article 8. 
An additional violation was found under Article 6, which has a more expanding 
and independent application, since its scope is not confined to human rights issues. 
Although domestic law did not oblige an individual to be legally represented in such 
disputes, the Court found that a lay person could not have a fair trial due the 
complexily of the legal issues that had to be examined.44 
More recently, in Steel and Morris, there has been a violation of Articles 6 and 
10 ill circumstances where legal aid was not made available to defendants in 
defamation proceedings. The applicants had been sued by a powerful multinational 
corporation following the publication and distribution of a leaflet, which was highly 
critical of its practices. It is important to note that the applicants were, at the time, 
on part-time employment and had to rely on income-support benefits. The 
underlying consideration in that case was whether people of lower income have the 
right to free expression to criticise the practices of powerful corporations without 
^° Airey v. Ireland, para. 32. 
4» Ibid.,.para. 25. 
42 Ibid., para. 24; Marckx v. Belgium, para. 31. 
Airey v. Ireland, para 33. 
44 Ibid., para. 24. See also the discrimination argument in the dissenting opinion of judge 
Evrigenis. 
191 
being intimidated by litigation proceedings. In examining whether legal aid was 
necessary for a fair hearing (under Article 6), and by extension, for the effectiveness 
of the right to free expression (under Article lo), the Court examined in detail 
a) The importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings. 
b) The complexity of the relevant law and procedure.^ s 
c) The applicant's capacity to represent him or herself effectively.^ ^ 
In general, the adjudication of defamation disputes is based on straightforward rules 
of evidence of facts and/or value judgements. In that case, the Court found inter alia 
that '[t]he factual case which the applicants had to prove was highly complex, 
involving 40,000 pages of documentary evidence and 130 oral witnesses, including a 
number of experts dealing with a range of scientific questions, such as nutrition, 
diet, degeinerative disease and food safety.'47 As a result, the denial of legal aid had 
rneant the applicants could not present their case effectively to the domestic court 
and had led to an unacceptable inequality of arms with the private corporation, in a 
violation of Article 6.1. A parallel violation was easily found under Article 10, as the 
right to free expression was inextricably linked to the fairness of legal proceedings, 
The context of freedom of expression needs particular attention, in that 
expression is infinite and no matter how difficult the evidential proof may be, if 
there is no reasonable judgment in the expression complained of; clearly, general 
conclusions on legal aid are not readily obvious, as compared, for example, to 
divorce proceedings. To point obiter here, perhaps the focus of the legal examination 
in Steel and Morris should not have been on the issue of legal aid, but on the level of 
evidential burden that had to be discharged by ordinary members of the public 
before the domestic judge. The Court, having recognised that 'the limits of 
acceptable criticism are wider in the case of such companies', expressly stressed 'the 
legitimate and important role that campaign groups can play in stimulating public 
discussion' on the activities of powerful multinational companies. 49 in such 
contextual circumstances, it can be argued that individuals should not bear a high 
evidential burden at the domestic level, in which case the issue of legal aid becomes 
45 Cf. Nicholas V. Cyprus, Admissibility decision of 14 March 2000, no. 37371/97. Puechavy, 
(note 38), p.756. 
Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, Judgment 15 February 2005, no. 68416/01, 
para. 61, citing, among other cases, Airey v. Ireland, para. 26. 
47 Ibid., paras. 65-66. 
48 Ibid., para. 95. 
49 Ibid., paras. 94-5. 
192 
less pertinent when complexity reduces or vanishes. In that respect, it may be more 
useful to prescribe a reasonable standard of evidential proof, rather than trying to 
impose legal aid to defend the indefensible. 
III. Assessing the Domestic Standards 
Access to a remedy or an arguable human rights claim is ultimately assessed against 
the standard of effectiveness.5° It is argued that access can only be effective if the 
domestic judge applies the substance of law of the Convention. The domestic 
implementation of European human rights standards may be organised differently 
between states with a monist and dualist tradition to suit different presumptions of 
accommodating state's sovereignty within the frarhework of international law. These 
issues, however, are mainly for domestic consumption and do not affect the 
technical analysis, since what counts in every case is the status of human rights and 
the level of their protection in the domestic legal order, si 
The following discussion of the case-law aims to show that the effectiveness of 
access is closely dependent on the appreciation of the substantive law of the 
Convention at the domestic level. 
1. Narrower Scope of Human Rights 
When access to a human rights claim is generally available at the domestic level, it 
pays to check whether the scope of the domestic human rights conforms to that of 
the rights enshrined in the Convention. The critical importance of this parameter 
has been seen in the case of Lopez-Ostra, in which the applicant complained under 
Article 8 that the state failed in its positive obligation to protect her private and 
family life from nuisance and environmental pollution caused by a nearby private 
plant. In the domestic court proceedings, it was found that the negative impact on 
the applicant's health was not so serious so as to infringe the fundamental rights that 
were recognised in the state's constitution.s^ The different outcome reached by the 
Court in assessing the same impact meant that the applicable scope of the domestic 
right was more restrictive than that under Article 8. Thus, although access to a 
human rights claim was provided, the applicable narrower scope of the domestic 
5° Article 13: 'the Right to an effective remedy". The standard of effectiveness cuts across the 
whole spectrum of the Convention, see, e.g., Artico v. Italy, Judgment 13 May 1980, no. 6694/74, 
para. 33; Bendersky v. Ukraine, Judgment of 15 November 2007, no. 22750/02, para. 42. 
Sapienza, (note 3), p. 297. 
51 Sapienza, (note 3), pp. 278-9. 
52 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Judgment of 9 December 1994, no. 16798/90, paras. 11,15. 
193 
right meant that such access could not be effective under the pan-European 
minimum standard of the Convention, 
More recently, in the case of Kontrova, the applicant complained about the 
failure of the police to prevent the killing of her children. At the domestic level, the 
applicant did not claim compensation for non-monetary losses. In examining the 
state's preliminary objection under Article 35. 1 for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, the Court noted that the applicant's action would have to be brought 
under the heading of personal integrity, which was not sufficiently certain in both 
domestic theory and practice. Thus, a rejection of the state's preliminary objections 
under Article 35.1 reasonably influences the conclusion of violation of Article 13 for 
lack of an effective remedy at the domestic level.53 
2. Less Rigorous Evaluative Principles 
The iihplementation of positive obligations is also dependent on the legal principles 
that the domestic court uses to evaluate the substantive content of positive 
obligations. If less rigorous evaluative principles are employed, then the institutional 
framework, through which the substantive law is determined and implemented in 
practice, is bound to conflict with the standards of the Convention.54 Therefore, it is 
pertinent to ask, as did Strasser, 'how the substantive issue can be correctly assessed 
by the Convention organs without prior domestic proceedings have been conducted 
in accordance with the requirements of the Convention.'ss 
In the discussion of Hatton and Others in chapter 2, we have seen that the 
Court examined closely the content and scope of various investigations and studies 
that the state authorities had undertaken in order to assess the negative impact on 
individuals from the expansion of activities of a private corporation. In the current 
chapter, we revisit this assessment process from the angle of Article 13. As noted in a 
previous section, access to a remedy was not possible in that case, because of the 
wide scope of an exclusionary statutory provision. Although the exclusionary effect 
of the domestic law would suffice per se to find a violation of Article 13, the Court 
examined also the standards of judicial review that applied to the acts or omissions 
of the public administration (e.g. to grant permission for extension of a private 
53 Kontrova v. Slovakia, 'From the above finding, as regards the Government's prehminaiy 
objection [vmder Article 35.1], it follows that the action for protection of personal integrity 
provided her with no such remedy [under Article 13].', para. 65. Of. Raymond, (note 21), p. 167. 
54 See Lord Steyn's opinion in R. v. Secretary for Home Department ex parte Daly [2001] 
UKHJ26. 
55 Strasser, (note 3), p. 603. 
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party's commercial activities). Under the standards of judicial review that applied at 
the time, an administrative practice with human rights implications would only be 
unlawful if it was unreasonable or irrational, Since these standards did not 
conform with the lower threshold of liability of the Convention's proportionality 
principle, it meant that access to a remedy could not be effective, and therefore, 
there had been a violation of Article 13. 
In addition, it should be recalled that there was a strong dissent by a 
considerable number of judges on the effectiveness of the actual investigations and 
studies that were carried out at the domestic level. Without counting the points of 
their criticism, it is only asked here how the balance between competing interests 
was found to be fair when the competent public administration did not assess the 
negative impact On individuals in accordance with the high threshold of necessity of 
the interference (i.e. pressing social need) so as to be proportionate, in both means 
and ends, to the legitimate aim pursued. Judicial review is not simply about access 
to a legal remedy. The evaluative principles and standards of judicial review is the 
alpha and omega of every administrative framework that educates public officials on 
how to carry out their duties and, therefore, they describe the standards of 
justification for public projects and the corresponding standards of professional 
negligence. 
Moreover, it was argued by the government that the investigations and studies 
by the public authorities had taken account of the interests of the individuals 
concerned. In parallel with the analysis of Lopez-Ostra above, it is asked which were 
these interests against which the negative impact assessment was made at the 
doinestic level, given that the right to respect for private and faniily life, within the 
meaning of Article 8, clearly, did not exist in the state's legal system at the time 
(prior to the Human Rights Act 1998). If Article 8 or another similar version of it 
were available, the first reaction of public officials would be to protect the human 
rights interests of the applicants. Thus, when a proposal for a legitimate interference 
is made, the public officials in charge of planning decisions (including the judges 
who become ultimately part of the process) should be able to understand the impact 
threshold of Article 8 and decide accordingly as to whether to accept or reject that 
proposal.57 
56 Following the Human Rights Act 1998 (took effect in 2000), the principle of 
proportionality is used in the judicial review of human rights claims, see, e.g., R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department ex parte Daly. 
57 For the scope of private life under Article 8, see, e.g., Lopez Ostra v. Spain, para. 51; 
Fadeyeva v. Russia, Judgment of 9 June 2006, no. 55723/po, para. 88. 
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Despite the deficiencies in the assessment of the negative impact by the public 
administration in Hatton and Others, the Grand Chamber did not find a violation of 
Article 8. It can be said that the Court took a pragmatic approach, and 'in substance', 
justice has been done in the end.s^  If this is a serious position, then we need to ask 
again whether the Court is a fourth instance forum or has a constitutional function 
of subsidiary nature. If the latter applies, then Strasser's proposal that (critical) 
procedural issues need to be examined first, can be extended by conditioning the 
examination of the substantive issue on a prior finding of non-violation of the 
procedural aspect of the state's obligations. By no means, we purport that the 
Court's task was easy in that case, but there is an urgent need for a firm approach on 
procedvu"al issues. It may be argued that even if the domestic system had been in 
conformity with the procedural and substantive standards of the Convention, the 
examination of the particular facts could have reached the same outcome (i.e. non-
violation of Article 8). There is, however, a fundamental difference between 
decisions made on ad hoc balances and those aiming at structural and procedural 
changes. An added emphasis on the latter puts pressure on the states to bring their 
systems in line vdfh the standards of the Convention, thereby reducing substantially 
the need for international petition. 
C. Ex Ante Accessibility 
The substance of positive obligations regards the active protection of human rights. 
The content of the active protection is ultimately determined against the aim of the 
actual prevention of human rights violations. In that respect, access to a legal claim 
to enforce the domestic implementation of positive obligations should be guaranteed 
before a violation of a human right occurs. 
In examining the states' preliminary objection on the alleged failure of the 
applicant to exhaust domestic remedies, as required under Article 35.i,^^ the Court 
constantiy stresses that 
the purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of 
preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those 
allegations are submitted to the Convention institutions ... . That rule is based 
on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the Convention - vrith which it has 
58 Hatton and Others u. the United Kingdom (GC), para. 129. 
59 Mertens, (note 21), p. 90 with further references to the practice of ihterriational law in 
footnote 178. 
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close affinity - that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the 
alleged breach in the domestic system.*° 
In the first sentence of that passage, it is noted that the state should be given 'the 
opportunity of preventing' an alleged violation. In principle, the ex post framework 
of law is designed to deter the violations of its provisions. The combining effect of 
Articles 35 and 13.1, as is also emphasized in that passage, means that there should 
be access to enforce the standards of law before harm is sustained. In that respect, 
the requirement for an effective remedy under Article 13 should be examined in 
relation to the question of whether access to a claim to prevent a human rights 
violation was available before a national judge, even if the European review takes 
place ex post facto due to the admissibility criterion of victim status under Article 
34-
Such an access should be available against the private parties who have failed to 
comply with the regulated standards that condition the operation of their activities 
(i.e. the substantive content of positive obligations). In the civil law context, an 
action of prevention is not often possible if the applicant has not already suffered 
any damage. Therefore, interested individuals should be able to challenge the 
private parties through access to the decision-making process of the public 
administration that controls and supervises the private parties' activities. In 
addition, the professional duty of care of public officials, who are in charge of the 
specific tasks of control of private parties, should also be open to challenge. 
Access to claim prevention of a human rights violation has also been facilitated 
by a relaxation of the victim criterion.^! Notable is the case of the state's negative 
obligations, whose main application is an act of prior interference. In such a context, 
the locus standi of potential victims has long been recognised when an act of 
interference has been launched but has yet to caiise any harm.^ ^ xhe relaxation of 
the victim criterion has reasonably been greater for positive obligations, since their 
60 Selmouni v. France, Judgment of 28 July 1999, no. 25803/94, paras. 74-77; D. v. the 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 May 1997, no. 30240/96, para. 83; Slimdhi v. France, Judgment 
of 27 July 2004, no. 57671/00, para. 38; Trocellier v. France, Admissibility decision of 5 October 
2006, no. 75725/01, para. 4 ; Murillo Saldias and Others v. Spain, Admissibility decision of 28 
November 2006, no. 76973/01 (available in French only). When the effective remedy is examined 
as part of the procedural aspect of a substantive right, the close link between Articles 13 and 35.1 
applies equally between the procedural aspect of the substantive right and Article 35.1. See, e.g., 
Opuz V. Turkey, Judgment of 9 June 2009, no. 33401/102, paras. 150-2, 205. 
^^Monnat v. Switzerland, 'the word "victim" in the context of Article 34 of the Convention 
denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of 
the Convention being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice (see Brumarescu v. Romania 
[GC], no. 28342/95, § 50, ECHR 1999-VII). An appUcant cannot claim to be a "victim" within the 
meaning of Article 34 of the Convention unless he is or has been directly affected by the act or 
omission in question or runs the risk of being directly affected by it', para. 31 (cited case omitted). 
*2 See, e.g., Klass and Others v. Germany; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom. 
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substance concerns the active protection of human rights and, therefore, the state is 
required to step in in various contexts of private interactions in order to regulate and 
implement specific measures of protection. 
The issue of access to claim prevention is particularly pressing when the 
physical and psychological integrity of individuals is at stake. ^ 3 Before going to 
discuss the exact stages at which such access should be available (i.e. the access 
points), we briefly mention a recent case from the jurisprudence that reaffirms 
prevention as the underlying aim of positive obligations (see also discussion in 
chapter 2, section C.II.). In the case of Kontrova, the state was found in violation of 
Article 2 because of the failure of police officers to protect the applicant's children 
from being harmed from another individual (her husband). Although the public 
officials involved were criminally prosecuted at the domestic level in order to 
attribute their individual responsibility, this ex post remedy did not suffice to 
discharge the state's positive obligations under Article 2 or the requirements under 
Article 13. The same would apply even if the applicant were able to bring a parallel 
action against the private party, who directiy caused the human rights violation, 
since it was the reactive response of the state agents that was challenged before the 
Court. This case shows that the Court adopts a strict approach to the state's positive 
obligations when there is a known context of private interactions (i.e. violence 
against the person) in which its agents are required to implement a core content of 
operational measures (entrenched in the jurisprudence) as obligations of means.^ 4 
In practical terms, the possibility of access can more clearly be seen in 
circumstances where the issue of human rights protection is not as spontaneous and 
immediate as in the cases of violence against the person. By way of example, in the 
activities of industry, systematic failures in human rights standards are regularly 
observed. Access to claim prevention of a human rights violation has been seen in 
the pre-emptive action of the applicants in the case of Taskin and Others. It should 
be remembered froni previous discussion that the case concerned the decision of the 
state authorities to allow the operation of a private gold inine despite evidence of 
expert opinion pointing to serious risks to the health and safety of the local 
population in the future. In examining a prevention claini under Article 8, the Court: 
has reiterated the state's positive obligations in the form of a 'decision-making 
63 See, e.g., Osman v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 October ,1998, no. 23452/94, 
para. 115; L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 June 1998, no. 23413/94, para. 36; Z and 
Others v. United Kingdom, Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC); Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 
19 February 1998, no. 14967/89. 
64 Kontrova v. Slovakia, paras. 53, 61,63,65. 
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process [that] must firstly involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to 
allow them [public authorities] to predict and evaluate in advance the effects of 
those activities'.^ ^ 'Appropriate investigations' and 'studies' are core administrative 
steps that define the substantive content of the state's positive obligations in the 
context of industry. Since it is these steps that guarantee the practical issue of 
prevention, their individual standards of effectiveness should be safeguarded by a 
complementary procedural framework that provides access to enforce their 
implementation.*^ As the Court pointed out 'the individuals concerned must also be 
able to appeal to the [domestic] courts against any decision, act or omission where 
they consider that their interests or their comments have not been given sufficient 
weight in the decision-making process (see, mutatis mutandis, Hatton and Others, 
cited above, § 127).'^ 7 
Accordingly, whether or not the state's procedurEil obligations under a 
substantive Convention right (taken alone or in conjunction with Article 13) are 
reviewed at the European level ex post facto, or pre-emptively for pragmatic reasons 
(i.e. in defiance of the victim criterion, as in Taskin and Others),^^ their content and 
standards of effectiveness can be evaluated against the underlying aim of prevention 
of human rights violations. In that respect, the state's liability is defined by the 
possibility of access to challenge at the domestic level, before an actual violation 
occurs, the activities of private parties, as well as the performance of public officials 
during the core stages of administrative control of which the substantive content of 
the state's positive obligations consists in the context concerned. 
D. Ex Post Accessibility 
The absolute minimum form of access to enforce the substance of positive 
obligations concerns the ex post remedial action. In the system of the Convention, 
the ex post enforcement of human rights standards is expressly required as an 
effective remedy under Article 13 or implied under the provisions of the substantive 
*s Taskin and Others v. Turkey, Judgment 10 November 2004, no. 46117/99, para. 116. 
6^  Xenos, (note 16), pp. 252-3. 
67 Taskin and Others v. Turkey, para. 116. See, more recently, Tatar v. Romania, paras. 20-
23, 88,101. 
68 Ibid. See the government's submission in Taskin and Others at para. 104. See also the 
cases of Ocfcan and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 28 March 2006, no. 46771/99 (available in 
French only); Lemke v. Turkey, Judgment of 5 June 2007, no. 17381/02 (available in French 
only). 
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rights.^ 9 A remedy to the aggrieved party is often synonymous to a sanction that is 
imposed on the private parties and public officials for their responsibility in the 
human rights violation. The task in this section is to discuss the principal forms of 
the ex post remedy that is required in various contexts of private interactions and 
highlight in a separate sub-section the intermediate procedure of investigation on 
which the effectiveness of a remedy depends. 
I. Compensation 
Compensation is the most basic remedy and, very often, the only available when a 
human rights violation occurs. Complaints usually find their way before the Court, 
because an award of compensation could not effectively be claimed or agreed at the 
domestic level.^ o Compensation serves both as a remedy and as a sanction in the ex 
post procedural system of the state's positive obligations. 
A claim for compensation will usually target the private party that is directiy 
responsible for the human rights violation, especially in narrow circumstances that 
go beyond the regulatory and supervisory power of the state. Such will be the case 
when a violation of a human right is caused by medical negligence. The Court 
clarified in Powell that a contracting state cannot be called to account for its positive 
obligations where high professional standards have been regulated in the context of 
medical care.^ i An error of judgment from the part of a health professional, or even a 
negligent co-ordination among health professionals in the treatment of a patient, 
does not give rise to the responsibility of the state authorities.^ ^ In that case, the 
applicant was able to obtain compensation through a civil law action in which 
professional negligence could be established. Accordingly, the substantive positive 
obligation of the state to regulate professional standards of duty care in a known 
context of private interactions is implemented (and accordingly discharged) by 
making available an ex post procedure to enforce the regulated standards. A finding 
of negligence in the execution of a duty of care gives rise to a right to compensation, 
^ See e.g., Osman v. the United Kingdom 'It is common ground that the State's obligation in 
this respect extends beyond its primary duty to seciu'e the right to life by putting in place effective 
crimind-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-
enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such 
provisions.', para. 115; Oneryildiz v. TY/rfcey, Judgment of 18 June 2002, no. 48939/99, para. 91^  
70 See, recently, Kyriakides v. Cyprus, Judgment of 16 October 2008, no. 39058/05; Biriuk 
V. Lithuania, Judgment of 25 November 2008, no. 23373/03. 
7^  Powell V. the United Kingdom, Admissibihty decision of 4 May 2000,45305/99-
7= See also Byrzykowski v. Poland, Judgment of 27 Jime 2006, no. 11562/05, para. 104. 
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which constitutes a remedy under the ex post framework of implementation of the 
state's positive obligations. 
An additional claim for compensation will have to be available against the 
failures of public officials in circumstances in which their involvement is expected to 
be more active and direct. In Z and Others, the state was found in violation of Article 
3 because of various failures of its social services department to prevent the abuse of 
children of whom its agents have assumed supervision (discussed in chapter 2). In 
that case, compensation was claimed for the negligence (acts and omissions) of 
public officials, whose duty of care was assessed against obligations of means. It was, 
therefore, insufficient that the applicants were free to sue the third party (i.e. the 
perpetrator) or to obtain some general form of compensation from the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme.73 A similar issue arose in the more recent case of 
Kontrova, in which the applicant petitioned before the Court because compensation 
was not available against the failure of the police to perform well-established duties 
of protection when her faniily members were threatened by another individual. 
II. Sanctions 
In some circumstances, compensation may not suffice by itself to implement 
effectively the state's positive obligations. 74 For this reason, there ishould be in 
addition adequate sanctions, which must be regulated in advance and made 
accessible to the victims of human rights violations or be pursued by the state's 
authorities on their own motion. In the following, we examine the type and intensity 
of sanctions in relation to the appropriate deterrent effect that has to be guaranteed 
in various contexts of private interactions. 
Violence against the Person 
The regulation of sanctions in the context of violence against the person must 
guarantee an appropriate deterrent effect, which has to be commensurate with the 
severity of consequences involved. For this reason, criminal law exists as a specific 
brianch of law that is aided by a criminal justice system for the management of 
criminal (jailed) sentences. In the Court's jurisprudence, the intensity of sanctions 
73 z and Offters v. the United Kingdom, para. 111. Di Stefano, (note 15), p. 113. See also 
Osman v. the United.Kingdom, paras. 145,153. 
74 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, 'The nature of the right at stake has implications for the type of 
remedy which the State is required to provide under Article 13. Where violations of the rights 
enshrined in Article 2 are alleged, compensation for pecuniaiy and non-pecuniary damage should 
in principle be possible as part of the range of redress available', para. 147 (cited cases omitted). 
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has mainly been examined in relation to Articles 2, 3 and 8 whose scope reflects 
different degrees of negative impact on the physical integrity of the person. 
In the introduction of this study, we have particularly noted the case of X and Y 
from the early period of application of positive obligations. In that case, the main 
question of the state's positive obligations towards the victim of a rape was whether 
criminal law sanctions had been regulated and enforcement procedures were made 
available to the applicants. Starting from the general (non-context related) point 
that under Article 8 '[rjrecourse to the criminal law is not necessarily the only 
answer',75 the Court specified that as far as cases where fundamental values and 
essential aspects of private life are at stake (i.e. higher degrees of negative impact), 
protection by the civil law is insufficient. It reasoned that '[ejffective deterrence is 
indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions'.^ * 
In short, in the context of violence against the person it is hardly argued that 
criminal law sanctions are not the appropriate remedy. 
Equally pertinent is the question of sanctions on public officials, whose salaried 
task is to actively protect individuals from threats of violence of which they have 
knowledge, as seen in the cases of Osman, and Z and Others. In both these eases, the 
intensity of sanctions on public officials was not considered, as all energy was 
consumed on the basic question whether the public officials, iniplementing the 
state's positive obligations on the ground, should be subjected to standards of 
professional negligence. 77 Recentiy, in Kontrova, it was no longer disputed that 
police officers should be criminally liable for failing to protect, within the scope of 
their powers, the applicant's children. In that case, criminal proceedings against the 
officers involved were still pending at the domestic level. As a result, the applicant's 
ysXand Yv. the Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80, para. 24. 
76 Ibid., para. 27. See also M.C. v. Bulgaria 'the Court considers that States have a positive 
obhgation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal-law provisions 
effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and 
prosecution.', para. 153. See also Jankovic v. Croatia, Judgment of 5 March 2009, no. 38478/05, 
para. 47. 
77 In Z and Others v. the United Kingdom the apphcants* lawyers argued that 'accountability 
of public officials, central to both Articles 3 and 13, required a right of access to a court whereby 
the individual could hold the responsible officials to accoimt in adversarial proceedings and 
obtain an enforceable order for compensation if the claim was substantiated. The wording of 
Article 13 also prohibited the creation of immunities for pubHc officials and any such immunity 
must be regarded as contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.', para. 106. Di Stefano, 
(note 15), p. 113. For a study of the domestic standards of liability in negligence that apply to 
public officials follov^ing the judgments of Osman v. the United Kingdom arid Z and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, see J . Wright, Tort law and Human Rights: the Impact of the ECHR on English 
Law (Hart, 2001); R. Drabble, J . Maurici, and T. Buley, LocaZ Authorities and Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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effort to target the state's response with regard to the individual responsibility of 
police officers was held premature under Article 35.1.7^  
In some circumstances, the question of the appropriate deterrent effect that 
expresses the pan-European minimum standard may also relate to lower sanctions 
than those prescribed in domestic law. Such an issue may arise indirectiy in cases of 
extradition of suspects or convicted criminals to states in which the standards of 
human rights do not conform to those of the Convention.79 In the case of Soering, 
the staite was found in violation of Article 3 for its decision to extradite (stayed 
awaiting the Court's ruling) the applicant in a non-Council of Europe country in 
order to face criminal charges of a death penalty potential. It was held that the 
death-row phenomenon associated with these proceedings would expose the 
applicant to a real risk of treatment, whose negative impact reaches the threshold of 
Article 3. As the status of Article 3 under the Convention is absolute, the deterrent 
effect of that treatment cannot be justified.^o Within the geopolitical area of the 
Council of Europe, such issues are confined to a very small number of member states 
that have still not abolished death penalty in peacetime.^ ' 
Medical Negligence 
Due to the special nature of its business, the entire context of medical care is subject 
to judicial scrutiny for violations of human rights.^ ^ Whether or not the state is 
under an obligation to set up a health care system to protect individuals in 
circumstances of personal vulnerability, as discussed in chapter 3, it is expected that, 
as a minimum, the state should go beyond the ethical demands of the Hippocratic 
oath to regulate professional standards of competence and due diligence in the law 
78 Kontrova v. Slovakia, Admissibility decision of 13 June 2006, no. 7510/04. 
79 Sellem v. Italy, Judgment of 5 May 2009, no. 12584/08. 
80 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88. P. Vegleris, 
'Twenty Years' experience of the Convention and Future Prospects' in A.H. Robertson (ed.). 
Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 1973): 341-412, 350; P. van Dijk, 
'"Positive Obligations" Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the States Still 
the "Masters" of the Convention?' in M. Castermans-Holleman, F. Van Hoof, J . Smith (edn), TTie 
role of the Nation-State in the 21st century ; Human Rights, International Organisations and 
Foreign Policy : Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Lav^ International, 1998): 17-33,27. 
81 Ocalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, no. 46221/99, see also the partly concurring, 
partly dissenting opinion of judge Garlicld and the reference to international developments, 
especially those of the International Criminal Court, para. 6 of his opinion. 
82 Bendersky v. Ukraine 'Consequently, any assault of medical nature, even minor, on the 
physical integrity constitutes an interference with the right to respect for private life' (translation), 
para. 59 (available in French only). 
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of negligence.83 Such standards are expected to apply uniformly to practitioners of 
both the public and private sector.^ 4 Where a medical practitioner breaches her duty 
of care, as defined in the regulated standards, the determination of the appropriate 
level of sanctions is influenced by the degree of negative impact involved (i.e. the 
harm sustained by the patient or the loss of chance to be cured), the degree of 
medical negligence, and the unintentional nature of the act or omission complained 
of (to distinguish from intentional violence against the person). 
In the ca;se of Calvelli and Ciglio, the Court had to decide whether involuntary 
homicide that resulted ft"om medical error should attract criminal charges. It was 
held that the minimum deterrent effect for the ex post procedural implementation of 
positive obligations is not that of criminal sanctions due to the involuntary character 
of the offence.85 The majority of the European judges were satisfied that a civil 
action was available to the victim from which a friendly settlement was reached. As a 
result, the applicants could no longer claim to be 'victims' within the meaning of 
Article 34.^^In such circumstances, due weight is given to the fact that the violation 
of a human right is often caused by an error of professional judgment in 
circumstances of pressure.®7 Also, as a matter of general policy, the over-regulation 
of the medical care system could perceivably lead to defensive practices that may run 
counter to the purpose of the whole system. By contrast, where a standardised 
medical procedure is involved that leaves no margin for error, the breach in the duty 
of care will be regarded as gross negligence. In such a case, a greater sanction than 
compensation or disciplinary measure should be envisaged in order to ensure due 
compliance of professional standards through a punishment of an appropriate 
deterrent effect. 
In addition, it has been argued that civil action may not have the appropriate 
technical resources to evaluate any higher degree of negligence that may been 
involved under the circumstances.^ s As pointed out in the dissenting opinion of 
judge Rozakis joined by judge Bonello in Calvelli and Ciglio 'it is difficult for one to 
accept that respect for the right to life, as provided for by Article 2, can, in principle, 
83 Powell V. the United Kingdom; Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, Judgment of 17 January 2002, 
no. 32967/96, paras. 48-51; Vo v. France, paras. 89-90; Byrzykowski v. Poland, paras. 104-5. 27; 
Bendersky v. Ukraine, paras. 60-1. 
84 Powell V. the United Kingdom; Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, para. 49; Dvoracek and 
Dvorackova v. Slovakia, Judgment of 28 July 2009, no. 30754/04, para. 65. 
85 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, para. 51. 
86 Ibid., paras. 54,55. 
87 Byrzykowski V. Poland, para. 104. 
88 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy. See also the opinion of the dissenting judge Ress in Vb. V. 
France. 
204 
be satisfied by proceedings, which by their nature, are not designed to...establish any 
liability through a thorough examination of the circuriistances which led to the 
death. Criminal proceedings contain exactly these safeguards.' Such considerations 
were also relevant in the case of Powell, in which the Court was satisfied that an 
alternative and more rigorous course of action (i.e. in criminal law) was also 
available to the applicant.^ 9 
The development of the Court's jurisprudence in relation to the intensity of 
sanctions in the medical care context has seen a setback in the cases of Maurice and 
Draon,9o In both cases, the Court found acceptable that the liability of medical 
professionals can outright be excluded when negligence occurs in pre-natal 
detection. It was only judge BoneUo who stood for the Convention's well-established 
standards, pointing out, in his separate opinion, that '[t]he internationally accepted 
norm remains the principle of liability. Every person who has, through malice or 
negligence, caused harm to others is bound to rnake good all damage 
occasioned...Immunity, detestable by nature, appears doubly so when wielded to 
maim fundamental rights.'^' 
The only other thing that is worth adding here is that the Court based its 
conclusion on the fact that the immunity from professional negligence was decided 
by the legislator after 'a comprehensive debate in Parliament' in the course of which 
account was taken of the 'general-interest considerations' of 'egalite' and 'solidarite' 
that the state's poHcy was pursuing 'in this difficult social sphere' for a 'fair 
treatment for all disabled persons'.^ a It failed, however, to distinguish that unlike 
disabled individuals at large (as discussed in chapter 3), in the present cases, there 
was ah express act (also in the form of omission) of interference that was causally 
attributed to a third party (i.e. the medical practitioner). This critical detail suffices 
per se to find the state in breach of its primary positive obligation to regulate 
standards of negligence and corresponding deterrent sanctions with regard to a 
professional activity, which is by nature connected to human rights. 
Going back to the general discussion, it should be said that actions targeting 
public officials for their failure to prevent a human rights violation are hardly 
encountered, since the issue of protection is closely linked to the duty care of the 
medical practitioner and/or the health condition of the patient. An action against 
89 See also Silih v. Slovenia, para 126. 
90 Maurice v. France, Judgment of 6 October 2005, no. 11810/03; Draon v. France, 
Judgment of 6 October 2005. 
9' Ibid., paras. 6-7 of the separate opinion of judge Bonello. 
92 Maurice v. France, paxas. 121-5; Draon v. France, paras. 112-5. 
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public officials is more likely when they are involved in the handling of complaints 
between private individuals.^s 
Industrial Activities 
The state is under a positive obligation to control the activities of industry and 
commerce (be it public or private) in order to protect the human rights interests of 
identifiable individuals (i.e. workers, local population, consumers of a product or 
service). As already discussed in chapter 2, the substantive content of positive 
obligations concerns the regulation of huinan rights standards in the activities of 
industry. In addition, public officials are required to assume the supervision and 
control of these activities in order to ensure the implementation of the regulated 
standards. In the ex post enforcement of positive obligations, the level of sanctions is 
expected to be commensurate to the degree of negligence and the gravity of 
consequences.' 
In the recent case of Oneryildiz, which concerned a fatal industrial accident 
(discussed in chapter 2), the Court laid down core administrative steps for the 
control of dangerous industrial activities. Accordingly, the victims of a human rights 
violation should be able to challenge the public officials to whom the specific tasks of 
control have been assigned. In examining the procedural aspect of the state's 
positive obligations as an integral part of the substantive right (Article 2), the Court 
found that the negligence of the state officials went beyond an error of judgment or 
carelessness (distinguishing case-law on medical negligence). Of importance was 
also the fact that the competent public officials had fully realised the negative 
consequences on individuals' physical integrity. It should be recalled from previous 
discussion that knowledge of the risks from a dangerous industrial activity is 
established by the public officials' own work. Therefore, when a systematic failure is 
detected, a criminal sanction should be imposed to deter futvu-e malpractice.94 A 
sanction is not enough to carry the label 'criminal' but should have a sufficient 
deterrent effect, as judged by the standard of effectiveness.95 
A remedy against the private party who controls and administers the industrial 
activity should also be available to the victims of human rights violations. If the 
private party has failed to implement the human rights standards that condition its 
93 Powell V. the United Kingdom; Thilgeh and thonus v. Luxemburg, Admissibility decision 
of 17 June 2008, no. 2196/05. 
94 Oneryildiz v. Turkey (GC), paras, 93,112,116-7. 
95 Ibid., para. 116,117. 
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activity, then the intensity of sanctions should reflect the degree of negligence 
involved. 
The level of sanctions is also determined in accordance with the degree of 
severity of consequences that have ensued from an industrial accident. Fatal 
incidents usually attract a criminal investigation by the competent state authorities 
(e.g. corporate manslaughter charges). Where there is incriminating evidence that 
establishes a causal link between the breach in the duty of care and the death of 
innocent individuals, the state authorities may be required to take an action against 
the third party and/or the public officials on their own motion.?* 
III. The Investigation Process: the Intermediate Determinative 
The effectiveness of the ex post fi-amework of implementation of positive obligations, 
depends on the intermediate stage of investigation. Due to its indispensable role, the 
state's investigatory mechanism is examined separately by the Court, either as the 
procedural aspect of a human right or under Article 13. This means that an 
intermediate procedural safeguard has been recognised as being determinative of 
whole issue of human rights protection and, therefore, it is examined in its own 
right. Accordingly, the issue of access to implement positive obligations concerns 
also access to challenge the standards of the investigation process. 
Because investigation is administered by the state, an action can only be taken 
against the public officials who are involved in that process, irrespectively of whether 
the subject of investigation is the acts (or omissions) of private individuals or the 
failures of other public officials.?^ 
The relevance and content of an action that challenges the investigation process 
can be seen in the case-law. In chapter 2, we have seen that, in Gungor, the Court 
could not find that the state was under a positive obligation to protect the physical 
integrity of the applicant's son, because the police officers were not aware of aiiy 
threat of violence against hini (i.e. the element of knowledge).98 However, when the 
^^Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, Judgment of 9 May 2006, no. 60255/00 The mere 
fact that the authorities have been informed of the death will give rise ipso facto to an obligation 
under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances in 
which it occurred' (translation), para. 90 (cited case omitted), (available in French only); Al Fayed 
V. France, Admissibility decision of 27 September 2007, no. 38501/02, para. 73; Menson and 
Others v. the United Kingdom, Filip v. Romania, Judgment of 14 December 2006, no. 41124/02, 
para. 47 (investigation under Article 3); M.C. v. Bulgaria, paras. 151,153. 
97 Powell V. the United Kingdom; Albekov and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 8 October 
2008, no. 68216/01, para. 95. 
98 See discussion of Gungor v. Turkey in chapter 2, section B.II.4. 
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examination turns to the ex post framework, the state is under a substantive 
procedural obligation under Article 2 to initiate an investigation in order to find 
those responsible. It is through that process that the regulatory framework of 
criminal law can be implemented ex post.99 in that case, the Court found that the 
investigation of the competent authorities did not meet the standards of 
effectiveness, due to the failure inter alia to follow important leads or summon 
appropriate witness or ensure that those summoned have testified before the 
police.'°° 
The indispensable and free-standing value of investigation is highlighted in 
cases in which the applicant's complaint under a substantive human right is held 
admissible under its procedural aspect only. In such cases, what is examined is 
whether there have been any failures of the investigating authorities to determine 
the liability of third parties and/or that of public officials in rdation to the acts of the 
former.i°' 
A substantial body of case-law dealing with the standards of the investigation 
concerns complaints of disappearance in circumstances in which a disappearance 
phenomenon is widely observed.On one hand, the investigation is relevant in 
99 Gungor v. Turkey, The essential aim of such an investigation is to ensure the effective 
implementation of domestic laws that protect the right to life.' (translation), para. 67 (available in 
French only); Menson and Others v. the United Kingdom, 'this [positive] obligation [to put in 
place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person] 
requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when 
there is reason to believe that an individual has sustained life-threatening injuries in suspicious 
circxmistances. The investigation must be capable of establishing the cause of the injuries and the 
identification of those responsible with a view to their punishment. Where death results, as in 
Michael Menson's case, the investigation assumes even greater importance, having regard to the 
fact that the essential purpose of such an investigation is to secvire the effective implementation of 
the domestic laws which protect the right to life'; Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, para. 56; 
Mantog v. Romania (No. 2), para. 64. 
Gungor v. Turkey, the deficiencies in the investigation are summarised in paragraph 89 
of the judgment. 
Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, (investigation of an industrial accident), Al Fayed v. 
France, (investigation of a car accident); Menson and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
(investigation of violence against the person); Mantog v. Romania (No. 2), (investigation of 
violence against the person); L.Z. v. Romania, Judgment 3 February 2009, no. 22383/03 
(investigation of a rape in prison) (available in French only); Voiculescu v. Romania, Judgment of 
3 February 2009, no. 5325/03 (investigation of a car accident). 
A. Reidy, F. Hampson, K. Boyle, 'Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the 
European Convention on Hiunan Rights in the Case of Tiu-key" (1997) NQHR 15(2) 161-173; C. 
Buckley, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Life in Turke/ (2001) 1(1) 
HRLR 35-65. See, e.g., Nuray Sen v. Turkey (No. 2), Judgment of 30 March 2004, no. 25354/94; 
Celikbilek v. Turkey, Judgment of 31 May 2005, no. 27693/95; Mentese arid Others v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 18 January 2005, no. 36217/97; Ulku Ekinci v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 July 2002, 
no. 27602/95; Tekdag v. Turkey, Judgment of 15 January 2004, no. 27699/95; Koku v. Turkey; 
Tepe V. Turkey, Judgment of 9 May 2003, no. 27244/95; Gongadze v. uicraine. Judgment of 8 
November 2005, no. 34056/02; Osmanoglu v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 January 2008, no: 
48804/99; Enzile Ozdemir v. Turkey, Judgment of 8 January 2008, no. 54i69/oo;^saduZayei;a 
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order to examine whether state agents were directly involved in the interference 
complained of or, seen from the state's perspective, to substantiate its defence that 
its agents did not interfere. On the other hand, the state is under a positive 
obligation to take operational steps (also an investigation) to trace missing persons 
and apprehend those responsible, that is the substantive positive obligation in ex 
ante circumstances.'°3 in the ex post procedural framework, access to challenge the 
investigation process will have to be available in whichever stage an investigation 
has been required.i°4 
The exact evaluation of the investigation process is made in accordance with the 
standard of effectiveness. In an often-cited statement, the Court reiterates that 
Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the 
cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard [of 
effectiveness]. 
In examining 'any deficiency' in the investigation that affects its effectiveness, the 
European judge is able to determine objectively and in great lengths the critical steps 
(and their own standards therein) that the investigating authority has to implement 
under the circumstances. Due to the nature and broad relevance of the investigation 
process, the standards of effectiveness have developed in the jurisprudence of both 
positive and negative obligations. Such standards include the promptness'°^ and 
independencei°7 of the investigation whose applicability transcends context. 
A crucial stage of the investigation is the trial proceedings. At that stage, the 
trial judge can address any deficiencies in the investigation process. In some cases, a 
problem in the investigation may arise from a misapplication or underevaluation of 
its findings at the trial stage. In the case of M.C., the Court found that although a 
regulatory framework for incidents of rape and sexual abuse has been provided by 
the state, as required by its positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8, the 
and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 17 September 2009, no. 15569/06; Vamaua and Others v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 18 September 2009, nos. 16064/90,16073/90. 
For the substantive content of positive obligations in the form of investigation, see, 
generally, Osman v. the United Kingdom. See, more recently, Opuz v. Turkey. 
Gungor u. Turkey. 
^°^Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, para. 57; Gungor v. Turkey, para. 69; Al Fayed v. 
France, para. 75, McKerr v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 May 2001, no. 28883/95, para. 
113-
Gungor v. Turkey, para. 70; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, paras. 106-7; Al Fayed v. France, 
para. 75; Ogur v. Turkey, Judgment of 20 May 1999, no. 21594/93, paras. 91-2; Ergi v. Turkey, 
28 Judgment of July 1998, paras. 83-4; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 
May 2001, no. 30054/96, para. 114.; Opuz v. Turkey, paras. 150-1; Yeter v. Turkey, Judgment of 
13 January 2009, no. 33750/03, para. 65; Dvoracek and Dvorackova v. Slovakia, paras. 65-6. 
Gungor v. Turkey, para. 68; Metison and Others v. the United Kingdom; Mantog v. 
Romania (No. 2), paras. 69-70; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 May 2001, 
no. 24746/94, paras. 108,136-140. 
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applicable judicial principles on the scope of the investigation undermined the effect 
of the domestic law. In estimating the required scope of the investigations under the 
circumstances, the Court relied on the practices of the member states and other 
international documents suggesting that incidents of rape and physical abuse occur 
also when the victim does not or cannot physically resist. It held that since the trial 
judge did not require the public investigator and prosecutor to expand beyond 
evidence of physical resistance, the state failed to satisfy its positive obligations 
under both Articles 3 and 8.^ °^  In Oneryildiz, the Court found the state in violation 
of Article 2 (its procedural aspect) on the ground inter alia that the life-endangering 
aspect of the public officials' negligence was hot examined by the investigating 
authorities and this deficiency was not corrected by the trial judge.i°9 
Similar issues have been seen also in cases that concern disputes between 
private parties in the context of medical negligence. In Bendersky, the state was 
found in violation of Article 6 because the domestic courts did not address one of the 
applicant's arguments pointing to additional evidence of medical expert opinion. 
Although this evidence was not decisive, it was important for the trial court's own 
investigation and assessment of the medical negligence complained of."° In 
addition, it has been discussed above that where involuntary homicide is caused by 
medical negligence, criminal sanctions may not be the European minimum 
standard. However, the scope of investigation can have a criminaJ law potential to 
ensure that the full degree of negligence can be exposed."' Thus, where serious 
consequences have ensued, a high degree of negligence calls for high compensation, 
or an action in criminal law if this option is available domestically. 
In all circumstances, it is expected that the European review of the scope and 
content of the investigation process should be reasonably linked to the substantive 
content of the state's positive obligations. An illustration of this point can be seen in 
the examination of the investigation process in Bone. In that case, the applicant 
complained about the state's failure to ensure safety standards in the operation of 
rail services. The Court found first that the state satisfied its positive obligations 
under Article 2 by regulating specific precautionary measures against the activities 
M.C. V. Bulgaria, paras. 153,182-5. 
i ° 9 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, para. 109; Oneryildiz v. Turkey, (GC), para. 115-6. See also 
Budayeva and Others v. Russia, para. 143. 
Bendersky v. Ukraine, para. 46. 
"1 See the dissenting opinion of judge Rozakis joined by judge BoneUo in Calvelli and Ciglip 
V . Italy, as quoted in page with note 88 above. See, similarly, Oneryildiz v. Turkey, under Article 
13: 'In other words, there was a close procedural and practical relationship between the criminal 
investigation and the remedies available to those apphcants in the legal system as a whole', para. 
148; Gungor v. Turkey, para. 97. 
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of the rail operators. In examining the procedural issue, the Court held that the 
competent authorities launched an investigation following the accidental death of 
the applicant's son whose scope covered the rail operator's compUance with the 
regulated safety measures. Therefore, when it is the investigation that is 
challenged, due to its vital role in the procedural implementation of human rights 
protection, the examination of its content and scope should at least include those 
steps of which the substantive law of positive obligations consists in the particular 
circumstances concerned. 
E. Conclusion 
Positive obligations produce a practical result when the protection of human rights 
can directiy be asserted at the domestic level. For this purpose, institutional access 
points should be in place to enable interested individual to participate in the 
implementation and enforcement of the state's positive obligations. 
Domestic access is essential to guarantee the subsidiary nature of the 
Convention and its own effectiveness. At the European level, the Court is first 
expected to determine the substantive content of the state's positive obligations in 
various contexts in which private individuals interact. When the substantive law is 
reasonably certain, then the following task is to target the state'is procedural system 
that implements the content of protection at the domestic level. Proposals for a 
priority examination of procedural issues are particular pertinent in the current 
phase of development of the jurisprudence, in which the substantive content of 
positive obligations is increasingly defined iii the form of a proceduralised 
framework of core administrative steps. 
The procedural implementation of the state's positive obligations depends on a) 
whether individuals can have access to challenge those who have specific human 
rights obligations and b) whether the effectiveness of such access is guaranteed by 
parallel procedural safeguards. 
At first, an action should be available to challenge the private parties whose 
activities involve threats to human rights. For such an action to be possible, the 
standards of duty of care should be regulated in advance. In many circumstances. 
"2 Bone V. France, Admissibility decision of i March 2005, App. No. 69869/01 (Available in 
French only). See also Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 20 March 2008, nos. 
15339/02;...; 15343/02, para. 162. 
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the substance of positive obligations regards an administrative framework (i.e. the 
corollary to the regulatory framework), which supervises the activities of private 
parties in order to realiise the aim of prevention of human rights violations. 
Administrative steps that are core to the issue of prevention can be marked as access 
points for the participation of interested individuals in the enforcement of human 
rights standards before a violation occurs. For this purpose, the performance of 
public officials should be challenged during the supervision and control of the 
activities of private parties so as to guarantee the effectiveness of the administrative 
framework. Individuals should also be able to have access to the critical stages of the 
decision-making process of the public administration in order to challenge the 
practices of private parties against the regulated human rights standards. 
Where there has been a violation of a human right, the ex post implementation 
of the substantive content of positive obligations is secured by a procedural 
framework that allows the victim access to a remedy. To this aim, sanctions should 
be prescribed and imposed whenever the regulated standards are breached. The 
intensity of these sanctions should reasonably correspond to the degree of 
negligence and the severity of consequences involved. Individuals should be able to 
seek a remedy against the private parties who have directly caused the violation of a 
human right. Where a causal link can be established between the acts (or omissions) 
of private parties and the breach of a duty of care of the public officials during the 
control and supervision of the activities of the former, access to challenge the 
negligence of public officials should also be available. 
All access points of the procedural framework of implementation of positive 
obligations in both ex ante and ex post circumstances depend on the intermediate 
stage of investigation. Since the process of investigation is crucial for the 
effectiveness of the individuals' accessibility, and by extension, for the whole system 
of human rights protection, a parallel access should also exist in order to challenge 
the investigation's own effectiveness. Accordingly, the evaluation process opens to 
all those parameters and standards that are critical to the effectiveness of the 
investigation. It has been argued that, as a minimum, the scope and content of the 
investigation should be evaluated in relation to the substantive law of the state's 
positive obligations that defines the duty of care of both private parties and public 




A. The General Message of Positive Obligations 
Positive obligations were initially developed in the system of the Convention to 
render the states indirectly responsible for violations of human rights by private 
parties. The growing social pressure, as expressed by a new generation of human 
rights complaints and the writings of insightful scholars iii the 1960s and 1970s 
culminated in the judgments of Marckx and Airey in 1979 in which positive 
obligations were recognised as 'inherent' in the system of the Convention. To the 
generation of Alexandra Marckx (the child of the applicant from the homonymous 
case), that is all of us who have been brought up taking the state's positive 
obligations for granted and the Convention as a common European space and 
culture, positive obligations mean something more. Following the popular 
perception that human rights have to be enjoyed in a wide range of circumstances, 
rather than simply not to be violated, European individuals are increasingly 
asserting positive obligations across the board. This new reality has been reflected in 
the first a;pplication of positive obligations in Marckx, in which the issue of human 
rights protection did not involve an interference by a private party. 
The first message of positive obligations is: the existence of the Convention as 
the institutional forum in which the individual can initiate a human rights claim. 
The second message of positive obligations is the active protection of human rights 
by the state. The source of the threat (i.e. the activities of private parties, including 
state-funded businesses) against which the state's protection has initially been 
directed, no longer appears in the second message of positive obligations due to the 
concurring reading of the first message. Once an independent forum has been 
secured and the active protection of human rights has been recognised as inherent in 
the Convention law, the general message of positive obligations has been stated. 
When the individual is able to directly access the supranational system of the 
Convention in order to question where and how human rights have to be protected 
under the state's positive obligations, the initiative of the constitutional balance of 
human rights passes fi-om the legislator to the people. The participatory abihty of the 
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ordinary individual should be evaluated through the reach of the Convention, which 
has long been established as an international regulator of human rights standards. 
There is no precedent in the political history of humankind in which the 
participation of the individual (not only the citizen) in both the domestic and 
international levels of power, has been possible in such an open-ended range of 
circumstances and in such a direct, simple, and yet most influential way. If we 
depart from the millennia-old assertion that man is a political animal, then it is the 
individuals' participation in the affairs of the polls that satisfies them most. In that 
respect, European individuals are 'united' around the common effort of building a 
supranational institution to control peace through an advanced control of the states 
from the individuals residing within their jurisdiction.' 
It is important, however, that the opportunity of the active protection of human 
rights has a practical effect. Positive obligations can only be taken seriously if a legal 
expertise is developed to manage their open-ended scope. It is also observed that 
due to a fashionable excitement or deliberate choice, positive obligations are often 
used as a buzzword for every measure of compliance with human rights standards, a 
fact that leads gradually to their dilution. Therefore, a technical expertise has first to 
secure the distinctive nature of positive obligations from which any meaningful 
content can subsequentiy be determined. 
B. The Distinctive Nature of Positive Obligations 
The binding effect of positive obligations is imposed by virtue of paragraph i of the 
Convention rights, which require the state to organise the protection of human 
rights in advance. In principle, therefore, the positive obligations of the state to 
actively protect human rights can be directed to the aim of prevention of human 
rights violations. In this regard, it is reasonably expected that the judicial 
examination of state's response should follow the hierarchical structure of the 
Conveiition rights (from paragraph i to paragraph 2) that reflects the logical 
organisation of human rights protection. In most of the Court's case-law, however, 
the positive obUgations of the state have not clearly been distinguished from its 
negative obligations, which arise under paragraph 2 of the Convention rights. This 
1W. Friedmaiin, 'The individuals of a state are counted in rnillions, whereas there are only 
about sixty states in the world; and these individuals by and large have the same basic interests, 
personal and proprietary, whereas the interests of states are alriiost infinitely unique.', pie 
Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens & Sons, 1964): iQi-
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situation is exacerbated by the growing tendency to label every measure of human 
rights compliance as a positive obligation. 
In the case-law, positive and negative obligations are often merged through the 
so-called 'fair balance' between the interests of the individual and those of the 
community. The Court has regularly reiterated that the legitimate aims of a state's 
interference, as listed in paragraph 2 of the Convention rights (where apphcable), 
may be of a 'certain' relevance in striking this balance. Under this approach, the 
judicial examination concentrates on ad hoc balances for which the state has a 
margin of appreciation. Consequently, it is not easy to define the European 
minimum standard that guides both the right-holders and the state in their 
respective rights and obligations in future instances. More seriously, when positive 
obligations are confined to the examination of paragraph 2, the obligation of the 
active protection of human rights appears as an incidental and indirect issue. 
Positive obligations are recognised as 'inherent' in the system of the Convention 
under paragraph 1 of the Convention rights, because the issue of the active 
protection of human rights is different from that of direct interference by the state or 
the process of its possible justification (i.e. negative obligations). In technical terms, 
this means that the distinctive nature of positive obligations has to be recognised 
accordingly in the order by which the judicial examination is structured. For this 
purpose, three conditions are particularly important: 
1. When the state upholds the act (or omission) of a private party that interferes with 
a human right, direct responsibility for the ensuing violation of that right lies with 
the state, because it is the laws of the state that have allowed that act. In such 
circumstances, the state is under a clear negative obligation to abstain from 
interfering (i.e. from upholding the act complained of) without meeting the 
exhaustively listed ainis and criteria of paragraph 2 provisions. In other words, the 
distinctiveness of positive obligations passes from the distinctiveness of negative 
obligations for which the paragraph 2 legitimate aims of interference do not have a 
'certain' relevance but are categorical criteria for strict observance. 
2. An act of interference on the part of the state establishes the element of 
knowledge of the need for human rights protection, for which ground, clearly, the 
obligation to abstain from an unjustified interference becomes essential. 
Analogously, it is the element of knowledge that can establish the state's 
'involvement' in the wide range of circumstances in which the active protection of 
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human rights may be required as a positive obligation. The existence of this 
objective element conditions the application of positive obligations and proves a 
manageable scope of state's liability. The element of knowledge will be implied in 
circumstances where known human rights issues exist. 
3. Positive obligations arise in relation to paragraphs 1 of the Convention rights 
which are the only provisions relevant to the issue of the active protection of human 
rights. In these provisions, the Convention contains the necessary normative 
resources to target directiy the improvement of the domestic legal principles and 
procedures that guarantee the effectiveness and implementation of human rights 
protection. Due to this directness, positive obligations often involve a core content of 
protection which is not affected by the optional choice of a state authority to pursue 
a justifiable interference. 
C. The Content of Positive Obligations 
The general content of positive obligations involves the substantive law of the active 
protection of human rights and the procedural guarantees that implement it in the 
state's legal order. In many circumstances, in order for the protection of human 
rights to be effective a series of interdependerit measures have to be taken in various 
stages. In that respect, positive obligations are determined as a multilevel structure, 
whose organisation points to a whole system of protection. Such an organised 
structure can clearly be defined when the content of positive obligations is evaluated 
in relation to the wide context of activities of private parties to which the applicant's 
circumstances relate. 
Both the general and detailed content of positive obligations are guided by the 
standard of effectiveness. This standard is evaluated against the aim of prevention of 
human rights violations that constitutes the practical meaning of the active 
protection of human rights. A continuous review of the effectiveness of protection is 
expected in order to adapt the content of positive obligations to the ever-changing 
socio-political circumstances. 
2l6 
I. The Substantive Content 
The substantive content of positive obligations is organised as a system of active 
protection that aims ultimately at the prevention of human rights violations. Due to 
the wide scope of the active protection, European standards can only prescribe a 
manageable content of positive obligations. 
As a starting point, the liability of the state for violations of human rights, which 
are not directly caused by its agents, is conditioned on the objective element of 
knowledge of the need of human rights protection that establishes the state's 
involvement in the circumstances concerned. In that respect, a core content of 
positive obligation includes, first, those measures establishing the element of 
knowledge in the various stages in which the active protection of human rights is 
required. 
Of preliminary importance is also the fact that positive obligations can only 
arise in relation to the specific rights that are enshrined in the Convention. It is 
pertinent, therefore, to estimate what the applicable scope of a human right is. In 
addition, inherent limits of practically have also to be recognised due to the limited 
resources of the member states and the economic disparities between them. 
Although, technically speaking, the questions of scope and limits may be examined 
separately, their individual determination requires mutual adjustments so as to 
manage the application of positive obligations accordingly. 
Moving beyond the basics of a manageable scope of positive obligations, their 
more specific content is determined in relation to the particular requirements of 
protection and the contextual differences involved. Where the state authorities 
decide to uphold directly or tacitly an act of interference of a private party, including 
situations of competing human rights interests, the distinctiveness and priority of 
the active protection of human rights is preserved by a synthesis of the state's 
positive and negative obligations. 
Defining the Scope of the Convention Rights 
Positive obligations or any kind of obligations can only be imposed on the state as 
long as a Convention right is engaged in an applicant's circumstances. It is 
necessary, therefore, to have a prior understanding of the applicable scope of the 
Convention rights. In technical terms, the question of the scope of a Convention 
right involves: a) the conceptual aspect of the human right concerned and b) its 
quantified aspect in the form of the actionable degree of the negative impact on the 
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individual. It is expected that the European judges should set the threshold of 
negative impact reasonably high in order to accommodate the issue of protection to 
the practical realities of the Convention's capabilities and those of the member 
states, and to maintain also the constitutional status of human rights in the 
hierarchy of norms. In that way, it is made clear that the business of Convention is 
open for the adjudication of important human rights issiies. 
Limits 
Inherent limits on positive obligations are implied in the provisions of paragraphs i 
of the Convention rights due to the limited availability of the state's resources. 
In most circumstances, positive obligations arise where there is a causal link 
between the activity of a private party and the violation of a human right. The limits 
of the state's positive obligations are determined differehtiy depending on whether 
the act complained of is taken a) in accordance with the laws of the state (e.g. lower 
human rights standards apply domestically) or b) in defiance of the state's legal 
standards. 
The imposition of limits is not particularly extensive when the main financial 
burden of protection is borne of the funds of the private party, whose Ijawful 
activities threaten human rights. By contrast, when the active protection of human 
rights is examined in relation to unlawful acts, limits are more easily justified due to 
the frequency or unpredictability of such acts. As with other technical issues, Umits 
are evaluated against the standard of effectiveness, which provides an objective base 
to determine the minimum content of protection. 
Limits can reasonably be imposed to a far greater extent when the active 
protection of human rights is examined in circumstances where the causal element 
of a prior interference from a state or non-state actor is absent. When positive 
obligations are claimed by individuals, who cannot enjoy human rights due to their 
own circumstances of personal vulnerability (i.e. physical and psychological 
conditions), limits are determined in conjunction with the scope of the Convention 
rights and the actionable thresholds of negative impact. In such a context, the 
financial cost of protection reasonably influences the setting of the actionable 
threshold that determines the applicability of a Convention right. In that respect, the 
question of hmits is directly connected to the justifiability of positive obligations 
over the preliminary question of the scope of a Convention right which may well be 
elaborated at very occasion of the applicant's claim. 
2l8 
Core and Ad Hoc Measures 
The positive obligations of the state to actively protect human rights concern easily a 
content of reactive measures to address a given threat on human rights. Reactive 
measures are closely dependent on a core content of regulatory and administrative 
measures in order for protection to be practically effective. Due to the preliminary 
importance of the core measures of protection, it is expected that their 
implementation should be guaranteed in priority, something that should be reflected 
accordingly in the structure of the judicial examination. Viewed also from the point 
of the economy of process, upon which the Convention's own effectiveness depends, 
a core content of positive obligations can be directiy targeted as a comprehensive 
system of protection. 
This approach is supported by the element of knowledge of the need of human 
rights protection which conditions the state's liability at whichever level and stage 
the content of positive obligations is examined. In that connection, the basic 
responsibility of the state's agents to react upon a specific threat to human rights will 
often arise if core measures have previously been implemented to establish the 
requisite evidence (knowledge) of that threat. 
If the prevention of human rights violations is the ultimate aim, the content of 
positive obligations can be defined as a comprehensive system of human rights 
protection which comprises i) a legislative/regiilatory framework; ii) an 
administrative framework; iii) practical measures for ad hoc application. 
In such a system, the effectiveness of protection depends on the individual 
effectiveness of core critical structures due to their interaction with the practical 
measures of the specific response. By way of example, when one of the practical 
measures of protection that is required in the applicant's circumstances is to warn 
about the dangers of some activities of private parties, it is reasonably presupposed 
that a core administrative practice must previously be implemented in order to 
establish the exact content of that information. In that way, both the ad hoc measure 
concerned (e.g. warning information) and the attached administrative practice (and 
the standards therein) that establishes it form part of the content of positive 
obligation that the state has to regulate in advance. Regulations are expected to be 
constantiy updated following knowledge of the efficiency results of the current 
practices or of qualitative and widely accepted international standards. 
In appropriate circumstances, specific measures and practices of administrative 
nature can also be regulated against the private parties, whose activities directiy 
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threaten human rights, provided that the state authorities retain a supervisory 
confrol through the independent functioning of public administration. 
A Synthesis of Human Rights Protection 
When a violation of human right is caused by a private party acting lawfully within 
the domestic legal order, the state may seek to justify the act complained of in 
pursuit of one of the legitimate aims of interference (where applicable) to Umit the 
scope a human right and, by extension, its positive obligations. In the post-Hatton 
and Others landscape of the jurisprudence, the examination of the standard of 
proportionality, as required under paragraph 2 of some Convention rights, involves 
an assessment of the negative impact on the individuals concerned. To guarantee the 
objectivity of the process, the judicial examination can extend to the administrative 
measures (i.e. to conduct a research) that provide the requisite evidence. 
Administrative measures are also required as core and direct positive obligations 
under paragraph i of the Convention rights. However, at the proportionality stage of 
paragraph 2, similar measures have only an indirect procedural relevance. 
Consequentiy, their determination is not made with the intensity and depth of the 
paragraph 1 examination. As was confirmed also in the Grand Chamber judgment of 
Hatton and Others, ad hoc balances of overall justice still prevail in paragraph 2. 
Accordingly, there are two pertinent issues, which have to be addressed: First, 
the protection of human rights is a permanent obligation under paragraph 1 of the 
Convention rights which has already arisen before the optional choice of the state to 
pursue a legitimate interference. Secondly, under the paragraph 1 examination, the 
content of positive obligations (i.e. core administrative practices) opens for a 
detailed and comprehensive evaluation and definition of the critical parameters that 
guarantee the effectiveness of protection. 
It is proposed that in order to maintain the priority and depth of positive 
obligations when a legitimate limitation to a human right is attempted, instead of 
merging the state's negative and positive obUgations through the perspective of the 
former (i.e. a prior interference, directiy or indirectiy, attributed to the state), a 
synthesis of human rights protection caii be realised from the distinctive nature of 
the state's dual obligations. Provided that a legitimate aim of interference can be 
engaged (a 'pressing social need' threshold applies), the point of synthesis can be 
found in the first criterion of paragraph 2 which concerns the 'quality' of legal 
safeguards that the state is under an obligation to 'prescribe by law' before an 
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interference is attempted. To the extent that core measures of human rights 
protection have already been required as positive obligations of the state, they 
amount to those legal safeguards that the law of the state must 'prescribe' and its 
authorities must implement in practice, before any legitimate limitation to the scope 
of a human right is attempted or considered. 
Such a synthesis is also applicable where individuals are legitimately placed 
under the control of the state authorities (i.e. prisons, mental institutions, 
immigrations centres, military service, etc.). In such circumstances, a legitimate 
limitation to the human rights of these individuals (i.e. hberty, personal life) can 
have additional human rights implications (i.e. health and safety issues), which are 
already known before and at the time of the initial interference. In that respect, the 
additional positive obligations, which arise for the state become part of the legal 
safeguards that the law has to 'prescribe' when the legitimacy of the interference is 
examined or reviewed or actually imposed. 
A natural synthesis is observed in circumstances where opposing positive 
obligations arise for the protection of individuals whose human rights conflict with 
those of another (e.g. custody of children, defamation of one's reputation, counter-
demonstrations, etc). In such situations, the implementation of a positive obligation 
constitutes an act of interference that engages the provisions of paragraph 2. The 
distinctive nature, however, of positive obligations is still maintained, because the 
interference complained of (as protection) does not have the optional imperative of 
the legitimate aims of paragraph 2 provisions. In such special circumstances, the 
synthesis of human rights protection requires a tailor-made approach to define a 
general prioritisation of the human rights interests involved and a due process, 
whose standards can be entrenched at the 'prescribed by law'level. 
11. Access Points of Domestic Implementation 
Positive obligations produce a practical result when an enforcement framework 
exists at the domestic level to guarantee the implementation of their substantive 
content. In essence, the positive obligations of the state to actively protect human 
rights has one meaning: the prevention of their violations, and two levels of 
enforcement: a) the ex post imposition of deterring sanctions, which are regulated in 
advance, and b) the possibility to challenge ex ante the non-compliance of human 
rights standards. These two levels of action should be directed against both the 
private parties, who directly cause the violation of a human right and the pubUc 
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officials in charge of control of the acts of the former. In order to secure the 
participation of the individual, as the directly affected party, in the implementation 
of positive obligations, various institutional access points should be available in 
relation to both levels of action. 
1. At the ex post level, the enforcement of positive obligations is organised through 
deterring sanctions (e. g. civil compensation, criminal sentences), which are 
imposed on the private parties, who have directly caused the violation of a human 
right. In that way, the regulated human rights standards, which condition the lawful 
operation of the activities of private parties, are implemented by a mechanism of 
sanctions that is set in motion when the victim has access to claim the prescribed 
sanction as a remedy. In appropriate circumstances, ex post enforcement is 
guaranteed by the initiative of public officials, provided that the victim is given 
access to the investigation process. 
Similar access points in ex post circumstances should also be made available in 
relation to the individual responsibility of public officials, who are in charge of the 
positive duties of protection of human rights. In that regard, a parallel framework of 
sanctions and professional standards (against which sanctions are assessed) should 
be arranged against the specific tasks of public officials, as defined by the 
substantive law of positive obligations. 
Being the absolutely minimum level of enforcement, the ex post framework 
must be guaranteed in all circumstances where the substantive law of positive 
obligations is reasonably certain. 
2. The enforcement of positive obligations can also be made before an actual 
violation of a human right occurs. Ah ex ante course of action is more feasible when 
the substantive content of positive obligation concerns a system of human rights 
protection that has been defined in relation to a known context of private 
interactions. The critical administrative stages of which such a system consists can 
serve as access points for the participation of the individual in the enforcement of 
the prescribed human rights standards. The niain aim is to challenge directly the 
private parties through the public administration that controls their activities, 
including also an action to challenge state officials for any deficiency during the 
execution of that control. The specific tasks of public administration can be enforced 
if they are open to a challenge (e.g. through judicial review) by interested individuals 
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in the corresponding stages at which the administrative control of the activities of 
private parties is exercised. 
The imposition by the Convention of the ex ante level of enforcement of positive 
obligations finds an apparent difficulty due to the admissibility criterion of victim 
status under Article 34. However, it should be remembered that this criterion 
applies at the European level only. There is nothing to prevent the Court, in its ex 
post judicial examination, from requiring that the administrative tasks of control be 
open to challenge prior to a violation of a human right, as the effective domestic 
remedy under Article 13, which is taken in conjunction with the substantive right 
under which these tasks are imposed (as the substantive law of positive obligations). 
In circumstances where the physical integrity of individuals is at stake, the Court has 
showed itself willing to admit complaints prior to an actual violation of a human 
right and require that interested individuals should have access to challenge 
entrenched tasks of administrative control, as an indispensable procedural coroUary 
of positive obligations under the substantive right (i.e. Articles 2, 3, 8) (taken alone). 
3. Institutional access for the implementation of positive obligations in the form of 
direct assistance to vulnerable individuals, where an act of interference is absent, is 
reasonably very limited. In such circumstances, the substantive content of positive 
obligations has yet to be determined through the preliminary questions of the 
legitimacy for the Court's intervention and the scope of the Convention rights. 
However, a certain tangible ground increasingly emerges in relation to the 
procedures, which guarantee the objective assessment of evidence in the 
examination of these preliminary questions. In that respect, access points can be 
required to enable individuals to challenge the procedural tasks through which an 
'arguable' human rights claim is examined at the domestic level. 
D. Conclusion 
Positive obligations mark the emergence of the ordinary individual as the atomic 
unit in the control of peace through the advanced control of the state in the wide 
range of circumstances in which the active protection of human rights is required. 
This opportunity is made possible by the direct access of the individual to the 
supranational system of the Convention, which unites European states in the 
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common project of building a European public order in the area of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
The expansion of positive obligations reflects the growing social movements of 
European individuals who press for their human rights in every circumstance in 
which they are relevant. It is important, however, to remember that although social 
pressure comes from the domestic level, the beginning and binding effect of positive 
obligations lies in the common European space of the Convention. 
In order to secure a manageable application of the wide scope of positive 
obligations, the Convention is required to adopt a comprehensive methodological 
framework that gives due weight to preliminary questions and contextual 
differences, including a corresponding categorisation of practical limitations. I f such 
a technical framework is provided, the active protection of human rights is not only 
maintained as the distinctive meaning of positive obligations but can specifically be 
directed to the prevention of human rights violations. Setting prevention as the 
ultimate aim, the substantive content of positive obligations expands beyond ad hoc 
responses to target a multilevel structure of measures as a system of human rights 
protection. To ensure an objective application and development of the standards of 
protection, a core content of positive obligations can easily concern a range of 
administrative measures. Due to their procedural function, administrative measures 
can also serve as institutional access points for the participation of interested 
individual in the domestic implementation of positive obligations. It is the 
possibility of access of the ordinary individual to the key levels of implementation of 
positive obligations that guarantees the constant vigilance and improvement of the 
standards of human rights protection, reminding the state of its basic constitutional 
priorities. 
Continuing from the phrase of Jan De Meyer that '[w]ithout the text of the 
Convention having to be amended or a new protocol drafted', it is argued, in 
addition, that, and whatever the number of petitions can be, positive obligations can 
be managed by shifting the focus of judicial examination on appropriate access 
points to allow the participation of the individual in the development and 
implementation of the active protection of human rights at the domestic level. The 
role of the Convention, as a non-living space, is to set human rights standards for the 
domestic systems. Once these standards have been set, repetitive cases raise only an 
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issue of 'execution' for which political pressure is required under the peer political 
body of the Committee of Ministers.^ 
Positive obligations present one of the biggest opportunities ever. As with other 
worthwhile projects in the past, the opportunity of positive obligations can be lost by 
a trivial and ever-available use. In the current crucial juncture of development of 
positive obligations, the main challenge is to prove scientifically that the open-ended 
scope of positive obligations can be legally managed and controlled. It is the 
scientific result that preserves the potential of positive obligations and the 
continuous progress in the protection of human rights. The cvirfent work is an 
invitation and a contribution to this challenge. 
= L. Wildhaber, 'A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?' (2002) 
23 (5-7) Human Rights Law Journal 161-165,162,163. 
225 
Bibliography 
AAipi^dxo? N., 'Oi «EXXriviKe?» Y7io0eaei? axo ExpaoPoupYo' [2002] ToS 1. 
Alkema Albert, "The Third-Party Applicability or "Drittwirkung" of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds), Protecting 
Human Rights: The European Dimension, Studies in Honour of G. J.Wiarda (2""^  
edn Heymann, 1990): 33-45-
Alston P. and WeUer J.H., 'An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights 
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights' (1999) Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 1/99. 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990101.html> 
Arai-Takahashi Y., The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002). 
Benson P., 'Equality of Opportunity and Private Law' in D. Friedmann, D. Barak-
Erez (eds). Human Rights in Private Law ( Hart, 2001): 201-243. 
Berenstein A., 'Economic and Social Rights: Their Inclusion in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Problems of Formulation and Interpretation' 
(1981) 2(3-4) H R U 257-280. 
Bird C, The Myth of Liberal Individualism (Cambridge University Press, 1999)-
BoYiaxtn? n., 'To 11° HpcoxoKoAXo xri? EupcojiaiKr)? EuiiPacTri? AiKuiconaxcov xou 
AvGpcbnou-npog xriv Ar|)iioupYici evog EupooTtaiKou AiKaiou' [1996] ToE 579. 
Bomhoff J., 'Liith's 50* Anniversary: Some Comparative Observations on the 
German Foundations of Judicial Balancing' (2008) 9 GLJ121-124. 
Bown A., 'Fundamental Rights in Private Law' [2000] S.T. L. 157-161. 
Boyle K., and Hannum H., 'Individual Applications under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and tiie Concept of Administrative Practice: the Donnelly Case' 
(1974) 68 AJIL 440-453. 
Caflisch L., 'The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 
and Beyond' (2006) 6 HRLR 4P3-415-
Buckley C., 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Life in 
Turkey' (2001) 1(1) HRLR 35-65-
Buquicchio de Boer, M., 'Children and the European Convention on Human Rights : 
A Survey of Case-law of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights' in 
F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The European 
Dimension, Studies in Honour ofG. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 73-89-
Cangado Trindade A., The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
in International Law: its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual 
Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
Cherednychenko O., 'Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of 
Human Rights?' (2006) 13(2) MJ 195-218. 
Chinkin C, 'A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension' (1999) 10 EJIL 387-395-
Clack A., 'Heathrow Case Challenged' Guardian (23 May 2005). 
Clapham A., 'The Privatization of European Human Rights' (DPhil thesis, European 
University Institute 1991). 
Clapham A., Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1993)-
Clements L. and Read J., 'The Dog that Didn't Bark: The Issue of Access to Rights 
under the European Convention on Human Rights by Disabled People' in A. 
Lawson and C. Gooding (eds). Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to 
Practice (Hart, 2005): 21-34. 
226 
Clements L. and Young J., 'Human Rights: Changing the Culture' (i999) 26(1) JLS 1-
5-
Connelly A., 'The Protection of the Rights of Others' (1980) 5(2) HRR117-140. 
Connelly A., 'Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (1986) 35 (3) ICLQ 567-593-
Costa, J-P., 'La Liberte d' Expression selon la Jurisprudence de la Cour Europeenne 
des Droits de 1' Honmie' (2002) 15 AxA 671-676. 
Cook K., 'Environmental Rights as Human Rights' (2002) 2 EHRLR196-215. 
Crawshaw R, 'International Standards on the Right to Life and the Use of Force by 
Police' (1999) 3(4) IJHR 67-91. 
Cullen H., 'Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (2006) 6 HRLR 585-592. 
Cullet P., 'Definition of an Environmental Right in a Human Rights Context' (1995) 
13(1) NQHR 25-40. 
de Blois M., 'The Fundamental Freedom of the European Court of Human Rights' in 
R. Lawson, M. de Blois (eds). The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in 
Europe, Essays in Honour ofH. G. Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): 35-59. 
de Fontbressin P., 'L' Effet Horizontal de Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' 
Homme et 1' Avenir du Droit des Obligations' in G. Cohen-Jonathan, J-F. Flauss, 
P. Lambert (eds), Liber Amicorum Marc-Andre Eissen (Bruylant, 1995): 157-64. 
de la Rasilla del Moral I . , 'The Increasing Marginal Appreciation of the Margin-of-
Appreciation Doctrine' (2006) 7(6) GLJ 611-624. 
Demerieux M., 'Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' (2001) 21 OJLS 521. 
De Meyer J., 'The Rights to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and 
Communications in Relations Between Individuals, and the Resulting Obhgations 
for States Parties to the Convention' in A.H. Robertson (ed.), Privacy and Human 
Rights (Reports and Communications Presented at the Third International 
Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights, 30 September - 3 
October 1970), (Manchester University Press, 1973): 255-275. 
De Salvia M., 'Ambiente e Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell' Uomo' (1997) 10(1) 
RIDU 78-83. 
De Salvia M., 'Illustration et Defense du Systeme Europeen de Protection Judicaire 
des Droits de rHomme: Des Regies Precises pour des ObUgations Claires et 
Partagees par les Etats' (2007) 69 RTDH 135-151. 
De Sanctis F., 'What Duties Dp States Have with Regard to the Rules of Engagement 
and the Training of Security Forces under Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights?' (2006) 10(1) ILHR 31-44. 
De Schutter O., 'Reasonable Accommodations and Positive Obligations in the 
European Convention on Human Rights' in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds). 
Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice (Hart, 2005): 35-64. 
Di Stefano A., 'Public Autiiority Liability in Negligence e Diritto ad un Ricorso 
Effettivo nell' Ordinamento Britannico: Nota all Sentenza della Corte Europea dei 
Diritti dell' Uomo nel Caso Z e altri c. Regno Unito' (2003)1 RIDU 97-127-
Done .K., 'Farborough Faced to Turned Away Business' Financial Times (11 February 
2008). 
Donner A., 'Transition' in F. Matscher, H. Petzold (eds). Protecting Human Rights: 
The European Dimension, Studies in Honour of G. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 
145-148. 
Drabble R., Maurici J., and Buley T., Local Authorities and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
Drogue C, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in- der Europaischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention (Springer, 2003). 
227 
Drost P., The Crime of State: Penal Protection for Fundamental Freedoms of 
Persons and Peoples (A.W. Sijthoff, 1959). 
Drost P., Human Rights as Legal Rights: The realization of Individual Human 
Rights in Positive International Law (A.W. Sijthoff, 2"<i ed., 1965). 
Drzemczewski A, 'The European Human Rights Convention and Relations between 
Private Parties' (1979) 26(2) NILR163-181. 
Drzemczewski A., 'To 'Epyo trig Aieupnvoris xcov AiKaicoiidxcov xov AvQpwTiov xou 
Su}iPouXiou xri? Eupcojirig [1991] EEEupA 685. 
Dubout E., 'La Proceduriisation des Obligations Relatives aux Droits 
Fondamentaux Substantiels par la Cour Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' 
(2007) 70 RTDH 397-425-
Duffy P., 'The Case of Klass and Others: Secret Surveillance of Communications and 
the European Convention on Human Rights' (1979) 4(1) HRR 20-41. 
Duffy P, 'The Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression, Contempt of Court and 
the European Convention on Human Rights' (1980) 5(1) HRR 17-53. 
Duffy P., "The Protection of Privacy, Family Life and Other Rights under Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights' (1982) 2 YbkEL 191-238. 
Eissen M-A., 'La Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme et les Obhgations 
de r Individu : une Mise a Jour' in>lmicorum Discipulorumque Liber Rene Cassin 
III: Protection des Droits de V Homme dans les Rapports Entre Personnes 
Privies (Pedone, 1971): 151-162. 
Eissen M-A., 'To Eupco:rTa\'K6 AiKaorripio AiKaico^dxcov xou Av9pd)jTOu' [1983] 
EEEupA 499. 
Eissen M-A., 'L'Avocat devant la Cour Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' in F. 
Matscher, H. Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension, 
Studies in Honour ofG. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 159-169. 
Evans R. and Boseley S., '"Drug Firms" Lobby Tactics Revealed' Guardian (28 
September 2006). 
Ewing D., 'The Human Rights Act and Labour Law' (1998) 27(4) ILJ 275-292. 
Feingold C, 'The Little Red Schoolbook and the European Convention on Human 
Rights' (1978) 3(1) HRR 21-47. 
Feldman D., 'The Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights' [1997] EHRLR 265-274. 
Feldman D., 'Privacy-related Rights and their Social Value', in P. Birks (ed.), Privacy 
and Loyalty (Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1997): 15-50. 
Fierens J., Droit et Pauvrete (Bruylant, 1992). 
Fenwick H., 'Clashing rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act' 
(2004) 67 MLR 889. 
Flogaitis S., 'La notion de principe de legalite' (1998) 10 ERPL 665-681. 
Flogaitis S., 'Les avances du principe de precaution en droit public grec' (2006) 59 
RHDI449-470. 
Forder C, 'Legal Protection under Article 8 ECHR: Marckx and Beyond' (1990) 37(2) 
NILR 162-181. 
Frantz L., 'The First Amendment in the Balance' (1962) 71YLJ1424. 
Fredman S., Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties 
(Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Friedmann W., The Changing Structure of International Law (Stevens & Sons, 
1964). 
Frowein J., 'Art. 13 as a Growing Pillar of Convention Law' in P. Mahoney; F. 
Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The 
European Perspective: Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 2000): 545-550. 
228 
Giddens A. (foreword) in M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, H. Anheier (eds), Global Civil 
Society (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Gohin O., 'La Responsabilite de 1' fetat en tant que Legislateur' (1998) 2 RIDC 595-
610. 
Gostin L., 'Beyond Moral Claims: A Human Rights Approach in Mental Health' 
(2001) 10 Camb Q Healthc Ethics 264-274. 
GouJbourne S., 'Airport Noise and the Right to Family Life: A Legitimate Application 
of Article 8 of the European Convention?' (2002) 24 LLR 227-236. 
Gray C, 'Remedies for Individuals under the European Convention on Human 
Rights' (1981) 5(3) HRR153-17-
Greer S., 'The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights' (1997) 15 Human Rights files (Director General of Human Rights, Council 
of Europe). 
Greer S., The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems 
and Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Harnisen R., 'The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement' 
(2001) 5(4) IJHR18-43-
Helaoui S., 'Respecting Human rights Abroad? On the Extraterritorial Application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights' (MPhil thesis, University of Lund 
2005). 
Heifer L., 'Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddeness as a 
Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime (2008) 19(1) 
EJIL125-159. 
Hickley M., 'Negligence over Soldier Son' Death in Iraq' Daily Mail (19 August 
2008). 
Hofstotter B., 'European Court of Human Rights: Positive Obligations in E. and 
others v. United Kingdom' (2004) 2(3) I CON 525-560. 
Hunt M., 'The 'Horizontal effect' of the Human Rights Act: Moving Beyond the 
Public-Private Distinction' in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds). Understanding 
Human Rights Principles (Hart, 2001): 161-178. 
Jacobs F., 'The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to Include 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1978) 5(3) HRR 166-178. 
Jarvis F. and Sherlock A., 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Environment' (1999) 24 ELR SUPP (Human Rights) 15-29. 
Joseph S., 'Denouement of the Deaths on the Rock: the Right to Life of Terrorists' 
(1996) 14(1) NQHR5-22. 
Kadelbach S., 'Nuclear Testing and Human Rights' (1996) 4 NQHR 389-400. 
Kilkelly U., The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (Ashgate, 
1999)-
Koch I . , 'Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties' (2005) 5(1) HRLR 81-103. 
Kumm M., 'Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as 
Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law' (2006) 7 G U 341-370. 
Lavender N., 'The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation' (1997) 4 EHRLR 380-390. 
Lawson R., 'Human Rights: The Best is Yet to Come' (2005) 1 ECLR 27-37. 
Leach P., 'Positive Obligations from Strasbourg - Where do the Boundaries Lie?' 
<www.londonmet.ac.uk/EHRAC>. 
Lippmann W., 'The Reconstruction of Liberalism' in C.H. McILwain (ed). 
Constitutionalism & The Changing World (Cambridge University Press, 1939): 
283-293. 
Lord Lester of Heme Hill, 'Universality Versus Subsidiarity: A Reply' [1998] EHRLR 
73-81. 
Loucaides L., Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff , 
1995)-
229 
Lucas O., 'La Convention Europeenne des Droits de I'Homme et les Fondements de 
la Responsabilite Civile' (2002) 6(6) JCP 286-290. 
Mahoney P., 'Universality Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free 
Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments' [1997] EHRLR 364-379-
Maljean-Dubois S., 'La Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme et le Droit a 
r Information en Matiere d' Environnement: A propos de 1' Arret rendu par la 
CEDH le 19 fevrier 1998 en 1' affaire Anna Maria Guerra et 39 autres c. Italie, 
(1998) 4 RGDIP 995-1022. 
Malinverni G., 'Les Fonctions des Droits fondamentaux dans la Jurisprudence de la 
Commission et la Cour Europeennes des Droits de 1' Homme' in W. Haller, A. 
Kolz, G. Miiller, D. Thiirer (eds), Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft (Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, 1989): 539-56o. 
Malinverni G., 'Variations sur un Theme encore Meconnu: 1' Article 13 de la 
Convention Europeenne des Droits de 1' Homme' (1998) 33 RTDH 647-57. 
Markesinis B. and Enchelmaier S., 'The Applicability of Human Rights as Between 
Individuals under German Constitutional Law', in B. Markesinis (ed.). Protecting 
Privacy (Oxford University Press, 1999) 191-243. 
Masterman R., 'Determinative in the Abstract? Article 6(1) and the Separation of 
Powers' (2005) 6 EHRLR 628-648. 
McBride J., 'Protecting Life: A Positive Obligation to Help' (i999) 24 ELR (SUPP 
HR)ELR 43-54. 
Mertens P., Le Droit de Recours Effectif devant les Instances Nationales en cos de 
Violation d'un Droit de I'Homme (Editions de I'Universite de Bruxelles, 1973)-
Mole N., 'Z and Others v UK and TP and KM v UK' [2001] I F U 117-123-
Miller C, 'Environmental Rights in a Welfare State? A Comment on Demerieux' 
(2003) 23(1) OJLS 111-125. 
Mitsopoulos G., "Tpixevepyeia" KOX "AvaXoyiKOXTixa" Aiaxa^ei? xou 
Ava9e(opri0evxo? ZuvxdYMaxo?/«Drittwirkung» et «proportionnalite» dans la 
Constitution Hellenique Revisee en 2001' (2002) 15 AxA 641-663. 
Mowbray A., The Development of Positive Obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart, 
2004). 
Muchlinski P., 'Mental Health Patients' Rights and the European Human Rights 
Convention' (1980) 5(2) HRR 90-116. 
Mundlak G., 'Human Rights and the Employment Relationship' in D. Friedmann, D. 
Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart, 2001): 297-328. 
Murdoch J., 'A Survey of Recent Case Law under Article 5 ECHR' (1998) 23 ELR 
(SUPP HR) 31-48. 
Ni Aolain F. 'The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Convention Concerning 
the Right to Life' (2001) 1NQHR 21-42. 
Norton-Taylor R., 'Sending Troops into Battie without Proper Equipment Could 
Breach Rights, Says Judge' Guardian (12 April 2008). 
Oliver D., Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Butterworths, 1999). 
Opsahl T., 'The Convention and the Right to Respect for Family Life Particularly as 
Regards the Unity of the Family and the Protection of the Rights of Parents and 
Guardians in the Education of Children' in A.H. Robertson (ed). Privacy and 
Human Rights (Reports and Communications Presented at the Third 
International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights, 30 
September - 3 October 1970), (Manchester University Press, 1973): 255-275. 
Opsahl T., 'The Right to Life' in R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, H. Petzol (eds), The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1993):-
207-223. 
230 
Orakhelashvili A., 'Restrictive Interpretation Of Human Rights Treaties In The 
Recent Jurisprudence Of The European Court Of Human Rights' (2003) 14 EJIL 
529-568. 
napapdg, n.,'To KeKxrijievo TOU EupcoyraiKou SuvraYiiaxiKOij noXmajiou' (2001) 10 
ATA 543. 
napaoKEuonouXog N. KCLX OuxpaKT] E., 'H «AuoTr|po3Toir|ar|» KQI oi ASeieg xcov 
KpaTou|jevcov' EXsvdepoTvma (16 November 2007). 
Partsch K., 'Written Communication' in A.H. Robertson (ed). Privacy and Human 
Rights (Reports and Communications Presented at the Third International 
Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights, 30 September - 3 
October 1970), (Manchester University Press, 1973): 275-282. 
OeppciKri? S, 'H IlpooTaoia xcov AiKaioiiciKov xou Av0p(b:n:ou oxa Sxe8ia xr|? 
EuptojiaiKri? Evojioirioecog' oe ZvniieiKja BeyAep/), x6|io? I I , 585 (Avx.N. 
ZdKKOuXa, 1988). 
Perrin G., 'Le Probleme de la Faute dans la Responsabilite Internationale de I'Etat' 
in W. HaUer, A. Kolz, G. Miiller, D. Thiirer (eds), Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft 
(Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1989): 127-133-
Petersmann E-U., 'On "Indivisibility" of Human Rights' (2003) 14 EJIL 381-385. 
Petersmann E-U, 'State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual 
Sovereignty: from Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
International Economic Law?' (2006) European Union Institute Working Paper 
Law No. 45. 
<http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/i8i4/6446/3/LAW%2020o6-45.pdf> 
nivQKiSqg r., 'H EuvxavnaxiKri Ycpr) vr\q EupcoJiaikrig ZunPaoriq AiKaia)|idxo)v xou 
Avepcbjtou' (2007) 33 AxA 71-95. 
Post H., 'Hatton and Others: Further Clarifications of the 'Indirect' Individual Right 
to a Healthy Environment' (2002) 2 N-SAIL 259-277. 
Puechavy M., 'L'Acces Egal de Tons a la Justice' (2003) 19 AxA 743-765-
Raday F., 'The Constitutionalization of Labour Law' in R. Blanpain & M. Weiss (eds). 
The Changing Face of Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Liber Amicorum for 
Clyde W. Summers (Nomos, 1993): 83. 
Raymond J., 'A Contribution to the Interpretation of Article 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights' (1980) 3 HRR 161-175. 
Reichman A., 'Property Rights, Public Policy and the Limits of the Legal Power to 
Discriminate', in D. Friedmann, D. Barak-Erez (eds). Human Rights in Private 
Law (Hart, 2001): 245^280. 
Reidy A., Hampson F., Boyle K., 'Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey' (1997) NQHR 
15(2) 161-173-
Rivero J., 'La Protection des Droits de 1' Homme dans les Rapports entre Personnes 
Privees' in ^Imicorum Discipulorumque Liber Rene Cassin III: Protection des 
Droits de I' Homme dans les Rapports Entre Personnes Privees (Pedone, 1971): 
311-322. 
Rogers H. and Tomlinson H., 'Privacy and Expression: Convention Rights and 
Interim Injunctions' [2003] EHLR (SPI) 37-53. 
Rogers J., 'Applying the Doctrine of Positive Obligations in the European 
Convention on Human Rights to domestic substantive criminal law in domestic 
proceedings, [2003] CrimLR 690-708. 
Rouiller C, 'L'Influence de I'Article 6 de la Convention Europeenne des Droits de 
I'Homme sur les Procedures Nationales', in P. Mahoney; F. Matscher; H. Petzold; 
L. Wildhaber, (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective: 
Studies in Memory ofRolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymaims Verlag, 2000): 1225-1233. 
231 
(Rozakis Ch.) Po^ciKri? X., H Hpooxaoia xcov AvGpwmvcov AiKaicojidxcov oe jila 
M8xaPaAX6|ievr| EupcbiTTri, (Avx.N. EdKKOuXa 1994). 
(Roukounas E.) PouKouvag E., AisOveg AiKaio (3'^ '^  ed.), (A,E. EdKKOuXa, 2004). 
Sands P., 'Human Rights, Environment and the Lopez-Ostra Case: Context and 
Consequences' [1996] EHRLR 557-618. 
Sadurski W., 'Constitutional Courts in the Process of Articulating Constitutional 
Rights in the Post-Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe, Part I : Social 




Sapienza R., ' I I Diritto ad un Ricorso Effettivo nella Convehzione Europea dei Diritti 
deir Uomo' (2001) 2 RDI271-297. 
Savarese E., ' I l ProtocoUo N. 14 all Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell' Unomo' 
[2004] R D I 714-729. 
Scheuner U., 'Fundamental Rights and the Protection of the Individual against 
Social Groups and Powers in the Constitutional System of the Federal Republic of 
Germany', in Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber Rene Cassin III: Protection des 
Droits de I' Homme dans les Rapports Entre Personnes Privies (Pedone, 1971): 
253-268. 
Shue H., 'The Interdependence of Duties' in P. Alston and K. Tomasevsld (eds). The 
Right to Food (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984): 83-95. 
Singh R., Hunt M., and Demetriou M,, 'Is There a Role for the "Margin of 
Appreciation" in National Law after the Human Rights Act' (1999) 1 EHRLR 15-
22. 
Simitis S. 'The Rediscovery of the Individual in Labour Law' in R. RogowsM, T. 
Wilthagen (eds). Reflexive Labour Law (Kluwer, 1994): 183-205. 
Simitis S. and Lyon-Caen A., 'Community Labour Law: A Critical Introduction to its 
History' in P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S Sciarra, S. Simitis (eds), European 
Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives, Liber Amicorum Lord 
Wedderburn ofChalrlton (Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1996): 1-22. 
Simitis S., 'Reconsidering the Premises of Labour Law: Prolegomena to an EU 
Regulation on the Protection of the Employees' Personal Data (1999) 5(i) ELJ 45-
62. 
Simpson B., Human Rights and the End of the Empire (Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
EioiXidvog A., 'H Epoaxaoia xou HepipdXXovxo? K Q I TI Eupa):naiKfi Si)|iPaar| 
AiKaicojidxcov xou AvGpcbifTOU - H E^ eXi^ r) i^q NoiioXoyiag cog xf|v YjroGeori AoJie^ 
Ooxpa, [1996] N6^ Iog Kai Ouori 33. 
Smith R., 'The Public is Being Regularly Deceived by the Drug Trials Funded by 
Pharmaceitical Companies, Loaded to Generate the Results they Need' Guardian 
(14 January 2004). 
Snellgrove L., Suffragettes and Votes for Women (Longmans, 1964). 
Spielmann D., 'L'Effet Potentiel de la Convention Europeenne des Droits de 
I'Homme entre Personnes Privees' (Nemesis - Bruylant, 1995)-
Spielmann Dean, 'Obligation Positives et Effet horizontal des Dispositions de la 
Convention', in F. Sudre (ed), L'Interpretation de la Convention Europeenne des 
Droits de IHomme (Nemesis - Bruylant, 1998): 133-174-
Starmer K., 'Positive Rights under the Convention' in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds), 
i/ncZerstandznp Human i?ig/jfsPnncip/es (Hart Publishing 2001): 139-159-
Strasser W., 'The Relationship between Substantive and Procedural Rights 
Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights' in F. Matscher, H. 
232 
Petzold (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension, Studies in 
Honour ofG. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 595-604. 
Sudre F., 'Droits Intangibles et/ou Droits Fondamentaux: Y a-t-il des Droits 
Preeminents dans la Convention Europeenne des Droits de I'Homme?' in G. 
Cohen-Jonathan, J-F. Flauss, P. Lambert (eds). Liber Amicorum Marc-Andre 
Eissen (Bruylant, 1995): 381-398. 
Sudre F., 'Les «Obligations Positives* dans la Jurisprudence Europeenne des Droits 
de r Homme' in P. Mahoney; F. Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds), 
Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective: Studies in Memory of 
Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2000): pp. 1359-1376. 
Taylor N., 'PoUcing, Privacy and Proportionality' [2003] EHRLR (SPI: Priv) 86-100. 
Tenekides C, 'La Cite d' Athenes et les Droits de 1' Homme' in F. Matscher, H. 
Petzold (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension, Studies in 
Honour of G. J.Wiarda (Heymann, 1988): 605-637. 
Thompson E., The Making of the English Working Class (New ed. Penguin, 1991). 
Tomuschat C, '"What is a 'Breach" of the European Convention on Human Rights?' 
in R. Lawson, M. de Blois (eds), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights 
in Europe, Essays in Honour of H. G. Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): 315-
337-
TaePpevr|5 B,, KapdKcoorag I . , 'H npooxaaia TOU nepiPoAXovTO? Kaxd TO I6I(OTIK6 
AiKQio', [2005] XpIAE 577-588. 
Trouwborst A, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International 
Law (Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
Tulkens F., 'Human Rights, Rhetoric or Reality?' (2001) 9(2) ER125-134. 
Tulkens F. and Van Drooghenbroeck S., 'L'Evolution des Droits Garantis et 
Tlnterpretation Jurisprudentielle de la CEDH', (Lecture at the University of 
Grenoble oh 27 September 2002) <http://webu2.upmf-gren0ble.fr/espace-
europe/acad2002/textes/tulkens.htm>) 
Tushnet M., 'The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (2003) 1(1) I CON 79-98.V 
van Dijk P., 'Asylum Law and Policy in the Netherlands' in R. Lawson, M. de Blois 
(eds). The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in 
Honour of H. G. Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): 123-155. 
van Dijk P., '"Positive Obligations" Implied in the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Are the States Still the 'Masters' of the Convention?' in M. Castermans-
HoUenian, F. Van Hoof, J. Smith (edn). The role of the Nation-State in the 21st 
century : Human Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy :' 
Essays in honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Law International, 1998): 17-33-
Vegleris P., 'Twenty Years' Experience of the Convention and Future Prospects' in 
A.H. Robertson (ed). Privacy and Human Rights (Reports and Communications 
Presented at the Third International Colloquy about the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 30 September - 3 October 1970), (Manchester University Press, 
1973): 341-412. 
(Vegleris P.) BeyXepTig O., 'H Su^Paori xcov AiKaicoiidxcov TOU Av0pcb:nou KOI TO 
EuvTayiia' [1976] ToE 385. 
Velu J., 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Respect for 
Private Life, the Home and Communications' in A.H. Robertson (ed). Privacy and 
Human Rights (Reports and Communications Presented at the Third 
International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights, 30 
September - 3 October 1970), (Manchester University Press, 1973): 12-95. 
Warbrick C, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of 
Terrorism' (1983) 32 ICLQ 82-119. 
Warbrick C , 'The Structure of Article 8' (1998) 1 EHRLR 32-44. 
233 
Warbrick C, 'Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on 
Human Rights' in M. Baderin, R. McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University Press, 2007): 241-256. 
Warbrick C, 'Constitutionalism and European Court of Human Rights', (Lecture at 
the University of Leeds on 14 March 2007) 
<http://www.law.leeds.ac.Uk/leedslaw/webdocs/leedslaw/uploadeddocuments/c 
fig-warbrick.doc>. 
Wildhaber L., 'A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?' 
(2002) 23(5-7) HRLJ 161-165. 
Wildhaber L., "iTie European Court of Human Rights in Action' (2004) 21 RLR 83-
92. 
Williams K., 'Medical Samaritans: Is There a Duty to Treat?' (2001) 21 OJLS 393-
413-
Wright, J., Tort Law and Human Rights: the Impact of the ECHR on EngUsh Law 
(Hart, 2001). 
Xenos D., 'Asserting the Right to Life (Article 2, ECHR) in the Context of Industry' 
(2007) 8 GLJ 231-254. 
Xenos D., 'The human rights of the vulnerable' (2009) 13 (4) International Journal 
of Hurnan Rights 591-614. 
Yee A., 'Wreckers in Deep Water: The Largest Ship Breaking Site in the World is 
FueUed by Lax Standards. But times are changing' Financial Times (Special 
Report—Waste & the Environment) (18 April 2007). 
Zierlein K-G., 'Functions and Tasks of Constitutional Courts' in P. Mahoney; F. 
Matscher; H. Petzold; L. Wildhaber, (eds). Protecting Human Rights: The 
European Perspective: Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 2000): 1553-1562. 
Zwart T., The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions: the Case Law of the 
European Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1994). 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Activity Report: Reform of the European Convention on Human Rights of the 
Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), CDDH (2006) 008, of 7 April 
2006. 
Buttarelli report on Protection of Personal Data with regard to Surveillance, The, 
[CJ-PD (2001)11 rev.]. Council of Europe (for the Project Group on Data 
Protection). 
Explanatory Report of Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rihgts and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the 
Convention (Protocol 14 Explanatory Report) (GETS No. 194). 
Memorandum by the European Court of Human Rights from the Third Summit of 
the Council of Europe. 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2005/April/SummitCourtMemo.htm> 
Issue Paper: Children and Juvenile justice: Proposals for Improvements, 
CommDH/IssuePaper (2009)1. 
Working Paper of General Assembly AS/Jur (2005) 32, of 9 June 2005, 
'Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights'. 
Working Document AS/Jur (2007) 35 rev, 'The Effectiveness of the European 
Convention on Human Rights at National Level'. 
234 
Recommendation Reci327(igg7) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on the Protection and Reinforcement of the Human Rights of Refugees 
and Asylum-Seekers in Europe, adopted 24 April 1997. 
Recommendation Reci6o6(2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on 'Areas where the European Convention on Human Rights cannot be 
implemented', adopted by on 23 June 2003. 
Recommendation Rec(20o6)2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe on the European Prison Rules (amending Rec (1987) 3), adopted 11 
January 2006. 
Report ECtHR: 'Analysis of Statistics 2009', <www.echr.coe.int> (Reports section). 
Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on judgment revealing an 
underlying systemic problem (adopted on 12 May 2004). 
